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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO
DON HALVERSON,
Plaintiff / Appellant,
and
CHARLOTTE HALVERSON
Plaintiff
VS.

NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
FOR THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their official
capacities and in their individual capacities; DAN
PAYNE, in his official capacity and in his
individual capacity,
Defendants / Respondents.
..............................................

Appealed from the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in
and for the County of Latah
HON. JOHN R. STEGNER, DISTRICT JUDGE
DON HALVORSON
PRO SE
RONALD J. LANDECK
AI'TORNBY FOR RESPONDENTS
Filed this -day of

-

I

2009

SIEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK

BY

-

--

Deputy

SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 36825-2009
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Don Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537
(208) 289-5602
Plaintiff, Pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAW
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife)) Case No. CV 2008-180
Plaintiffs
VS.

)

PLAINTIFFS' THIRD RECORD

)

SUPPLEMENT

North Latah County Highway District; Board of )
Commissioners for the North Latah County

)

Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard

)

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official

)

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;

)

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

)

Individual Capacity

)

Defendants

)

STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
County of Latah

)

Don Halvorson and Charlotte Halvorson. depose and say:
1. We are the Plaintiffs named in the above case and hereby submit Plaintiffs' Third

Record Supplement

PLAINTIFFS TI-IIRD RECORD SIJPPLEMENT
1

2. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct copy
of Defendants' Responses To Plaintiffs' First Request For Admissions (Ameberg)
referenced as Item No. 1.
3. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct copy
of Defendants' Responses 'To Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories (Arneberg) referenced as
Item No. 2.
4. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding ~ c m b e is
r a true and correct copy
of Defendants' Responses To Plaintiffs' First Request For Admissions (Payne)
referenced as Item No. 3.
5. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct copy
of Plaintiffs' Letter to NLCE-ID Co~~imissioners
dated 3/8/07 referenced as Item No. 4.

6. Attached hereto with reference tt, the correspol~dingnumber is a true and correct copy
of Minutes of 312 1/07 regular meeting of the NLCWD Commissioners referenced as Item
No. 5.
7. Attached Lierexo with reference w the corresponding number is a true and correct copy
of Minutes of 9/12/07 regular meeting of the NLCHD Coinmissioners referenced as Item

No. 6.
8. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding'number is a true and correct copy
of letter sent to the NLCHD Comnm;ssioners (da-ted 8/23/07, delivered to NLCHD clerk
on 8/28/07) requesting declaration c\f the applicability of I.C. 4[)-203a referenced as
Item No. 'I

9. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct copy
of Regulatorj Takings Analysis Requests 1 through 5 Plaintiffs submitted to the
XLCHD Commissioners referenced as Item No. 8.

10. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct
copy of Minutes of 8,/8/07regulsir meeting of the NLCHD Commissioners referexed as
Item No. 9.

PLAINTIFFS THIRD RECORD S'f-jPELEI4EVT
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11. Attached hereto wit11 reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct
copy of Minutes of 4/12/07 regular meeting of the NLCHD Commissioners referenced as
Item No. 10.
12. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct
copy of Defendants' Responses To Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories (Payne) referenced as
Item No. 1 1.

13. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct
copy of Defendants' Responses To Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Payne) referenced
as Item No. 12.
14. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct
copy of Defendants' Responses To Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Arneberg)
referenced as Item No. 13.
15. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct copy
of North Latah County Highway District, Application and Permit to Use Public Right-ofWay-Approaches

referenced as Ite~nNo. 14.

16. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct
copy of Building Permit Application, Latah County Department Of Planning and
Building referenced as Item No. 15.
17. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct
copy of Wagner 2ndDriveway access permit referenced as Item No. 16.
18. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct
copy of Defendants' Responses To Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Hansen)
referenced as Item No. 17.
19. Attached hereto with reference to the correspoilding number is a true and correct
copy of Defendants' Responses To Plaintiffs' Second Request For Admissions
(Arneberg) referenced as Item No. 18.

20. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct
copy of Defendant Payne's foreman's log referenced as Item No. 19.
PLAINTIFFS THIRD RECORD SUPPLEMENT
3

ut:sz

2 1. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct
copy of Defendants' Answering Brief To Plaintiffs' Motions For Partial Summary
Judgment Filed September 19, October 6, and October 21,2008, Defendants' Motion To
Strike And Defendants' Motion For Attorney Fees referenced as Item No. 20.
22. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct
copy of Plaintiffs' Letter to Commissioners Dated 8/8/07, submitted at the regular
meeting of the Commissioners 8/8/07 as proposed settlement of the issues referenced as
ItemNo. 21.
23. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct
copy of Affidavit Of Dan Payne In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motions For Par-tial
Summary Judgment Filed September 19, October 6, and October 2 1, 2008 referenced as
Itern No. 22.
24. Attached hereto with reference to the coi~espondingnumber is a true and correct
copy of Affidavit Of Dan Carscallell In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motions For Partial
Sumrnary Judgment Filed September 19, October 6, and October 2 I , 2008 referenced as
25. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct
copy of Affidavit Of Orland Arneberg In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motions For Partial
Summary Judgment Filed September 19, October 6, and October 21,2008 referenced as
Item No. 24.

Dated this

20

day of

2009.
Don Halvorson

PUBLIC foryhe State of Idaho
fy cpin&ission expires: 7-2
F- Z C / L
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN

=-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

--

I hereby certify that on t h i s z day of%Janfiw

,2009, I caused a true and correct

copy of this document to be served on the following indigdual in the manner indicated below:
RONALD J. LANDECK
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE &
GRAHAM, P.A.
4 14 S. Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
CARL B. KERRICK
DISTRICT JUDGE

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[x]

U.S. Mail
Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
FAX (208) 883-4593
Hand Delivery

I [x]

U.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail

Don ~ a l v o r s o n
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3:

3.) The 1996 alteration exceeded the limits of the prescriptive right of way in t h e
foilowing manners:
a. Extension of the road bed and supporting structures beyond the old line

fence-the boundary set by the owner as the limit to the prescriptive right of way
and recognized by judicial custom and precedent as a prescriptive easement
boundary.
b. The usage limit was narrow (less than 12 feet) and any increase of width

(greater than 1 to 2%--less than 3 inches) would be considered to be in excess of
incidental variation.

--

c. The actual physical location of CCR was altered in the straightening of the
curves and the extension of the road bed around the rock outcropping and the
washout of the roadbed.

d. The excavated trees (spontaneousty growing-non human planted, 60 to 80
years old) indicated there had been no road usage amongst or under them.-

e. Judicial custom and precedent recognizes the rebuttabfe presumptions of
location and width as being as is now as it was at the end of the prescriptive
period in the absence of known alterations. The 1996 agreement and the 1996
alteration rebut these presumptions.

--

f. There is no archeological evidence of a 50 foot highway ever existing in
Camps Canyon and more specificatly the usage of the present CCR shows no
archeological evidence of ever being 50 feet wide with the natural occurrence of
rocks, trees, and steep terrain contradicting such a claim.

g. There is no objective evidence indicating a 50 foot highway was ever
established in Camps Canyon.

--

--. ..--

.
.

mSPONSE:
Object as to relevance of 1996 activity. Object as to form of request to the extent it calls for
legal concltrsion. Without waiver of objection:
a. Denied.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST FOR mMISSIONS
(AF?IwBERG) -- 3

098;

b. Denied.

c. Admitted.
d. Denied.

e. Object to this subpart as it calls for a legal conclusion.
f. Denied.

g. Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4:

4.) The 1996 alteration was a "taking" of private property (considered as a gift
dedication).
RESPONSE:

Object to relevance of 1996 activity. Object to this Request as it calls for a legal conclusion.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5:
5.) No permission was given by Ed Swanson for future widening in the 1996

agreement.
RESPONSE:

Object to relevance of 1996 activity. Object to form of Rquest. Without waiver of
objection: Admitted, as no such permission was requested by Defendant District.
REQUEST FOR A4BMISS16)NNO. 6:

6.) Ed Swanson waived no future constitutional rights in the 1996 agreement.
RESPONSE:

Object to relevance of 1996 activity. Object to form of Request as no such waiver was
requested. Without waiver of objection: Admitted.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST FOR mMJSSIONS
(ArnTBERG) -- 4

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7:

7.) The 1996 alteration accomplished what the 1996 agreement entailed.
RESPONSE:

Object as to relevance of 1996 activity. Object to form of Request as there was no such
agreement. Without waiver of objection: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8:

8.) When the 1996 alteration was finished in the fall of 1996 all work was complete that
was agreed to in the 1996 agreement.
RESPONSE:

Object as to relevance of 1996 activity. Object as to form of Request as there was no such
agreement. Without waiver of objection: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9:
9.) There are no written records of the 1996 agreement.

RESPONSE:

Object as to relevance of 1996 activity. Object as to form of Request as there urasno such
agreement. Without waiver of objection: Admitted.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10:
10.) There are no written records of the 1996 alteration either as planning goals prior to

the alteration or as accomplishments after compltition of the 1996 alteration.
mSPONSE:

Object as to relevance of 1996 activity. Without waiver of objection: Denied. The District
foreman's journals describe 1996 work related to CCR.

DEFEmANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FEST REQUEST FOR FeI3MISSIONS
BERG) -- 5

07S8

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11 :
11.) The 1996 alteration was conducted in violation of Idaho Statutes.
RESPONSE:

Object to this request as it calls for a legal conclusion.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12:
12.) The line fence to the northeast of the 1996 alteration was reconstructed by the

Halvotsans in the spring of 1997.
RESPONSE:

Object to relevance of 1997 activity. Without waiver of objection: Denied. Halvorsons
constructed a new fence in 1997.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13:
13.) The Halvorsons left a 5-10 foot buffer (the buffer) between the northeast edge of
the 1996 reestablished road bed and the reconstructed fence kine.___

-

RESPONSE:

Object to relevance of 1997 activity. Object to the form of Request as the fmce line was not
reconstructed. Object to Request as ambiguous as to when and where Halvorsons ''left" a buffer.
Without waiver of objection: Denied, as there was a separation between three and ten feet between
traveled edge of CCR and fence when constructed in 1997.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14:

14,) The buffer had neither been granted to the NLCHCl by Ed Swanson nor by the
Hafvor'sons. The buffer remained in the possession of the Halvorsons.

DEFENLSAWT'SRESPONSES TO P
(
BERG) -- 6

EF'S FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS

Rl3SPONSE:

Same objections as Request No. 14. Without waiver of objection: Admit only that no grant
was made by Swanson to NLCHD and, otherwise, denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15:

15.) The buffer can only be obtained by the NLCMD through the civil procedures of
eminent domain.

RESPONSE:
Same objections as to Request No. 14. Object to this Request as it calls for a legal
conclusion. Without waiver of objection: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 16:
16.) No eminent domain/condemnatian procedures have been processed on CCR.

RESPONSE:

Admit.
faEOUEST FOR ADMXSSLON NO. 17:
17.) The widening of CCR in 2005 and 2006 to the northeast resulted in:
a. the physical invasion of the buffer for a total of 5x 50 feet.

b. redirection of the runoff drainage from the road bed creating additional erosion

and undermining of the fence support post.

c. damages to the fence of burying the wires;

d. a known trespass and creation of a public nuisance.
WESPONSE:
Object to Request as ambiguous as to what is meant by "DuRer," "fence" and"wires."
Without waiver of objection:
a. Denied.
b. Denied.

--

REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21 :

21.) Widening of prescriptive right of waysihighways through maintenance is
unconstitutional.
RESPONSE:

Object to this Request as it calls for a legal conclusion.
REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22:
22.) Widening ~f prescriptive right of waysbhighwag.3 through maintenance is a policy of

the NLCHD.-p

RESPONSE:

Denied.

REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23:

23,)Your relationship with Ridgeview Farms is described as:
a. a long time business relationshipRidgevie'uz~
Farms farms for you;

b. tong time neighbors and friends.-

-

RESPONSE:

Object as to relevance and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Without waiver of objection: Adrmt I have had business relationships and have been neighbors and
friends.
m O U E S T FOR BDR?bISSICBNNO. 24:
24,) You are aware of Dan Payne's relationship with Ridgeview Farms and the owners

of Ridgeview Farms.
RESPONSE:

Admitted to the extent that I believe Dan Payne is distantly related to an owner of
Ridgeview Farms, otherwise, denied.

DEFENDAMT'S RESPONSES TO PLAliWFF'S FLRST REQUEST FOR A43MSSICPNS
BERG) -- I "I

UyCji

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25:
25.) You are aware of Bob Wagner's relationship to Ridgeview Farms in the nature of:
a, employment and/or share in the farming;

---

6. brother-in-law of one of the partners.-

RESPONSE:
a. Denied.

b. Admitted.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26:
26.) You talked with Bob Wagner about the property line dispute.

RESPONSE:

Object as to the form of this Request as the word "dispute" is ambiguous. Without waiver
of objection and if the dispute relates to a purported property line dispute between Halvorsons and
Wagners: Admitted. I first became aware of this issue when Halvorsons and Wagners appeared at
a Commissioners meeting to discuss it. I had no further conversations with Mr. Wagner during the
permitting phase. I have since spoken to Mr. Wagner on several occasions concerning his problems
with Mr. Halvorson.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAENTDFF'S FIRST REQUEST FOR AI)MISSIONS
(
BERG) -- 11

IiJEOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27:
27.) You were aware of the property line dispute and:
a. made available aerial photos to Bob Wagner;

b. knew Bob Wagner had done his own survey;

-

c. you told Bob Wagner that CCR had never been moved.

d. you told Bob Wagner that CCR had never been altered (straightened or
widened).
e. you assured Bob Wagner that historic access of the Harris (Wagner) driveway

was where Bob Wagner thought it to be.
f. you assured Bob Wagner that the 8 foot embankment where the historic
driveway entered CCR was not the mation of the NLCHD and the 1996
alteration.

RESPONSE:

Same objection as to Request No. 26. Without waiver of objection:
a. Denied.

b. Admitted.

c. Admitted as to its general location and denied as to minor movement..
d. Denied.

e. Denied.
f. Denied.
REOUEST FOR mMISSTON NO. 28:
28.) Your statementls at agency meetings 4/12/06 andlor 3121107 that CCR has never
moved in your fifetime, tenure as commissioner, or under your watch as commissioner
islare not based in fact.

RESPONSE:

Object to form of Request as it misstates the statements made. Without waiver of objection:
Denied.

D E F E M D N ' S MSPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST IXEQUEST FOR hDh4ZSSIONS

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 33:

33.) Your refusal to initiate validation proceedings of CCR to resolve the location, public
record, and establishment errors was:
a. abuse of discretion;

---

- --.-.

-

b. an arbitrary decision-not based on the evidence andlor finding of fact;
c. was done to prevent the discovery of the statutory and constitutional

contraventions of the 1996 agreement and/or the 1996 aiteration.
RESPONSE:

Object to this Request as it calls for a Iegal conclusion. Without waiver of objection:
Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 34:
34.) Your offer to vafidate CCR if we pay you a fee of $750 is based on the finding:

a. of insufficient evidence has beerrgiven tuthe NLCHD to have the
Cornmtssioners initiate validation proceedings;

--

b. that you have objective evidence to offer to substantiate your claims of:

( I ) prescriptive right of way;
(2) the location and width to be as the location and width were known to
be at the end of the prescriptive period of CCR.

c, that an attempt to extract further fees from the Halvorsons might be a way to
get them to abandon their claims.
EaESPONSE:

Object to this Request as it calls for a legal conclusion. Without waiver of objection:
Denied.
a. Denied.
b. Denied.

c. Denied.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAZNTZFF'S FIRST REQUEST' FOR ATL)MfSSSONS
(
BERG) -- 14

TEM NO. 2

Documents are set forth in these Kesponles to the First Request For Admissions andlor these
Responses.

INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

2.) Any change in the (a) use, (b) width, (c) location, or (d) natureltype of the right of
waylhighway of CCR which'may be in contravention to Idaho Statutes, ldaho State
Constitution, U.S. Constitution, andlot Fedsral statutes and/or is disputed by an abutting
landowner may be adjudicated by what NLCHD avaifable means? Please be complete
in your answer indicating the name of the rrieans { ~ ~ O C ~the
S Sfon-nat
),
of t h e process,
and how the means (process) is initiated (If the format has a written form and/or a
written self explanatory form, this is sufficient to cite the form and where to obtain a
copy.), and what form would the decision come in (written and/or verbal)?

Object to this Interrogatory as it calls for a legal conclusion m a o r legal advice.

INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

3.) List all available information and documents you know of, the names, addresses,
phone numbers and whereabouts of anyone, who may have information of or the

possession of documents c~ncerningthe acquisition of the prescriptive right of
wayfhighway, CCR, the time of the pre3scriptivs periad for the prescn'ptive right of
waylhighway, CCR, the establishment af the prescriptive right of waylhighway, CCR,

and lor the width, location and use of the prescriptive right of way, CGR, at the end of
the prescriptive period for the prescriptive right of way/highway, CCR.
RESPONSE:
Object to this Interrogatory as unduly burdensome and oppressive in that it covers an
unlimited time frame and seeks information and documents not reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiver of objection, Documents regarding CCR
in NLCHD's possession are primarily set forth in District foreman's journals and Commissioner

DEFENPUW'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS9FIRST WEmOGATORIES
i
BERG) -- 4

Minutes. Width of CCR was widened on the north side in 1996 to approximately its present
width. CCR was widened on south side in 2005 and 2006 by approximately four feet of road
surface and the addition of sloping cut banks. All District Commissioners and the foreman,
including Payne, for the CCR where subdistrict is located have knowledge of this information.

INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

6.) What islare the point/$ of difficulty in the resoluti~nof the dispute with the
Halvorsons?

-

---.-

RlESPONSE:
Object to this Interrogatory as not relevant and not calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

7.) Do you consider the Halvorsons' complaints frivolous?
RESPONSE:
Object to this Interrogatory as not relevant and not calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

8.) If if7 is an affirmative answer, please state what evidence you would have to support

a finding the Haivorsons have no complaint of legal merit and/or no disputed facts.
RESPONSE:
Object to this Interrogatory as not relevant and not calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

DEFEIWANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST INTERROGATORIES
(ARlu'EBERG) -- 5

INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

9.) If your answer to # 7 is a negative answer-you believe that the Halvorsons
complaints are not frivofous-pfease so state what vaiid complaints that the Hatvorsons
have if these valid complaints are different from # 6.
PUESPONSE:
Object to this Interrogatory as not relevant and not calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

10.) State the number of meetings you have had with the Halvorsons in trying to resolve
the dispute over CCR.
RESPONSE:
One (1) meeting in July, 2007 at CCR. I was present at several meetings of NLCHD
commissioners in 2006 and 2007 where Mr. Kalvorson was present and addressed CCR issues.

INTERROGATORY NO. 11 :

11.) If your answer to # 6 andlor # 9 are affirmative-that the Halvorsons have vaiid
complaints-pfsase list each complaint as you understand it and the decision on which
this complaint was answered and how and where the Halvorsons received their answer
to each valid complaint.

MSPONSE:
Object to this Interrogatory as not relevant and not calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

'S IXESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST INTERROGATORIES
(BR4\iXBErPG>-- 6

TEM NO. 3

RIESPONSE:

Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23:

23.) You are aware of Orland Arneberg's conflict of interest with Ridgeview Farms and
the owners of Ridgeview Farms and the Wagner permit issuance and property line

dispute with the Halvorsons.

-

RESPONSE:
Denied.

M O U E S T FOR ADMISSION NO. 24:

24.) You are aware of Dan Payne's conflict of interest with Ridgeview Farms and the

owners of Ridgeview Farms and the Wagner permit issuance and property fine dispute
(the dispute) with the Halvorsons.

.

RESPONSE:
Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25:

25.) You are aware of Bob Wagner's relationship to Ridgeview Farms in the nature of:
a. employment andlor share in the farming;
b. brother-in-law of one of the partners.

a. Denied.

b. Admitted.

WOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26:

26.) You talked with Bob Wagner about the dispute.

'S RESPONSES TO PLANTIFF'S FRST REQUEST FOR AI)MISSIONS

OebG

RESPONSE:

Object as to the form of this Request as the word "dispute" is ambiguous. Without waiver
of objection and if the dispute relates to a purported property line dispute between Halvorsons and
Wagners: Admitted. My first discussion with Mr. Wagner was when I met with him at his property
and wanted to discuss a driveway permit. Mr. Wagner showed me a survey stake and I suggested
he site the driveway along the route of the historic access as to his property. He said he thought Mr.
Halvorson might have a problem with that so he asked for a permit over property that "he knew was
his property." I issued that permit. Later, Mr. Halvorson complained at a Cornmissioners meeting
that Mr. Wagner had cut a driveway over a portion of Mr. Halvorson's property. Mr. Wagner was
present and stated the driveway was on Mr. Wagner's property. Later, Mr. Wagner requested a
second permit further onto his own property to avoid problems with Mr. Halvorson. 1issued that
second permit to replace the first permit.

FWOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27:

27.) You were aware of the dispute and:
a. knew Arneberg had made available aerial photos to Bob Wagner;

b. knew Bob Wagner had done his own survey;

c. you knew Arneberg and/or Payne had told Bob Wagner that CCR had never
been moved.

d. you knew Arneberg and/or Payne had told Bob Wagner that CCR had never
been altered (straightened or widened).

e. you knew Arneberg and/or Payne had assured Bob Wagner that the historic
access of the Harris (Wagner) driveway was where Bob Wagner thought it to
f. you knew Arneberg andlor Payne had assured Bob Wagner that the 8 foot
embankment where the historic driveway entered CCR was not the creation of
the NLCMO and the 1996 alteration.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO P L M I F F ' S FRST WEQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS

RESPONSE:

Same objection as to Request No. 26. Without waiver of objection:
a. Denied.
b. Admitted.
c. Denied.
d. Denied.
e. Denied.
f. Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 28:

28.) Arneberg's statemenus at agency meetings 4/12/06 andlor 3121107 that GCR has
never moved in his lifetime, tenure as commissioner, or under his watch as

commissioner islare not based in fact.
RESPONSE:

Object to this Request as it misstates the facts. Without waiver of objection: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 29:

29.) You are knowledgeable of the decisions of the 1996 agreement and the 1996
alteration.
RESPONSE:

Object as to relevance of 1996 activity. Object as to the form of Request as there was no
such agreement and the word "decisions" is ambiguous. Without waiver of objection: Denied.
REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 30:

30.) It is the NLCHD policy to avoid deeded highwaylright of way easements in favor of
prescriptive easements.

DEFENDhVT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FRST REQTJEST FOR DMISSIONS
(PAUNE) -- 12

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 39:

39.) The civil procedure requirements of eminent domain/condemnation found in the
Idaho Code and the civil procedure requirements of the taking of private property found

in the Idaho Code are found:
a.. in the written polic;ies of the NLCHD:-

b. in the employee training handouts, manuals ar instruction sheets;

c. in verbal policies/custorns of the NLCHD;
d. in employee training seminars, andlor in service trainings.
RESPONSE:
Object to relevance of this Request. Object to this Request as it calls for a legal conclusion.
Without waiver of objection, the Idaho Code speaks for itself, and, otherwise: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 40:

40.) The centerline of CCR has moved to the northeast and no longer is where it was in

RESPONSE:
Admit the centerline of CCR has moved in different directions throughout the length of

CCR and the centerline is no longer where it was in 1996 in most segments of CGR.
REQUEST FOR mMLSSION NO. 41:

41 .) The present width of CCR is now greater than it was in 1996.RESPONSE:
Admit the present width of CCR in most segments is greater than it was in 1996.

m Q U E S T FOR ADMISSION NO. 42:

42.) The width of CCR was greater after the 1996 alteration than it was before.

'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FWST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS

-

RESPONSE:

,

Object to the form of this Request B ambigdous as to what is meant by the term "the 1996
alteration." Without waiver of objection: Admit that the width of only a short segment of CCR was
greater after the 1996 alteration in the area of Swanson property than it was before.

EaEOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 43:

43.) The centerline of CCR moved to the northeast in the 1996 alteration
IXESPONSE:
Same objection as to Request For Admissicn Nu. 42 Without waiver of objection: Admit
that the centerline over a short segment of CCR moved to the northeast in 1996.

m Q U E S T FOR ADMISSION NO. 44:

44.) The centerline of CCR moved to the northeast in the 1996 alteration and no longer
is where it was at the end of the prescriptive period.-

-

RESPONSE:
Same objection as to Request For Admission No. 47 Object to the form of this Request as
ambiguous as to what is meant by "end of prescriptive period" and what segment of the centerline is
at issue. Object to this Request to the extent it calls for a legal conclusion. See Response to
Request for Admission No. 40.

REQUEST FOR AI)MISSION NO. 45:

45.) Without having done a survey before the I996 alieraticiii p c i can't tell exactly
where the centerline of the old prescriptive right of way/ highway, CCW, was.
RESPONSE:
Denied.

DEFEmAlu'T'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQmST FOR PpDMISSIONS
O"AYNE) -- 17
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ITEM NO. 4

Don and Charlotte Hilvorson
i 290 American tiidge Road
Kendrick, ID 84537
208-289-5602
March 8, 2007
Latah County Highway District
1 132 White Avenue
Moscow, ID 83843
Re: h4ovement of C a m p Canyon Road 3ed
Dear Sirs:

A problem exists on Camps Canyon Road which has gone unattended for several years. Recently this
problem has grown into a tumultuous struggle since Bob Wagner bought and begqn
to develop an old
'1
farm into a home site along this road. As bewildered as we are with the degree to which disagree~tle~lts
can rise, i t has, and it remains unresolved.
The inmediate resolution appears to he directed. Ifowevct, the long term resolution appears to be
making a turn toward predicting another such ium:lituous :pisi)de. If the road moves, the problem
begins again.
The long term handle on the situatiol~involves stability of the location of the road bed. Whether this can
be addressed by a process of deeded easement, higf:way v.~lidation,erninent domain or sorne other
process, we submit it for your consideration.

If it is only we who consider this a potential problem and 1:either the Highway District nor the Wagners
consider there to be any such long term problem, we will step back, resolve the immediate problem to its
end, and proceed the best we can in the future. However, :ts we see it, yoil're in the Left lane, you're
signaling to turn Left, we assutne you'will turn Left. Turning to the Right may happen, but i t is unlikely.
We expect h r t h e r iildependent revision to Camps Canyon Road in the not too diqant future. The
reasons are too great not to expect it:
1.

Roads migrate downhill, to the inside of a curve and towards any available space.
a. It's downhill to the North
b. The inside o f the curve is to the North
c. The corner post is 10 feet from the North edge of the road.

2. A car was parked up along the alfalfa field again this winter. The steepest part of the West grade
lies at the West property line.

3.

More development seems to be the case? as opposed to not

4.

You've said you won't or can't before, yet you have ~novedthe road bed to the Korth again and
have ctosed the road.

Don and Charlone Halvorson

;?,,f-

03;;
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Don and Charlotte I-falvorsoi~
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, ID 83537
208-289-5602

1'

STATEMENT
Description o f problem arising from movement of road bed along a section of Camps Canyon Road in
t h e S E % N E % of Section 15 T39N R3WBM.

l i e k r e n c e A: Deed Description lknovtq as Scitedule C paragraphs 4 and 5 ~vhicltreads: "save and except
t h e tract . . ."
Reference B: Map depiction for orientation purposes of original deed descriptio~l':
Note: Both reference A and Reference

B are provided through Latah

County Recorder's Office

Reference C: Hand drawn map depicting sequential plotting o f property corners arising from beginning
point known now as 0 and subsequent corners A, B and C.
Reference D: Recent survey by Rimrock 'Consulting
Reference E. Aerial view of area. Provided by FS/'\
Reference I;: Minutes fro111 April 12, 2006 Highway District meeting
Reference
G: Out of Original Prescriptive right-of-way
--

I-lctw THE S U R V E POINTS
Y
Aft~ALIGNED
Point of beginning (Point 0 ) is determined from intersection of
and West line of SE '/4 / NE 54 of Section 15.

'1

jf

line of Camps Canyon Road

Subsequent property corners A, B and C are sequentially aligned from that intersection.
Property corners move if the centerline of the road bed moves at point 0. The 3+/- acre parcel
was attached to the road to afford access to public road for the +/- 140 acre farm now owned by
Kate and Bob Wagner.

DESCRIPTION
O F M O V E M E N T O F ROAD BED O F CAMPSCAWYON
ADJACENT T O S A I D j+/-A C R E PARCEL.
Reference il !'previ~?usl;/~,o!ed)describes poin: S as the iniersectioi~of $ iine of Camps Canyon
Rozd with West line of SE '/4 / NE" % of Section 1 5 as being appro.ltirnately 12 rods and 3 feet
south of N W corner of the SE % / N W % of Sectiort 15 (20 1 feet).
I'

*

B

Reference D. Recent survey by 'Rimrock Consulting: Point 0 now lies 150.91 ' south of corner
of the SE 1/4/ NW % of Section 15.
Point 0 112s n:aved 5O+ feet. to- the
, Norih F-lowever Point C-has ~ ; n o b ~2-1'
d
A

:CJ
TI

ti-eLANCI
_Jth

03:,17
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rm-h

We believe both surveys to be accurate within their own degrees of latitude of accuracy

*

Furthermore we state that we did on April 12, 2006, attempt to describe and approximate said
road bed discrepancies as follows: (Note: This date preceded date of reference D.)
I

'

1 . Point 0 has moved North significantly, thus moving property corners A, B and C of said 3 t / acre parcel. This was due to recent roadbed revisions.
2. Point C , the east property line intersection with the centerline of Camps Canyon Road has
also been altered in excess of movement caused by movement of point 0. Furthermore roadbed
revision at this point included a dropping of the road bed surface 3' - 5'. The combination of
these revisions has altered the functionality of the old road access to the said 3-t/- acre parcel.
3. Furthermore, at the April 2006 meeting the Highway District contended that all these
revisions were within the prescriptive right-of-way, we hold that we disputed that on the Aprill2,
2006 meeting that they were not within the prescriptive right-of-way. Furtherinore our South
fence line along said area of Camp's Canyon Road is out the prescriptive right-of-way in at least
3 places and probably in ~ t entirety.
s
We've seen no documentation to this point (February 24, 2007) to substantiate denial of road
I
bed alterations or prescripti~~e
right claims.

4

'

5. It also appears to us that the respective iandowllers along prescriptive right-of-ways have the
right to use the part of the prescriptive right not under the road bed, so long as the flow of traffic
is not interrupted. This use includes but nlay not be limited to fences and property lines.
Requests may be for renloval of such things as fences, but destruction by the I--IighwayDistrict of
fences is not permitted, nor is the ignoring ofproperty lines between land owners in permitting
driveway access to public right-oilways.
6. Request for survey and surveys of record on April 12, 2006. (Statements of minutes from
April 12, 2006 he meeting, Reference F). It was our opinion on that date that a professional
survey was the place to start due to the significai~trevisions to Camp's Canyon Road over the last
few years. As to whoin shotild pay for the survey, we felt the burden was with the party wishing
to extend improvernents.(e.g. (.!riveway) into disputed areas, as long as the dispute was not
frivolous. The burden here lies with the Wagners. Suggestion that the Highway District help
pay for the survey was made on the basis of previous descriptions on how the Highway District
has aided in the problem. Bob Wagner's stated "surveys" (plural, April 12, 2006). No
documents were provided. Bob had shown me the results of his self performed survey in the fall
of 2005. This survey started in error, was performed in ersor and ended in an en-or which should
have been obvious to a competent surveyor. The only other survey conducted that we know of
was the one conducted by fohn Bohman, Gary Osborn and Danny Payne. just preceding the
,A.pril 12, 2006 meeting. This one was much closer to reality; however, its greatest value was to
show how far off Bob Wagner's original survey was. Neither of said surveys were presented and
both surveys suggested a professional survey needed to be done, contrary to the point that h4r.
Wagner was making. Erroneous surveys have little to no value.

7. Continuing in reference to the minutes of the April 12, 2006 meeting record i t is furthermore
stated that we did suggest that Bob Wagner take issi~ewith the Highway District for the very

reason described prev,ously. Any survey done would need to
to hold the road bed o f Camp's Canyon Road staole.

coordinated with some attempt

SUBSEQUENT
ACTION
Survey was completed by us at our expense. The survey was requested by us on Aprll 12, 2006 as Bob
Wagner had already constructed his driveway through the disputed area. Survey b a s completed on or
about 6/30/06. It revealed that the Wagners had trespassed and/or encl-oached 011property line.

Further resolution failed, even though we offered the Wagners four possible solutions. The solutions
were offered in the order o f which were the most likely to succeed in the resolution of determining the
limits o f the property lines and holding the road bed constant as best we could. All included Wagners to
pay for the survey.
1.

Bob Wagner to approach the I-tighway District with offer of a deeded easement. Mr.
Wagner said this proposal was turned down by the IHighway District. The Highway
District denies Mr. Wagner approached them with said proposal.

2.

Share the disputed driveway. Bob could enter the bottom and we could exit the top. Bob
did not want to share.

3.

We would seIl the Wagners the I5 +/- acres we owned or] tile Sout,b side of Camp's
Canyon Road. Too much.

4.

Readjust property line so that driveway coc~lcibe accotnplisl~ecl2nd con~bincdefforts to
hold the road bed constant. Bob Wagner was tlliwillil~gto iiccept survey.

1

S c h e d u l e rl

T h e l a n d r e f e r r e d t o i n this p o l i c y is s i t u a t e d i n t h e S t a t e oE
Idaho, C o u r ~ t yof Latah a n d i s descri lied ~ i . 5 fol.lows:
~ 1 , / 2 ~ ~ 1o f/ 4S e c t i o n 1 0 , Townsllip 3'3 North,

I'ianye 3

W.B.M.

E I / ~ N E o
~ f/ S~e c t i o n 1 5 , Townsllip 34, North, Range 3 , W . B , , M .
S A V E A N D EXCEPT'

Ltle Isrzct of l a n d described a s follows, Lo-wi t

B e g i n n i n g a'k a p o i n t where the public road passes through t h e
West l i n e o f t h e S E I / ~ N E b~e /i n~g I 2 rods a n d 3 f e e t , more o r
less, S o u t h o f t h e P J c r t h w e s t ccrnei: of the S ~ l , / 4 ~ ~ 1of/ 4
S e c t i o n 1 5 ; r u n n i n g Lhence due soulil 2 5 rods a n d 5 1 / 2 f 5 e t ;
r u n n i n g t h e n c e due East 2 3 r - o d s ; r u n n i n g thence due N o r t h 6
r o d s a n d 5 f e e t , more o r l e s s , t o l:lle courjty r o a d ; r u n n i n g
thence i n a Northwesterly d i r e c t i o n 4 2 r o d s and G f e e t , more o r
l e s s , a l o n g t h e c o u n t y road ko Like PC31 IJT OF B E G I P I N I N G ,
"

ITEM NO. 5

T h e regular meeting of the North Latall County Highway District Uoilrd of Cornnlissioners
w a s held a t t t ~ cM o s c o \ v oft?ce o n hlarch 21, 2007 a t 1:30 p n ~ .Presettt were C h a i r m a n
Orland Arneberg, Cornrtlissioner Richard [Ianscn: Foremen Dan Payne, Paul Stubbs and
Don Brown, a n d D;tn Carsc;tlien.
T h e minutes from the meeting on March 7, 2007 were approved as read.
T h e bids for rock ;tt the N:lgle/Stlattuck pit were opened. l'hey were as fo1low.s:
Deatley Crushing
tons
size
40,000 314" rntnus
I 114" minus
5,000
3,000
112"chips
Sand Eq
1,000
1,000
6"mlnus

pricelton

extension

$4.80 $192,00000
$4 65
$23,25000
$6.30 $18,900.00
$G 20
$6,200.00
$0 62
$4,62C09

North Idaho C r u s h i n g
size
tons
minus
3/4"
40,000
5,000
1 114" minus
112" chips
3.000
1,000 Sand Eq
1,000 6"minus

pricelton

---------------total

$244,97000

extension

$4 42 $1 76,800 00
$4.42 $22,10000
$4 42 $13,26000
$4,42000
$4.42
$4,42000
$4.42

----...------

total

$221,00000

Richard Hiinsen rnitde ij ntotion to accept North Idaho Crushing's low bid. O r l a n d
Arneberg seconded. '('he motion passed.
Don Halvorson citttle in to tiiscuss issues fie has with the alignment of the C a m p ' s Canyon
Iioad. ( M r . Halvorson's letter is at the end of these minutes) Ron Landeck itsked about the
oltl driveway. M r . flalvorson said the driveway \+as west of the original a n d brought
pictttres to show it. Richarcl Hansen asked Don Halvorson if h e had any problem with Bob
Wagner's c u r r e n t driveway. Don f4alvorson said he had no problem with it. Don Halvorson
said the r o a d is not w h e r e it t ~ s e dto be. Richard f-Iansen showed pictures from 1949 a n d
1965 t h a t show the r o a d in the same place it is totfay. Don Halvorson said the picture may
not show enough detail to show a SO to 80 foot difference in roadway position. O r l a n d
Arneberg a n d R i c h a r d Hangen doubted the road could have tnoved that f a r a n d it would
probably show even a t this scale. Don Halvorson said the original piece of property was
deeded to give road access. Richard Hansen asked what any of this had to d o with the
highway district. Don Halvorson said he didn't w a n t the road moved b u t would like some
assurance t h a t the r o a d would stay where it is. Mr. I-Ialvorson was also concerned with how
people p a r k e d on the road. Tami Van Houten said she parks on the road a n d walks d o w n
the hill to h e r house on occasion. Richard Hansen asked Dan P a y n e if a n y t h i n g else would o r
could b e d o n e to t h e road, Dan P a y ~ said
e he's done most everything t h a t could be d o n e
without m a j o r construction. Don Halvorson said he just wanted a s s u r a n c e t h a t there would
b e some conferring with property owners if there w e r e to be any m a j o r r o a d changes. Dan
Payne a s k e d Don Halvorson about the road frontage that was missing a n d w h e r e the 200 feet
could have gone. M r . Halvorson explained that it was due to the movement of the road. Dan
Payne said when he originally approved Bob Wagner's approach h e m e a s u r e d o f f w h a t it
t
Halvorson claimed tie w a s off, Bob W a g n e r has s i n c e moved the
was s u p p o s e d to be h ~ l Don
driveway. Richard I f a n s e n asked Don Halvorson what he wanted. Don Halvorson said he
a n d Bob W a g n e r w a n t e d input if the highway district pianned o n m a k i n g a n y changes to the
road. Don Halvorson said he wanted to know if anytfling n e a r tiis fence s o he wouldn't have
to deal w i t h damage. M r . Iialvorson said he didn't w a n t any problems. R i c h a r d Hansen

explained that tec1inic:illy the fence erlcroaclled on the right-of-way. Ron Landeck quoted
Idaho Code 40-109 that s:i?.s.tt~cHigt~\v;iyDistrict's right-of-\vsy is what they need to
maintain a safe roacIw:~y. Don I-ialvorson said hc had people who could testify that the
roadway had moved. Ortarld Arrleberg said he's liveti out there flis whole life a n d can testify
that the road hasn't rnoved. Richard Eiansen said the property line issues have nothing to do
wit11 the highway district. 11011Larideck explained that the highway district doesn't just
build roads at will ivithout consulting with I;tndontt~er-s.Landeck said the highway district
nlaltes tf~ernselvesawar-c of coricerris anti would keep clon infornled. lion Lanticck said that
f)y looking a t the aerial photos one could see tl~ei-ehave lleen n o m a j o r c t ~ a n g e sin the
position of the roadway in the last 40 years. Do11 Halvorson asked about liirn a n d Bob
W a g n e r giving a deed to North Latah County Higtlway District for the road right-of-way.
Mr. Halvorson said Iiis biggest deal is getting nior~eyback for the survey he had done.
Iiichard Hansen said that was behveen him and Bob Wagner. Richard Hansen asked Don
I-lalvorson if fie ant1 Bob Wagner ivantecl the rrltiln;ttc decision on :tny road iinprovernents.
Mr. f4:tlvorson ~ i ~ itic
t l just wantetl input. fticli;~r-d
I-lansen said there is a n esisting road with
a 50 foot prescriptive right-of-wily a n d Do11 11:tlvor-son sccrned only to be worried about
movement of the road w'itftout his j~r-iorkrlowlctigc, l i i c l ~ a r dHansen asked M r . H;tlvorson if
he felt his fence was more than 25 feet frorn the center of the rqo:td. Don I-I;~lvorsonsaid he
thought it was. Iiichard I-i2riscn said he tttought it wasn't. 1)ori f-Ial.rlorson said his only
intent was to 111aint:tin his fence. [)an C;tr-sc;tllen asl<cd Ilon Halvorson if -- a s long as
nothing rno\,es \vitl~outfir-st corislrlting \vitIi HaIvor.son ancl Wagner - everything is okay,
Don I-liiI\rorson said t11;it e\.erjlthirtg was okiij,.
,John and Melanie Wolf attencied to discuss s road access far-tf~ertiown C a m p ' s Canyon
Road. Dan I'ayne s;tid Ile would discuss i t lvitl] thein on site when they had a chance.
'I'he Commissioners went into esecutivc session a t 2 : 5 5 pm.
T h e Comn~issionersadjourned from executive session a t 3:50 pm.
T h e Commissioners asked that excavator specs go out so bids c;tn be opened o n April 11.
Don Brown asked if the Case roller should be auctioned off o r if fhey should continue to r u n
it. Richard Hansen said he'd r a t h e r not r u n it. Orlarid Arneberg said to go a h e a d a n d
auction it off with the surplus equipment. T h e surplus auction is scheduled f o r April 25.
T h e r e was some discussion about a gravel roatl standard. T h e commissioners felt t h a t a
gravel s t a n d a r d should be inclutfed in the specifications for certain cases.
Don Brown asked about sight distance. T h e commissioners said to continue with the 200 foot
s t a n d a r d until the new road s t a n d a r d s a r e adopted.
Being no f u r t h e r business, the nieeting adjourned a t J:50 pni
T h e next meeting was scheduled for April 1 I , 2007.

Ct~airnian

Secretary

ITEM NO. 6

AGENDA
NORTH LATAH COUNTY E-IIGHWAY DISTRICT

Wednesday, September 12,2007,1:30 P.M.
Highway District Office

1 132 White Avenue

I.

Call to Order

2.

Approve rninutcs July 2 5 , 2007

3.

pay bills

4.

Open Rock Bids

5.

Open surplus grader bids

6.

Don Nalvorson

7.

Latah Trail proposal - Tom Lannr

8.

Blaine Street Extension - Susan Wilson, Team Idaho

9.

Map, Bridge Discussion - Hodge and Associates

10.

Caterpillar discussion - Butch LaFarge

1 1.

Executive Session pursuarlt to Idaho Code Section 67-2345(l) if necessary

12.

Other Business

13.

Foremen Communication

T h e regular meeting of the North Latah County Highway District Board of Commissioners
was held a t the Moscow office on September 12,2007 at 1:30 pm. Present were Chairman
Orland Arneberg, Commissioners Sherman Clyde and Richard Hansen, Foremen Paul
Stubbs and Tim Sturman, and Dan Carscallen. Comnussioner-Elect Charles Bond also
a ttcnded.
T h e minutes from August 22, 2007 were approved as read.
Sherman Clyde made a motion to pay the biHs as listed on the back of this page. Richard
Ransen seconded. The motion passed,
'I'he commissioners opened bids for rock in Moscow and Deary. They were as follows:
DeAtley Crushing
Hunt Pit (Deary)
45,000 tons 518" minus
2,000 tons 1112"rninus
1,000 tons 112" chips
1,000 tons 3" minus
1,000 tons Anti-Skid

$3.93
$3.83
$4.43
$3.83
$4.43
Deary

/ton
/ton
/ton
iton
/ton
Total

$1 76,850.00
$7,660.00
$4,430.00
$3,830.00
$4,430.00
$197,200.00

Jensen Pit (Moscow)

45,000 tons
5,000 tons

5/8" minus
112" chips

$3.99 /ton
$4.49 /ton
Moscow Total

$1 79,550.00
$22,450.00

$202,000.00

Grand

Total

$399,200.00

$4.75
$4.75
$4.75
$4.75
$4.75
Dsary

/ton
/ton

$21 3,750.00
$9,500.00
$4,750.00
$4,750.00
$4,750.00

North Idaho Crushing
Hunt Pit (Deary)
45,000 tons 5/8" minus
2,000 tons 11/2"minus
1,000 tons 1/2"chips
1,000 tons 3" minus
1,000 tons Anti-Skid

/ton
/ton
/ton
Total

$237,500.00

$4.30 /ton
$4.30 /ton
Moscow Total

$1 93,500.00
$21,500.00
$215,000.00

Grand

$452,500.00

Jensan Pit (Moscow)

45,000 ions
5,000 tons

5/8" minus
112" chips

Total

T h e Commissioners decided to discuss the bids later in the meeting so they could get
through the agenda,
Don Halvorson attended to ask if the photos of the Camp's Canyon R o a d t h a t t h e Highway
District had were evidence in substantiating the North Latah County Highway District's

the road has never moved. Mr. Halvorson asked if those photos could be
orthogonally rectified so the commissioners' ruling could be an informed one. Ron
Landeck said that no proceeding has been in front of the commissioners to have them make
a ruling. Landeck said that if Mr. Halvorson wanted a ruling of some kind h e needed to
file a petition for validation of public right-of-way, then the commissioners could formally
accept any evidence and have a public hearing regarding the road. Mr. Halvorson said he
has come before the con~missionerswith a complaint and tried to get it rectified, but to no
avail. Landeck said the forni for validation is available. Rlr, Halvorson said it was never
offered. Dan Carscallen said that was because the Highway District was never sure what
Mr. Halvorson wanted, and he gave Mr. Halvorson an application for validation of public
right-of-way. Mr. Halvorson asked why he had not been offered the form before. Landeck
said t h a t the con~missionerswere trying to work this out as infornlally as possible. Mr.
Halvorson asked why the process was not yet formal. Landeck explained that the formal
process requires a public hearing. Mr. Halvorson said that the Highway District's ability
to prove that the Camp's Canyon Road is still located where it has always historically been
located has not been shown, in his opinion. Landeck said it was not the Highway District's
responsibility to initiate the validation proceeding, but as a landowner Mr. Halvorson can
file a petition to initiate the formal proceedings. Don Halvorson asked if he could have a
response to his earlier filings regarding regulatory takings o r would he have to re-file those.
Landeck said there would be no official response to those filings as they do not technically
relate to the proceedings, but that Mr. Halvorson would not have to re-file them. Mr.
Halvorson said he did not fee1 time was being well spent and there should be quicker
response to his communications. Dan Carscallen said that the responsc to his earlier
communications was that he should petition for validation of public right-of-way. Mr.
Halvorson said he was not getting the answers to his questions. Landeck said the questions
submitted were not really something the commissioners could answer. Mr. Halvorson
asked how con~plaintswere norniaily dealt with by the commissioners. Landeck said that
they deal with complaints all the time and usually they are resolved informally. Sherman
Clyde said that the fence that the tree fell on was in the public right-of-way. M r . Halvorson
contended that it didn't used to be until the road was moved, in his opinion. M r .
Halvorson asked that if he filed for validation of public right-of-way would he get his
money back if he prevailed. Landeck said there was no guarantee that he would get his
money back, as the filing fee was p u t in place to cover legal fees a n d research. Landeck
said the response to said petition was outlined in Idaho Code a n d that the North Latah
County Highway District would respond as required. Don Halvorson said there was public
a n d private interest overlapping in this situation. Mr. Halvorson said that the Highway
District h a d a responsibility to the public interest. Mr. Halvorson asked Ron Landeck if he
represented the Highway District o r the commissioners. Landeck said h e represented t h e
Highway District, a n d he represented the commissioners as well, since they a r e the elected
representatives of the North Latah County Highway District. Landeck said h e also has
advised the commissioners on several issues in the past, Mr. Halvorson said t h a t he may
h a v e a lack of knowledge regarding highway district issues a n d that may not entitle him to
resoiution, b u t he felt that Ron Landeck and the highway cornrnaissioners could use their
knowledge. Mr. Halvorson said that the validation petition was not exactly w h a t he
wanted, b u t he feels the North Latah County Highway District is abusing the statutes.
R i c h a r d Hansen said that Mr. Eial~orson'sassertion that the highway district is impeding
his interests shows a lack of sensibility on Mr. Balvorson's part. Mr. Halvorson said t h a t
the tree through the fence was still a big issue. Richard Hansen said the highway district
claim that

could remove the tree if it was within the prescriptive right-of-way. Mr. Halvorson said
that the highway district did not have that right, Richard said the tree belonged to the
landowner. Mr. Halvorson said the tree came from across the road. Dan Payne asked Mr.
Halvorson if he saw him or one of his crew pushing the tree through the fence. Mr.
Halvorson said he did not. Dan Payne said that unless Mr. Halvorson could prove the
highway district pushed the tree through the fence he should drop that issue. Mr.
Halvorson asked Landeck if that was the Highway District opinion. Landeck said that was
Dan Payne's opinion and that until Mr. Halvorson filed his petition for validation of public
right-of-way he would advise the commissioners to not talk specifics. Mr. Halvorson said
that 40-203 in the Idaho Code provided for the commissioners to initiate validation
proceedings on their own, Sherman Clyde said that there were other people who are on the
agenda and he asked Mr. Halvorson to wait until the end of the meeting to finish his
busitless. Mr. I-falvorson said he would wait.
'ram Lamar came in rep~.esentingthe Latah Trail Foundation to follow up on a meeting
that was held out at the Wallen RoadJLatah Trail intersection. Tom said that the
Foundation, Latah Count?; Board of Commissioners, and representatives from the Idaho
Transportation Departme~ltand North Latah County Highway District met out there to
talk about a bridge across Wallen Road. Bids are going out for the bridge a n d trail
improvements. Tom asked if the highway district could grade and rock the road with
gravel to make it a usable surface. Torn said that volunteers had cleared vegetation and
brush to allow room for improvement work and would continue to do so over the next
weekend, finishing by September 15. Tom L a m a r wanted to officially request the highway
district's assistance in making the trail usable. Tom said it might not serve all cyclists, but
it would help the majority of users. Tom asked if the commissioners had any ideas, but
that he would like 3 inches of gravel graded and compacted. Sherman Clyde asked Tim
Sturman his feelings on the project. Tim said some of the rail bed is in good shape a n d
would tune u p nice, but other parts had more of a river rock base a n d would need Si8"
gravel to make a usable surface. Sherman Clyde asked who would pay for the rock. T o m
Lamar said the Latah Trail Foundation would set up a n account a t North Idaho Crushing
if the highway district would donate the hauling. Dan Payne said that the Deary crew
worked on the City of Troy's part of the trail. Dan said the City of Troy paid for the rock
while NLCHD a n d I T D hauled it, and NLCHD graded the rock, but it was paved shortly
thereafter and not left for an extended period. Dan Payne said that with a g r a d e r working
on the road that width is a n issue. Sherman Clyde asked Tom L a m a r when they planned
on paving the trail. T o m said they weren't sure since the bridge is the priority a n d they'll
pave w h a t they have money for, and they plan to d o it in the spring. Richard Ifansen asked
about doing the rock in the spring, since the road would have to be reprocessed before
paving anyway. T o m said they would like to use it as much as possible in the meantime.
Sherman Clyde thought it might be more cost effective to do all the work in the spring.
Tom L a m a r asked a b o u t putting half the rock down in the fall then doing the rest in the
spring. Dan Payne said there would have to be quite a bit put down to be processed, then
be prepared to replace about 1/3 of it in the spring to make sure you have a good base for
the asphalt. Dan Payne wondered about peeling off the marbles to get down to some
harder base. Tom L a m a r asked if just doing some small bits here a n d there where
necessary to get through the winter would be good, a n d would the highway district commit
to coming back in the spring to put a finish job on the trail. Richard Hansen said that
should b e okay, and Sherman Clyde and Orland Arneberg a,oreed. Tom Lamar said he

would tell Latah County Parks Director Andy Grant to coordinate with Tim Sturman on
the work.
Scott Becker reported on the Boulder Creek Bridge. Scott said the abutnlents were okay
a n d are sunk well into the bedrock. Scott said that right now there needs to be a structural
analysis of the bridge. The decking is getting bad and the bridge is only rated for 50,000
ibs. Dan Payne said it may be tinie to replace the bridge or at least the decking. Scott
Becker was going to ask if there were any other options and maybe go after emergency
funds to replace the bridge. Sherman Clyde thought this was a good opportunity to go
after grant money for a project. Scott Becker said most grant money for bridges is federal
a n d would be about two to four years out, Scott said there may be other ways to make the
bridge work, a n d there may be other funds to go after with fearer strings attached. Scott
said he would have enough information for a decision by the next meeting.
Butch LaFarge asked about how the conln~issionersplanned on paying for the excavator,
a n d he suggested tfley take the sales order around to various banks to find out what kind of
financing is out there. Butch also asked if the commissioners still planned on a new road
grader. Butch said he would bring up a machine and a simulator for the men to have some
time with the new setup.
T h e commissioners went into executive session at 3: 15 pm.
T h e commissioners adjourned from executive session a t 3:30.
Don Halvorson asked what tie could do to solve his situation. Ron Landeck said Mr.
Halvorson should file a petition for validation of right-of-way. Sherman Clyde said if Mr.
Halvorson would file it the commissioners would act on it. Mr. Halvorson said the right-ofway was invalid. Sherman Clyde said Mr. HaIvorson had to file for validation of right-ofway. Mr. Halvorson asked why the highway district would not file for validation, Both
S h e r m a n Clyde and Richard Hansen said they felt the road is where it always has been, so
they were okay with the road's location, therefore there was no reason for them to initiate
validation proceedings. Mr. Halvorson asked how to get a contested case. Ron Landeck
said to s t a r t with a validation petition. Landeck said t h a t if Mr. HaIvorson h a d other issues
he should get a n attorney. Mr. Halvorson said that the validation petition would not deal
with the trespass issues. Landeck said that hiring a lawyer would be Mr. Balvorson's Erst
step. S h e r m a n Clyde said that both sides were just going round a n d round over the same
issues a n d that Mr. Halvorson should just hire a lawyer.
S h e r m a n Clyde made a motion to accept DeAtley's rock bid. Richard Nansen seconded.
T h e motion passed.
Won Landeck said the new zoning ordinance is causing right-of-way issues. In o r d e r to get
a building permit, people have to show that they have access to a public road via a n
easement o r public right-of-way. Ron said the right-of-way maps will go a long ways to
solving some of these problems.
T h e r e was some general discussion about Skyview Estates. T h e L a t a h County Zoning
Commission is having a hearing on it on September 19.

There was some talk about the tractor/mowers and how they don't work as they were
promised. Ron Landeck wanted Dan Carscallen to get the info to him from the bid and he
would see if the highway district had any recourse regarding them.
Being no further business, the meeting adjourned at 4:20 pm
The next meeting was scheduled for September 26,2007.

Chairman

Secretary

TEM NO. 7

Don and Charlotte Halvorson
i290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, ID 83537
208-289-5602
August 23,2007
Latah County Highway District
1132 White Avenue
Moscow, ID 83843
Re:
Movement of Camps Canyon Road Bed
Dear Sirs,
We, the undersigned, petition the North Latah County Highway District for a declaratory ruling
pursuant to Title 67 Chapter 52 67-5232 on the applicability of Title 40 Chapter 40-203a in the disputed
right-of-way of Camps Canyon Road as it travels through the SE 'A of NE 'A of section 15 T39N3 WBM.
Due to numerous revisions and alterations the location of Camps Canyon Road can no longer be
determined; and, as we have indicated to you, that Camps Canyon Road does not conform to the
location as described in the public record as compared to the recent survey done by Rimrock
Consultants.

Dorl and Charlotte Halvorson

TEM NO. 8

Idaho Regulatory Takings Act Guidelines

k
Q E L ~

Appendix B: Request for Regulatory Taking Analysi

Recommended Form for:
REQUEST FOR TAKING ANALYSIS
Nari~c:

Address:
City:
County:

--

Don and Charlotte Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho
Latah

Y

0dzg/0.7
%

Zip Code:

83537

Background Infornlation

1.

'1911isSbml satisfies the written request requirement for a regulatory taking analysis from a statc
agency or local governmental entity pursuant to Idaho Code 67-8003(2). The owner of the property
subject to the government action must file this with the clerk or secretary of the agency whose act is
qucstioncd within twenty-eight (28) days of the final decision concerning the matter at issue. A
regulatory taking analysis is considered public information. Such an analysis is to be performed in
accordance with the checklist established by the Attorncy General of the State of Idaho pursuant to
Idaho Code 5 67-8003(1). See page 7 of the Idaho Kegulutor-jj Tkkil?gL?Act Guide1ine.c for a description
of the checklist.
?
-.

I2escription of Property
a. l.,ocation of' Property:

SE 'A NE % Section 15 T39N3WHM

-

b. Legal Description of Property:
-

3.

GOVT Lo'r I (NENE) 37.0 AC S E N E 15 39 3
PARCEL NUMBER KP 39N03W150008 A

Description of Act in Question
a. Date Property was Affected:
Fall 2004
h. Description of How Property was Affected:
1) INCIDENT OF PUSHING THE TREE THROUGH TIiE FENCE
.----

-

At the 4/12/06 Highway District meeting, I brought to the attention of the cornm~ssioner.~
tflc blatant disregard fbr private property as evidenced by a fallen tree pushed tflrougf~the fence.
The grader operator had pushed a wind fallen tree through our fence. Richard Wanson (NLCHD
Commissioner) vehemently claimed that he did not believe that a highway employee would do
such a thing. I said that I found it to be unbelievable also, but it was so and that I would be glad
to s l ~ o whim if he would come out to see. Richard Hanson did come out about 6 weeks later and
he and I walked down Camps Oanjson Road to observe our complaints. ?'he k~ilowiilgis
excerpted from our notes..

"111 May, 2006 I met with Richard Hanson on site. I told him that if we both found

0323

this event (the fallen tree being pushed through the fence) to be unbeliebable, then it
is gross negligence, for neither he nor I would believe that a reasonable man would
do such a thing. I offered him the possibility of two to three other people to confirm
what I had said. (Notwithstanding that he claimed he did not believe that a highway
employee would do such a thing) Hanson claimed the event was within their
prescriptive right. I told him i t was also within their prescriptive right to act
reasonably. (Neither Hanson nor any other Highway District personnel have seemed
interested in talking to any other people who rnight confirm or extend any remarks I
had made.) He went on to say that it was, after all, my tree as the landowner
continues to own what is not within the roadbed but is still within the prescriptive
right-of-way. I pointed out to him that the tree originated on the other side of the
road and in any event was not my tree. Furthermore the tree lay where it had lain for
six months; the remains of the tree had not been causing anyone other than the road
district a problem. A neighbor had sawed out a chunk of the tree to allow passage of
vehicles, and maintenance on that section of the roadway was only once a year.
There did not appear to be any emergent reason to deal with the tree at the moment
of the passage of the grader. This claim that the prescriptive right overrides
everything is, in our opinion, not correct. Furthermore our fence lies outside of the
old prescriptive right-of-way that was given up in 1996. Although Richard I-Ianson
agreed with me on the probable past position of the road he seemed to rely on Orland
Arneberg's claim that there had been no revisions to the road bed during his
[Arneberg'~]~'watch".Richard I-ianson probably does not have historical experience;
and so is at a disadvantage to say when or how alterations have occurred. He may or
may not have asked Orland or the foreman, Dan Payne."
In the 3/21/07 meeting this issue was brought up again in which Mr Hanson
asked if our fence was more than twenty-five feet from the center of the road and we
responded that it was more than 25 feei from the center of the old prescriptive rightof-way. We do not believe that a highway district can create a new prescriptive
right-of-way. Further we state that the NLCHD does not know the exact location of'
the right-of-way due to their alterations of the road. This would require survey and
records both of which seem to be carried out with deliberate indifference to the Idaho
Statutes and private property rights.

Our opinion is that the pushing of the tree through the fence is not justified in the
presence of or the absence of a prescriptive right-of-way. Furthermore we consider these acts
and omission as a taking of private property.
c. Regulation or Act in Question:
Title 40 Chapter 6 40-605,608,6 10,6 1 1, Title 18 Chapter 70 18-7012, 7001. Title 18
Chapter 26 18-2602, Title 40 Chapter 13 40-1 336, Title 67 Chapter 23 67-2343,
Title 40 Chapter 2 40-203a, Title 6 Chapter 9 6-904c, Title 40 Chapter 23 40-23 19,
2302, Idaho Administrative Procedure Act Title 67 Chapter 52 5201 through 5292,
Ethics in Government Manual-Lawrence Wasden, 42 U.S.G. ( 1 983) (Section 1 983)
Idaho Re,gulatory Takings Act Title 67 Chapter 80 8001, 8002, 8003, Idaho Constitution
Article I , S 14. Right of Eminent Domain

d. Are You the Only Affected Property Owner? Yes

No

X

e. State Agency or Local Governmental Entity Affecting Property:
North Latah County Highway District

f. Address of Agency or Local Governmental Entity:
1 132 White Ave.
Moscow, Idaho 83843

Idaho Regulatory Takings Act Guidelines
Appendix I-3: Request for lieguiatory Taking Analy

'

Recommended Form for:

oflzd~

REQUEST FOR TAiUNG ANALYSIS
Narne:
Address:
C'ity.

Cou~~ty.
1.

Don and Charlotte Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kcndrick, Idaho
Latah

%C
-

Zip Code:

83537

Background Inforn~ation

'Ihis form satisfies the written request requirement for a regulatory taking analysis from a state
agency or local governnlental entity pursuant to Idaho Code 3 67-8003(2). The owner o f the property
suejcct to the Sovernmcnt action must file this with the clerk or secretary of the agency whose act is
questioned within twenty-eight (28) days of the kina1 decision concerning the matter at issue. A
regulatory taking analysis 1s considered public information. Such an analysis is to be performed in
accordance with the checklist established by the Attorney General of the State of Idaho pursuant to
Idahc) Code 5 67-8003(1). See page 7 of the i~1'uhoRegrlcrtory 7'ctkiny.s Acf Guide1ine.c for a description
of' the checklist.
2.

Description of Property
a. Location of Property:

SE % NE 54 Section 15 T39N3WBM
h. l..egal Description of Property:
GOVT LOT 1 (NENE) 37.0 AC SENE I5 39 3

PARCEL NUMBER RP 39N03 W 150008 A
3.

Description of Act in Question
a. Date Property was Affected:
Summer/falI 2006
-b. Description of' I-10th I'roperty was AfTected:
2) BLJRYING 'THE FENCE WIRES DURING THE 2006 ROAD RED

P

Vv1QFiN1-h~

At the 3/21/07 regular meeting we showed thc commissioners pictures of the wires buried
during the 2006 widening of the road bed. Dan Payne asked where this fence encroachment was
and I told him that it was by the culvert and the corral. Although notified at this meeting no
repair has occurred.
We consider these acts and omissions to be a takirlg of private property.

c. Regulation or Act in Question:
Title 40 Chapter 6 40-605. 608, 61 0, 6u. Title 18 Chanter 70 18-701 2. 7001. Title 1 8 _
Chapter 26 18-2602, Title 40 Chapter 13 40- I336, 'l'itle 67 Chapter 23 67-2343.

Title 40 Chapter 2 40-203a, Title 6 Chapter 9 6-904c.. Title 40 Chapter 23 40-23 19,
2302, Idaho Admirlistrative Procedure Act Title 67 Chapter 52 520 1 through 5292,
Ethics in Government Manual-Lawrence Wasden, 42 U.S.C. ( 1 983) (Section 1983)
Idaho Regulatory Takings Act Title 67 Chapter 80 800 1, 8002, 8003, Idaho Constitution
Article I , 6 14. Ripht of Eminent Dornain

d. Are You the Only Affected Property Owner? Yes

No

X

e. State Agency or Local Governmental Entity Affecting Property:
North Latah County Highway District

f. Address of Agency or Local Governmental Entity:
1 132 White Ave.
Moscow, Idaho 83843

Idaho Regulatory Takings Act Guidetines

Appendix B: Request for Regulatory Taking An
Recommended Form for:

b

REQUEST FOR TAKING ANALYSIS
Name:

Don and Charlotte Halvorson

Address:
City:
County:

1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho
Latah

1.

Zip Code:

83537

Background Information

This form satisfies the written request requirement for a regulatory taking analysis from a state
agency or local governmental entity pursuant to Idaho Code $ 67-8003(2). The owner of the property
subject to the government action must file this with the clerk or secretary of the agency whose act is
questioned within twenty-eight (28) days of the final decision concerning the matter at issue. A
regulatory taking analysis is considered public information. Such an analysis is to be performed in
accordance with the checklist established by the Attorney General of the State of Idaho pursuant to
Idaho Code 5 67-8003(1). See page 7 of the Idaho Regularory Takings Act Guidelines for a description
of the checklist.
2.

Description of Property
a. Location of Property:
SE % NE 54 Section 15 T39N3WBM
b. Legal Description of Property:

GOVT LOT 1 WENE) 37.0 AC SENE 15 39 3
PARCEL NUMBER
3.

RP

39N03W 150008 A

Description of Act in Question

a. Date Property was Affected:
~&mer/~all2006
b. Description of How Property was Affected:
3 ) THE INCIDENT OF THE ROLLER BEING PUSHED INTO THE FENCE
At the west end of the corral fence there is a section of fence constructed of four 2x6
rails. These rails cover the anchor chain which stabilizes the support post for the westward
heading section of wire fence. An old soil compaction roller lay outside of the corral fence here
since around 1996. In 1996 the highway district revised the road and I rebuilt the fence. The.
roller came from across the road--the Harris/Huff place, now the Wagners'. The roller and a
deck of logs were left at the edge of the road by the highway district after that revision. It did not
belong to me, so I left it where it stood and buiIt the new corral fence leaving the roller outside of
the fence. In 2006, when the road was widened, the highway district filled the older ditch at the
edge of the road with their widening. They then created a new ditch by pushing the roller into
the.fence dislodging a rail and undermining the wirefence supportposr. The previous drainage
had been working fine for ten years.

We consider these acts and omissions to be a taking of private property. Pushing the rolIer into
the fence is not justified in the presence or absence of a prescriptive right-of-way.
c. Regulation or Act in Question:
Title 40 Chapter 6 40-605, 608, 610, 61 1, Title 18 Chapter 70 18-7012, 7001, Title 18
Chapter 26 18-2602, Title 40 Chapter 13 40-1336, Title 67 Chapter 23 67-2343,
Title 40 Chapter 2 40-203a. Title 6 Chapter 9 6-904c, Title 40 Chapter 23 40-23 19,
2302, Idaho Administrative Procedure Act Title 67 Chapter 52 5201 through 5292,
Ethics in Government Manual-Lawrence Wasden, 42 U.S.C. (1983) (Section 1983)
Idaho Regulatory Takings Act Title 67 Chapter 80 8001, 8002, 8003, Idaho Constitution
Article 1, 614. Right of Eminent Domain
d. Are You the Only Affected Property Owner? Yes

No

X

e. State Agency or Local Governmental Entity Affecting Property:
North Latah County Highway District
f. Address of Agency or Local Governmental Entity:
1 132 White Ave.
Moscow, Idaho 83843

C?

p"<
*
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Idaho Regulatory Takings Act Guidelines
Appendix B: Request for Regulatory Taking Analysis
Recommended Form for:

REQUEST FOR TAKING ANALYSIS
Name:
Address:
City:
County:
1.

Don and Charlotte Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho
Latah

ZipCode:

83537

Background Information

This form satisfies the written request requirement for a regulatory taking analysis from a state
agency or local governmental entity pursuant to Idaho Code $ 67-8003(2). The owner of the property
subject to the government action must file this with the clerk or secretary of the agency whose act is
questioned within twenty-eight (28) days of the final decision concerning the matter at issue. A
regulatory taking anaiysis is considered public information. Such an analysis is to be performed in
accordance with the checklist established by the Attorney General of the State of Idaho pursuant to
Idaho Code S 67-8003(1). See page 7 of the Idaho Regulatory Takings Act Guidelines for a description
of the checklist.
2.

Description of Property

a. Location of Property:

-- SE % NE '/4 Section 15 T39N3MrBM
b. Legal Description of Property:

GOVT LOT 1 (NENE) 37.0 AC SENE 15 39 3
3.

PARCEL NUMBER RP 39N03W 150008 A
Description of Act in Question
a. Date Property was Affected:
Spring; 2006
b. Description of How Property was Affected:
4) WAGNER DRIVEWAY ACCESS PERMIT AND TRESPASS
Regular meeting of North Latah County Highway District took place on 4/12/2006.
Orland Arneberg (NLCHD Commissioner) and Dan Payne took a biased and what we felt was
unIa\vfid position on the Wagner driveway saying that the prescriptive right-of-way gave Bob
Wagner the right to trespass as the disputed area was on their prescriptive right-of-way. Dan
Payne's contention that the road frontage he had measured was not in accordance with the
Wagner deed was correct. However, this incongruence of the physical situation and the deed
description was evidence of road bed alteration and revision rather than a factor for giving the
Wagners a permit to construct a driveway access. (Dan Payne and Orland Ameberg should have
known this for it was they that altered the highway.) The need for a survey was clear and I
suggested that the NLCHD and the Wagners share the cost of a professionaf survey. Either the
highway district didn't know where the highway was in relation to the public record due to
multiple revisions, in which case a survey and validation of the highway was in order; or they did

know the highway had moved out of its old prescriptive right of way in 1996 and they were
purposely misrepresenting the situation. Either way the NLCHD did not have a valid right-ofway because they had not done the survey at the time of the revision. Although the driveway
access was the topic the NLCHD wanted to talk about I brought up other issues mainly
concerning the abuse of the prescriptive right of way (the driveway issue was made a
"prescriptive right" issue by the NLCHD.).
We consider these acts and onlissions to be a taking of private property.
c. Regulation or Act in Question:
Title 40 Chapter 6 40-605, 608, 6 10, 61 1, Title 18 Chapter 70 18-70 12, 700 1 , Titie 18
Chapter 26 18-2602, Title 40 Chapter 13 40-1336, Title 67 Chapter 23 67-2343,
Title 40 Chapter 2 40-203a, Title 6 Chapter 9 6-904~.Title 40 Chapter 23 40-23 19,
2302, Idaho Administrative Procedure Act Title 67 Chapter 52 5201 through 5292,
Ethics in Government Manual-Lawrence Wasden, 42 U.S.C. (1983) (Section 1983)
Idaho Regulatory Takings Act Title 67 Chapter 80 8001, 8002, 8003, Idaho Constitution
Article I , 4 14. Right of Eminent Domain
d. Are You the Only Affected Property Owner? Yes

No

X

e. State Agency or Local Governmental Entity Affecting Property:
North Latah County Highway District
f. Address of Agency or Local Governmental Entity:
1132 White Ave.
Moscow, Idaho 83843

Idaho Regulatory Takings Act Guidelines

Appendix B: Request for Regulatory Taking Analysis
Recommended Form for:

REQUEST FOR TAKING ANALYSIS
Name:

Address:
City:
County:
1.

-

Don and Charlotte Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick. Idaho
Latah

Zip Code:

83537

Background Information

This form satisfies the written request requirement for a regulatory taking analysis from a state
agency or local governmental entity pursuant to Idaho Code 8 67-8003(2). The owner of the property
subject to the government action must file this with the clerk or secretary of the agency whose act is
questioned within twenty-eight (28) days of the final decision concerning the matter at issue. A
regulatory taking anaiysis is considered public information. Such an analysis is to be performed in
accordance with the checklist established by the Attorney General of the State of Idaho pursuant to
Idaho Code 67-8003(1). See page 7 of the Idaho Regulatory Takings Act Guidelines for a description
of the checklist.
2.

Description of Property
a. Location of Property:

SE % NE L/4 Section I5 T39N3WBM
b. Legal Description of Property:

GOVT LOT 1 (NENE) 37.0 AC SENE 15 39 3
PARCEL NUMBER RP 39N03W 150008 A
3.

Description of Act in Question
a. Date Property was Affected:
2005- 2006
b. Description of How Property was Affected:
5 ) 2005-2006 Widening of Camps Canyon Road
During; the years of 2005-2006 the NLCHD has taken land without due process mdl or iust
compensation in widening of Camps Canyon Road in a northerly direction as it passes through
our property. Where there was 5- 15 feet of buffer of land, which in our opinion belon~s
unencumbered bv any instrument to us, between the road bed and our fence there is now, in
places, no clearance between our fence and the road bed and the road bed is encroaching on ow
riahtfully built and rig;htfully positioned fence. Not only has this widening taken land without
just compensation it has unlawftrllv damarred our fence.
c. Regulation or Act in Question:
Title 40 Chapter 6 40-605, 608,610, 61 1, Title 18 Chapter 70 18-7012, 7001, Title 18
Chapter 26 1 8-2602, Title 40 Cha~ter13 40-1 336, Title 67 Chapter 23 67-2343.
Title 40 Chapter 2 40-203a, Title 6 Chapter 9 6-904c. Title 40 Chapter 23 40-2319,

TEM NO. 9

T h e regular meeting of the North Latah County Higfirvay District Board of Commissioners
was held a t the Moscow office on August 8, 2007 at 1:30 pm. Present were Chairman
O r l a n d Arneberg, Commissioners Sherman Clyde and Richard Hansen, Foremen Dan
Payne, Paul Stubbs and Tim Sturman, and Dan Carscallen.
T h e minutes from July 25, 2007 y e r e approved as read.
S h e r m a n Clyde made a motion to pay the bills as listed. Richard Eiansen seconded. T h e
motion passed.
Sht.rnt;rn CIydc took a ~ l i o n ~ eto~ lintroduce
t
Charles Uond, \,!lo was elected on August 7,
2007, 21s the nelv conlmissiorier from the Mosco\v i i r e ~ .
<JayM c M u n n from C a n t e n ~ o o dEstates came in to :rsk the cornmissionerc; if they had m a d e
a decisior~regarding the acceptance of the road system in Cantenvood fcstates as a part of
the High\v;ty District system. Richard I-Iansen asked that if the Highway District accepted
the roads into the system and chip sealed it, tsould the horneo\rners association reimburse
f o r labor a n d materials for that first chip seal, Mr. klcMunn said t h a t he understood t h a t
to be the deal. There was some discussion about costs, especially since the commissioners
were u n s u r e about whether the road was wide enough and whether the road's base would
be sufficient. Sherman Clyde said he would rather have the homeowners pay a contractor
to chip seal t h e road, since the fact contractors are available to bid t h e project precludes
the highway district from doing the work. Sherman Clyde was also still concerned a b o u t
the road base. 'The con~missionersdiscussed that they may not w a n t to take on the road
":$s-is" because of width and road base concerns. Iiichard I-Iansen said he was also
concerned a b o u t the proximity of the p u m p houses to the road right-of-way. T h e
commissioners said they were not ready to m a k e a decision yet, a n d w a n t e d to move o n
with the meeting, but they would deliberate o n it later. M r . M c h l u n n said he looked
forward to their decision.
Dan Carscallen stlowed the commissioners the contract that Ron L a n d e c k wrote up f o r the
B e r n a r d Olson rock pit. T h e comn~issionerssaid it looked okay a n d said t h a t Don Brown
would take it to Bernard to get it signed.
Don Halvorson came in to say he wanted a third party mediator to negotiate a settlement
regarding his issues on the Camp's Canyon Road. Mr. Halvorson a s k e d if h e could t a l k
directly to t h e Highway District attorney. Sherman CIyde said h e w a s n o t in favor of Mr.
Halvorson talking directly to t h e Highway District's attorney. R i c h a r d H a n s e n didn't
know w h a t Mr. Halvorson would gain other than not having to pay his o w n attorney.
S h e r m a n Clyde said the only thing Mr. Halvorson wanted was to not h a v e to pay a lawyer.
O r l a n d A r n e b e r g said the Highway District's lawyer could not represent both sides.
R i c h a r d H a n s e n asked if Mr. Halvorson was going to h i r e another lawyer. Mr. Hatvorson
s a i d he would represent himself. The omm missioners said they would n o t Iet M r . Uaivorson
d e a l directly with tfic highway district attorney,'so Mr. Halvorson presented a proposal to
settle his issues with Camp's Canyon Road. Dan Carscallen told Mr. Halvorson that t h e *
H i g h w a y District's attorney would-be gone for the foIIolving week, so h e hoped to have a n
a n s w e r to M r . Halvorson sornetiAe before September 12, 2007.

Tim S t u r m a n said the Nets i[iolland/Lnnd Pride tractor/motr,er was not living u p to
expectations. Dan Payne said he was not satisfied with Deary's setup either. T h e
conlmissioners decided lo go rneet with the staff at St, John Kardtvare after the meeting.
Scott Becl<er carne in a n d thiinkcd Sherman CIj,de on behalf of Hodge a n d Associates for
his time as Comniissioncr. Scott also took time to congratulate Charles Bond for his
victory in the election on the prior (fay. Scott said that the right-of-way m a p project w a s
progressing a n d t h a t all the permits for the investigations of the bridge by Boulder Creek
campground were subrnittcd and he was awaiting an answer. Scott said he expected to be
able to begin w o r k in Septenlbcr. Dan Payne said he was worried about how they would
get a hoe down into the creek without disturbing too much of the bank. Richard Hansen
said that a n y brush talten out could be replaced by planting some tvillo~vbranches and they
should use the new C a t tracltlioe to prevent oil leaks into the creek. Scott also said that
applications would come out i l l September for investment funds, so the commissioners
might w a n t to look a t ~ v t l a torojects to apply for. Scott said there tvere also sotne bridge
funds av:iilable, a n d he would alert the comrnissioners to what could be done.
T h e commissioners went into executive session at 2:43 pm
T h e commissioners adjourned from executive session at 2:48 pm
Alan Martinson carrle in to tell the conimissioners that he got a g r a n t to pay for weeti
control a n d \vould like to share i t ~ v i t hthe highway district. Alan said he wouid get with
Dan Carscallen on h o w to get the funds.
S h e r m a n Clyde m a d e a motion to deny the acceptance of tfle Cantenvood subdivision
roads into the highway district system, citing that he had to take the entire public interest
into account when thinking about what roads to take into the system, a n d that he could not
in good conscience t a k e that road into the system when there were so many questions
regarding r o a d w i d t h a n d the road's base. Richard Hansen seconded. T h e motion passed.
T h e r e was some discussion about getting bids for road graders. T h e commissioners were
each given a list of specifications so they could decide what to hsve listed in the specs for a
road g r a d e r bid.
S h e r m a n Clyde said he was not satisfied with the way things were looking on C a m e r o n
Road. S h e r m a n said the road should be widened another 100 feet north.
Being no f u r t h e r business, the meeting adjourned a t 3:10 pin
T h e next meeting w a s scheduled for August 22,2007.

Chairman

Secretary

Ttte regular meeting o f t h c Not-~EIListah C ' o u n ~ltigl~nlaj
,
District Uo:lrd of
Comrnissioners Isas held :tt the hlosco\v office o n April 12, 2006 a t 1:30 pm. Present
were C h a i r m a n Clriand At-neberg, Corriinissioner liiclrard Hansen, Foremen Dan
Payne, Paul Stubbs ant1 Don Brown, a n d Dan Carscallen.
?'he niinutes from the rneeting on M a r c f ~8, 2006 %sereapprovecl :is read.
Richard Hansen made :I ltiotion to p a l the bills ;rs tfiey a p p e a r on the back of this page.
O r l a n d Arneberg seconciotl. 'I'lie motion passed.
Don Halvorson came in wit11 concerns about ?eveIoprnent ;rlong a n d itnprovernents to
Carnps Canyon Road. Mr. I-fal~.orson'smain cornipl:lint was that irnprovernents to the
r o a d increase traffic and encourage development. He complained that there was no
speed control on the t-oatl, and the creok crossing w;ts hi31-d for ;t vehicle with ;i trailer.
M r . Nalvorsorl also said tiler-e were property line dis~lutesfrom road widening a n d
moving of the roadway. hIr-. I-ialvorson tcrougllt in hand-drawn rnaps showing where
h e contended the road useti to be \:ersus M here i t is now. Mr. E-Ialvorson also said he
wanted a s u n t e y of his and his neighbor's property, but he wanted his neighbor a n d the
Highway District to pay for it. Bob \Y;tgr~ersaid he had no issues ~ v i t hthe Highway
District, a n d he h a s had stir-vej8s,but they did riot meet with M r . l-ialvorson's
satisfaction. Frarlces Wagner sitid there \r;rs really only one issue today a n that w:is the
r o a d has not moved, arid tltc south side is \utlere i t h;rs a l ~ v a y sbeen, therefore there was
n o historical differel~ceon the south side o f t h e road whic11 borders M r . Halvorson's
property. M r . I-Ial.iforson sitid he'd be Itccping ;in el,cl on tvhilt thc FJigtl\vay District did
o n t h a t road.
T h e commissioners went into executive sessiorr to discuss pending legal m a t t e r s at 2:35

The conimissio~aerscame out of executive session a t 4:20
T h e commissioners set the budget hearing for ,July 26
R i c h a r d Hansen said the brirsh cutter \vould be on Big C r e e k Road the w e e k of April 17
Speed limit classes are on April 18 and 19,2006
P a u l S t u b b s said Lou Lively w a n t s to use public right-of-way on the platted streets in
H a r v a r d to access property outside H a r v a r d city limits. T h e cornmissioners said it w a s
okay to use the public right-of-way, but the Highway District ~ v o u l dnot be maintaining
them.
T h e next rneeting was scheduled for April 26, 2006.
Being no f u r t h e r business, the meeting adjourned a t 4:35 prn

Chairman

-

Secret21r-y

TEM NO.

INTERROGATORY NO. 12:

12.) For each meeting in interrogatory # 10) please state all evidentiary points bought
by each participant, any findings of fact determined by the you and the other
cornrnissi~ners,what final decisions you and the other commissioners stated, how the
final decisions were rationally arrived at and how these final decisions were written

down and transmitted to the Halvorsons.

RESPONSE:
Object to this Interrogatory as not relevant and not calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissibIe evidence. Without waiver of objection, the public actions and deliberations of
Commissioners are set forth in Minutes of their meetings which are available to the public. As to
the July, 2007 meeting at CCR, I explained to Mr. Halvorson the actions I had taken with
Wagners (see Response to Interrogatory No. 13 herein), and Mr. Halvorson disputed my
assertions.
INTEmOGATORY NO. 13:

13.) Was your decision to issue the Wagners a driveway access permit a rationally
based decision on the facts, evidence and circumstances considering the property line
dispute was in process?

RESPONSE:
Object to the form of this Interrogatory as it assumes "circumstances considering the
property line dispute" that were not known to me. Without waiver of objection: Mi. Halvorson
had not told me of any dispute with Wagners. To the best of my knowledge and belief,
Wagners' request was for a permit on an approach located wholly within Wagners' property.
My decision was rationally based on facts and circumstances known to me.

DEFENDANT'S MSPBNSES TO P

TIFFS' FRST INTERROGATOmS

INTEMOGATORY NO. 14:

14.) Ifyour answer to interrogatory #13.) was an affirmative answer please answer the
following:

(a) State the facts, evidence, legal precedentlcustom for the basis of that
decision;

(b) State any and all other reasons for that decision;
(c) At the present time would you now still adhere to the same decision?
(d) If # 14.) (c) is not an unqualified affirmation, please state your reasons for

adjusting your decision.
RESPONSE:
a. Response to Interrogatory No. 13.
b. Met all NLCHD requirements.

c. Yes.

d. Not applicable.

INTERROGATORY NO. 15:

15.) Did your approach (4/12/06 regular meeting of the NLCHD) to the Wagner
driveway permit issuance, to the non revocation of the uniawful permit issuance, of
refusal to accept culpability in the disagreement, of refusal to share in the resolving
predetermining survey, and to the resolution of the right of way dispute of CCR in any
way:
(a) advance the aspirations of the Wagners to obtain a reasonable, most cost

effective, environmentally sound, and legally conducted accomplishment of a driveway
access to CCR? if so please state and how this advancement was accomplished;

(b) inhibit the aspirations of the Wagners to obtain a reasonable, most cost
affective, environmentally sound, and legally conductad accomplishment of a driveway

access to CCR? ff so please state and if so haw this inhibition was accomplished;
(6) advance the aspirations of the Halvorsons to find an equitabte settfernent to

the issue that would not unconstitutionally burden the servient estate andlor mar their
title to their property? If so please state;

(d) inhibit the aspirations of the Halvorsons to find an equitable settlement to the
issue that would not unconstitutionally burden the servient estate andlor mar their title to
their property? If so please state;

(e) advance the public interest? If so please state;
(f) inhibit the public interest? If so please state;
RESPONSE:
Object to this Interrogatory as it calls for speculation and legal conclusions and is not
relevant and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible svidence.
INTERROGATORY NO. 16:

16.) What purpose/s would the decision to not revoke the permit serve if a ciariwing

sunfeywas being called for?

D E F E m A N ' S MSPONSES TO PL
(PAXI'?\%) -- 9

FFS' FIRST NTERROGATORIES

RESPONSE:

Object to form of Interrogatory as ambiguous as to what is meant by permit. Without
waiver of objection: if referring to Interrogatory No. 13, to the best of my knowledge no request
was made by Walvorsons to revoke such permit and, therefore, no decision to not revoke was
ever considered.

INTERROGATORY NO. 17:

17.) Whose decision was it not to revoke the permit?RESPONSE:
See response to Interrogatory No. 16.

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.

County of Latah

D m Payne, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that he is a Defmdant in the
above-entitled action; that he has read the foregoing Responses, and that the contents thereof are
true to the best of his information and belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

y of May, 2008.

SES TO P L m T E F S ' FRST INTEW-OGATBRIES
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and objections are not waived for any other purpose and are specifically not waived for any other
purpose within this litigation.
As a general response to all of the Interrogatories, Defendant directs Plaintiffs to the
information already in the record in this matter and information that remains in Plaintiffs' control or
more readily and reasonably obtainable by Plaintiffs than Defendant.

FtESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
GENERAL OBJECTIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL INTERROGATORIES
Defendants object to responding to these Interrogatories because the Interrogatories
contained in these Second Interrogatories, together in their numbered and unnumbered sub-parts,
exceed the number of Interrogatories allowed under Rule 33(aj(3), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
All responses are subject to and without waiver of this objection.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 1. Please state the standard
operating procedure for straightening, widening, altering, andlor changing CCR.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATOMES 1.
The standard operating procedure for North Latah County Highway District public roads
established by prescription or public use. except those of a lesser width presently existing at the
t i ~ n ethose highways are established, is to widen such roads as required for proper construction
and ~naintenancein the discretion of the District up to a width of 50 feet. On information and
belief, CCR is a public highway established by prescription or public use and, therefore, would
be constructed and maintained in the discretion of the District as such forth above

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATOMES 2. Please state the standard
operating procedure for insuring no private property is taken in straightening, widening, altering,
and/or changing CCR.

DEFEXDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES
(PAkWE) -- 2
-

0343

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 5. PIease state the steps you took to
insure that no private property was taken i11 2006 in the changes, alterations, straightening, and or
widening of CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 5.
The District, through its foreman, determined that said construction in 2006 was within
the 50-foot prescriptive width of CCR. In addition, adjacent property owner Robert Wagner told
District Foreman Dan Payne to do whatever was needed to accomplish the widening of the CCR
by approximately four feet on Mr. Wagner's side of CCR.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 6. When did you first become
aware of a property line dispute between the Wagners and Plaintiffs in the vicinity of the 3+/acre parcel?

mSPOMSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 6.
In Spring 2006 Robert Wagner informed District Foreman Dan Payne that Don
Halvorson does not agree that Mr. Wagner's driveway approach is located wholly on Wagners'
property. The District Commissioners first became aware of the dispute when Mr. Halvorson
attended a meeting in Spring 2006 to ask that the District perform a survey of the
Halvorson/Wagner property lines.

PLAlhNTIFFS' SECOND INTElRROGATOREES 7. When did you issue the first
driveway access permit to the Wagners?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEHaROG-%TOMES7.
On information and belief, during Spring 2006.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEWROGATOMES 8. When did you take final action on
the first Wagner driveway access permit (Latall County Building department shows record of
you signing off on the question of road access for the Wagners' building permit in March 2006)?

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND NTERROGATORIES

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEhCROGATOMES 8.
Object as this interrogatory is ambiguous as to what is meant by "take final action."
Without waiver of said objection, following District's issuance of the iirst driveway access
permit to the Wagners, the Wagners requested a substitute driveway access permit sometime
within several months after March 2006, the District issued that second Wagner driveway access
permit as a replacement for the first driveway access permit, and the first permit was iinpliedly
revoked by the District as a condition of the issuance of the second permit.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEmOGATOWIIES 9. What was the final action taken
on the first Wagner driveway access permit?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 9.
See Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 8.

PLAINTIIFFS' SECOND INTEmOGATORIES 10. Did the Wagners apply for a
second driveway access permit?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORLES 10.
Yes.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATCOMES 11. (a) Do you know of any
reasonis why the Wagners applied for a second driveway access permit? (b) If so, for what
reasonis did the Wagners apply for a second driveway access permit?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEmBGATOMES 11.
(a) On information and belief, after Ffalvorsons surveyed their real property adjoining
Wagners' real property and after Don Halvorson told Robert Wagner that Wagners could not use
the first approach Wagners had constructed, Wagners decided to move their driveway approach.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND WTERROGATONES
(PA-WE) -- 5

(b) On information and belief, to avoid conflict with Halvorsons over the location of the
Wagners' driveway.

PLAINTIFFS SECOND INTERROGATORIES 12. What steps did you take to
ascertain the facts of Plaintiffs' allegation that the ixiagners' first driveway access permit was
violating the law, that is, trespassing before the 4/12/2006 NLCHD regular meeting?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEZIROGATOMES 12:
Dan Payne measured a distance of 699 feet along CCR, which measurement was part of
Wagners' deed as the point of commencement of Wagners' real property, from the point where
Halvorsons' purported property line fence intersected CCR. Dan Payne determined based upon
these observations that the location of the Wagners' first driveway was within Wagners'
property.

PLAINTIFFS SECOND INTERKOGATOMES 12.12"~
#f21: What steps did you
take to ascertain the facts of Plaintiffs7 allegation that the Wagners' first driveway access permit
was not violating the law, that is, trespassing after the 4/12/2006 NLCHD regular meeting?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND I N T E ~ O G A T O R I E S1 2 . 1 2 "#~I Z ~ :
None other than those previously taken as stated in Response to Plaintiffs' Second
Interrogatories 12.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEmOGATORIES 13. What steps did you take to
ascertain the facts of Plaintiffs' allegation that the Wagners' first driveway access permit was not
violating the law, that is, trespassing after the completion of Plaintiffs' survey?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 13.
None other than those previously taken as stated in Response to Plaintiffs' Second
Interrogatories 12 [211d # 121.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MTERROGATONES
(PAWE) -- 6

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 14. Why did you not at any time
consider revoking Wagners' first permit; that is, what objective data did you rely on that the
Plaintiffs' allegation of trespass of the first Wagner driveway access permit was not correct?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATFOMES 14.
Dan Payne relied on observations set forth in Response to Plaintiffs' Second
Interrogatories 12.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTElRROGATORPES 15. In your response to Plaintiffs'
First Interrogatories Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. I3 you stated "To the best of my knowledge
and belief, Wagners' request was for a permit on an approach Iocated wholly within Wagners'
property. My decision was rationally based on facts and circumstances known to me." What
were these facts and circumstances, including circumstances of any and all changes to CCR in
the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel and the ramifications of these changes and their potential
effect on the historic driveway access to the 3+/- acre parcel and your knowledge of these
changes?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEWOGATOPUES 15.
See Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 12. In addition, there was an old
approach to Wagners' property and Wagners' survey confirmed that the approach was located
wholly within Wagners' property.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEMOGATORPES 16. In your response to Plaintiffs'
First Interrogatories Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 13 you stated "To the best of my knowledge
and belief, Wagners' request was for a permit on an approach located wholly within Wagners'
property. My decision was rationally based on facts and circumstances known to me." What
facts and circumstances did Plaintiffs present to rebut your statement at the 4/12/2006 meeting

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORTES

(PAWE) -- 7

and what steps did you take to insure the correctness of your knowledge and/or belief or did you
simply ignore Plaintiffs' allegations with deliberate indifference?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND ZNTEmOGATORIES 16.
Plaintiffs did not present facts and circumstances to rebut any statement made by me at
the 4/12/2006 meeting. I considered Plaintiffs' allegations and determined that my previous
observations justified the actions previously taken.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 17. (a) On or before 4/12/2006 did
you and others make measurements to determine the position of the east property line of the 3+/acre parcel? (b) What measurements did you make? (c) What were the results of these
measurements?

WESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEmOGATORIES 17.
See Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 12.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORlES 18. (a) At the 4/12/2006 meeting of
the NLCHD Commissioners did you state that the driveway access permit was valid as it was
within the NLCHD's prescriptive right? (b) If this is not an accurate restatement, please restate
in your own words the relationship between the driveway access per~nit,validity of the permit,
and the claim of prescriptive right of way as expressed by you at the 411212006 meeting.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERWOGATOMES 18.
(a) No.
(b) Dan Payne said to Mr. Wagner, to the effect of "Check it. If you are within any
public prescriptive right-of-way, your driveway access permit is okay." Dan Payne does not
remember the exact words said.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND mTERROGATORIES
(PAkWE) -- 8

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 19. (a) At the 4/12/2006 meeting of
the NLCE-ID Commissioners did you state that the driveway access permit was valid as it was
within road frontage recorded on the Wagners' deed? (b) If this is not an accurate restatement,
please restate in your own words the relationship between the driveway access permit, validity of
the permit, and the measurement of road frontage.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEEROGATOMES 69.
(a) Yes, with the explanation set forth in paragraph (b) of Response to Plaintiffs' Second
Iilterrogatories 8. See also Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 12.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATOMES 20. In your response to Plaintiffs'
First Interrogatories Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 14 subpart (b) you stated, "Met all NLCHD
requirements." Does the NLCHD allow a permit to be issued for an unlawful act and if not, how
then did the first Wagner driveway access permit "Me[e]t all NLCHD requirements"?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 20.
'To the best of NLCHD's knowledge, no. See Response to Plaintiffs' Second
Interrogatories 12 - 19.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERWOGATOMES 21. In your response to Plaintiffs'
First Interrogatories Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 16 you stated, ". . .to the best of my knowledge
no request was made by Halvorsons to revoke such permit and, therefore no decision to not
revoke was ever considered." In reference to this statement, please answer the following:
(a) Is not the decision to revoke a permit, yours and the Coinmissioners of the NLGHD?

(b) On what facts, opinions of facts, and the application of what laws to these factls
andlor opinioids of f a d s was the decisioil not to revoke the first Wagner driveway permit made?

DEFENDANT'S fWSPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND NTERROGATONES
fPAYNE) -- 9

(c) On 4/12/2006 at the regular meeting of the NLCHD, Plaintiffs alleged that they
rebutted claims by jlou and Orland Arneberg that the prescriptive right of way gave the NLCHD
the right to issue the first Wagner driveway access permit where they had issued the perinit for,
notwithstanding the potential violation of the east property line of the 3+/- acre parcel, that the
measurement of the road frontage described in the Wagner deed was no longer a dependable
statistic as the NLCHD had altered the road in 1996 and had straightened the road, and Plaintiffs
requested that the Wagners and the NLCHD share the cost of a survey as the Defendants had no
rights (the NLCHD to issue a permit) in the actions they had taken, and the Wagners had no
rights to build a driveway. Plaintiffs alleged that the first Wagner driveway access and the
permit for it were in violation of the law. Notwithstanding your denial of Plaintiffs allegation
that they asked the NLCHD to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, why did the
NLCHD not consider the revocation of the first Wagner driveway access permit'?
(d) From what authority do you derive the discretion to revoke the first Wagner
driveway access permit or not to revoke it; that is, how does the NLCHD have the discretion to
break the law?
(e) What steps did you take to insure the Plaintiffs were not correct in their allegations?

(f) Considering that you stated that you knew CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel
had been straightened, widened and altered in the last half of 1996 (see Plaintiffs' First Request
For Admissions Request For Admission No. 3, subpart c.) , as you were participatory in the
alterations, what steps did you take to insure the permit was valid, not issued for a unlawful act?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND IIVTEMOGATOMES 7 ! .

(a) The NLCHD's foremen are responsible for NLCHD permit decisions and Dan Payne,
as district foreman, acts under authority of the NLCHD Commissioners.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES

(PAYNE) -- I0

(b) See Responses to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 12 - 19. Ultimately, Wagners'
first driveway permit was impliedly revoked when the second permit was issued.
(c) No compelling information had been presented by Plaintiffs.
(d) Object to the form of the question as argumentative. The NLCHD acts under Idaho
law regarding driveway access permits and the revocation thereof.
(e) See Responses to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 12 - 19.

(0See Responses to Plaintiffs'

Second Interrogatories 12 - 19.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 22. In the application of law to fact,
including any and all substantiating data available or known and the location of this data, please
state any changes in CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel after May 3 1, 1996 to present in
the legal established:
a. Width;
b. Location:

c. Nature.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 22.
To the best of my information and belief, CCR was widened with surplus material from
ditching activities on Little Bear Ridge Road in the area above Plaintiffs' corrals in 1996.
Several trees were removed on Plaintiffs' property with Plaintiffs' permission. In 2005 and 2006
enough additional fill material was used to widen CCR and install a culvert on the Wagners' side
of the road by approximately four feet. This activity included drilling and blasting a boulder on
Wagners' side of the road. The road was widened slightly on Halvorsons' side of the road using
surplus material from ditching activities. Some of this information is detailed in Foreman's daily
calendar notes.

DEFENDANT'S ESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND NTERROGATORIES
(PAWE) -- I 1

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATOMES 26. Did you give notice to Plaintiffs
that the NLCHD was planning to widen CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in 2005?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATOMES 26.
No.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATOMES 27. Did you give notice to Plaintiffs
that the NLCI-ID was planning to widen CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in 2006?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 27.
No.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATOWES 28. State in your own words the
circumstances of the covering of the separation between Plaintiffs' new fence (Defendants claim
Plaintiffs' reconstructed fence) and the traveled surface of the road (Defendants call this
separation between Plaintiffs' new fence and the traveled surface of CCR--Plaintiffs7 call it the
buffer) (see Plaintiffs' First Request For Admissions Request For Admission No. 13) with dirt
and gravel and appearance of a new drainage ditch in the area to the northeast side of CCR in the
vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel between the end of Plaintiffs' corral fence and for 50 feet to the
northeast of the corral fence, if this coverage with dirt and gravel is not and relocation of the
drainage ditch is not the work of the NLCHD and is not considered the supporting structure of
CCR, and the admission to the widening of CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel does not
include any widening or changes to CCR to the northeast side of the road (see Plaintiffs' First
Interrogatories Interrogatory No. 3); that is, that present width now is as it was at the end of the
widening of 1996, and that there was a 3 (Plaintiffs state this to be 5 to 10 feet between the right
of way, that is the roadbed and its supporting structures including ditches and Plaintiffs rebuilt
fence) to 10 foot separation between Plaintiffs' fence and 'the traveled surface of CCR, when and

.
SECOND INTERROGATORIES
DEFENDANT'S E S P O N S E S TO PLAINTIFFS'
( P A W E ) -- 13

by whom was this change made, as the dirt and gravel now lay upon Plaintiffs' fence and the old
compaction roller that occupied that space is now pushed back into and onto the fence?
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S' SECOND INTEmOGATORIES 28.
NLCHD's maintenance activities in this vicinity have included maintaining an existing

ditch, not a new drainage ditch, in an area to the northeast side of CCR in the vicinity set forth in
this interrogatory and normal maintenance activity. To the extent that any dirt and gravel now
lie upon Plaintiffs' fence, such is a result of the Plaintiffs placing the fence within the NLCHD
prescriptive right-of-way.
VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Latah

)
) ss.
)

Dan Payne, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that he is a Defendant in the
above-entitled action; that he has read the foregoing Responses, and that the contents thereof are
true to the best of his information and belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / 4 Xday of

+

2on8.

NOTAR* PUBLIC for
My c o m i s s i o n expires:

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATOMES
(PAYNE) -- 14
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(d) Do you deny that Ed Swanson understood what Dan Payne had said about the work
to be done on CCR in the last half of 1996 in the vicinity of the 3+/-acre parcel?
je) Do you deny that Dan Payne made any contacted with Ed Swanson before the work
done on CCR in the last half of 1996 in the vicinity of the 3+/-acre parcel?
(f) Do you deny that there was any conversation at all between Dan Payne and Ed

Swanson in the last half of 1996 about the work to be done on CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/acre parcel?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEmOGATORIES 3.
(a) Orland Arneberg took

such steps and does not admit that there was such an

1-10

agreement between the District and Ed Swanson.
(b) - (f) Orland Arneberg has no information regarding any of these matters except to
know that Dan Payne was going to work and did work on CCR in 1996.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 4. Please state the present legal
established nature (type), width, and location of'CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel. In
the application of Iaw to fact, include any and all substantiating data available and the location of
this data for each and every characteristic, attribute and/or limit of the right of way in the vicinity
of the 3+/- acre parcel. If no substantiating objective evidence is available or known please so
state.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERKOGATORLES 4.
To the best of Orland Arneberg's knowledge, CCR in this vicinity is a public road
established by prescription or public use which, at the time of its establishment, was, under Idaho
law, fifty (50) feet wide and continues to be fifty (50) f'eet wide, meaning twenty-five (25) feet

on either side of the established centerline thereof.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLATNTXFFS' SECOND INTERROGATONES
(AWEBERG) -- 4

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATONES 5. What steps did the NLCHD take
to insure no private property was iinproperly taken and/or not recorded in the widening and
changing of the location of CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in 1996?
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATOMES 5.

Orland Arneberg has no specific knowledge but generally knows that the District makes
o n psblic
every reasonable effort to remain within its fifty (50) foot right-of-way in c r ? ~ ~ e r , t i with
roads established by prescription or public use.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEMOGATORIES 6. What steps did the NLCIiD take
to insure no private property was improperly taken andlor not recorded in the widening and of
CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in 2005 and/or 2006?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERKOGATOMES 6.
Orland Arneberg has no specific knowledge but generally knows that the District makes
every reasonable effort to remain within its fifty (50) foot right-of-way in connection with public
roads established by prescription or public use.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEWOGATORTES 7. In Plaintiffs' First Request For
Admissions you denied Request For Admission No. 7.) Do you disagree with, whether with or
without an agreement with Ed Swanson, the work done on CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre
parcel acco~nplisheduhat the NLCHD intended to accomplish at the time in the last half of

1996? If so, why, if not why not?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOKD INTERROGATOMES 7.
To the best Orland Arneberg's knowledge, there was no agreement with Ed Swanson
and, because the District accomplished work in 1996, he presumes that it accomplished what it
intended to accomplish.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEmOGATBRIES
(AWEBERG) -- 5

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 8. Please state the legal established
width and location of CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel on December 3 1, 1996. I11 the
application of law to fact, include any and all substantiating data available and the location of
this data. If no substantiating objective evidence is available or known please so state.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERIB_OGATORIES8.
See Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 4.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 9. Please state all circulnstances
pertaining to the NLCHD's present claim of a 50-foot andlor a 25 foot from centerline
prescriptive right of way/highway in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel on the northeast side of

CCR and all and any upplicufion/s of'luwh to fuctL~pertainingto this cluirn.
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEIIROGATOR4ES 9.
See Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 4.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 10. Do you deny an ancient fence
was present amongst the trees, which were cut down and excavated during the work done on

CCR in the last half of 1996 in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, and ran along the northeast
side of CCR prior to the work done on CCR in the last half of 1996 in the vicinity of the 3+iacre parcel?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 10.
Orland Arneberg has no knowledge regarding "an ancient fence" in this area in 1996.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGA%ORF,ES11. In Response to Request For
Admission No. 4 of Plaintiffs' First Request For Admission, your response was objection on the
grounds it calls for a legal conclusion. No legal conclusions were requested; rather, as a

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAmTIFFS' SECOND IPU'TERROGATORIES
(ARNEBERG) -- 6

Commissioner of the NLCHD, you know f a d s , have opinion/s of factls and apply laws to these
factls and opinionis of facts.
a. What islare your knowledge of the factis and/or your opinionis of the f a d s with
regard to the taking of private property in the work done in the last half of 1996?
b. What islare your knowledge of the factls andlor your opinionis of the f a d s and the
application of law to factls and/or opinionis of f a d s with regard to the taking of private property
in the work done in the last half of 1996?
c. In your position as Commissioner of the NLCHD mihat steps were taken to insure no
private property was acquired by the improper interference of your/NLCHD action by the work
done in 1996?

m S P O N S E TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEWROGATOMES 11.
To the best of my knowledge, based upon my observations of CCR in this vicinity prior
to 1996 and after 1996, the District has not taken any private property as it has not engaged in
any activities outside of its 50 foot prescriptive right-of-way, the determinations concerning
which, in the first instances are left to the discretion of District foremen in their day-to-day
operations.

PLAINTIFFS SECOND INTEWROGATOMES 12. In Plaintiffs First Request For
Admissions, Request For Admission No. 26, you stated, "Admitted. I first became aware of this
issue when Halvorsons and Wagners appeared at a Commissioners meeting to discuss it. I had
no further conversations with Mr. Wagner during the permitting phase. I ha.ire since spoken to
Mr. Wagner on several occasions concerning his problems with Mr. Halvorson." In regards to
this admission and your stated qualifications, answer the following interrogatories.
a. Where and when did these conversations take place?

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLANTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES
(ARNEBERC) -- 7

b. Were other people present at these conversations?

c. What do you mean by the expression of "the permitting phase"; give the range of
dates?
d. How did the different parties become aware of the same Commissioners' meeting to

discuss the same issue; that is how did John Bohman, Gary Osborn, Bob Wagner, Kate Wagner,
Patsy Wagner, Francis Wagner, and Don Halvorson all arrive at the same place at the same time;
that is, were John Bohman, Gary Osborn, Bob Wagner, Kate Wagner, Patsy Wagner, Francis
Wagner, on the meeting agenda, or was Don Halvorson on the meeting agenda and who put then1
on the agenda?
e. Did either or both parties receive notice and if so how was notice provided?

f. Was the issue put on the meeting agenda; that is, why did you choose to address Don
Halvorson rather than any of the other people in the room'?
g. Do you have any reasonable explanation for the confluence of both parties arriving at
the same meeting with the availability of the time on the meeting schedule to address the issue?
h. Was any communication directed by the NLCHD (including commissioners and/or

employees) to either party about discussing the issue at a commissioner's meeting?
i. Was the meeting you refer to the 4/12/06 meeting?

j. What are the dates of the "issue" with reference to the dealings of the Halvorsons ~vith
the NLCHD on the matter from your knowledge; that is, how long have the Halvorsons been
talking to the NLCHD about the driveway permit and/or the NLCHD's unauthorized activities
on CCR in the SENE of Section 15 T39N R3wBM?

k. Did any NLCHD commissioner andlor employee inform or talk to any of the parties to
inform those who also attended this meeting (subpart j.).

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES
(ARNEBERG) -- 8

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 12.
a. I do not recall.
b. I do not recall.

c. I mean sometime after April 2006.
d. I do not know.
e. I do not know.
f. I believe because District secretary Dan Carscallen informed me that Dan Halvorson
wanted to address the Commissioners.
g. The word we had was that Don Halvorson was going to speak to the Commissioners

about an issue involving the Wagners, although I do not know how anyone else learned that
information.
h. hlot to my knowledge.

i. Yes.
.j. Since 4/12/06.

k. Not to my knowledge.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERWOGATORIES 13. In Plaintiffs' First Request For
Admissions, Request For Admission No. 28, your response, an objection to the Request For
Admission was that the form of the request, "...misstates the statements made". Please restate
the statements in your own words.

DEFENDAVT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES
(ARNEBERG) -- 9

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATOFUES 13.
Orland Arneberg has no specific knowledge but generally knows that the District makes
every reasonable effort to remain within its fifty (50) foot right-of-way in connection with public
roads established by prescription or public use.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 14. In Plaintiffs' First Request For
Admissions, Request For Admission No. 28, your response, an objection to the Request For
Admission was that the form of the request, ". . .misstates the statements made". Please restate
your words and/or your meaning to the words, if the words are to imply anything but what your
words stated as recorded in the minutes of the 3/21/07 meeting, "Orland Arneberg said he's lived
out there his whole life and can testify that the road hasn't moved".

RESPONSE: TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 14.
Orland Arneberg has no specific knowledge but generally knows that the District makes
every reasonable effort to remain within its fifty (50) foot right-of-way in connection with public
roads established by prescription or public use.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 15. Do you deny giving Bob
Wagner the aerial photos presented at the 3/2 1/07 NLCHD meeting by the commissioners and/or
copies of these aerial photos any time preceding 7/1/2006?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 15.
Yes.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 16. In Plaintiffs' First Request For
Admissions, Request For Admission No. 27. your response was, "Admitted as to its general
location and denied as to minor movement." Please (a) define "minor niovement" and (b) state

DEFENDANT'S FESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES
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circumstances under which you told Bob Wagner this (i.e. when, where, and who else was
present).

FUZSPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 16.
(a) '.Minor movement" includes some straightening of curves and the widening of
approximately four feet on the Wagners' side of the road and a lesser widening on the
Halvorso~ls'side of the road.
(b) 1 do not recall the circumstances.

VERTFICATION

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.

County of Latah

1

Orland Arneberg, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that he is a Defendant in
the above-entitled action; that he has read the foregoing Responses, and that the conte~ltsthereof are
true to the best of his information and belief

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this I q

F?

-

day of - 3

/

,2008.

NOTARY PUBLIC for idaho.
My commission expires:

("/26;g)~ / n
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APPLICATION AND PERMIT TO USE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY -- APPROACHES
COPY OF PERMIT MUST BE PRESENT AT WORK SITE DURING CONSTRUCTION
PUBLIC ROAD SURFACE TYPE. (DIRT) (GRAVEL) (PAVEMENT)
I

r

Start Date:

NOTICE
This pennit shall not be valid for excavation
until, or unless, the provision of ldaho code,
Title 55, Chapter
have been complied
with.
PRIOR TO EXCAVATION, CALL ONE
NUMBER LOCATION SERVICE

Est. Completion Date:

22

Road Name:

Location:

Sight Distance:
I

Posted Speed'

-

,

I

-

,

1I

APPROACH
Single Residence
Multiple Residence

No Served

Business type

1

-

,

,.,

Telephone No.

i

i-800-442-i 585

-

..

WiDTH

SURFACE TYPE
(VEHICLE COUNT)

ESTiMATED ADT

Must meet the requirements of North Latah County Highway District (NLCHD)
Approach Policy and 349-221, ldaho Code

Agriculture

I

Other

Explain:
ATTACH SKETCH OF PROPOSED WORK AND TRAFFIC CONTROL PLANS:
SPECIAL PROVISIONS:

See reverse side f o r General Provisions.

-

P
,

-

BE
1 CERTIFY THAT I AM THE OWNER OR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PROPOSED PROPERTY
SERVED AND AGREE TO DO THE WORK REQUESTED HEWON IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS PRINTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE. THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND THE PLANS MADE A PART OF
THIS PERMIT.
NAME OF PERMITFEE
APPLICANT-PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT
ADDRESS

SIGNATURE OWNER/ AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE

CITY STATE ZIP

DATE

I

1

I

I

I

SUafECT TO ALL TERMS, CONWTIONS, AND PROVISIONS S
M ON THIS FORM OR ATTACHMENTS, PERMISSWN IS HEREBY
GRANTED TO THE AWE-NAMED APPtlCANT TO PUiFORM THE W O W MSCRJBED ABOVE.

NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT USE
TEMPORARY PERMIT

Tentative appmwl subject to inspection of installation.

Approved
Date:
Corrections Rquired:

FINAL PERMIT
d j e c t e d

Date:

Date:

By:
NLCHD Authorized Representative

Approved by:
NLCHD Authorized Reprentative

---

L,

GENERAL PROVISIONS

2. The NLCHD may change, amend or terminate this permit or any of the conditions herein enumerated if permittee
fails to comply with its provisions or requirements as set forth herein.
3. Approaches shall be for the bona fide purpose of securing access and not for the purpose of parking, conducting
business, or servicing vehicles on the public right-of-way.

4. No revisions or additions shall be made to an approach or its appurtenances on the public right-of-way without
the written permission of ~e NLCHD.
5. The permittee shall furnish all material, labor and equipment involved in the construction of the approach and its
appurtenances. This shall include furnishing approved drainage pipe of a size specified on permit (12 inch
minimum) curb and gutter, concrete sidewalk, etc., where required. Materials and workmanship shall be good
qualrty and are subject to inspection and approval by the NLCHD.
6. The NLCHD reserves the right to require the permittee, its successors arid assigns, at any time, to make such
changes, additions, repairs and relocationsto any approach or its appurtenances within the public right-of-way
as may be necessary to permit the relocation, reconstruction, widening, drainage, and maintenance of the
roadway andlor to provide proper protection to life and property on or adjacent to the roadway.

7. Approaches shall conform to the plans made a part of this permit. Adequate drawings or sketches shall be
included showing the design, materials, construction requirements and proposed location of the approach. All
approaches shall be in accordance with Exhibits 9 ahd 13 of the Manual for Use of Public Right of Way Standard Approach Policy.
8. During the construction of the approach(es), such barricades, signs and other traffic control devices shall be
erected and maintained by the permittee, as may be deemed necessary by the NLCHD. Said devices shall conform
to the current issue of the Manual on U n i f m Traffic Control Devices. Parked equipment and stored materiak
shall be as far from the traveled way as feasible. Items stored within 30 feet of the traveled way shell be marked
and protected. The NLCHD may provide barricades (when available) upon request.

9. In accepting this permit, the permittee, its successors and assigns, agrees to hold the NLCHD harmless from any
liability caused by the installation, construction, maintenance or operation of the approach(es).

10.If the work done under this permit interferes in any way with the drainage of the roadway, the permittee shall
whdly and at his own expense make such provision as the NLCHD may direct to take care of said drainage
problem.
11. Upon completion of said work herein contemplated, all rubbish and debris shall be immediate4 removed and
the roadway and roadside shall be left neat and presentable and to the satisfaction of the NLCHD.
12. The permittee shall maintain at his or their sole expense the structure or object for which this permit is granted
in a condition satisfactory to the NLCHD.
13. Neither the acceptance of this permit nor anwing herein contained shall be construed as a waiver by the
permittee of any rights given it by the constitution or laws of the state of Idaho or of the United States.

14. No work shall be started until an authorized representative of ttre NLCHD has given witten notice to the
permittee to proceed, except in case of an emergency when verbal authorization may be given with a writlen permit
and fee required within five ( 5 ) working days.
15. This permit shall be void unless the work herein contemplated shall have been completed before 30 days
unless otherwise arranged with local road foreman.
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Job Address:

Snow Load:

2:

NJY DEPARTMENT OF PLA. .4ING & BUILDING
Parcel#:

I

113.58

dw'/d,,4b~l/q

Consult With Building Department

I

11

APK>CATION

PERMIT

1

I

I

I

I

I

W L I N G ADDRESS

PHONE.

I

LIC. NO.

i

Numhar of Exisf!ng Dwe!!ing Ur.lts sn Parcel:

L/

Use of Building (For This Permit):

7.
I

8.

Class o f Work:

9.

Describe Work:

10.

Change of Use From:

&&

&

fl Move

0 Remove

g:e--

n4

/L-

a Repair

17 Alteration

t]Addition

&ew

Change Use To:

r

$3.

Slze of Exterior Decks:

&&covered

Uncovered

I

i

I

SPECIAL CONDITIONS TO BE MET:
Before Certificate o f Occupancy Can Be Issued:
a State Plumbing Final inspection

COMMENTS

SEPARATE PERMITS ARE REQUIREDFOR ELECTRICAL AND PLUMBING AND
ARE OBTAINED THROUGH THE IDAHO DIVISION OF BUILDING SAFETY.
THE PERMIT APPLIED FOR WIWI THIS APPUCATION BECOMES NULL AN0

I

WARNING:
COMMENCEMENT OF CONSTRUCTION PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF A
LATAH COUNTY BUILDING PERMIT. AND PRIOR TO ZONING APPROVAL, IS
DONE W I N THE UNDERSTANDING M A T ALL WORK WILL BE RWOVED IFA
PERMIT IS NOT ISSUED OR IF ZONING APPROVAL IS NOT RECENED.
-

-

-

FIRE SPRINKERS REQUIRED:
CI YES
&

OTHER
APPROVAL
L

ENERGY
AUDIT

BOTH SlGNATURES REQUIRED:

PERMIT

FEE

DATE.
1

I

I

I

COMMENT:
I

COMPLIANCE:
O MEC
RECEIVED
BY:

OWNER:

DATE:

a NO

#
*
-

FROM 'NLCHD

f:?

f/

FAX NO. : 2088771298

Nov. 1 3 2007 06:5 6 Q M

L
-

?
,
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APPLICATlON AND PERMrr TO USE PUBUC RIGHT-OF-WAY

- APPROACHES
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PUBLIC ROAD SURFACE TYPE,
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r
-?/,PC;
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Posted Speed.
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6 ,/ / ]
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PRIOR
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NUMBER LOCATION SERVICE

Telephone No.
i'

. '

SURFACE N P E

I

Agriculture

W

-

m,kG

No. Sewed

Business type

I

ONE

1-800-342-1585

-

Singis Residence

Other

I

This psrmtt shall not be valM for srcavetlon
utltt!, or ~ n ! e s s?I?n
~ pwfslor\,crf M8hs d e ,
Tltle 55, Chapter 22 heve been camplied

I

APPROACH

Multiple Residence

~

/I

-

/

Eet. Completion Dets

1

Explain.
T
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Murt
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-

O
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R
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8PECtAL PROVISIONS:
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-
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NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIOWWAY DISTRICT U S E
TEMPORARY PERMIT

TenMtve sppnwal subject to lnepedlon of Irrrztal~ation.

ApprclvbdnD.ts:
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--

--

Ziiata:

I

F l W L PERMIT
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--.------

By:
A
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P
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RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORlES 6.
No, although Richard Hansen had no knowledge about the location of CCR in 1996.
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 7. Did Plaintiffs ever show you
evidence that CCR's present location and the location as recorded in the public record in the
vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel were not in agreement; that is, a comparison of the described
location of CCR in Plaintiffs' deed and the survey done by Rimrock Conu!taqtc in May te July

.

2006?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 7.
No. Richard Hansen does not recall information from Plaintiffs' deed.
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 8. In the application of law/s to
fjctis and or opinion/s of fact/s what application did your legal advice to Plaintiffs' questions and
Plaintiffs' requests for resolution of controversies consist of in stating that their questions and
requests for resolution to the controversies would be answered by paying a $750 fee and
applying for validation?
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 8.
Richard Hansen's statement concerned the existence of a statutory process for resolving
issues regarding location of public roads and rights-of-way, which process is available to
property owners if they elect to pursue it.
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORBES 9. Your response to Plaintiffs' First
Interrogatories (Hansen) Interrogatory No. 14 was:
(a) "Object to the form of Interrogatory as it misstates the 'decision"'. Please restate
your reason for the decision not to get a survey to resolve the dispute over the driveway access
permit in your own words.

(b) "NLCHD Commissioners continued to attempt to resolve Halvorson's concerns but
Halvorsons chose to initiate a lawsuit rather than utilize alternative dispute resolution process."

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAIXTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES
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Did not the Halvorsons request a formal meeting (3/2 1/07), an informal meeting 7/07, file
Requests For Regulatory Taking Analysis, request a disputed case under IDAPA, offer to the
Wagners and the NLCHD a deeded easement resolution, request to speak with the NLCI-ID
counsel, submit a proposal for resolution in August 2007, and request that the NLCHD
Commissioners initiate validation of CCR?
(c) What "alternative dispute resolution processes" did Commissioners offer in the last
two years?
(d) In your own words what were the "THalvorson's concerns"?
(e) List each "concern" and what steps the NLCHD Colnmissioners did to "attempt to
resolve Halvorson's concerns"?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S' SECOND INTERROGATOMES 9.
(a) No decision was made regarding this matter.

(b) E-lalvorsons did do those listed items.
(c) Commissioners cited the validation process and offered to meet and did ineet at CCR.

(d) "Halvorson's concerns"' were those expressed during the rneeting with the
Commissioners on 4/12/06 and as later stated in the Complaint in this action.
(e) See response to subparagraph (c) above. Comn~issionersalso listened to the
Halvorsons' statements made at public meetings of the District. The District's attorney
discussed these matters with Halvorsons' attorney.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORfES 10. Did the NLCHD issue a permit
for a driveway access permit to the Wagners before 4112/06 and after 9/2/2005?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEZBROGATOMES 10.
Richard Hansen does not ktlow when the access permit was issued.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 11. Did the Wagners abate their first
driveway because it was trespassing on the Halvorson property?

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND bTTERROGATORIES
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RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 11.
Richard Hansen does not know why, although on information and belief, Hansen believes
that the Wagners did so to avoid future conflict with the Halvorsons.

PLAlNTIFFS SECOND INTERROGATORIES 12. Did the NLCHD issue a second
permit for a driveway access permit to the Wagners after 513 1/2006?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATONES 12:
Yes.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 13. Why did the NLCHD issue a
second permit for a driveway access permit to the Wagners after 513 1/2006?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 13.
Because Wagners requested it and it otherwise met District requirements.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 14. What did the NLCHD do with
the first Wagner permit for a driveway access; that is, was final approval given?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERnOGATORIES 14.
On information and belief, the District approved the first Wagner permit for driveway
access.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 15. Why was final approval and
record of the first Wagner permit not kept; that is Dan Payne signed approval of road access on
the LVagners' Latah County building permit on 3/27/2006, was this not reason to keep the first
permit as it was the authority for signing the building permit?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTFERROGATOMES 15.
On information and belief, the first Wagner permit for driveway access was not kept
because Wagners received a second permit and, therefore the first permit was no longer
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAKTIFFS' SECO'ND INTEKROGATORIES
(HANSEN) -- 6

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 22.
Object to the form as this question as ambiguous and confusing. Without waiver of
objection, Richard Hansen believes that the first Wagner driveway access permit was impliedly
revoked on issuailce of the second Wagner driveway access permit based upon foreman Dan
Payne's explanation of that event.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 23. Did the Commissioners by their
actionsiinactions at the 4/12/2006 meeting, as the final policy makers of the NLCHD, endorse
the issuance and/or non revocation of the first Wagner driveway access permit for a known or
should have known violation (malicious trespass a~ld/orcreation of a nuisance) of law?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 23.
No. Hansen believes that the first Wagner driveway access permit was lawfully issued.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEZaROGATOFUES 24.

Did the Commissioners by

their actionslinactions at the 411 212006 meeting, as the final policy makers of the NLCHD,
elldorse the issuance and/or non revocation of the first Wagner driveway access permit for a
known or should have known violation (malicious trespass and/or creation of a nuisai~ce)of law,
and acted/failed to act in deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs colorable claim?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 24.
No. Hansen believes that the first UJagner driveway access permit was lawfully issued.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATONES 25. What reasons did you give
Plaintiffs for the legal justification of the Plaiiltiffs allegation that the grader operator liad pushed
a tree through their fence in the fall of 2004?

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAlXTIFFS' SECOND rWTERROGATORIES
(HANSEN) -- 10

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND ZNTERROGATOMES 25.
Object to the form of the question as ambiguous and misstating the facts as Richard
Hansen has not given any reasons for the "legal justification of the Plaintiffs' allegation" set
forth. On information and belief, Hansen believes that a tree may have been moved from the
roadway during District maintenance operations.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 26. What steps did you take to
insure Plaintiffs complaint that the grader operator had pushed a tree through their fence in the
fall of 2004 was not accurate; that is, whom did you interview, either Dan Payne, Jim Sergeant
and/or others?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATOFUES 26.
Richard Hansen received information from Dan Payne regarding this matter.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATOMES 27. What was your final
determination of Plaintiffs' allegations of damage to their fence by the grader operator pushing a
fallen tree through their fence?

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTEmOGATORIIES 27.
Richard Hansen made no "final determination."

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATOMES 28. Plaintiffs have brought
coinplaints to the Commissioners of the NLCHD about alleged damage to their fence.
(a) Have Plaintiffs ever been given notice to remol-e their fence?

(b) Are the damages alleged by Plaintiffs to their fence justified by the claim of
prescription by the NLCHD? If so, by what statute?
(c) Damage to a fence is a misdemeanor, or a felony I.C. 5 18-7001, and/or I.C.
7012; in your application of law to opinions of facts and/or facts, how do you explain the

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS5SECOND NTEREiOGATORlES
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Defendant has made reasonable inquiry and the infom~ationknown or readily obtainable by
responding Defendant is insufficient to responding Defendant to admit or deny.

MSPONSES TO =QUESTS

FOR ADMISSION

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADblISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 1:In
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND lNTERROGATORlES 4, your response was
"To the best of Orland Arneberg's knowledge, CCR in this vicinity is a public road
established by prescription or public use which, at the time of its establishment, was,
under Idaho law, fifty (50) feet wide and continues to be fifty (50) feet wide, meaning
twenty-five (25 feet on either side of the established centerline thereof". Admit that this
response, a public road established by prescription or public use which, at the time of its
establishment-

ffdahoify (50) feet wide and continues to be fifty (50)

feet wide,.meaninq twenty-five (25 feet on either side of the estgblish_ed c e n t e r thereof is NLCWD policy/custom notwithstanding any particular circumstances pertaining
to the individual highwaylright of way, such as Camps Canyon Road. That is all
prescriptive rights of way/highways under the authority of the NLCHD are 50 feet wide.

RESPONSE:
Objection as to relevance of request regarding highways other than Cainps Canyon Road

(CCR). Object as to form of request to the extent it calls for a legal conclusion. Without waiver
of objection: Denied that the response is NLCHD policy/custom, rather the response applies a
legal presumption under Idaho law to the facts of this circumstance.

mOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 2: Referring to
the same REPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND lNTERROGATORIES 4, admit that
CCR was never surveyed andlor laid out to be 50 feet that is no records of Camps

Canyon Road being laid out to 50 feet wide exist.

DEFE?;DANTYSRESPONSES TO PLAmTFF'S SECOh'D REQbTST FOR ,OTvlISSiONS

(ARNEBERG)-- 2
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RESPONSE:
Orland Arneberg does not know whether CCR has ever been "surveyed" and/or "laid out"
or whether any such records exist.

REQUEST FOR ADhlISSION NO. 3:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 3: Referring to
the same REPONSE 70 PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 4, admit that
there

IS

no evidence of any adverse use and acquiescence by owner of a strip of land to

the extent of 50 feet during the prescriptwe per~odIn the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel
on Camps Canyon Road.

RESPONSE:
Object as to form of request as it is confusing and ambiguous as to the identity of the
adverse user, what is meant by "acquiescence" and what is meant by the "prescriptive period."
Without waiver of objection: Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADhlISSION NO. 4:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 4: Referring to
the same REPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 4, admit that
there was no such law that demanded a public road established by prescription or public
use to be 50 feet wide.

RESPONSE:
Object as to form of request to the extent it calls for a legal conclusion. 'Without waii,er of
objection: Denied upon the basis that I.C. Section 40-23 12 and its predecessor statutes establish the
width of public highways at not less than fifty (50) feet.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND REQUEST FOR PLDhlISSIONS
(ARNEBERG) -- 3

Cj26.1

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5:
PLAINTIFFS'
---

SECOND REQUEST EOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 5: Referring to

the same REPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 4, admit that a
prescriptive right of waylhighway could be of a lesser width than 50 feet.

RESPONSE:
Object to the form of the request as it is argumentative, calls for speculation, calls for a legal
conclusion, is hypothetical and irrelevant and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. Without waiver of objections: Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 6: Referring to
the same REPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 4, admit that a
prescriptive right of way is as wide as the road width including supporting structures
such as ditches, that is the width of the road is the width of the right of way.

RESPONSE:
Same objections to Response to Request No. 5 above. Without waiver of objections:
Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISS1ONS, REQUEST NO. 7: Referring to
the same REPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 4, admit that
there is no evidence to show that Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/-acre
parcel was used to the extent of 50 feet at the end of the prescriptive period.

RESPONSE:
Object to the form of the request as it is confusing and ambiguous as to what is meant by the
"end of the prescriptive period." Without waiver of objection: Denied.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND E Q L E C T FOR ADb,IJSSTONS
(AiWBEIIG) -- 4

RESPONSE:

Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 14: Referring
to the same REPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 4, admit that
the entrance into and the permanent occupation of the private land as a matter of the
moving and widening of Camps Canyon Road in 1396 was by permission of the owner
of the private property, Ed Swanson.

RESPONSE:

Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 15: In
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 5, 6, & 13 your response
was "Orland Arneberg has no specific knowledge but generally knows that the District
makes every reasonable effort to remain within its fifty (50) foot right-of-way in
connection with public roads established by prescription or public use." Admit that,
operation within the NLCHD's 50 foot riqht of way jcconnection wjth public roads
established
-

bv prescription or public useI is NLCHD policylcustom of authority to

operate.

RESPONSE:
Same objections as to Request No. 5 above. Without waiver of objections: Denied upon
same basis set forth in Response to Request No. 4 above.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 16:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND-.REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS,REQUEST NO. 16: Admit that
the

NLCHD has a policylcustom of widening a prescriptive right of way without prior

notice and/or permission of the underlying, adjoining, and/or abutting landowner
(servient estate).

DEFENDAKT'S E S P O K S E S TO FLAlT\JTTFF'S S E C O W REQLXST FOR ADMISSIONS
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RESPONSE:
Object as to relevance of hypothetical request and as to form of request as ambiguous
and coilfusing as to what is meant by "widening a prescriptive right of way." Without waiver of
objections: Denied as NLCHD does not require permission to work on public roads and does
make reasonable efforts to provide notice to affected property owners of road improvement
projects.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 17:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND

--

REQUEST FOR ADMISaONS, REQUEST NO. 17: Admit that

the NLCHD has a policy/custom of widening a prescriptive right of way only after prior
notice and/or permission of the underlying, adjoining, and/or abutting landowner
(servient estate) was obtained.

RESPONSE:
See Response to Request No. 16

REQUEST FOR ADhlISSION NO. 18:
PLAINTIFFS'
SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 18: Admit that
.-- - -

-.

the NLCHD has a policy/custom of widening a prescriptive right of way only after prior
notice and/or permission of the underlying, adjoining, and/or abutting landowner
(servient estate) and that no prior notice was given and/or no perrnission was obtained
from the Halvorsons for the widening of Camps Canyon Road in 2005, 2006 and/or

2008.
RESPONSE:
See Response to Request No. 16. ?Vithout waiver of objections: Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADIPIISSION NO. 19:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 19: Admit that
the NLCHD has a policy/custom of surveying, conveying, and recording prior to the
actual widening of a prescriptive right of way.

DEFELTIANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTEF'S SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
(ARhTBERG) -- 8
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RESPONSE:
Same objections as to Request No. 16 above. Without waiver of objections: Denied.
REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20:
--PLAINTIFFS'

SECOND_El_EQUEST FOR ADMISS.JONS, REQUEST NO. 20: Admit that

the NLCHD did not survey, convey, and/or record prior to the actual widening of a
claimed prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road, in the area of the 3+/- acre
parcel in 2005, 2006: andlor 3008.

RESPONSE:
Object to form of request as ambiguous and confusing as to what is meant by "convey" and
by "actual wording of a prescriptive right of way," and that request misstates the true facts. Without
waiver of objections: Admitted that NLCHD did not survey or record anything regarding CCR in
those years, and othenvise denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21:
PLAINTIFFS' SECONlJ

REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 21 : Referring

to the same REPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 5, 6, &13,

(seePLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST N O . 2 3 admit
that such policy/custom as admitted in PLAINTIFFS' SECO-ND REQUEST FOB
ADMISSENS, REQUEST NO. 15 also as policy/custom of the NLCHD precludes,
excludes, or in any and/or all ways denies, or allows the exception for any need for any
notice and/or hearing for any of the following:
(a) injury to a fence;
(b) widening of prescriptive highwayiright of way regardless on which side of the

road the widening took place;

(c) A rebuttal of Defendants' claim to prescription after s u c h activity such as

widening or straightening of a right of wayihighway has taken place.

DEFEPBANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOhT, REQUEST FOR ADMISSIOIU'S
(rn\iEBERG) -- 9
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(d) Any complaint that d u e to any alteration in the highwayiright of way the
highwayiright of way no longer occupies ths identical strip of land it did at the
end of the prescriptive period that the legal establishment of the prescriptive
right of wayfright of way is nullified and is invalid.

RESPONSE:
Object to the f o m ~of this request as confusing and ambiguous in all respects. Without
waiver ofobjeciions: Denied upon h e basis that no admission was made to Request No. 15 above.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 22: Referring
to the same REPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES 5,6,
&13,
(see PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 151 admit
that such policy/custom as admitted in PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR
ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 15 also as policy/custom of the NLCHD has precluded,
excluded, or in every way denied, or allowed the exception for any need for any notice
and/or hearing to Plaintiffs for any of the following:
(a) injury to Plaintiffs' fence;

(b) widening of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/-acre parcel
regardless on which side of the road the widening took place;
(c) Plaintiffs' rebuttal (on 4/12/06, 3/12/07 or at any other subsequent meeting of

the NLCHD or meeting with the Plaintiffs) of Defendants' claim l o prescription
to the northeast side of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/-acre
parcel.

(d) Plaintiffs' complaints on 4/12/06 or any other time or meeting of the
Commissioners of the NLCHD that the first Wagner driveway access permit
was issued without proper regard to the property lines underlying the claimed
prescriptive right of way, Plaintiffs' denial of any such 25 foot from centerline
right of way under any prescriptive claim or a n y other theory of right of way,
and/or Plaintiffs' complaints that Camps Canyon Road had been altered in

DEFEhQANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
(AKYEBERG) -- 10
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1996 and that the road frontage shown on the Wagner deed description was

no longer valid;
(e) Plaintiffs' complaints that due to the alteration in the last half of 1996 to
Camps Canyon Road the legal established prescriptive right of way is invalid.

RESPONSE:
Same response as to Request No. 21 above. Object as to relevance of request. Without
waiver of objection: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 23: Admit that

-

a hearing was feasible on 4/12/06 to hear, reasonably consider and meaningfully
respond to Plaint~ffs'complaints that the first driveway access permit was u n l a ~ u l l y
issued, the NLCHD did not know the location of CCR due to numerous alterations,
(specifically the alteration of 1996),damage to Plaintiffs' fence and Plaintiffs' complaint
of improper interference with Plaintiffs property rights by issuing and failing to revoke the
first Wagner driveway access permit and by widening CCR in 2005.

RESPONSE:
Object as to relevance of request. Without waiver of objection: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24:
PLAINTIFFS'
.-

SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO.24:

Considering the feasibility/infeasibility of a hearing on 4/12/06, admit that all necessary
parties were present.

RESPONSE:
Object as to relevance of request. Without waiver of objection: Denied.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S S E C O h 3 REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
(A2JUEBERG) -- I I
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADNIISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 27:
Considering the feasibility1 infeasibility of a hearing on 4/12/06, admit that time was
allotted o n the agenda a n d that you first called on Don Halvorson to speak.
RESPONSE:
Objection as to relevance of request. Without waiver of objection: Denied that a hearing
was considered and admitted that time was allotted and Don Halvorson was first called on to speak.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 28:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 28:
Considering the feasibility/ infeasibility of a hearing on 4/12/06, admit that you were
aware that Don Halvorson was going to attend the meeting and that you were going to
give him time to speak. (See Plaintiffs' Secorid Interrogatories (Arneberg)
lnterrogatories No. 12 including all subparts.)

RESPONSE:
Objection as to relevance of request. Without waiver of objection: Denied that hearing was
considered and admitted as to being aware Don Halvorson was going to attend and was given time
to speak.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 29:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 29: Admit that
you denied Plaintiffs a ~ e a n i n g f uresponse
l
by not taking steps to accurately record the

minutes of the 4/12/06 meeting, that is, to provide a verbatim transcribable record of the
meeting.

IIESPONSE:
Denied.

DEFE-NDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND REQbESI FUR ADMISSIONS
(ARNEBERG) -- 13
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 30:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 30:
Considering the feasibility/ infeasibility of a hearing on 3/21/07, admit that time was
allotted on the agenda for the Plaintiffs to talk about their complaints and that Plaintiffs
had submitted a letter outlining their complaints 2 weeks ahead of time to notify
Defendants of their complaints.

RESPONSE:
objection as to reievance of request. 'Without waiver of objection: Denied that a hearing
was considered and admitted time was allotted and that a letter was submitted.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 31:
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, REQUEST NO. 31: Admit that
you denied Plaintiffs a meaningful response by not taking steps to accurately record the
minutes of the 3/21/07 meeting, that is, to provide a verbatim transcribable record of the
meeting.

RESPONSE:
Object as to relevance of request. Without waiver of objection: Denied.

VERIFICATION

STATEOFIDAH0
) ss.

County of Latah

1

Orland Arneberg, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that he is a Defendant in
the above-entitled action; that he has read the foregoing Responses, and that the contents thereof are
true to the best of h s information and belief.

DEFEhii31~4llT'SRESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND REQUEST FOR ALMISSIONS
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TEM NO. 20

3.2 Operating Procedures Motion.

Defendants incorporate Section 3.1 of this Answering Brief in its entirety in response to the
Operating Procedures Motion. Plaintiffs' entire argument is premised on an assumption, which
Plaintiffs have failed to support factually on this record, that the District has overstepped its
boundaries and, in doing so, left Plaintiffs without procedural safeguards to prevent a predeprivation
loss of property rights. As there is, at the least, a genuine issue of fact as to whether the District has
overstepped any boundaries, this Motion must fail as Plaintiffs have not shown any cause to claim a
deprivation of their rights.
This Motion must also fail because Idaho Code 5 40-203 A provides a predeprivation
process that allows any property owner within the District system, a right "to initiate public
proceedings to validate a highway or public right-of-way" if the "location of the highway.. . cannot
be accurately determined due to numerous allegations of the highway.. .." among other provisions.
Idaho Code 5 40-203 A(1). This statute speaks directly to Plaintiffs' circumstances, yet, as this
Court has previously been advised through a declaratory judgment filed by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs
elected not to avail themselves of this "predeprivation" remedy that Idaho law provides.
Again, as ivith the Nullification Motion, Plaintiffs' legal theory and support is misguided.
The District's policy for improving public highways under its jurisdiction is based on Idaho Code
$40-23 12 and the holdings of Mesei-vey and its progeny. The District is well within its legal rights
to widen a road without holding a public hearing when that activity occurs within the area of the
District's public right-of-way. Plaintiffs fail to accept or understand that the District is empowered
under law to improve and even widen public highways so long as it does not exceed, under usual
circumstances, the lawkl 50 foot width of that highway. Plaintiffs' failure to accept or understand
has resulted in a need to grasp at procedural "straws" such as are presented with this motion. The
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED SEPTEMBER 19, OCTOBER 6 AND OCTOBER 2 1,2008,
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE AND DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY
FEES -- 8

cases cited by Plaintiffs primarily center on the deprivations of personal rights or freedoms visited
by government on unsuspecting citizens otherwise powerless to act. Even under those
circumstances, the courts have been reticent to apply a broad stroke requiring a hearing before every
deprivation of a person's rights. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U S . 3 19,335 (1 976); see also
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,268-9 (1 970). The Mattlzews and Goldberg cases illustrate that
the degree of potential deprivation that may be caused by a particu!ar decision is a factor in
assessing the validity of the process, as is the fairness and reliability of the process and the probably
value, if any, of the additional procedural safeguards. Id. A Anal factor in striking the appropriate
due process is the "public interest." This includes the administrative burden and other societal costs
that would be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an evidentiary hearing
upon demand in all cases.. .." Mattlzews, supra at 347. The administrative costs to the District in
matters such as the instant case would outweigh any safeguard. Moreover, this case is unique in the
District's history which is evidence that this alleged problem does not need additional safeparcfs
See Arneberg Affidavit, par. 10.
Therefore, given that Plaintiffs have not shown a deprivation, have an avaiIable
predeprivation remedy, and have not shown that a hearing is warranted under the due process
considerations of this case. t h s Motion must be denied.

3.3 4 1983 Motion.
Defendants incorporate Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this Answering Brief in its entirety in
response to the $ I983 Motion. This Motion appears to be a rehash of the Operating Procedures
Motion within a different cloth and adding mention of a certain driveway permit issue. Again,
Plaintiffs have not shown a violation of their constitutional property rights, and the District has
shown that the District has acted withn its lawfit1 authority in all matters pertaining to Camps
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL
SUMAM*ARY
JUDGMENT FILED SEPTEMEER I?, OCTOBER 6 AND OCTOBER 2!, 2008,
DEFENDANTS' IMOTION T O STRIKE AND DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY
FEES -- 9
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Don and Charlotte Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, ID 83 537
(208) 289-5602
dawn01@<tds.net

Commissioners
North Latah County Highway District
1132 White Avenue
hfoscow, ID 83843

August 8,2007
Moscow, Idaho

Dear Commissioners:
After several discussions on the subject of your claim of prescription to the north side of
Camps Canyon Road and your resistance to wanting to validate Camps Canyon Road under 40203a or to even wanting to look at 40-203a, we shall consider these discussions as completed
unless the NLCHD has any further findings of fact.
. The highway disiricls oS Idahu have a systern US rules whicli gives then1 the authority
and the discretion to maintain safe highways for the people of Idaho. Inasmuch as the NLCHD
is allo~vedto interpret their statutes, it would not be likely that one interpretation would be
deliberate indifference to the statutes. Therefore it would be unlikely to treat highway validation
with deliberate indifference as this would probably be unconstitutional. Maintaining a valid
right-of-way is a necessary link in respecting the property rights of landowners. This
constitutional right may be violated by conunissioners and personnel who are not trained in these
statutes andlor by organizations which show indifference toward them. Indeed the NLCI-ID has
a responsibility to maintain safe roads, but they are obligated to do so fairly as outlined ill tlie
statutes. Indifference to this obligation by simply creating a policy of not taking on the
resolution of valid complaints and by ignoring the encroachment of roads and fences is not in
keeping with the spirit or the letter of the law (see Ida110 Regulatory Takings Act guidelines).
Yet this deliberate indifference is manifested by a number of questions, acts and omissiolls.
What care has the NLCHD taken to insure property rights are respected and even not
violated? At the time that the 1996 revision of Camps Canyon Road took place uras not a survey
required (40-605)? (A survey would l~a\;eprevented, if not guided the resolution of these
incidents). If a survey was not done prior to the revision at the discretion of the con~missioners,
then what are the guidelines dictated by such discretion to insure that this discretion is not
arbitrary or capricious? Under routine maintenance of a gravel road bed how far does the
average centerline migrate? What then is the procedure for non average road beds (i.e. changing,
altering, widening, revising, straightening, etc.)? How are these no11 average situations then
accounted for? (Statutes require that records be kept.) In the event of multiple revisions how is
the accrual of movement recorded? (We ask tlzat these questions be answered in ~ l r i i i ~as~most
g
ofthe important docurnerztation seems to avoid the record of the rnitzutes of the meetings.)
In the light of the fact that at the edge of a roadway is private property these matters
would seem to dictate care rather than deliberate indifference. As multiple incidents arise a
pattern of a possible policy arises also. Do you actively listen to these complaints and inquiries,
investigate them, come to a final decision on them and insure the complaint or inquiry was
addressed and answered? An empty complaint box xvould not necessarily mean there are no
complaints, but rather that this policy has been in effect long enough that the patrons ha~regiven
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We request that the NLCHD make final decisions in the follott.-ingmatters either by
resolution now or in writing by 8/15/07
1)

INCIDENT OF PUSHING THE TREE THROUGH THE FENCE

At the 4/12/06 Highway District meeting, I brought to the attention of the
commissioners the blatant disregard for private property as evidenced by a fallen tree
pushed through the fence. The grader operator had pushed a wind fallen tree through our
fence. Richard Ha~sor!(NLCHD Commissioner) vehemently claimed that he did not
believe that a highway employee would do such a thing. I said that I found it to be
unbelievable also, but it was so and that I would be glad to show him if he would come
out to see. Richard Hanson did come out about 6 weeks later and he and I walked down
Camps Canyon Road to observe our complaints. The following is excerpted from our
notes..
"In May, 2006 I met with Richard 1Hanson on site. I told him that if we both
found this event (the kllen tree being pushed through [he fence) to be
unbelievable, then it is gross negligence, for neither he nor I would believe
that a reasonable man would do such a thing. I offered him the possibility of
two to three other people to confirm what I had said. (Notwithstanding that
he claimed he did not believe that a highway employee would do such a
thing) Hanson claimed the event was within their prescriptive right. I told
him it mas also within their prescriptive right to act reasonably. (Neither
Hallson nor any other Highway District personnel have seemed interested in
talking to any other people who might confirm or extend any remarks I had
made.) He went on to say that it was, after all, my tree as the landowner
coiltiilues to own what is not uithin the roadbed but is still within the
prescriptive right-of-way. I pointed out to him that the tree originated on the
other side of the road and in any event was not my tree. Furthermore the tree
lay where it had lain for six months; the remains of the tree had not been
causing anyone other than the road district a problem. A neighbor had sawed
out a chunk of the tree to allow passage of vehicles, and maintenance on that
section of the roadway was only once a year. There did not appear to be any
emergent reason to deal with the tree at the n~omeiltof the passage of the
grader. (This eltent did er'entunllj, lend to the escape of livestock). This claim
that the prescriptive right overrides everything is, in our opinion, not correct.
Furthermore our fence lies outside of the old prescriptive right-of-way that
was given up in 1996. Although Richard Hanson agreed 1% it11 me on the
probable past position of the road he seemed to rely on Orland Arneberg's
claim that there had been no revisions to the road bed during his
[Arneberg's]"watch". Richard Hanson probably does not have historical
experience; and so is at a disadvantage to say when or how alterations have
occurred. We may or may not have asked Orland or the foreman, Dan
Payne."
In thc 3/21/07 meeting this isstue was brought up again in which Mr
Hdnson asked if our fence was more than twenty-five feet fiom the center of
the road and u e res~ondedthat it was more than 25 feet from the center of
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the old prescriptive right-of-way. We do not believe that a highway district
can create a new prescriptive right-of-way. Further we state that the NLCHD
does not know the exact location of the right-of-way due to their alterations
of the road. This would require survey and records both of which seem to be
cahied out with deliberate indifference.
Our opinion is that the pushing of the tree through the fence is not justified in the
presence of or the absence of a prescriptive right-of-way. Furthermore we consider these
acts and omission as a taking of private property.

2)

BURYING THE FENCE WIRES DURING THE 2006 ROAD BED WIDENING

At the 3/21/07 regular meeting we showed the commissioners pictures of tlie
wires buried during the 2006 widening of the road bed. Dan Payne asked where this
fence eilcroachrnent was and I told him that it was between the culvert and the corral.
Althougli notified at this meeting no repair has occurred.
We consider these acts and omissions to be a taking of private property

3)

THE INCIDENT OF THE ROLLER BEING PUSHED INTO THE FENCE

At the west end of the corral fence there is a section of fence constructed of four
2x6 rails. These rails cover the anchor chain which stabilizes the support post for the
westward heading section of wire fence. An old soil cornpaction roller lay outside of the
corral fence here since around 1996. Tn 1996 the higllway district revised the road and T
rebuilt the fence. The roller came from across the road--the f-larris/Huff place, now the
Wagners7. The roller and a deck of logs were left at tlie edge of the road by the highway
district after that revision. It did not belong to me, so T left it where it stood and built the
new corral fence leaving the roller outside of the fence. In 2006, when the road was
widened, the highway district filled the older ditch at the edge of the road with their
widening. They then created a new ditch by pushing the roller into the fence dislodging
supportpost.
- The previous drainage had been
a rail and undert??iningthe ~t~irefence
working fine for ten years.
We consider these acts and omissions to be a taking of private property. Pushing
the roller into the fence is not justified in the presence or absence of a prescriptive rightof-way.

4)

JK4GNER DRIVEJVAY ACCESS PERLVIT AZu'D TRESPASS

Regular meeting of Noi-th Lataii County Highway District took place on
4/12/2006. Orland Arneberg mLCHD Commissioner) and Dan Payne took a biased and
what \we felt was u n l a ~ ~ fposition
ul
on the Wagner driveway saying that the prescriptive
right-of-way gave Bob frt-agner the right to trespass as the disputed area was on their
prescriptive right-of-way. Dan Pajne's conter~tionthat the road frolitage he had
(j17i 4
\J L' Y
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measured was not in accordance with the Wagner deed was correct. However, this
incongruence of the physical situation and the deed description was evidence of road bed
alteration and revision rather than a factor for giving the Wagners a permit to construct a
driveway access. (Dan Payne and Orland Arneberg should have known this for it was
they that altered the highway.) The need for a survey was clear and I suggested that the
NLCHD and the Wagners share tlie cost of a professional survey. Either the highway
district didn't know where the highway was in relation to the public record due to
multiple revisions, in which case a survey and validation of the highway was in order; or
they did know the highway had moved out of its old prescriptive right of way in 1996 and
they were purposely misrepresenting the situation. Either way the NLCHD did not liave
a valid right-of-way because they had not done the survey at the time of the revision.
Although the driveway access Mias the topic the NLCHD wanted to talk about I brought
up other issues mainly concerning the abuse of the prescriptive right of way (the
driveway issue was made a "prescriptive right" issue by the NLCHD.).
We consider these acts and omissions to be a taking of private property.

5)

VALIDATION OF THE RIGHT OF WAY
A.

There is no finding of fact to substantiate tlie Highway District claim of
prescription. Orland h e b e r g ' s testimony (Camps Canyon road has not
been moved on his watch or lifetime.) is simply repeated testimony as it is
neither substantiated by evidence and an exercise of reason nor stands
alone as a finding of fact as not rebutted. ( q t l ~ IVLCHD
e
has any evidence
or$fir?dingoffact fo substanfiate this stafenzentpleasejbrwrd it to us
immediately.)

B.

We offer the following as evidence in rebutting Orland Arneberg's
testimony and any or all other findings as they may be in averring a claim
of prescription.
I.

Deed indicating stated distances from survey points - (no claim is
made for this as a recorded survey). The points referenced in the
deed do accurately represent the historically accepted property
corners on the ground. REFERENCE A

2.

Survey by Ri~iirockConsultants(recorded instruments No. 5 138 19
and No. 506494) indicating the survey points of the road at
present. FEFERENCES D and H

3.

The difference in kil and #2 is at the east property and at the west
end. These measurements are shown to be movement of the road
bed to the North as follows.

HOWTHE SURVEYPOINTSAREALIGNED
Point of beginning (Point 0 ) is determined from intersection of 6 line
of Camps Canyon Road and West line of SE % / NE 54 of Section 15.

CjSit.j
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Subsequent property corners A; B and C are sequentially aligned from
that intersection.
DESCRIPTION
OF MOVEbIENT OF ROAD BED OF CAMPS
CANYON
ADJACENT TO SAID 3+/- ACRE PSIRCEL.
Reference A (previously noted as ffl above) describes point 0 as the
intersection of line of Camps Canyon Road with West line of SE !A /
NE % of Section 15 as being approximately 12 rods and 3 feet south of
NW corner of the SE !4 / NW !A of Section 15 (20 1 feet).
Reference H. Recent survey by Rimrock Consulting: Point 0 now
lies 148.52' south of corner of the SE !A / NW % of Section 15.
Point 0 has moved 521- feet to the North. Point C has nioved 53 +/-' to
the North
We believe both surveys to be accurate within their ow11degrees of
latitude of accuracy.

4.

Aerial photos of 1949, 1965, and 2005 presented in errant
interpretation by the Highway District at the 312 1/07 regular
meeting as evidence of no movelne~ltof the road bed. Further
accurate measurements and comparison to the 1989 (reference I)
photos shows similar niovement of the road bed similar to the
difference noted in ff-3)and that the movement occurred after 1989
If these aerial photos are to be submitted as qualified evidence of
position of Carnps Canyon Road, some exercise of rational
examination should be exemplified in their interpretation.

5.

Evidence of old road bed at the east TVagner property line

6.

Request by Dan Payne of Ed Swanson to alter the road bed in
1996.

7.

Public opinion.

Due to numerous alterations to Camps Canyon Road the location of the highway can not
be determined accurately and due to the fact that Camps Canyon Road did not conform to the
location of the highway as described in the public records (Prior to our survey conducted by
Rirnrock Consultants), we consider the right-of-way and the claim of prescription to be invalid
and a taking of private property.

PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT

0-,
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We submit the following description as a final decision on the dispute over the right-ofway of Camps Canyon Road as it travels through our property. We request that acceptance of
this settlement be presented as a resolution now or in writing by 8/15/07. Denial or lack of
action by resolution will be considered by us as a final decision and further action will be
pursued as appropriate.
The path of Canlps Canyon Road through SE !A of the NE ?4conier of Section 15
1)
T39N3WBM shall be described into two parts. Beginning at the E line of section 15 and the
intersection of Camps Canyon Road with Little Bear Ridge Road 25 five feet will be deeded to
the NLCHD on the south side of the present centerline of Camps Canyon Road to the
intersection of the property line with the U'agner parcel. On the north side of Camps Canyon
Road 25 feet shall be deeded from the present center line of Camps Canyon Road from the
intersection of Little Bear Ridge Road to tlie point of the eastern most fence post (approximately
1/8 mile from the beginning point- east of the clump of pine trees). Froin this fence post and
westward from it the north edge of the road bed is to be described as the property line, except in
cases where the road bed encroaches on the fence. At these points the property line is described
as being one foot south of the fence line. This description is to be surveyed and recorded. This
survey, recording and any necessary cunveyal-ice slyall be the fiilatlcial responsibility of the North
Latah County Highway District. (At any point that the highway district feels that it can not
adequately provide a safe roadbed and maintain a safe road bed they can survey their intended
needs and compensate for removal of and reconstructioii of the fence and the acquired land. The
road bed can then be validated in its new position.)
Erection of a barrier to protect private property from eiicroacll~ilentof routine
2)
maintenance and snow removal.
We submit the following bill for survey conducted and recorded by Rimrock
3)
Consultants which was done to remove the trespass of the Wagner driveway access in 2006 on
our property. We feel the NLCWD and the Wagners are the direct, proximate, legal, implied, and
intervening cause of this trespass. By not only issuing a permit but also promoting this trespass
in the 4/12/06 regular meeting of the NLCHD, and the construction of this access during a time
of dispute, the NLCHD and the Wagiiers did act negligently and in bad faith and participated in a
taking of private property. As concurrent, sufficient combined and joint causes this permitting
and coiistruction did damage the terrain of the land, result in general darnages to the right to
enjoy land arid special damages incurred in the recovery of the private property. The said survey
by Rimrock Consultants was necessitated by this taking to rightfully return possession of the
property to us. Acceptance of this will be indicated by reimbursement of this amount ($5,156.50)
to us no later than 8/15/07. Non remittance of this request will after 8115/07 be considered as a
final decision and further action will be taken as appropriate.
4)

Expenditures for fence damages, repaired and to be repaired accrued to 818107-

$1000.
Legal fees accrued due to these proceedings will also be submitted for remittance
5)
when finalized.

??*
%-/

To

Commissioners, N
August 6,2007

atah County Higliway District

Don and Charlotte Halvorson
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ITEM NO. 22

2. I have been employed by Defendant North Latah County Highway District
("District") since 1974 and District foreman since 1994. Since 1974, my duties for District
foreman have included maintaining and improving projects on Camps Canyon Road with the
primary difference being that, as foreman, I oversee and supervise the District's work instead of
doing it.

3. 1 have personal knowledge of the location of Camps Canyon Road and practically all,
if not all, of the maintenance and improvement work that has been undertaken by the District on
Camps Canyon Road since 1974.
4. At least since 1974, the District has maintained Camps Canyon Road as needed by
grading and/or adding gravel.
5. In 1996, to improve road safety for increased public, vehicular traffic, the District
widened the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road on the north side (the side then owned by
Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest to Plaintiffs' real property) by approximately 4 feet to its
approximate present width by hauling in fill dirt from a ditch cleaning project nearby and
grading that dirt and adding some gravel onto the road surface, and the District installed a culvert
and covered the exposed bedrock in the road with fill dirt.

6. In 2005 and 2006, to improve road safety for increased public vehicular traffic, the
District widened the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road on its southerly side (the side
opposite Halvorsons' real property) by drilling and blasting bedrock, adding gravel to level the
road surface, sloping and seeding the banks on that side, extending the culvert under the road by
approximately four feet (4') and improving the ditch on that southerly side of the road.

AFFIDAVIT OF DAN PAMYE DY OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL
SUMMAXY LBGMENT FILED S E P T E m E R 19, OCTOBER 6 A9,D OCTOBER 21,2008 -- 2
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7 After the District's improvements in 2006, the traveled surface of Camps Canyon
Road does not exceed approximately 23 1/2 feet in width in the general vicinity of Plaintiffs' real
property and averages approximately 21 feet in width in that stretch.
8. Camps Canyon Road follows the same approximate centerline now that it did when I

began work for the District in 1974.

9. In addition to using and maintaining the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road and
in order to properly grade and drain the road for safe public travel, the District must maintain the
cut slope, which is the southerly side of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of Plaintiffs'
property and the ditch and culvert on that southerly side bencath the cut slope, and the District
must utilize the fill slope, which is the northerly side of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of
Plaintiffs' real property, for structural support for the traveled surface of the road and for snow
removal and storage in winter months.
10. Absent special circumstances, which are not applicable in this case, such as when the

District has been deeded a public right-of-way less than fifty feet wide or when an improvement
predated the establishment of the public road, the District's public road maintenance and
improvement activities are undertaken based upon Idaho law that states a public highway shall
be not less than fifty (50) feet wide. In my opinion, this minimum width is reasonably necessary
to properly maintain a public highway in rural Latah County that is safe and reasonably
convenient for the public.

1 1. The entire stretch of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of Plaintiffs' real property
used by the District for public highway purposes as described in paragraph 9 above lies within
the District's minimum fifty (50') wide right-of-way.

AFFIDAVIT OF DAN P A W IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL,
S T M M m Y JUDGMENT F L E D SEPTESfBER 19, K T O B E R 6 Ah33 OCTOBER 21,2008 -- 3
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12. Sometime after 1996, Plaintiffs constructed a fence on the steep hillside on the full

(northerly) slope adjacent to the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road and, in places, within
fifteen feet (1 5 ' ) of the centerline of Camps Canyon Road. While the fence does not interfere
with the public traffic on the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road, the District's maintenance
activities, primarily grading and snow removal, are affected by the fence's placement. That is,
given the steepness of the slope on Plaintiffs' property, it is virtually impossible to properly
maintain Camps Canyon Road without some gravel or snow reaching Plaintiffs' fence. Plaintiffs
have failed to remove or reconstruct the fence outside of the District's right-of-way and, in fact,
Plaintiffs have now used their placement of the fence to support their claim that the District has
damaged and trespassed upon their property. To the contrary, the District has been diligent in its
efforts to avoid causing any damage to Plaintiffs' misplaced fence or their property.

13. The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated this 4th day of November, 2008.

SUBSCEUBED AND SWORN TO before me this 4th day of November, 2008.
r
L
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NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of Idaho
My commission expires:
- '7 -. c ./2

AFFIDAVIT OF DAN PAYNE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL
S U h M m Y J'T&rDGMENTF L E D SEPTEMBER 19, OCTOBER 6 AND OCTOBER 21,2008 -- 4
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ITEM NO. 23

2. I am the Secretary of the North Latah Ccunty Highway District ("District") and, as
such, custodian of and responsible for the District's official records.
3. Included in the District's records is the official map of the District's highway system

showing the general location of each public highway within the District's jurisdiction.
Following public hearing and adoption by the District's Ccmmissioners pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 40-202(1), this official map was recorded under Instrument No. 356157, records of Latah
County, Idaho, on November 18, 1986. Camps Carryon Road, including the portion thereof that

is at issue in this litigation, has been shown on the District's official map as a public highway
under jurisdiction of the District from its adoption to the present.
4. Based upon review of the District's records which reveal that neither the District nor
Latah County ever received a deed to Camps Canyon Road, it is my opinion that Camps Canyon
Road was established as a public highway through public use.
5. The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated this 4th day of November, 2008.

bw-

Dan C&-scallen

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 4th day of November, 2008.

NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of Idaho
My commission expires:
1
7 - 2 il I 3

AFFIDAVIT OF DAN CARSCALLEN IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS7MOTIONS
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDChlENT FILED SEPTEMBER 19, OCTOBER 6 AND
OCTOBER 2 1,2003 -- 2

TEM NO. 24

2. 1 have Iived on Little Bear Kidge Road in the vicinity of Camps Canyon Road since

my birth in 1926.
3. I remember traveling by automobile on Camps Canyon Road with my parents fi-om
about the age of four between Little Bear Ridge Road and Burnt Ridge Road which passes
through or near the real property owned by Plaintiffs Halvorson that is at issue in this matter.
4. In the I 93OYs,when 1 was a student at the Little Bear Ridge grade school located on

Little Bear Ridge near its intersection with Camps Canyon Road, I oftentimes sledded down
Camps Canyon Road with friends during the winter months, weather permitting.
5. I have traveled frequently by motor vehicle on Camps Canyon Road in the area of the

Halvorsons' real property every year since 1930 and observed other members of the public
routinely using Camps Canyon Road during that time period.
6. I have been a North Latah County Highway District ("District") Commissioner since
the late 1970's and have served as Chairman of the District's Board of Commissioners for
approximately 24 years.
7. Camps Canyon Road is a public highway under the jurisdiction of the North Latah

County Highway District. It is my belief that Camps Canyon Road was established as a public
highway through public use prior to 1930.
8. Although improved by the District over many years, Camps Canyon Road follows

the same approximate centerline now that it did when I first traveled it in the early 1930's
9. Throughout my term as a District Commissioner, the District and its employees have
made every reasonable effort to undertake a11 public highway improvements and maintenance
activities on public highways within the District's jurisdiction, including those established
through public use, within a fifty-foot right-of-way prescribed by Idaho Law.

AFFIDAVIT OF ORLAND M B E R G IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS
FOR PARTIAL S W A R Y JUDGMENT FILED SEPTEMBER 19, OCTOBER 6 AND
OCTOBER 2 I , 2008 -- 2
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10. As a convenience to property owners, the District and its employees make every

reasonable effort to communicate with affected property owners regarding improvements to
public highways within the District's highway system prior to undertaking those improvement
projects. I-Ialvorsons' Complaint is the first the District has received from a property owner
since I became a District Commissioner which complains that the District took the property
owner's property without due process of law.
I I. The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief

Dated this 4th day of November, 2008.

,Lf,

L2/+4'*

Orland Arneberg
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 4th day of November, 2008.

J

.q/ui
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N O T ~ Y
PUBLIC for the State of Idaho
My commission expires: 4.-I 7--Jc i -;

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 4th day of November, 2008,I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:

DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537

[ X] U.S. Mail

[ 1 Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ ] FAX (208) 322-4486
[ ] Hand Delivery

AFFLDAVIT OF ORL-AND ARNEBERG IN OPPOSITION TO PLAlh'TIFFS7 MOTIONS
FOR PARTLAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED SEPTEMBER 19, OCTOBER 6 A%T
OCTOBER 2 1,2008 -- 3

Don Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537
(208) 289-5602
Plaintiff. Pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife))
Plaintiffs
VS.

Case No. CV 2008-180

)

PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS

)

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

North Latah County Highway District; Board of )

JUDGMENTS AND OTHER

Commissioners for the North Latah County

)

MOTIONS SUBMITTED

Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard

)

JANUARY 26, 2009 AND BRIEF

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official

)

Capacities, and in their lndividual Capacities;

)

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

)

Individual Capacity

1

Defendants

)

1. Motions
1.1
-

Under IRCP Rule 56, Plaintiffs. as a matter of law, move/petition Court to grant

partial summary judgment on Defendants' policies, customs, standard operating procedures,
interpretations of and/or the exertions of go\-ernmental pourer, under the color of state law, under

I.C. 5s 40-23 12, 23 17,2319, 203a, 605, 1310: 608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7,
andlor under Defendants authority to issuelto revoke driveway access permits in regards to a

PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009, AND BRIEF
1
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claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way are facially invalid, as they ilnproperly interfere
with abutting land owners property rights and violate abutting landowner's 5" Amendment and
14'" Amendment rights by resulting in the taking of wrongful possession of abutting land
owner's land; and/or Defendants' policies/customs are not rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest, and do not provide a record (a necessary evidentiary hearing) on which
the agency can rationally base a decision, and therefore not a valid exercise of Defendants police
powers are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants discretion and/or are illegal, and are
therefore facially invalid; and/or said policies, customs, exertions of governmental power fail to
circuinscribe Defendants' broad authority to issue/revoke drive way access permits, to determine
encroachment to unrecorded prescriptive rights of way, and/or to determine the width of
unrecorded prescriptive rights of way, and/or the validity of the legal establishment of
unrecorded prescriptive rights of way with statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous
deprivations. Plaintiffs petition Court, in these facial challenges, to grant order to strike down
the exertiolis of Defendants governmental pourer (custom/policy/standard operating
procedure/interpretation of I.C. §§ 40-23 12'23 17,2319,203a, 605, 13 10, 608, 2302, Title 40Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and/or under Defendants authority to issue/to revoke driveway
access permits). Plaintiffs seek relief in the form of temporary and permanent injunction
preventing any further improper interference with abutting land owner's 5"' Amendment rights,
destruction of abutting landowners property, ~vsongfulinvasion and occupation of abutting land
owners land, andlor by any further extensions of the "width of the road", by ulifounded and
unsubstantiated claims to "width of the easement" greater than the "width of the road" and/or the
legally established width and location as authority to act/fail to act for unrecorded prescriptive
rights of way without substantial evidence in the agency record to support such claims and
without due process and equal treatment under the law, declaratory relief as to abutting
landowners' rights to due process and equal protection in any and all exertions of governmental
power effecting property abutting to, underlying and adjoining to a claimed unrecorded
prescriptive right of way/highway.
PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUhlMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009, AND BRIEF
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1.2
-

Under IRCP Rule 56, Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, movelpetition Court to grant

partial summary judgment on Defendants' policies, customs, standard operating procedures,
interpretations of and/or the exertions of governmental power, under the color of state law, under
I.C.

$5 40-23 12,23 17, 2319,203a, 605, 1310, 608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7,

and/or under Defendants authority to issuelto revoke driveway access permits as applied to
Plaintiffs in regards to Plaintiffs' land in the SENE Section 15 T39 N 3WBM and the highway
Camps Canyon Road traversing Plaintiffs' land from the late fall of 2005 until present are
invalid. Defendants' exertions of governmental power, under I.C.

$5 40-23 12, 23 17, 23 19,

203a, 605, 1310, 608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7,andlor under Defendants
authority to issuelto revoke driveway access permits, as applied to Plaintiffs, have i~nproperly
interfered with Plaintiffs' property rights, have resulted in Defendants' wrongful possession of
Plaintiffs' land temporarily and/or permanently, and/or the destruction of Plaintiffs fence and
property; Defendants' exertions of power, as applied to Plaintiffs, bear no relatioil to and/or
Defendants have shoun no relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, andlor
are not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, and Defendants have provided no
evidentiary hearing on which to base their findings and conclusions, and therefore not valid
exercises of Defendants police powers; and as Defendants' exertions of governmental powers are
capricious and arbitrary, as Defendants' conclusions and findings are not supported by
substantial evidence in the agency record and/or "not for public use", an abuse of Defendants'
discretion and/or illegal; and/or said policies, customs, exertions of governmental power fail to
circun~scribeDefendants' broad authority to issue/revoke drive way access permits, to determine
encroachment to a claimed unrecorded prescriptive rights of way, andlor to determine the valid
width, location, use andor character of the clainled unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camp
Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, and/or the validity of the legal establishment of the claimed
unrecorded prescriptive right of way Camp Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, with statutory
safeguards and remedies for erroneous deprivations. As applied to Plaintiffs, Defendants'
actionslfailures to act have violated Plaintiffs sthAmendment rights as Defendants have provided
PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009, AND BRIEF

no evidentiary hearing on which Defendants base their findings and conclusions and their
actionslfailures to act are so arbitrary and capricious as to violate Plaintiffs due process and not
"for public use rights, and Plaintiffs seek relief under their14thAmendment rights and under 42
U.S.C. 1983 for injunctive and declaratory relief and damages. In this as applied challenge,
Plaintiffs petition Court to grant order for injunction preventing Defendants' invalid,
unconstitutional applications of Defendants' exertions of governmental power, under the color of
state law, under I.C.

5s 40-23 12,23 17,23 19,203a, 605, 1310, 608, 2302, Title 40-Chapter 20,

Title 7-Chapter 7, and/or under Defendants autliority to issuelto revoke driveway access permits
(custom/policy/standard operating procedurelinterpretation of I.C.

$5 40-23 12, 23 17, 23 19, 203a,

605, 1310, 608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and/or under Defendants autl~ority
to issue/to revoke driveway access permits) and to grant order that Defendants are liable under
42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff seek relief in the form of the return of Plaintiffs' wronghlly taken
property and any and all economic and non economic damages incurred by Plaintiffs in such
wrongful taking as to be determined by trial, temporary and permanent injunction preventing any
further improper interference with Plaintiffs' 5thAmendment rights by any further extensions of
the "u-idth of the road", by unfounded and unsubstantiated claims to a "width of the easement"
greater than the valid "widtli of the easement" or as so to be determined by an evidentiary
hearing as authority to actlfailure to act for the unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps
Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 31-1- acre parcel, without substantial evidence in the agency
record to support such claims and without due process and equal treatment under the law,
declaratory relief as to the accurate determination of the width of the road and Plaintiffs rights to
due process and equal protection in any and all exertions of governmental power effecting
Plaintiffs' property abutting to, underlying and adjoining to Camps Canyon Road, and for full
common law damages to be proved at trial.

1.3
-

Under IRCP Rule 56, Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, n1ove:petition Court to grant

partial summary judgment on Defendants' policies, customs, standard operating procedures,
interpretations of andlor the exertions of governmental power, under the color of state law, under
PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009, AND BRIEF
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I.C. $ $ 40-23 12, 23 17,2319,203a, 605, 1310,608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7,
and under Defendants authority to issuelto revoke driveway access pesmits; as Defendants'
exertions of governmental power denies Plaintiffs equal protection of a legally established, valid,
a highway location, width, use andlor character established at a evidentiary hearing in
consideration of the circumstances pertaining to Camps Canyon Road, unless previous owner
had limited the width with a fence in the SENE T39N R3WBM right of way/highway traversing
Plaintiffs' property, as all other similarly situated abutting landowners abutting to or underlying
to recorded and or to unrecorded prescriptive rights of waylhighways under the jurisdiction of
the NLCHD or ill the State of Idaho andlor as all other similarly situated abutting landowners
abutting to or underlying to deeded rights of waylhighways under the jurisdiction of the NLCHD
or in the State of Idaho, as no rational basis for this denial has been s h o r n to Plaintiffs and as
such this denial bears no relation to the public health, safety, morals, and/or general welfare and
is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest as this denial is not supported by
substantial evidence in the agency record, is an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or is illegal;
or that these exertions are subject to strict scrutiny, as applied to Plaintiffs, this denial has
violated Plaintiffs

st'' Amendment substantive rights by wrongfully, arbitrarily and capriciously

taking Plaintiffs' land. Plaintiffs petition Court to grant order enjoining Defendants from
enforcing their exertions of governmental power under I.C. $5 40-23 12,2317,2319,203a, 605,
1310, 608, 2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and under Defendants authority to
issuelto revoke driveway access permits and/or as applied to Plaintiffs andlor to grant order that
Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs seek relief in the form of the return of
Plaintiffs' ~vrongfullytaken property and any and all economic and non economic damages
incurred by Plaintiffs in such wrongful taking as to be determined by trial, temporary and
permanent injunction preventing any further improper interference with Plaintiffs'
Amendment rights by any further extensions of the '"idth

jth

of the road", by unfounded and

unsubstantiated claims to "width of the easement" greater than the .'width of the road" as
authority to actlfail to act for the claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon
PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
h4OTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009, AND BRIEF
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Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, without substantial evidence in the agency record to
support such claims and/or to validate Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part and witliout due
process and equal treatment under the law, declaratory relief as to the accurate determination of
the width of the road and Plaintiffs rights to due process and equal protection in any and all
exertions of governmental power effecting Plaintiffs' property abutting to, underlying and
adjoining to Camps Canyon Road, and for full common law damages to be proved at trial and the
return of Plaintiffs' wrongfully taken land.
1.4
-

Under IRCP Rule 56, Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, movelpetition Court to grant

partial summary judgment on Defendants' policies, customs, standard operating procedures,
interpretations of and/or the exertions of governmental power, under the color of state law, under
I.C. $5 40-23 12, 2317, 23 19,203a, 605, 13 10,608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7,
and/or under Defendants authority to issuelto revoke driveway access permits; as Defendants'
exertion of governmental power, facially, goes too far and destroys the value of abutting land
owner property by allowing tlie physical invasion of and occupation of an abutting land owners
land, denies abutting land owner the right to peacefully enjoy their land and the right to the
economic benefits derived from their property and the right to restrict others from their property
and is not a valid exercise of Defendants' police powers, violating abutting land owner 5th
Amendment rights to due process and an evidentiary hearing andlor for a public use. Plaintiffs
petition Court to grant order to strike down the exertions of Defendants governmental power
(custom/policy/standard operating procedurelinterpretation of I.C.

$5 40-23 12, 23 17,2319, 203a,

605, 1310, 608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and/or under Defendants authority
to issuelto revoke driveway access permits) and Plaintiffs petition Court to grant order for
injunction preventing Defendants' unconstitutional applications of Defendants' exertion of
governmental pourer, under the color of state law, under I.C. $6 40-23 12,2317,23 19,203a, 605,
1310, 608, 2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, andlor under Defendants authority to
issueito revoke driveway access permits. Plaintiff seek relief in the form of temporary and
permanent injunction preventing any further improper interference with abutting land owner 5"'
PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009, AND BRIEF
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Amendment rights by any f~lrtherextensions of the "width of the road" without substantial
evidence in the agency record to legally establish and or verify the location, width, use and/or
character of the right of way and without due process and equal treatment under the law and not
for public use, by unfounded and unsubstantiated claims to "width of the easement" greater than
the "width of the road" as authority to actlfail to act for unrecorded prescriptive rights of way
without substantial evidence in the agency record to support such claims.

1.5
-

Under IRCP Rule 56, Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, movelpetition Court to grant

partial summary judgment on Defendants' policies, customs, standard operating procedures,
interpretations of andlor the exertions of governmental power, under the color of state law, under
I.C.

$5 40-23 12'23 17'23 19,203a' 605, 1310,608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7,

andlor under Defendants authority to issuelto revoke driveway access permits; as Defendants'
exertion of governmental power, as applied to Plaintiffs, results in the physical invasion and
occupation of Plaintiffs' land and destroys the value of Plaintiffs' property, denies Plaintiffs the
right to peacefully enjoy their land and the right to the economic benefits derived from their
property and the right to restrict others from their property and is not a valid exercise of
Defendants' police powers, violating Plaintiffs 5thAmendment rights to due process andlor for a
public use. Plaintiffs petition Court to grant order to strike down the exertions of Defendants
governmental power, as applied to Plaintiffs, (custorn/policy/standard operating
procedurelinterpretation of I.C.

$5 40-23 12, 23 17,2319,203a, 605, 1310,608, 2302, Title 40-

Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7,andlor under Defendants authority to issuelto revoke driveway
access permits) and Plaintiffs petition Court to grant order for injunction preventing Defendants'
unconstitutional applications of Defendants' exertion of govenlmental pom-er, as applied to
Plaintiffs, under the color of state law, under I.C. $ $ 40-23 12,2317, 23 19, 203a, 605, 1310, 608,
2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7,andor under Defendants authority to issuelto
revoke driveway access pernlits and Plaintiffs petition Court to grant order that Defendants are
liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff seek relief in the form of the return of Plaintiffs'
wrongfully taken property and any and all economic and no11 econolnic damages incurred by
PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009, AND BRIEF

Plaintiffs in such wrongful taking as to be determined by trial, temporary and permanent
injunction preventing any further improper interference with Plaintiffs' 5'" Amendment rights by
any further extensions of the "width of the road" without due process and equal treatment under
the law and not for a public use, declaratory relief as to the accurate determination of the width
of the road and Plaintiffs rights to due process and equal protection in any and all exertions of
governmental power effecting Plaintiffs' property abutting to, underlying and adjoining to
Camps Canyon Road, and for full common law damages to be proved at trial.
1.6
-

In the alternative, under IRCP Rule 56, Plaintiffs, as a matter of law,

movelpetition Court to grant partial summary judgment on Defendants' interpretations of andlor
the exertions of governmental power, in the event that this Court determines that all required due
process and/or equal protection and/or determinations of public use were carried out correctly
and in compliance with the 5"' Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and under I.C.

$5 40-23 12,

23 17, 23 19,203a. 605, 1310, 608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7,andlor under
Defendants authority to issuelto revoke driveway access permits; that Defendants' exertions of
governmental power goes too far and destroys the value of Plaintiffs' property, denies Plaintiffs
the right to peacefully enjoy their land and the right to the economic benefits derived from their
property and the right to restrict others from their property and has taken Plaintiffs' property and
provides no provision for just compensation for the value of the property taken and the duration
of the time of the taking, facially andlor as applied, violating Plaintiffs 5th Amendment rights.
The relief that Plaintiffs seek is just compensation of the fair market value of the property taken
for public use.

1.7
-

Under IRCP Rule 56, Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, move/petition Court to grant

partial surnmary judgment that Defendants', in their individual and official capacities, under the
color of state law, have violated Plaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process rights and
Plaintiffs equal protection rights by their arbitrary and capricious exertionsifailures to exert their
governmental powers, not supported by substantial evidence in the agency record, abuse of
Defendants' discretioil andlor Defendants' illegal acts/failures to act, by the wrongful taking of
PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009, AND BRIEF

Plaintiffs land resulting in the physical invasion of Plaintiffs' land, by issuing andlor failing to
timely revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit and widening of Camps Canyon Road in
the vicinity of the 311- acre parcel beginning in the late fall of 2005 and continuing to the
present, and damage to Plaintiffs' property without due process andlor equal protection of the
law. Plaintiffs continue their claim that the issue which causes the harm is the that Defendants
claim of an undisputed 50 foot, 25 feet from centerline, unrecorded prescriptive right of way is
disputed (the "width of the easement" needs to be factually determined, if there is a dispute
before Defendants act) as Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part is as claimed, an unrecorded
prescriptive right of way and by definition no evidentiary hearings have been held to make a
rational decision on the width, location, use and/or character of the right of way and that this
issue requires due process and that it is undisputed that Defendants have not afforded Plaintiffs
due process ("no final decision") and that Defendants have i~nproperlyexerted their
governme~ltalpowers, Defendants' actlfailures to act are arbitrary and capricious, as in widening
of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+1- acre parcel andlor issuinglfailing to
revokelfailing to revoke in a timely manner the first Wagner driveway access permit without "a
final decision"-provide

due process and/or equal protection-of

the "width of the easement" of

Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel and Defendants have therefore made
findings and conclusion not based on substal~tialevidence in the record and have acted and have
failed to act under invalid policies/customs; broad authorities of "not unauthorized"
actionslfailures to act uncircumscribed with statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous
deprivations: therefore Plaintiffs have a valid 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim. Plaintiffs petition Court to
grant order that Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff seek relief in the form of
the return of Plaintiffs' wrongfully taken property and any and all economic and non economic
damages incurred by Plaintiffs in such wrollgful taking as to be determined by trial, temporary
and permanent injunction preventing any further improper interference with Plaintiffs' 5'"
Amendment rights by any further extensions of the "width of the road" without due process and
equal treatment under the law and as is only supported by substantial evidence in the agency
PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
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record, by unfounded and unsubstantiated claims to "width of the easement" greater than the
"width of the road" as authority to actlfail to act for the unrecorded prescriptive right of way,
Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, without substantial evidence in the
agency record to support such claims and without due process and equal protection of the law,
declaratory relief as to the accurate determination of the width of the road and Plaintiffs rights to
due process and equal protection in any and all exertions of governmental power effecting
Plaintiffs' property abutting to, underlying and adjoining to Camps Canyon Road, and for full
common law damages to be proved at trial.
1.8 Under IRCP Rule 56, Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, lnovelpetition Court to grant
partial summary judgment that Defendants', under the color of state law, have violated abutting
land owner's procedural and substantive due process rights and equal protection rights by their
invalid policies, customs, standard operating procedures for widening a claimed unrecorded
prescriptive right of way as well as for issuinglrevoking driveway access permits as well as for
adjudicating the issue of encroachments on an easement of an unrecorded prescriptive right of
way by not circumscribing Defendai~ts'"not unauthorized" exertions of govenmlental powers
under I.C. $5 40-23 12,23 17, 23 19, 203a, 605, 1310,608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7Chapter 7, by not making provisioils for an evidentiary or predeprevatio~ihearing and/or with
other statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous deprivations. Plaintiffs petition Court to
grant order enjoin Defendants from enforcing their policies andlor customs on unrecorded
prescriptive rights of way without substantial evidence in the agency record to support such
claims.

1.9 Under IRCP Rule 56, Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, movelpetition Court to grant
partial summary judgment that Defendants', under the color of state law, have violated Plaintiffs'
procedural and substantive due process rights and Plaintiffs' equal protection rights by their
invalid policies, customs, standard operating procedures for widening the claimed unrecorded
prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, as well as
for issuinglrevoking driveway access permits for the issuance and failure to revoke the first
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Wagner driveway access permit, as well as for adjudicating the issue of Plaintiffs' fence
encroaching on the easement of Camps Canyon Road by not circumscribing Defendants' "not
unauthorized" exertions of governmental powers under I.C. $4 40-23 12,23 17, 2319,203a, 605,
1310, 608, 2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, by not making provisions for an
evidentiary or predeprevation hearing and/or with other statutory safeguards and remedies for
erroneous deprivations; therefore Plaintiffs have a valid 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim. Plaintiffs petition
Court to grant order that Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs seek relief in the
form of the return of Plaintiffs' wrongfully taken property and any and all economic and non
economic damages incurred by Plaintiffs in such wrongful taking as to be determined by trial,
temporary and permanent injunction preventing any further improper interference with Plaintiffs'
5"' Amendment rights by any further extensions of the "width of the road" without due process
and equal treatment under the law and support by substantial evidence in the agency record and
illegal damage to Plaintiffs' fence, by unfounded and uilsubstantiated claims to "width of the
easement" greater than the "width of the road" as authority to actlfail to act for the uilrecorded
prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+1- acre parcel, without
substantial evidence in the agency record to support such claims, declaratory relief as to the
accurate determination of the width of the road and Plaintiffs rights to due process and equal
protection in any and all exertions of governmental power effecting Plaintiffs' propei-ty abutting
to, underlying and adjoining to Camps Canyon Road, and for full cornmoil law damages to be
proved at trial.

1.10 Under IRCP Rule 56, Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, movelpetition Court to grant
partial summary judgment that Defendants', under the color of state la-7, have violated Plaintiffs'
rights under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act
and/or Title 40 Chapter 20 of the Idaho Code and have violated Plaintiffs' 5thand 1 4 ' ~
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution rights of due process (procedural and substantive) and
equal protection and as such Plaintiffs petition Court to grant order that Defendants are liable
under 42 U. S.C. 1983. Plaintiff seek relief in the form of the return of Plaintiffs' wrongfully
PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
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taken property and any and all economic and non economic damages incurred by Plaintiffs in
such wrongful taking as to be determined by trial, temporary and permanent injunction
preventing any further improper interference with Plaintiffs' 5"' Amendment rights by any
further extensions of the "width of the road" without due process and equal treatment under the
law and without support by substantial evidence in the agency record, and illegal damage to
Plaintiffs' fence, by unfounded and unsubstantiated claims to "width of the easement" greater
than the "width of the road" as authority to actlfail to act for the claimed unrecorded prescriptive
right of way, Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, without substantial
evidence in the agency record to support such claims, declaratory relief as to the accurate
determination of the width of the road and Plaintiffs rights to due process and equal protection in
any and all exertions of governmental power effecting Plaintiffs' property abutting to, underlying
and adjoining to Camps Canyon Road, and for full common law damages to be proved at trial.

1.11 Under IRCP Rule 56, Plaintiffs and under IAPA, as a matter of law, movelpetition
Court to grant judicial review of the NLCHD record on the acquisition, establishment, and
alterations to Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel and the issuance andlor
failure to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit. I.C. 3 67-5201 defines an "agency"
according to the type of actions which the agency undertakes and as such and in this action
Defendants and the NLCHD fulfill this definition of agency, agency action and agency rule or
order.

1.12 Under IRCP Rules 37 and 26, andlor under Idaho's Doctrine for the Spoliation of
Evidence relevant to Civil Case CV 2008- 180 pertaining to the establishment of Camps Canyon
Road in SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM, to the alteration, widening, and/or straightening of
the prescriptive right of waylhighwaylroad, Camps Canyon Road from 1996 to present, to the
determination of the present limits (e.p. width, location, character, use) of the Camps Canyon
right of way, and to the destruction of the first Wagner driveway access permit, Plaintiffs
petition Court to grant order to sanction Defendants and Defendants' Counsel for discovery
abuse andlor for spoliation of evidence. In relief Plaintiffs petition Court, at the Court's
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discretion, to apply such fees and costs to Defendants and Defendants Counsel as Court deems
appropriate, to consider these matters as an admission by conduct and to apply a negative
evidentiary ruling adverse to Defendants in all issues pertaining to the location and width of the
claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 34-1acre parcel, before and after the 1996 alterations to Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the
3+/- acre parcel, in the issuance and /or failure to revoke the first Wagner driveway access
permit, and before and after the 2005 and 2006 widenings of Camps Canyon Road, in the
vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel and/or to disallow Defendants from augmenting the agency public
record with findings, conclusions, facts, or evidence not already properly in the public record
and/or already properly recorded whether in minutes, records, logs, or other docun~ents,and
other sanctions as this Court sees fit to do under its inherent powers to protect the integrity of the
judicial process and to ensure fairness to Plaintiffs for Defendants'
destr~~ctionlspoliationlconcealmei~t
of the evidence Defendants are duty bound to maintain.

Defendants have failed to keep accurate records and to survey prior to alteration; therefore
Defendants have no basis for their claims, conclusions and findings. It would now be unfair to
allow Defendants to unilaterally create a record ad lib. The claims that Plaintiffs m&e are based
on the fact that Defendants have made operational actions/failures to act without a record of
substantial evidence. Defendants have intentionally destroyed the evidence the precedent
conditions of the as is wllere is physical attributes of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the
3+/- acre parcel by altering the unrecorded prescriptive right of way without first creating

accurate record to do so. The agency record in this case made be required for determination of
damages, and or injunctive and declaratory relief; however, the proper place for it is at a public
meeting, not by affidavit and/or testimony of opinions of the Defendants at trial.
1.13 Under IRCP Rule 56, Plaintiffs petition Court, for partial summary judgment on the
issue that Defendants' policies/customs/stai~dardoperating procedures for accurate record
keeping, surveying, recording, and/or conveying of or maintaining records of acquired easements
and/or agreements with abutting land owners or of alterations, widening, or straightening of
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prescriptive rights of way/highways/roads is invalidlunconstitutional,as applied to Plaintiffs, as
Defendants' policieslcustomslstandard operating procedures do not circumscribed Defendants'
broad authority with statutory safeguards andlor remedies for erroneous deprivations. Plaintiffs,
therefore petition court to grant order that, Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff
seek relief in the form of the return of Plaintiffs' wrongfully taken property and any and all
economic and non economic damages incurred by Plaintiffs in such wrongful taking as to be
determined by trial, temporary and permanent injuizction preventing any further improper
interference with Plaintiffs' 5thAmendment rights by any further extensions of the "width of the
road" without due process and equal treatment under the law and without support of substantial
evidence in the agency record, and illegal damage to Plaintiffs' fence, by unfounded and
unsubstantiated claims to "width of the easement" greater than the "width of the road" as
authority to act/fail to act for the unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road in
the vicinity of the 3+1- acre parcel, without substantial evidence in the agency record to support
such claims, declaratory relief as to the accurate determination of the width of the road and
Plaintiffs' rights to due process and equal protection in any and all exertions of governmental
power effecting Plaintiffs' property abutting to, underlying and adjoining to Cainps Canyon
Road, and for full common law damages to be proved at trial. In the alternati~e,Plaintiffs
petition Court for partial summary judgment on the issue that Defendants are negligentlnegligent
per se in obtaining and keeping accurate records.

1.14 Plaintiff petitiod move Court to Reconsider Plaintiffs' Partial Suillmary Judgments
Filed September 19, October 6, and October 21 under I.R.C.P. Rule 11 (a) (2) (B) and under
IRCP: Rule 56 (d)". ..by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an
order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to
which tlie amount of damages or other relief is not in controx7ersy,and directing such further
proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
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deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly"; Rule 56 (e) "Form of
affidavits - Further testimony - Defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may peimit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against the party"; and Rule 56 (g)" Affidavits in summary judgment proceedings made in bad
faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits
presented pufsuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the
court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused that party to incur, including
reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of
coiltempt", Plaintiffs petition Court, for Reconsideration of Plaintiffs' Partial Suininary
Judgments Filed on September 19, October 6, and October 21 on the grounds that: (i) the Court
failed to ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro.irersy,that is what
substantial evidence exists in the agency record to substantiate Defendants' claims of a fifty
foot-25

feet froin centerline right of way (Camps Canyon Road is an unrecorded prescripti.i~e

right of way) exists presently or ever existed and what material facts are actually and in good
faith controverted; (ii) the Court failed to direct such further proceedings in this action that are
just by denying Plaintiffs partial summary judgment, that the agency record does not substantiate
Defendants' claims of a fifty foot-25

feet from centerline right of way originally existing

(Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel was a claimed unrecorded
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prescriptive right of way-no

formal evidentiary proceedings have taken place) and the agency

record runs contrary to Defendants' present claim of a fifty foot-25

feet from centerline right of

way as Defendants have admitted to altering the claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way,
Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in 1996,2005 and 2006 and admit to
having not afforded Plaintiffs due process and equal protection by providing no hearing or "final
decision" or validation of the claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road
in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel and that such actionslfailures to act are not legal under I.C.
Ij 40-23 12; (iii) opposing affidavits were not made on personal knowledge, Orland Arneberg was

only a four year old at the time he said Camps Canyon Road existed as a county road before
1930 (this requires 5 years prior to 1930, regardless whether a four year old child is competent to
testify on the observation of who and %?henpeople may have been traveling on Camps Canyon
Road prior to 1930); were made in bad faith-Orland

Arneberg's averring that the centerline of

Camps Canyon Road follows the same "approximate" centerline now as it did in the 1930 (there
is no evidence in the agency record on the centerline of Canlps Canyon Road in the 1930s, no
surveys or descriptions of the land intended for the alterations of 1996,2005,2006 (see 1.C.s $
40-605 and 1310) and no accurate records (see I.C.5 § 40-608 and 2302)of the agreements with
land owners or of the alterations intended (Defendants First Record Supplement attests to facts
and opinions of fact which run counter to Arneberg's affiance that the centerline is the same now
as it was in 1930); Orland Asneberg's affiance that that a fifty foot right of way is prescribed by
law wit11 no evidence in the record to substantiate a fifty foot right of way in this case is not even
a valid presumption let alone has been determined by law; Orland Arneberg's affiance that the
NLCHD talks with land owners before making improvements when Defendants have
acknowledged that Plaintiffs were gillen no notice or hearing and acknowledge that all Plaintiffs
attended the 4/12/06 meeting in which the Wagners attended and time was allotted on the agenda
and no hearing was held and that Plaintiffs have attended several meetings and have written
letters and that no -'final decisions"; Dan Carscallen's affiance that Camps Canyon Road is on
the official map without substantial evidence in the agency record that an evidentiary hearing
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confirming Camps Canyon Road rightful inclusion on said map is meaningless if not provocative
of the wrong public and public assumptions (see Homestead Farrns v. Board ofColrnm 'rs Tetor?
County, state ofIdaho, 141 Idaho 855, 119 P 3d 630 (2005); Dan Carscallen's affiance that
Camps Canyon Road was established by use and without more, as substantial evidence in the
agency record, runs contrary to Orland Arneberg's affiance that a fifty foot right of way exists, as
an u~lrecordedprescriptive right of way has no evidence in the record other than to presume it
might have a fifty foot right of way, unless the landowner limited the width of the right of way
with a fence; Dan Payne's affidavit admits that alterations were made to Camps Canyon Road
without substantial evidence in the agency's public record (no formal hearings on the original
presumed fifty foot right of way, unless the right of way had been limited by a land owner by
fence or some other means has taken place neither before or after the 1996 alterations nor before
or after the 2005 or the 2006 alterations) and that the "width of the easement" is a matter of law,
and that the original width of the road was in his opinion (not substantiated by evidence in the
public record) to be 2 1 feet minus 4feet added to the north side in 1996 and minus 4 feet added to
the south side in 2005 and 2006--equal to 13 feet and this affiance whether to be considered to
be admissible evidence as it is not part of the public record runs contrary to Defendants claim of
use to the extent of 50 feet existed prior to 1996; Dan Payne' affiance that his description of the
Camps Canyon right of way lies within the District's fifty foot is in bad faith as there is no
evidence in the agency's public record to conclude or base a finding that the District has a fifty
foot right of way; Dan Payne's affiance that the damage to Plaintiffs' fence is due to Plaintiffs'
placement of Plaintiffs7 fence is unsubstantiated by the agency record as Plaintiffs' fence could
legally be placed at the edge of the road and Plaintiffs left a buffer between the edge of the road
and the fence of 5 to ten feet in the narrowest 15 foot segment of the buffer and that most of the
buffer was, when Plaintiffs reconstructed the fence, in excess of 10 to 15 feet, and that
proportionally speaking for a 15 foot road base, as was the width of the road after the 1996
alterations, Plaintiffs buffer was a greater buffer than a 25 foot from centerline right of way
leaves for a 23 foot road base (15 feeti23 feet=.65; there is 13.5 feet of room at the edge of the
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width of the road for snow storage maximum if one assumes a fifty foot right of way; .65 of a 15
foot right of way would proportionally need .65x13.5 feet=8.8 feet of room for snow). Plaintiffs
far exceeded the buffer needed for snow storage even though they were not required to do so and
the injury lies with Defendants unreasonableness and care in plowing the road. Further,
Defendants have the power of eminent domain to obtain land for road purposes and they are
legally prohibited to damage Plaintiffs' fence whether a 50 foot right of way exists or not and
both conclusio~lsand findings-that

the damage to Plaintiffs' fence and the position of Plaintiffs'

fence are not substantiated by the evidence in the agency record; nor set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence-a

validation or evidentiary proceeding is a matter of public

agency record and the public agency record can not be augmented outside of a public meeting;
(iv) Defendants set forth no specific facts which would not indicate the 50 foot "width of the
easement" was not debatable and required a predeprivation hearing; further the evidence iuns
contrary to a g debatable 50 foot "width of the easement"; Defendants showed no evidence
from the agency record and their response to interrogatory showed they have no evidence in the
public agency record that the claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road
in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel is fifty feet wide or that the present claiin of a fifty foot-25
feet from centerline is the identical one so claimed at the end of the prescriptive period or that
would be sufficient to meet their burden at trial that Defendants have not deprived Plaintiffs of
their property and/or liberty rights as they readily admit no due process was given Plaintiffs and
that they have widened the road and issuedifailed to revoke the first Wagner driveway access
permit; Defendants claimed authority to 50 feet of right of way under I.C. § 40-23 12 and the
holdings of Meservey, neither of which imply that a 50 foot right of way is any more than a
presumption (not mandated as a choice is given for the width of a highway) and indicate an
evidentiary hearing is necessary to consider the circumstances peculiar to the case, and that a
fifty foot presumption is not alid if the landotf-ner had limited the width with a fence; as a

matter of law. whether the verbiage is nullificatio~~,
lack of validation, or the burden of proof lies
m-ith those claiming prescription as they have changed the road from the unrecorded user
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evidentiary record of the actual physical attributes of the right of way as they existed before 1996
and without accurate record keeping or prior survey the Defendants had a duty to perform
without an agency record of substantial evidence that they fulfilled their duty, Plaintiffs were
entitled to a judgment on the undisputed facts (that the right of way was disputed and
unsubstantiated by substantial evidence in the public record) and not simply a repetition of the
undisputed fact-the

claim of the 50 foot "width of the easement" needs to be factually

determined. This is the undisputed fact that Plaintiffs petitioned the Court to grant an order
confirming liability of Defendants under § 1983, as Defendants needed to substantiate in the
agency record before Defendants applied their claim through their actions/failures to act which is
in effect Defendants' "final decision"; (v) Defendants affidavits were made in bad faith, as the
claims that the Defendants are within their lawful 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of way is
simply repetitious testimony, unsupported by specific evidence, which has been rebutted, as this
Court confirms by saying that the width of the Camps Canyon easement must be addressed; (vi)
Court can not meld facial and as applied claims; Court denied Plaintiffs Motion for partial
summary judgment on Defendants' invalid standard operating procedure to widen a prescriptive
right of way on the basis of an as applied factual determinatioll-"the

width of the easementn-

although wliich "width of easement" was not specified it was implied to be the ~vidthof the
Carnps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 31.1- acre parcel easement (see State v. Korsen 138
Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d 126 (2003)(generally a facial challenge is mutually exclusive from an
applied challenge), (vii) the Court erred in its findings or conclusio~lsor abused its discretion as
the Court's denial of the partial summary judgments was not based on the substantial evidence in
the record and was not made in accordance with the law, I.C. $40-23 12 and the holdings of

Meservey; (viii) the "width of the easement" is a factual determination more properly a part of
the administrative process of the NLCHD and a mater of NLCHD agency record; and (ix) the
partial sunlrnary judgments were petitioned for as a matter of law-(a)

there is not substantial

evidence in the agency record to sustain a conclusion that a fifty foot-25 feet from centerline
right of way exists (neither Meservey nor I.C. 8 40-23 12 mention a designation of 25 feet from
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centerline) and further all evidence as supplied by Plaintiffs and interrogatories and admissions
of Defendants runs contrary to the claim by Defendants that the present claim of prescription is
the identical one claimed by user as the end of the prescriptive period; (b) Defendants standard
operating procedure for widening a prescriptive right of way is invalid as it is not circumscribed
by statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous deprivations, and most specifically a
predeprivation hearing before action is undertaken which may effect landowners rights-to
determine the "width of the easement"; and (c) not only does (b) qualify Plaintiffs for cause of
action under

5 1983 all actions as applied to Plaintiffs which might be based on the "width of the

easement" make Defendants liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 upon Defendants admission that they
have done so and they have not offered any due process. As a matter of law Defendants claimed
their policies under I.C.5 40-23 12 and the holdings of Meservey absolved Defendants from
having to determine the width of the easement before operational actio~l/failureto act and/or
when such dispute of the "width of the easement" was brought to Defendants attention; (x) the
Court abused its discretion to grant Plaintiffs partial summary judgment by avoiding Defendants
policies and interpretations under I.C.5 40-23 12 and the holdings of izileservey; (Municipalities
are liable for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 if such violatiolls result from the
execution of an agency's policy or custom (see Monell v. Department of Social Svcs., 436 U.S.
658,694 (1978); and (xi) Court incorrectly identifies I.C. 5 40-203a as a predeprivation remedy
and as a post deprivation remedy I.C. 5 40-203a is inadequate on the grounds: (a) a
predeprivation remedy is feasible, predictable, and practicable; (b) exhaustion of agency
remedies is not necessary under 5 1983; and even if exhaustion of agency remedies was required,
this case meets both exceptions to exhaustion in Idaho as the Defendants are alleged to be biased
both in their culpability to improperly altering Camps Canyon Road and their ties to the
aspirations of the Wagners and it would be unjust to require Plaintiffs pay a $750 fee to petition
Defendants to validate Camps Canyon Road when Plaintiffs had already shown them the
evidence for questioning the validity of Defendants claims and Defendants stated that they were
not interested and the Defendants were acting outside their authority, to operate without a valid
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right of way; and (c) Defendants are esstopped from claiming Plaintiffs should file for validation
proceedings when it is their duty for providing Plaintiffs with a valid right of way (see Ware v.

Idaho State Tax Conzrn 'n, 98 Idaho 477, at 483 (1977).
1.15 Under IRCP Rule 56, Plaintiffs petition Court, for partial summary judgment on the
issue that Defendants failure to initiate validation proceedings, under I.C. § 40-203a and under
the resolution of the Commissioners was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of the Commissioners
discretion, and/or illegal , and that Commissioners were, as final policy makers deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiffs claims of constitutional deprivations. Such failure is capricious and
arbitrary and is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, and therefore not a
valid exercise of Defendants police powers, as applied to Plaintiffs, violating Plaintiffs 5th
Amendment and

Amendment rights. Such failure denies Plaintiffs equal protection of a

legally established right of way/highway traversing Plaintiffs' property, as all other similarly
situated abutting landowners abutting to or underlying to unrecorded prescriptive rights of
wayhighways under the jurisdiction of the NLCKD or in the State of Idaho and/or as all other
similarly situated abutting landowners abutting to or underlying to recorded rights of
wayhighways under the jurisdiction of the NLCHD or in the State of Idaho; that these exertions
are subject to strict scrutinylin the alternative are not rationally related to a legitimate
gover~mlentalinterest, as applied, violating Plaintiffs 5thAmendment and 1 4 Amendment
~ ~
rights. S u c l ~failure results in the physical invasion of and destroys the value of Plaintiffs'
propei-ty, denies Plaintiffs the right to peacefully enjoy their land and the right to the economic
benefits derived fi-om their propel-ty and the right to restrict others from their property and is not
a valid exercise of Defendants' police powers, violating Plaintiffs

sthAmend~nentrights to due

process and/or for a public use. Such failure is arbitrary and capricious as it runs counter to the
evidence in the agency record; as it is not supported by substantial evidence in the agency record;
as Defendants failed to consider an important aspect of the problem-that

authority for their

operational duties is dependent on a valid right of way; as it is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. Such failure is an abuse of
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Defendants discretion andlor is illegal. Plaintiffs petition Court to grant order enjoining
Defendants from enforcing their exertions of governmental power under Defendants invalid right
of way and to grant order that Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs seek relief
in the form of the return of Plaintiffs' wrongfully taken property and any and all economic and
non economic damages incurred by Plaintiffs in such wrongful taking as to be determined by
trail, temporary and perinanent injunction preventing any further improper interference with
Plaintiffs' 5'" Amendment rights by any further extensions of the "width of the road", declaratory
relief as to the accurate determination of the width of the road and Plaintiffs rights to due process
and equal protection in any and all exertions of governmental power effecting Plaintiffs'
property abutting to, underlying and adjoining to Canps Canyon Road, and for full common law
damages to be proved at trial.
1.16 Under IRCP Rule 56, Plaintiffs petition Court, for partial summary judgment on the
-

issue that Defendants failure to reply to Plaintiffs Requests for Takings Analysis, under the
IRTA was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of the Commissioners discretion, and/or illegal , and
that Commissioners were, as final policy makers deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs claims of
constitutional deprivations. Such failure is capricious and arbitrary and is not rationally related
to a legitimate governnlental interest, and therefore not a valid exercise of Defendants police
powers, as applied to Plaintiffs, violating Plaintiffs 5thAmendment and 1 4 ' ~Amendment rights.
Such failure denies Plaintiffs equal protection of a legally established right of way/highway
traversing Plaintiffs' property, as all other similarly situated abutting landowners abutting to or
underlying to unrecorded prescriptive rights of way1highwaq.s under the jurisdiction of the
NLCHD or in the State of Idaho and/or as all other similarly situated abutting landowners
abutting to or underlying to deeded rights of waylhighu-ays under the jurisdiction of the NLCHD
or in the State of Idaho; that these exertions are subject to strict scrutinyiin the alternative are not
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, as applied, violating Plaintiffs 5'"
=Imendment and 14"' Amendment rights. Such failure results in the physical invasion of and
destroys the value of Plaintiffs' property, denies Plaintiffs the right to peacefully enjoy their land
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and the right to the economic benefits derived from their property and the right to restrict others
from their property and is not a valid exercise of Defendants' police powers, violating Plaintiffs
5thAmendment rights to due process and/or for a public use. Such failure is arbitrary and
capricious as it runs counter to the evidence in the agency record; as it is not supported by
substantial evidence in the agency record; as Defendants failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem-that

authority for their operatioilal duties is dependent on a valid right of way; as it

is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise. Such failure is an abuse of Defendants discretion and/or is illegal. A failure to
provide due process and equal treatment under the law in a meaningful way and at a meaningful
time is in and of itself a "final decision". Such defense of no final decision is frivolous and
arbitrary as Defendants have not shown a rational basis to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare. Plaintiffs petition Court to grant order enjoining Defendants from enforcing
*

their exertions of governmental power under Defendants invalid right of way and to grant order
that Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs seek relief in the form of the return of
Plaintiffs' wrollgfully taken property and any and all economic and non economic damages
incurred by Plaintiffs in such wrongful taking as to be determined by trial, temporary and
permanent injunction preventing any further improper interference with Plaintiffs' 5th
Amendment rights by any further extensions of the "width of the road", declaratory relief as to
the accurate determination of the width of the road and as granted by I.C.9 67-8003(3) and to
declare Defendants actioils null and void and to return Plaintiffs land wrollgfully taken by
Defendants and Plaintiffs rights to due process and equal protection in any and all exertions of
governmeiltal power effecting Plaintiffs' property abutting to, underlying and adjoining to
Camps Canyon Road, and for full cominon law damages to be proved at trial.
1.17 Under IRCP Rule 15 (b) Rule 15(b). "Amendments to conform to the evidence.
-

When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment
of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these
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issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial
on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action
will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice the party in maintaining the party's action or defense upon the
merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence",
Plaintiffs petition Court for leave of the Court to make such amendments to their Complaint as
may be necessary to cause Plaintiffs' pleadings to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues and to supplement and amend damages and relief as appropriate.
1.18 Under I.R.C.P. Rules 26, 36, and 37 Plaintiffs petition Court to compel discovery
and consider sufficiency of answers of Defendants failure to answer and Defendants evasive
answers as a failure to answer and Defendants insufficient answers in regards to all agency
records concerning the recording of, laj~ingout of, survey of, evidentiary proceedings in regards
to, and/or other documentation of the claimed right of way Carnps Canyon Road in the SENE
Sectioli IS T39N R3 WBM. Plaintiffs have sought reconciliation of these matter with Defense
counsel to no avail (see Plaintiffs' Certificate of Compliance) and nowr petition Court to
determine such answers and/or responses as in Plaintiffs Third Record Supplement Items Nos. 1,
2, 3, 11, 12, 13, 17, and 18.
1.19 Under IRCP Rule 56, PIaintiffs petition Cou-t, for partial summary judgment on the
issue of Defendants', under the color of state law, in their official capacities and in their
individual capacities, have physically invaded and have wrongfully taken possession of
Plaintiffs' Iand and damaged Plaintiffs property by invading Plaintiffs' buffer by widening
Canlps Canyon Road in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM fi-om the late fall of 2005 until
present and by issuing andlor failing to revoke the First ITJagner driveway access permit
beginning at a to be determined time early in 2006 and extending to a to be determine time.
Defendants have actedlfailed to act arbitrarily and capriciously, andlor have abused their
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discretion, aiid/or have illegally denied Plaintiffs procedural due process in these matters, and/or
have arbitrarily and capriciously, and/or have abused their discretion to, and/or have illegally
determined the width, location, use, and/or character of the easement of Camps Canyon Road, in
the pertinent part, andlor have arbitrarily and capriciously, and/or have abused their discretion to,
and/or have illegally determined Plaintiffs' fence and buffer to be within and/or encroaching on
the Camps Canyon Road easement, andlor have arbitrarily and capriciously, and/or have abused
their discretion to, and/or have illegally issued and/or failed to revoke the first Wagner driveway
access permit. In all such aforementioned matters, and amongst other failures of due process and
arbitrary and capricious conclusions, findings, actions and/or failures to act, abuse of
Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal actions/failures to act, Defendants have failed to provide an
evidentiary hearing to factually determine the width of the easement and therefore all actions
and/or failures to act are a denial of procedural due process and hence are arbitrarily and
capriciously, and/or an abused their discretion, and/or have illegal; as well as, irrational as
Defendants have no evidentiary support in their agency record for their conclusions, findings,
actions and/or failures to act. Plaintiffs petition court to grant order of Defendants' liability
under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and that such actions/failures to act, under the color of state law, were well
~vitkinu7ell established law of which a reasonable person would have known, and to enjoin
Defendants from further "improvements" of, alterations to, andlor issuance of right of way use
permits until the width of the easement of Camps Canyon Road has been factually determined
and to declare Plaintiffs' rights and relations to I.C. $9 30-23 12, 2317, 2319, 203a, 605, 1310,
608, 2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7,and/or under Defendants authority to issuelto
revoke driveway access permits in relation to the Camps Canyon Road right of way, and with
damages as to be determined.
1.20 In the alternative, Under IRCP Rule 57, I.C. 5 10-1201, I.C. § 10-1202, I.C. 5 67-

8003 (3), and anlongst others., Plaintiffs petition Court to grant order declaring Plaintiffs' rights
and relations under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and temporary and pennanent
injunctive relief from Defendants' policies, customs, and/or standard operating procedures,
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and/or Defendants' actions and/or failures to act, and/or Defendants', as and to the extent that
Defendants are final policy makers of the NLCHD, approval of any and all unconstitutional
subordinate's decisions concerning any and all alterations in Camps Canyon Road in the SENE
quarter quarter, any and all Plaintiffs' alleged injuries to Plaintiffs fence andior physical
invasions of Plaintiffs buffer, alteration in the runoff drainage from Camps Canyon Road in the
SENE quarter quarter and/or issuance/revocation of the first Wagner driveway access permit and
to the extent that the first Wagner driveway access pennit was issued and remained un revoked
for an indefinite period of time and to the extent that the invasions of and physical occupations of
Plaintiffs' buffer and the subsequent injuries to Plaintiffs fence involve lands not under the
authority of the Defendants andlor in the wrongful possession of the Defendants; and, even if it
were determined that such lands are urithin the authority of the Defendants, that such injuries and
wrongful possessions of Plaiiltiffs lands both in the alterations to Camps Canyon Road in the
pertinent part and/or the issuance/revocation of the first Wagner driveway access permit are
invalid to the extent that Defendants have no rational basis for the Defendants' conclusions,
findings, actions, failures to act, and/or to a legitimate governmental interest as Defendants'
conclusions, findings, actions, failures to act, and/or to a legitimate governn~e~ltal
interest are
without support of substantial evidence in the agency record and are therefore arbitrary and
capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretioll andior illegal; failure to properly train their
employees in the light of an obvious need to train, and/or in deliberate indifference to the
deprivation of Plaintiffs' property rights and/or improper interference with Plaintiffs' property
rights, and/or the wrongful taking of possession of Plaintiffs' land and the destruction of
Plaintiffs' property, and/or Defendants have failed to circumscribe their broad authorities to
define and legally establish the width, location, use, character, and/or other defining limits to the
Camps Canyon right of wajr, have failed to circumscribe their broad authority to alter Camps
Canyon Road, have failed to circumscribe their broad authority to issue/revoke driveway access
permits, and or have failed to circumscribe their broad authority to determine and/or to enforce
encroachments of Plaintiffs' fence and/or buffer on the right of way of Camps Canyon Road with
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statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous deprivations by not providing evidentiary public
proceedings to record and accurately determine the legal establish position, width, use and/or
character of Camps Canyon Road and/or to not survey and provide and accurate description of
the lands to be used in intended alterations and/or to properly record and/or document
agreements with abutting land owners concerning alterations in the Camps Canyon right of way
and/or to provide a rational basis for their iss~~a~~ce/revocations
of driveway access permits to
insure such permits are wholly on permitee's land andlor to provide notice and hearing to
Plaintiffs in such matters and/or to treat with deliberate indifference Plaintiffs' attempts to
exhaust agency remedies, whether such remedies exist or not; for Defendants to arbitrarily and
capriciously or for Defenda~~ts
to abuse their discretion or for Defendants to illegally deny and/or
not respond to Plaintiffs' Requests for Regulatory Takings Analysis under the IRTA and/or not
initiate validation proceedings when Plaintiffs have reasonably provided doubt of the legal

establishment of and have shown the failure of the Defendants to accurately or reasonably locate
the width, location, use and or character of in their issuance of and/or failure to ti~llelyrevoke the
first Wagner driveway access permit and have shown Defendants that the present location of the
Carnps Canyon right of way in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel does not agree with the Latah
County Records and have asked Defendants to do so and/or to treat deliberate in difference
Plaintiffs' attempts to develop a disputed case, to attend the 4/12/06 meeting of the NLCHD
Co~ninissionersand give Defendants fair warning that they did not have a 50 foot-25

feet from

centerline right of way in the SEXE quarter quarter of Section 15 and even if they once had had
an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, whether it was 50 feet-25 feet from centerline, they no
longer did as the NLCHD under the auspices of Defendants Payne and Chairman Arneberg had
altered the right of way with the permission of the previous otvner and that the location of the
right of way now lies northeast of the old trees and fence which previously had lined the right of
way and that Defendants had no authority to issue the first Wagner driveway access permit for an
access which was east of the east property line of the 31-1- acre parcel, to push dirt and gravel into
Plaintiffs buffer and to push a wind fallen tree through Plaintiffs' fence, as kvell as prepare a
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letter of Plaintiffs' evidence and to arrange time of the agenda to present Plaintiffs' evidence and
to be denied the formality of a hearing, and to be denied a right to represent themselves and the
Defendants' refusal to allow Plaintiffs to speak with Defendants' counsel, as well as a multitude
of other arbitrary and capricious conclusions and findings unsubstantiated by substantial
evidence in the record, abuses of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal acts and/or failures to act;
as in matters concerning the right of way of Camps Canyon Road in the SENE Section 15 T39N

R3WBM froin the late fall of 2005 until present. Plaintiffs petition Court with notice to request
Defendants show cause for Defendants arbitrary, capricious, abuses of Defendants discretion,
and/or illegal acts/failures to act as to why Defendants have no rational basis for a legitimate
governmental interest, lack substantial evidence in the agency record for the Defendants'
co~lclusio~ls
and findings and Defendants denial of notice and hearing to Plaintiffs and
Defendants denial of statutorily provided safeguard and remedies for erroneous deprivations
were not extended to Plaintiffs and why Plaintiffs should not be granted further action under 42
U.S.C. 1983 for damages, injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs seek relief, including but
not limited to, in the form of the return of Plaintiffs' ~vrongfullytaken property and any and all
econoinic and ilon economic damages incurred by Plaintiffs in such wrongful taking as to be
determined by trail, temporary and permanent injunction preventing any further iinproper
interference with Plaintiffs' 5"' Amendment rights by any further extensions of the "width of the
road", declaratory relief as to the accurate determination of the width of the road and Plaintiffs
rights to due process and equal protection in any and all exertions of governmental power
effecting Plaintiffs' property abutting to, underlying and adjoining to Camps Canyon Road, and
for full common law damages to be proved at trial.

1.21 Plaintiffs petition Court under Rule 7(b)(3) I.R.C.P. to enlarge time for Plaintiffs to
name expert witnesses and/or make dispositive motions and to advance all scheduled dates in
this case as to effect at least a 60 day lapse between this Courts' Opinions and Orders as to the
matters in these Motions and the already limited scheduled events leading to the trial in these
matters as to serve justice in these matters and in the manner of judicial economy and to better
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delineate the issues and the facts which need to be determined at the trial and including enlarging
the time until the actual trial date to accommodate such pretrial motions, discovery and/or
conferences.
These motions are supported by Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Plaintiffs' First
Certificate Of Compliance and Plaintiffs' Affidavit In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motions For Partial
Summary Judgments And Other Motions Submitted January 26,2009, And the following Brief.
Plaintiffs request oral argument.
2 Standard for Summaw Judgment
"Judgment shall be granted to the moving party if the nonmoving party fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish an essential element to the party's case." AdcColm-Traska v.
Beker, 139 Idaho 948, 950-51, 88 P.3d 767, 769-70 (2004).
"The requirement found in Idaho caselaw that a party moving for summary judgment
'present evidence' is not a requirement that the party 'present specific facts' as Foster implies.
'Evidence' and 'facts' are related but nonetheless different concepts. As a result, the summary
judgment process imposes different requirements on a niovant than those faced by the adverse
party. Although the party moving for summary judgment must establish through 'evidence' the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact, there is no requirement the movant present specific
facts. See Smith [v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No.

21, 128 Idaho at 719,918 P.2d at 588. Once the

nlovant has made and appropriately supported its motion, it is the responsibility of the adverse
party to come forward with evidence, id., and to 'set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial' I.R.C.P. 56(e)." Foster v. Paul, 141 Idaho 890, 120 P.3d 278 (2005).
(Emphasis added.)

3. Introduction
3.1 Plaintiffs posit that the only claim the Defendants have to an unrecorded prescriptive
-

right of way, as was the case of Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, prior to 1996, is that
it remains as it always has been, unaltered and used and maintained by the public for at least 5
years. By the nature of the beast, an unrecorded prescriptive right of way means it is
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unrecorded; there have been no evidentiary hearings, laying out and/or surveys to accurately

describe the boundaries of the right of way. An unrecorded prescriptive right of way maintains
is legal establishment solely on the basis it remains essentially unchanged, that is identical to the
strip of land as was first acquired. There is no other rational inclusion of an unrecorded
prescriptive right of way into a system of ordered quantities other than the statute wliicli allows
its entry. In the case of the unrecorded prescriptive right of way that entry into the legal system
is 1.C.g 40-203 (see Homestead Farms v. Board of Comm 'rs Teton County, state of Idaho, 141
Idaho 855, 119 P 3d 630 (2005) (an unrecorded prescriptive right of way needs an evidentiary
hearing to enable it to be included on the Highway District's map). The Defendants cannot
perform this function on their own initiative (see Galvin v. Canyon County High~.c)ay
District No.
4, 134 Idaho 579, 6 P.3d 829 (2000) ("Section 40-203A may only be used to validate an existing
highway or public right-of-way about which there is some kind of doubt. It does not allow for the
creation of new public rights. In order to validate a public right-of-way under Ij 40-203A, the
Board must first find that a right-of-way exists although there is some doubt about its current
status"). For Defendants to act upon an unrecorded prescriptive right of way they must have a
rational basis for their actions, such as to improve a highway. Defendants, through their counsel,
assert that I.C. Ij 40-23 12 is the statute under which Defendants base their authority to improve
public highways (see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. 20, at 8-9) ("The District's
policy for improving public highways under its jurisdiction is based on Idaho Code $40-2312
and the holdings of Meservey ...

'I)).

Defendants also claim that all prescriptive rights of way are

mandated to be 50 feet-25 feet from centerline by Idaho Code Ij 40-2312 (see Plaintiffs' Third

Record Supplement, Itern No. 18, at 3-3, Requests for Admissions Nos. 4 3 , and 6). For
Defendants to proceed in such endeavors as to "improve" the unrecorded prescriptive right of
way, they must (i) do so only with statutory authority (see Roeder Holdings v. Ada County, 41
P.3d 237 (2001) ("In the absence of valid statutory authority, an administrative agency may not,
under the guise of a regulation, substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or exercise its
sublegislative powers to modify, alter, enlarge, or diminish provisions of a legislative act that is
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being administered", citing Roberts v. Transportation Dep 't, 121 Idaho 7277, 827P.2d 1178 (Ct.
App. 1991) a f t d 12 1 Idaho 723 (1991)), and (ii) at least a rational basis for a legitimate
governnlental interest (see Gamble v. Eau Claire County, 5 F.3d 285 (7'" Cir. 1993)
(". ..exertions of goverilrnental power that lack a rational basis, in the sense of some connection

however tenuous to some at least minimally plausible conception of the public interest, are held
to violate due process even if there is no procedural irregularity; so it they deprive someone of
life, liberty, or property, they give rise to a claim under the due process clause", citing Pennell v.
City of San Jose, 485 U.S. I, 1I, (1 988); Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund v. Lady Baltimore Foods, Inc., 960 F.2d 1339, 1343 (7thCir. 1992)). Defendants' reliance
on Idaho Code §40-23 12 for authority "to improve" is misplaced (see Roeder Holdings; see
Opinion and Order On Plaintiffs Motions For Summary Judgment And Defendants' Motion For
Protective Orders, For Enlargement Of Time And For Attorney Fees (hereafter Opinion)).
Likewise Idaho Code §40-23 12 does not mandate a 50 foot right-25

feet from centerline right

of way. The Defendants have no legal basis for their authority to "improve" an unrecorded
prescriptive right of way under I.C.

5 40-23 12, nor a legal basis for a mandated 50 foot-25

fiom centerline right of way for an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, ~
g
-iJ

feet

that there is a need

for a factual determination of the "width of the easement". Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants
have not provided them with due process, a factual determination of the "width of the easement",
and in the Plaintiffs recent petitions for partial summary judgments Plaintiffs posited that it is an
undisputed material fact that Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, originally \+-asacquired
as an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, however that the legal establishment is in doubt as its
physical co~~ditions,
as it has been moved from its original position and widened. Therefore it
can not occupy the identical strip of land under which it was claimed-therefore

there is no

physical evidence of the original right of way, as this evidence was destroyed in the 1996
alteration.

3,2 Court has denied Plaintiffs' recent petitions for partial summary judg~nentson the
grounds that the "width of the easement" is a needed factual determination (Opinion at 4, at 7
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and at 8). Plaintiffs concede that the width of the easement is a necessary factual determination;
however, Plaintiffs continue to contend that Plaintiffs have sought discovery of Defendants' facts
of the "width of the easement" to no avail, have been met with htility in trying to get Plaintiffs'
facts of the "width of the easement" into the public record, have aslced Defendants to validate the
unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel,
under their own resolution to provide for adequate evidentiary agency record and/or in some
other way to provide adequate agency record, have submitted Requests For Regulatory Taltings
Analysis and amongst other futile attempts and Plaintiffs have not been given a meaningful
response to any of Plaintiffs' questions as to the evidence Defendants have in the agency record
on which Defendants base their conclusions and findings on the "width of the easement". Based
on Plaintiffs' interrogatories and requests for admissions Defendants have acknowledged they
have no evidence in their agency record to support their findings and/or coi~clusionsthat there
was a fifty foot ripht of way acquired by user at the end of the prescriptive period (see Plaitztiffs '

Third Record Supplement, Item No. 13, at 4, Interrogatory No. 4; See Plaintiffs' Third Record
Supplement, Item No. 18, at 2-3, Request For Admission No. 2) and the evidence ill the record
runs contrary to the conclusions that the 50 foot prescriptive right of way now claimed is the
identical one so claimed at the end of the prescriptive period (see Plaintgfs ' Third Record

Supplement, Item No.1, at 3-4, Request For Admission No. 3, subpart c.; see Plaintiffs' Third
Record Supplement, Item No. 2, at 4-5, Interrogatory No. 3; see Plairztiffs ' Third Record
Szipplenzent, Item No. 3, at 16-17, Interrogatory Nos. 40-44). Further Defendants failed to
survey and/or to accurately describe the lands to be involved if private property was to be
involved in the alterations of 1996 (see I.C. 5 40-605 and I.C. $40-13 10 for the proper authority
to alter, "improve" a highway, not in I.C. 5 40-23 12, as Defendants' counsel states as the origin
of Defendants authority to "improve" and to mandate a "lawful" 50 foot right of way).
Defendants have also destroyed another rational basis for their claim-the

physical attributes of

Camps Canyon Road in the SENE Section1 5 T39N R3 WBM, and without survey and
description no record exists here either. Tlie road now is not the same as it was prior to tlie 1996
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alterations and Defendants decisions, conclusions and findings to widen the road again in 2005
and 2006 and to issuelrevoke the first Wagner driveway access permit on which Defendants base
conclusions and findings as to their claims of a fifty foot-25

feet from centerline prescriptive

right of way on Camps Canyon Road in the SENE Section15 T39N R3WBM are therefore
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion andlor illegal; as, such findings and
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence in the record-no

evidentiary hearing,

have no legal mandated width, and no record of the physical originating basis of the claim-the
identical strip of land on which the claim was made-and

still they deny Plaintiffs due process.

Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs of their property and liberty
rights without due process and equal protection of the law in the Defendants' exertion of their
governmental power based on these arbitrary conclusions (see Cornplaint at 8-25). Such absence
of a factual determination of the "width of the easement" was the undisputed material fact on
which recent petitions of partial summary judgments were based. The Court determined this
undisputed material fact as valid (the width of the Camps Canyon easement must be addressed);
however, the Court then side stepped Defendants' sole defense that, as a matter of law, Idaho
Code 5 40-23 12 and the holdings of hfeservey justify Defendants' actions of urroilgfully taking
Plaintiffs' land and damaging Plaintiffs' fence, and Defendants' claim that Plaintiffs' allegations
of wrongful taking did not require due process (see FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 41 1 U.S. 726,
745-746,93 S.Ct. 1773,36 L.Ed.2d 620 (1973); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278,291, 85 S.Ct.
980, 13 L.Ed.2d 839 (1965) (It is beyond dispute that agency action taken without statutory
autl~orization,or ~ h i c frustrates
h
the congressional policy which underlies a statute, is invalid).

3.3 Even though there are no disputed facts in regards to Camps Canyon road, in the
pertinent part, (i) that it was originally an unrecorded prescriptive right of way; (ii) that in 1996
alterations were made in \\-hi& the physical location was changed and the road was widened;
(iii) that no evidentiary hearing was recorded by the agency to ascertain the location and width of
the easement prior to the 1996 alterations; (iv) that no survey was done prior to the 1996
alterations; (v) that no accurate description of the land required in the alterations; (vi) that no
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record exists as to any agreements made with the owner at that time; and (vii) that no record in
the proceedings of the Commissioners shows orders for laying out or for altering Camps Canyon
Road, in the pertinent part, Defendants say they have the authority under I.C. 5 40-23 12 to once
again to "improve" Camps Canyon Road without providing Plaintiffs with due process (see
Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 20, at 8-9). Defendants do not have substantial

evidence in their agency for the conclusion and findings that they have either a 50 foot or 25 feet
from centerline right of way or that they are still within the original right of way or that no
private property was acquired in the 1996 alteration, and as such, these conclusions are arbitrary
and capricious. Further, the neither I.C. § 40-23 12 nor the holdings of Meservey give
Defendants the authority to improve Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part without affording
Plaintiffs due process. Defendants acknowledge they have conducted "not unauthorized
actsifailures to act on Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part based on these arbitrary and
capricious findings and conclusions-widened

the road in 2005 and 2006 and issued and or

failed to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit in 2006. These acts/failures to act are
also arbitrary and capricious. The widening is based on the arbitrary conclusion that the
widening is within a fifty foot-25feet

right of way. Plaintiffs have alleged that the widening of

Camps Canyon Road from the late fall of 2005 until present and the issuance and failure to
revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit have resulted in the Defendants taking wrongful
possession of their land andlor that Defendants have improperly interfered with Plaintiffs'
property rights ~ Jtaking
J
their land without due process and not for public use. The standard
operating procedure of the Defendants to widen an unrecorded prescriptive right of ~ ~ isa y
invalid for the very reason the Defendants' conclusions and findings in regards to Defendants
claim of a 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right of way on Camps Canyon Road is arbitrary and

capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal-Defendants

have not

circumscribed their broad authority to widen an unrecorded prescriptive right of way with the
statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous deprivations. As a matter of law, Defendants'
standard operating proceduse is facially invalid but it was denied on the grounds of a factual
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determination of the width of Camps Canyon Road (see Opinion, at 7). Court fails to note that a
facial challenge is a matter of law and not a matter of factual determination (see State v. Cobb,
132 Idaho 195 197(1998) (a facial challenge to a statute or rule is "purely a question of law").
Then ignoring that it is the issue which causes the harm (see Williamson County Regional
Planning Comrn 'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172, 193 (1985) (The matter of the "issue that
inflicts the actual, concrete injury" determines the necessary proofs) the Court denied Plaintiffs
cause of action under a valid § 1983 claim. The fact that the width of easemelzt had not been
factually determined was the denial of due process and which resulted in the arbitrary and
capricious actions and failures to act when the Defendants took wrongful possession of
Plaintiffs' land; as the "width of the easement" needs coilfirlnation before Defendants take action
to alter the road (see I.C. $5 40-605, 13lo), as Defendants have no agency record to support their
claim and Defendants have the burden of proof to support their claim with specific facts from
their record, as Defendants must show that Camps Canyon Road has an evidentiary record of
public use and public maintenance for at least five years

that use was prescriptive and 50

feet-25 feet from centerline wide. Defendants are not only without an agency record of
substa~~tial
evidence in support of Defendants actions/failures to act, they also have an agency
record, in this case, in which the evidence runs contrary to Defendants' claims-that

Camps

Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, is prescriptive and 50 feet-25 feet from centerline wide. The
contrary evidence is that Camps Canyon Road has been altered over the last five years and
before (in 1996); tliat these alterations were accomplished without survey andor accurate
description of the lands involved prior to the alteration; that there are not any agency records of
Commissioners findings and conclusions; and that there is no substantial evidence in the record
to support any findings and conclusions. Hence, Defendants affidavits were simply rebutted
repetitious testimony without any specific facts of support, as in recorded evidentiary hearings to
support their claims. Validation proceedings are not properly carried out by affidavit, as they
require due process of a public meeting. This Court recalls its caveat in denying Plaintiffs
petitions for declaratory judgments on I.C. $540-203a and 67-8003(3) that these matters will be
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heard at trial, begs the question if this Court is the proper place for a validation and/or
evidentiary hearing on Camps Canyon Road (see The Oglala Sioux Tribe OfIndians v. Andrus,
603 F.2d 707 (1979) ("It is an establisl~edprinciple that an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations is generally accorded great deference by a reviewing court. See United States v.
LarionoJ-F, 43 1 U.S. 864,872,97 S.Ct. 2 150,53 L.Ed.2d 48 (1977); U h l l v. Tallman, 380 U.S.
1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965). This principle is not, however, absolute. A court
need not accept an agency's interpretation of its own regulatioils if that interpretation is
inconsistent with the statute under which the regulations were promulgated, is plainly
inconsistent with the wording of the regulation, or otherwise deprives affected parties of fair
notice of the agency's intentions. See United States v. LarionofJ; supra, 43 1 U.S. at 872-873, 97
S.Ct. 21 50; Udall v. Tallnzan, Supra, 380 U.S. at 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 792; 4 K Davis, Administrative
Law Treatise 5 30.12, at 260-261 (1958)")..
3.3 In confirmiilg that there is a dispute of the "width of the easement" the Court
confirms Plaintiffs' undisputed facts-that

there is a valid dispute to the claimed 50 foot-25

feet from centerline width; and confirms that Defendants did not bring forth more than a scintilla
of evidence to confirin that the "width of the easement" was adequately and legally decided (see
Opinion at 4, "The status of the prescriptive right of way itself is a question of material fact, thus
summary judgment is not appropriate on this issue"). What is at stake here is what the Court
deems "this issue" to be. Plaintiffs contend that "this issuei' is the "status of the prescriptive
right of way itself is a question of material fact" and as such "the issue" is undisputed-that
Plaintiffs and Defendants dispute the "width of the easement"-there

has not been due process

given Plaintiffs. This too is arbitrary and capricious (see see Lingle v.Chevron US. A. Inc., (04163) 544 U.S. 528 (2005) 363 F.3d 846) (if the action/failure to is so arbitrary as to deny due
process or for public use that is the end of the inquiry). Camps Canyon Road is a claimed
unrecorded prescriptive right of way, meaning there is no agency record on which Defendants
have to rationally base their conclusions and findings. Defendants' conclusions and findings are
now not only ail abuse of Defendants' discretioil (facially illvalid procedures, as a
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predeprivational hearing is necessitated n7he11 in the case of "not unauthorized" actslfailures to
act a predeprivational hearing is foreseeable and feasible; (see Parrutt v. Taylor, 45 1 U.S. 527
(1981) and see Zinermon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113 (1990)); and/or illegal (see I.C. $5 40-605,
1310,608,2302, Title 40- Chapter 20, anlongst others; See Goodirzg Hwy. Dist. v. Idaho
Irrigation Co. 30 Idaho 232, 165 P 99 (1917) ("In order that act of county commissioners in
laying out highway be valid, whether upon public domain or private property, board must
conforin to law giving such authority, as power to establish highways rests in legislature and
right may be exercised only in such manner as legislature provides.")); they are also arbitrary aild
capricious, as these conclusions and findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the
agency record (which is also an abuse of Defendants' discretion andlor illegal). The Court
co~lfirmsthis. "The underlying issue in this case requires a factual determination of the width of
the right of way of Camps Canyon Road", (see Opinion at 8). We agree with Court's statement;
however, that is why Plaintiffs are now in court. There is no substantial evidence in the agency
record that Defendants have completed their duties under I. C. $5 40-605 or 13 10 for any of their
admitted to alterations of Camps Canyon Road, under tj 1983, instead of requesting a judicial
review of a validation proceeding under I.C.

$5 40-208. This Court seems to be saying that

Plaintiffs do not have a $ 1983 procedural due process claim as Plaintiffs must show a "taking"
first, altllough Defendants have never shown a rational basis to the public health, safety, nlorals
or general welfare. The legitimate goverim~entalinterest in this case is the jt"Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution and as such this legitimate gover~mentalinterest is not force the individual to
bear the burden of the public improvement. "'lilt is axiomatic that the Fifth Amendment's just
compensation provision is 'designed to bar Government fiom forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' First
English E~mzgelicalLutheran Church of Glendale v. County ofLos Angeles, 482 U. S. 304,482

U. S. 3 18-319 (1987) (quoting Armstroiig v. United States, 364 U. S. 30, 364 U. S. 49 (1960))"
Pennell v. City ofSan Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9 (1988). See also iMonongahela iYav. Co. v. United
States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1 893). Most simply stated Plaintiffs have shown and Defendants have
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admitted that a "taking" has occurred (see Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980), ("The
determination that governmental action constitutes a talung is, in essence, a determination that
the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power
in the public interest"). Defendants acknowledge to widening the road and issuing the first
Wagner driveway access permit. These are 5'' Amendment violations as Defendants have done
so without due process and for not a public use. "This issue" (valid procedural due process
claims, predeprivational and post deprivational) continues and as well remains undisputed by
Defendants that no hearing has been before the commissioners (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record
Supplement, Item No. 6, at 6). Without waiver of Plaintiffs' predeprivational rights, Plaintiffs
have sought to exhaust agency remedies. Plaintiffs' attempted to establish the facts on which
Defendants base their claims of a fifty foot-25

feet from centerline right of way, not the least of

which was Plaintiffs' repeated attempts to show Commissioners that all the permissive factors
that would allow Commissioners to initiate validation proceedings under their own resolution
were in place and repeated requests that Commissioners initiate validation proceedings.
Plaintiffs have been denied these postdeprivational remedies and this is also undisputed and the
Court has denied Plaintiffs declaratory relief in these matters. As Defendants have not even
attempted to provide due process, only to claim that they did not have to without a legal basis for
their conclusion and without specific facts to support their claim, both of which have been
acknowledged by this Court (see Oinion), these conclusions, findings, actionslfailures to act,
decisions, an&ior exertioils of Defendants' governmental power is arbitrary and capricious, as
well as an abuse of Defendants' discretion andlor illegal (see Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96
Idaho 734,536 P.2d 729 (1975) (An action is capricious if it is done without a rational basis. It
is arbitrary if it was done in disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without
adequate determining principles.))
3.4 The Court's suggestion that the proper course for Plaintiffs to pursue is misplaced;
". . .I.C.§ 40-203a allows for a land owner to initiate a hearing, should doubt exist as to the legal

establishment of evidence of establishment of a highway or public right of way', (see Opinion, at
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8). It is not the job of the Plaintiffs to maintain an agency record substantial enough to support
Defendants' conclusions and findings (see Castrigno v. McQuade, 141 Idaho 93 (2005), citing
Ware, "However, Ware is distinguishable from the case at bar based on key factual differences.
In Ware, the Court never analyzed whether certain failures by the Tax Commission in providing
the mechanics for the plaintiffs to receive a proper tax refund was an adequate basis for the Court
to excuse the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In fact, the exhaustion
doctrine was never an issue, as it appears the taxpayers in that case had complied with the
applicable appellate procedures. Instead, Ware dealt with the issue of whether an agency should
be estopped from claiming that a taxpayer's failure to use the prescribed process for requesting a
tax refund precludes the ability to receive such a refimd when the agency itself had clearly failed
to fulfill its statutory obligation of providing the mechanics of making an application and also
"overtly represented the law as being other than it actually was." Ware, 98 Idaho at 483, 567
P.2d at 429. In such circumstances, the Court found that the Tax Commission's "requirement of
filing a claim for the refund was the requirement of a useless and futile act," and thus the right of
the taxpayer in receiving a refund should not be prejudiced by the course of illegal conduct
followed by the Commission. Id.") (emphasis added). There are no prescribed applicable
appellate procedures for Plaintiffs to oversee Defendants' adequate record keeping policies, and
who may have that authority is unknown to Plaintiffs. However it is quite clear there is no Idaho
statute saying it is Plaintiffs' duty to hold public hearings in order that Defendants record is
replete with substantial evidence to support Defendants' conclusions and findings. Further,
Plaintiffs requests for public hearings has been denied. It is also not necessary that Plaintiffs
sustain further injury-pay

a $750 fee-to

recover what the Defendants have already wrongfully

taken (see Harris v. Counzy of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497 (1 990). To assume Defendants would
suddenly see the light by Plaintiffs paying a $750 fee is irrational; as Plaintiffs had already
shown Defendants evidence of all three permission granting factors for Commissioners to initiate
validation proceedings under their own resolution (see PlaintiSfs AAfJidavif,at 19, see Plaintiffs '
Third Record Supplement, Item No. 4, at 1 through 9).
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3.5 The Court concludes that the Defendants have "submitted affidavits from the
commissioners of the Highway District which have stated that the Commissioners actions
regarding Camps Canyon Road have been made within the lawfbl authority of the Highway
District", (see Opinion, at 9). These statements are simply repetitious testimony that has
repeatedly been rebutted, as the statements are unsupported by specific evidence. Plaintiffs
disputed this at the hearing, that the affidavits do not bring forth specific evidence that the
agency record contains substantial evidence to support Defendants claims, conclusions or
findings. Further, Defendants improperly attempted to conduct a validation proceeding by
affidavit, and to supply data which was not extended to Plaintiffs through interrogatory and
improperly are augmenting the public record. If the Court implies that the Defendants have
substantial evidence in their records to substantiate their claim to the location and width of the
Camps Canyon right of way, such as an evidentiary hearing of some sort to establish the validity
of their claims, to exonerate their actions/failures to act, then Plaintiffs petition Court to compel
that discovery and to determine sufficiency of Defendants' answers as Plaintiffs have not
received any such indication such recorded evidence exists. I.C. 3 40-202(3) sets forth three
types of highways, two recorded and one unrecorded. The unrecorded one is described as
highways that were 'used for a period of five (5) years, provided they shall have worked and kept
up at the expense of the public'. Highways in this unrecorded category require evidence
showing that the road was used for a period of five years and worked and kept up at the expense
of the public, with the exception of those unrecorded ways which may have been established
before 1893 when no public upkeep was required (see Homestead Farms v. Board ofConznz 'rs
Teton County, state ofIdaho, 141 Idaho 855, 119 P 3d 630 (2005) (Justice Eismann

SPECIALLY CONCURRING). Such evidence must be taken at an open public meeting and
therefore should be part of the public record.

3.6 Further, Defendants do not rely on a factual determination for their claim nor on an
unambiguous reading of iMeservey and I.C. 3 40-2312, as they say Aeservey and I.C. 3 40-23 12
gives them the authority to widen a road without holding a public hearing (see Pluintiffs ' Third
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Record Supplement, Item No. 20, at 8-9). Defendants claim here is in error on two counts: (i)
the authority to widen is not found under I.C. Cj 40-23 12 (and as such violates the authorizing
statute to widen, I.C.

$5 40-605 and 1310); and (ii) neither Meservey nor I.C. 5 40-2312 suggest

that anything can be done without a hearing, an evidentiary proceeding, to the contrary Meservey
says consideration to the circumstances peculiar to the case must be given. Defendants'
interpretation of I.C. Fj 40-23 12 and the holdings of Meservey is misplaced and invalid as neither
Meservey nor I.C. Fj 40-23 12 grant Defendants the authority to operate within a 50 foot-25 feet
from centerline of a claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way without a evidentiary
proceeding, at the least not by denying the abutting landowner an opportunity to rebut and there
is no presumption if the landowner had limited the width of the right of way in such manners as
with a fence. Further neither Meservey nor I.C. 5 40-23 12 even mention a 25 foot from centerline
designation. Defendants in effect stated their authority to 50 feet was a matter of law (see
Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 20, at 8-9) and not a matter of substantial
evidence in the agency record which is "the issue" Plaintiffs brought forth; that, as a matter of
law, Plaintiffs have the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the law
not only via Meservey, but via many other doctrines of law as well. Actions/failures to act by
Defendants are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants discretion, and/or illegal without
"the issue" Plaintiffs complain of-Plalintiffs
of an evidentiary hearing-and

right to procedural due process, the agency record

the Court's Opinion that the "width of the right of way Camps

Canyon Road needs to be address" (Opinion, at 9) only confirms Plaintiffs' partial summary
judgment and does not deny it. Plaintiffs have a valid

5 1983 claim based on the record the court

expounds as the conclusions and findings on which Defendants base their authority to operate
within 50 feet of the road are without substantial evidence in the record and are therefore
arbitrary and capricious, and abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal. Defendants seek
exoneration of their actions/failures to act completely from the holdings of Meservey and I.C. Cj
40-23 12, absent any evidence in the agency record which as reading into a statute a provision
which is not there and/or denying one which is expressly stated is also arbitrary and capricious,
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an abuse of Defendats' discretion, and/or illegal. As solely a matter of law, Plaintiffs petitions
for partial summary judgments were in order and Defendants affidavits were presented in bad
faith and meant only to delay. Plaintiffs claim under 5 1983, that as without the foreseeable and
predictable predeprivational hearing preceding the "not unauthorized" actionsifailures to act of
the Defendants have physically invaded and destroyed the value of Plaintiffs land, their right to a
clear and marketable title and their right to restrict others.

3.7 Defendants have not denied issuing and not revoking the first Wagner driveway
access permit and widening of Camps Canyon Road and invading and occupying Plaintiffs'
buffer and injuring Plaintiffs' fence. Defendants have merely said they were authorized to do so
by a clearly ambiguous and obfuscated interpretation and unwritten policy/custom based on I.C.5
40-23 12 and the holdings of Meservey. The holdings of Meservey greatly limits Defendants
creative interpretation of I.C.5 40-23 12. Defendants claim that I.C.5 40-23 12 demands that an
unrecorded prescriptive right of way has to be fifty feet-25 feet from centerline and that
Defendants need not hold a public hearing to determine the width of the easement prior to any
action which would affect the positive guaranties of the U.S. Constitution of Plaintiffs' or any
abutting landowners property or liberty rights are an abuse of Defendants discretion, are arbitrary
and capricious are illegal and not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and are
not based on substantial evidence in the agency record and run contrary to the evidence of the
agency record and the record of this case and are plainly contrary to law (see E~zterprise,Inc. v.

Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 536 P.2d 279 (1 975) (it is arbitrary if it was done in disregard of the
facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles). Meservey holds
a 50 foot width is at best an evidentiary presumption and infers that circumstances peculiar to the
case must be considered and that no presumption exists if land owner limited the width of the
right of way, for instance with a fence. There is no better determining principle than due process
to complete those goals. Denial of this due process is a violation of Plaintiffs due process rights
(procedural and substantive) (see Complaint).
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3.8 Further, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants must know the "width of the easement"
and that the determination of the "width of the easement" is a prerequisite of widening,
straightening, altering a highwaylroadlright of way and/or issuinglrevoking a driveway access
permit (see Opinion, at 9, "Specifically, the determination of the width of the right of way of
Camps Canyon Road must be addressed."). Plaintiffs do not disagree with the Court's
conclusion; they simply state it is a matter of when, where and how. Plaintiffs posit that the
determination needed to be done before the widening and other "not unauthorized" operational
duties were performed-as

in a predeprivational hearing, and that this determination needed to

be done at a public meeting and not behind closed doors or at other inappropriate times andlor in
other unmeaningful manners or to have it refused to be done at all. Failure of Defendants to
survey and failure at proper record keeping is also arbitrary and capricious as these failures
increase the public agency's risk at liability for erroneous deprivations and increase Defendants'
risk to have to pay more for the acquisition of the land needed for improveinent of the public
way (common law damages versus fair market value). Further, Defendants admissioi~sthat they
have altered the road on numerous occasions is not only an admission of operating outside of the
"width of the road", it also sheds further doubt on the legal establishment of the right of way.
There is no evidentiary hearing before or after the 1996 alteration or before any further
alterations (see I.C. § 40-605; also annotation under $ 605 is illustrative of Plaintiffs position, "In
order that act of county commissioners in laying out highway be valid, whether upon public
domain or private property, board must conform to law giving such authority, as power to
establish highways rests in legislature and riglit may be exercised only in such manner as
legislature provides." Gooding Hwy. Dist. v. Idaho Irrigation Co. 30 Idaho 232, 165 P 99
(1917). In effect the right of way just keeps moving around and getting wider and there is no
substantial evidence in the record supporting Defendants actions. To now reestablish which has
not been established is illogical, and abuse of Defendants discretion and/or illegal. Defendants
must know the demarcation between public and private property (see I.C. $4 40-605 and 401310). Defendants unwritten policies, customs in regards to I. C. $ 40-23 12, 23 17 and 23 19 are
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demonstrably inadequate as Defendants clearly have made established policy on an informal
basis (see Easter House V. Feldev 910 F.2d 1387 (7thCir. 1990) ("If the policymaker establishes
policy and procedure on an informal basis without the aid of formal policy and procedure
guidelines--that is, decides policy on a case-by-case basis--then his pronouncement in a given
case reflects the state's position. Thus, a party who suffers a loss without due process protection
in his individual case may easily argue that the lo.ss occurred as a result of an inadequate
established procedure"). Widening, straightening, altering a highwayhoadlright of way and/or
issuinglrevoking a driveway access permit are "not unauthorized" exertions of Defendants'
governmental power (see Parratt v. Taylor, 45 1 U.S. 527 (198 1) and see Zinermon v. Burch 494

U. S. 113 (1990)) and Defendants are deliberately indifferent when they ignore a valid complaint
that Defendants do not have authority to a 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right of way

presently nor did they originally and that at the outer bounds of width of the original right of way
was determined by and may even be less than the position of previous owners' fence. Further,
such policies, customs which afford Defendants' broad authority to affect Plaintiffs' property
and liberty rights must be circumscribed with statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous
deprivations (see Zinermon above).

3.9 Defendants are "not unauthorized", to widen, straighten, or alter a
highwaylroadlright of way and/or to issue/revoke a driveway access permit; however, this
discretion is limited by legislative and constitutional issues-the

exertion of Defendants

governmental power, custon~s/policies/standardoperating procedures of the Defendants, must be
valid, constitutional, and circumscribed by the statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous
deprivations (see Zinermon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113 (1990). As Gooding implies, Defendants
operational standards are set by the Idaho legislature which in turn is confined only by the
constitutions of the U.S. and the State of Idaho. Plaintiffs agree with Courts conclusion (see
Opinion, at 9, "Specifically, the determination of the width of the right of way of Camps Canyon
Road must be addressed."); how-evernot determining the "width of the easement" is the cause of
the problem, not the exoneration of it. Plaintiffs continue their claim that Defendants'
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procedures, such as Defendants' standard operating procedure for widening an unrecorded
prescriptive right of way are invalid, as Defendants do not circumscribe their broad authorities
with statutory safeguards and/or remedies for erroneous deprivations; and that such safeguards
are found in I.C.5 40-23 12 and the holdings of Meservey. Defendants' broad authority to
determine the "width" of Camps Canyon Road or any unrecorded prescriptive right of way is to
be circumscribed by an evidentiary hearing as per iMeservey and Defendants' broad authority "to
widen" Camps Canyon Road or any unrecorded prescriptive right of way is to be circumscribed
by the law giving Defendants the authority to widen as per Goodi~zg(without prior survey and
accurate description of the lands required prior to the alteration of an unrecorded prescriptive
right of way is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal as it (i)
not only does not put substantial evidence in the record that private property was not taken; (ii) it
also destroys the relevant evidence, the as is where is precedent conditions on which the original
claim was made. Defendants readily admit that no evidentiary hearing has been before the
Commissioners and that their policy to widen lies in I.C. tj 40-2312 and not under I.C.

$5 40-605

and/or 1310. Defendants say, that they are not required to afford Plaintiffs due process and equal
protection and that they don't have to follow the law giving them the authority "to widen". That
is a matter of law and not a factual determination. Any and all such policies, customs, standard
operating procedures which are dependent of the accurate and undisputed knowledge of the
"width of the easement" of Camps Canyon Road are invalid as well, as the Defendants have
arbitrarily and capriciously determined the "width of the easement", that is without formal
evidentiary hearing. Without a formal evidentiary hearing, after Plaintiffs bring forth good
reason for the need of an evidentiary hearing as Camps Canyon Road had been sigl~ificalltly
altered in 1996, Defendants have abused their discretion, and/or Defendants' actions and/or
failures to act are illegal.

3.10 The civil procedures of eminent domain are just such valid, coi~stitutioi~al
exertions
of Defendants governmental power to alter a highway.

PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009, AND BRIEF
45

0962

3.11 Defendants' defense of "no final decision", in previous Plaintiffs' motions for
declaratory judgments, implies Defendants are presenting a defense of land use regulatory lawa quasi-legislative process of some sort, as is the Court's Opinions on Plaintiffs' Motions for
partial summary judgments on the basis of need for a factual determination of the "width of the
easement", in the sense that a "taking" needs first to be determined, andlor a discretionary,
legislative, regulatory activity or exercise of a police power bearing a relation to the health,
safety, morals, or general welfare of the public. Plaintiffs infer what Defendants and the Court
are saying is that the Defendants are operating under some police power to regulate the use of
Plaintiffs' land for the sake of the health, safety, welfare of the public. However Defendants
have not shown the authority to regulate Plaintiffs' land; that they have a rational relation to a
legitimate governmental interest. It is irrational to say, as well as the Defendants are estopped
from saying, a determined "use" for which Defendants have claimed a benefit-an
prescriptive right of way in this instance-that
Defendants have made no "final decision"-that

unrecorded

such "use" is now undetermined, that is,
they are in the process of determining the final

use of Plaintiffs' land. An unrecorded prescriptive right of way is not a work in progress across
an abutting landowners' property; Defendants have no legal authority under I.C. 5 40-23 12 and
the holdings of Meservey to move Camps Canyon Road and to widen it and/or to annihilate
Plaintiffs' fence with impunity There is no source for the regulatory power so claimed by
Defendants. Defendants have no authority to move Canzps Canyon Road across the SENE of
Section 15 T39N R3 WBM ad lib and especially not without consulting and conducting the
required civil procedures of eminent domain under the guise of regulation of public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare. Defendants have no authority, legitimate governmental
interest, to regulate Plaintiffs' land use as Plaintiffs' use of their land is not immoral, unsafe,
unhealthful, nor a cause of a diminution of the general welfare of the public or the Waglzers
Defendants' desire to "improve", somehow implying to make a highway safer is not rationally
based to the proposition that Plaintiffs' use of their land is unsafe, immoral, unhealthful and/or a
diminution of the public's general welfare. Seeking to use Plaintiffs' land for road purposes is a
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public benefit and as such the legitimate governmental interest lies with and thus is only
rationally based to the Idaho State and Federal Constitutions formulations of eminent domain
and the legitimate governmental interest to spread the burden of the benefit derived amongst the
public as a whole. Defendants have no authority to create a prescriptive right of way, only to
maintain, preserve what was acquired. There is no source of authority to alter a highway under
either LC.$ 40-23 12 or the holdings of Meservey. Further, as it is a substantive violation that is
at stake, as the side stepping that the Defendants endeavor to do is a violation of Plaintiffs' 5th
Amendment rights, which is also a right which is originated ill the Bill of Rights to the
Constitution of the U.S., such violations are substantive in origin, in addition to the procedural
violations and Defendants are then compelled to bring forth an end which would necessitate such
means as to deny Plaintiffs their 5" Amendment rights of due process. The "taking" that the
Court suggests is rather a wrongful possession of Plaintiffs' land, as a taking would imply that
the procedures of the 5'' Amendment were adequately accomplished. Not only do Plaintiffs
t
were not adequately accomplished, Plaintiffs allege
allege that such jth~ m e n d m e nprocedures
that even if it were so determined that the procedures were correct Defendants could not do what
Plaintiffs allege as Defendants' actions/failures to act are capricious, as they are done without a
rational basis. They are arbitrary, as they were done in disregard of the facts and circumstances
presented and/or without adequate determining principles.

3.12 Defendants policies for improving Camps Canyon Road is based on
-

I.C. $ 40-

23 12, iWesevvey, and its progeny (see Plaintiffs ' T h i r dRecord Supplement, Item No. 20, at 8-9
("The District's policy for improving public highways under its jurisdiction is based on Idaho
Code $40-2312 and the holdings of ,Veservey ... "). I.C. 5 40-23 12 and the holdings ofllifeservej)
do not grant that authority. This is arbitrary and capricious (see Roeder f i l d i t ~ g v.
s Ada County,
41 P.3d 237 (2001) citing Levin v. Idaho State Boatdof Medicine, 133 Idaho 413 (1999) ("A

regulation that is not within the expression of the statute, however, is in excess of the authority of
the agency to promulgate that regulation and must fail?'). Not only do Defendants arbitrarily and
capriciously not bring forth any specific facts of substantial evidence in the agency record for
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their co~lclusionsand findings, Defendants also claim that I.C.

5 40-23 12 and Meservey absolve

them of all need to adhere to the positive guasar~tiesof the Constitutioils of the U.S. or the State
of Idaho, that they have a prescriptive right to 50 feet without any regard to the "circumstances
peculiar to the case" (see Mesewey). This is illegal. Plaintiffs have not waived their
constitutional rights to due process, a predeprivation hearing when it is feasible, by the lack of
knowledge that the NLCHD plans to widen, straighten or alter Camps Canyo11 Road, by the lack
of knowledge that the NLCHD plans to float dirt and gravel into the "buffer" and onto Plaintiffs'
fence; nor have Plaintiffs waived any constitutional rights by attending the 4/12/06 nleetiilg of
the Commissioners and giving Cominissioners/Defendants fair warning that the NLCHD has
issued the first Wagner driveway access permit for an access wholly on Plaintiffs' land and fair
warning that the "buffer" is not part of Defendants easement. I.C. 5 40-203a does not give
Plaintiffs notice of Defendants activity and an opportunity for a predpreivation hearing as
Defendants suggest in their brief (see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 20, at 8).
Defendants attempt to abdicate their duties and misrepresent the law by implying that Plaintiffs
should pay $750 and complete their agency record for them. See Ware v. Idaho State Tax

C'ormn 'n, 98 Idaho 477, 567 P.2d 423 (1 977). After the determination of the "width of the
easement" and only after that determination, and most pointedly so in the event that Plaintiffs
dispute that determination, may the Defendants enforce the regulation of the "use" of that
easement as determined by I.C. 5 5 40-23 17/2319, and/or Defendants authority to issuehevoke
driveway access permits, and possibly amongst others. I.C. 8 40-2312 and A.ileservey do not
absolve Defendants of duties of due process under these statutes either. An action is capricious
if it is done without a rational basis. It is arbitrary if it was done in disregard of the facts and
circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles ( see Enterpvise Inc.,
above).
3.13 Any such regulation, as under I.C. $5 40-23 17/23 19, Defendants authority to
-

issue/revoke driveway access permits, due process is required, as a fact that each individual
statute itself demands due process; as well as the Idaho Doctrine of Quasi-Judicial Capacity
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demands due process; as well as the 5" and 1 4 ' ~Amendments compel due process and equal
treatment; as well as the Idaho State Constitution, under Article I $5 13 and 14 demand due
process; and as well as the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition
Policies Act and Title 40 Chapter 20 of the Idaho Code demand due process for Plaintiffs --with
the caveat that due process is required to the adjoining land owner in Defendants authority to
issue/revoke driveway access permits, and that Defendants authority to issuelrevoke driveway
access permits, related to the permitee land owner may be legislative and subject to a "'final
decision", but not Plaintiffs' due process rights and equal protection rights. Defendants have the
discretion to determine the width of the road, to determine to widen the road, to issue a driveway
access permit, to revoke a driveway access permit, andlor to determine if an abutting land
ouner's fence is encroaching on an unrecorded prescriptive right of way. However Defendants
don't have the discretion to break the law ("[Dliscretionary fitnction does not shield negligent
implementation of statutes.. ." Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint School District hTo.231, 116 Idaho
326, 775 P.2d 640).

3.14 An admission of "no final decision" in a non legislative actiodfailure to act-a
-

quasi-judicial action/failure to act is a due process violation and accompanied with the lack of
the necessary factual determination of "width of the easement" is plausible, enough for a 42
U.S.C. 1983 claim (see Board ofRegents v. Rolh, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); see also Gonzez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980)). Although this action is of the form of a boundary dispute between
individuals, this case is distinguished by the fact that one party is a governmental agency.
Plaintiffs' disagreement lies with those who are determining Plaintiffs' rights and relations to the
laws of the Federal government and the State of Idaho and are thus bound by strict requirements
of due process and equal protection, whether Defendants believe they are or not. If Defendants
do not believe that the rights of all of us are regulated by the responsibility of the same rights of
others. election to or employment in a governmental agency does not absolve them of their lack
of foresight.
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3.15 What the Defendants can and can not regulate is not the discretion of the
Defendants, as such a choice is made by the Idaho State legislature, within Constitutioilal
bounds. See Levin v. Idaho State Board of Medicine, 133 Idaho 413,418,987 P.2d 1028, 1031
(1999) (A regulation that is not within the expression of the statute, however, is in excess of the
authority of the agency to promulgate that regulation, and must fail.) The sphere of a legitimate
governmental interest is determined by the legislature and in this case-that

legitimate

governmental interest is governed by the 5"' Amendment and is not a choice of the Defendants to
make. Curtis v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 122 Idaho 73,831 P.2d 541 (1992) (To be
valid, an administrative regulation must be adopted pursuant to authority granted to the adopting
body by the legislature). Operational activities to widen the road and/or issue /revoke driveway
access pemits of the Defendants are not authorized under I.C.

5 40-23 12 and the holdings of

Meservey. Defendants do not have the autonomy of a "Staten-Defendants'

regulatory duties

are unambiguously stated, harmoniously construed, and neither vague nor overly broad.
Defendants' and Defendants' counsel's attempt to purposely obfuscate I.C. fj 40-23 12 into an
unconstitutioi~aloperational custom/policy. All three statutes I.C. 5 40-23 12, I.C.

5 40-23 17, and

I.C. 5 40-23 19 in their own right require due process. Defendants' denial of due process under
I.C. fj 40-23 17, I.C. 9 40-23 19, Defendants' authority to issue/revoke driveway access permits on
the grounds of a unconstitutional interpretation of I.C. tj 40-23 12 is invalid and is also an
arbitrary and capricious, substantive due process violation actionable under the 14~"Amendment
at all levels of interpretation whether land is involved or not (see Lingle v.Cizevron U S . A. Inc.,
(04-163) 544 U.S. 528 (200-5) 363 F.3d 846).
3.16 Questions of the wisdom of the fairness of a regulation (e.g. ripeness, final
authoritative decisions, application for just compensation, requests for variance, futility
exemptions-in

this case "final decision" and "width of the easement") do not arise if the

regulation does not have a source-a

legitimate governmental interest. Such violations as to

obfuscate the legitimate governmental interest then pushes to the violations to the realm of
substantive due process and as such may require a greater scrutiny-a

strict scrutiny.
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Defendants are "not unauthorized" to alter the Camps Canyon Road, to issuelrevoke the first
Wagner driveway access permit, andlor to enforce encroachments laws, they are acting under the
color of law, Defendants are a state agency; all of which place Plaintiffs in Defendant-favoring
forum. This makes this case a candidate for strict review as the Court's interest alone may not
correctly resolve the problems of fairness or comity presented of the lack of foreseeability of the
choice of the correct governmental interest as is placed on the so "regulated" Plaintiffs.
Defendants are then compelled to show the end to their necessary means. What end do
Defendants have in mind that would justify the means of avoiding due process at every turn of
the road? Great amounts of time, money, and effort are expended daily in the education of
children to inform them that this is the manner in which a democracy is run and lives are put at
jeopardy daily in the defense of just such due process requirements. For Defendants to abusively
and unilaterally undue the basis of democracy in deliberate indifference is a shock to the
conscience.
&
Defendants
l
J
have also been biased in these matters which lzas resulted in Defendants

abuse of discretion, deprivation of Plaintiffs liberty rights and property rights, and the abuse of
the processes of resolution, discovery, and/or litigation. Defendants have intentioilally destroyed
relevant evidence of the original and subsequent locations and widths of Camps Canyon Road
through numerous alterations without accurate record keeping and/or surveying (once again the
lack of substantial evidence in the agency record appears as not a glitch in the system; but rather,
as intentionally done or defiantly avoided) as well as the first Wagner driveway access permit.
Defendants have failed to answer interrogatories and have failed to answer interrogatories by
evasive answer and have insufficiently answered requests for admissions. Defendants have also
augmented the public record with false information and data by stating the right of way of
Camps Canyon Road in the viciizity of the 3+/- acre parcel has not been moved and/or altered.

3.18 Diagnostic shortcuts are often expeditious, however they are flawed by the small
percentage of false negatives and false positi17es. Land is a 5"' Amendment property right yet not
all land cases are subsumed by the 5" Amendment. See Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City
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oJ&n Valley, 506 F.3d 85 1 (9'[' Cir. 2007). A taking is not require to be shown in an arbitrary
and capricious or substantive due process claim, merely alleged. Defendants have not denied the
"not unauthorized" activities of Plaintiffs allegations. See McCulloch v. Glasgow, 620 F. 2d 47
(5'h Cir 1980) (plaintiff was entitled to Due Process before road was built over land of disputed
ownership). See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), (14'"
Amendment property right even though dispute exists). See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) ("...right to procedural due process is 'absolute' in the
sense it does not depend upon the merits of a claimants assertion.. ."). See Crown Point
Development, Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851 (9t" Cir. 2007), ("...note that Lingle
answers the question whether takings jurisprudence or due process doctrine governs by stating:
'[The Takings Clause] is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights
per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference.. ..Due
process violation cannot be remedied under the Takings Clause, because if governmental action
is found to be impermissible-for

instance because it fails to meet the 'public use' requirement

or it is so arbitrary as to violate due process-that

is the end of the inquiry." Plaintiffs $ 1983

claim is valid on so many grounds it may be difficult for the Court to see the forest for the trees.
4. Ripeness, Final Decisions, Variances, Takings, Arguments Plaintiffs incorporate by
reference all preceding sections of this document.
4.1
-

Arbitrary and Capricious, Denial ofProcedura1 Due Process, Substantive Due

Process Violations; Final Decisiorz And Taking Is Efected By Actiort/Failure To Act; Exhaustion
ofAgency Remedies Not Required: Plaintiffs continue their assertion that they have a valid 42
U.S.C. 1953 claim based on the elements of such a claim and/or that the Defendants have denied
Plaintiffs due process on several issues and occasions: (i) in the fall of 2005 when the widening
of Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part began again, without giving Plaintiffs notice and an
opportunity to rebut Defendants' claim to a 50 foot-25

feet from centerline prescriptive right of

way; (ii) in 2006 when the Defendants once again widened Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent
part, without notice or hearing to Plaintiffs; (iii) on 4/12/06 when Plaintiff attended the regular
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meeting of the NLCHD Comlnissioners and all parties were available and time was allotted of
the agenda and Plaintiff gave Commissioners fair warning that they were improperly interfering
with Plaintiffs property rights by issuing the first Wagner driveway access permit for an access
wholly on Plaintiffs' land and (iv) when at the 4112/06 meeting Plaintiffs gave Defendants fair
warning that Defendants had wronghlly invaded Plaintiffs' buffer; (v) at the 312 1/07 regular
meeting of the NLCHD Commissioners meeting, Plaintiffs had told Defendants that they had
again wronghlly invaded the buffer and damaged Plaintiffs' fence and had changed the runoff
drainage from the road and damaged Plaintiffs fence and caused erosion of Plaintiffs' land; (vi)
and when at the 3/21/07 meeting Plaintiffs requested Defendants initiate validation proceedings
on their own resolution or by some other means to legally establish the location and width and
character of the right of way, after Plaintiffs wrote Defendants a letter reciting their relevant
evidence and requested time on the agenda, and (vii) at both the 4112/06 and the 312 1/07
meetings when Plaintiffs rebutted that the Defendants had a 50 foot-25

feet from centerline

right of way. Each of these were an event in and of themselves with their own consequences,
rather than a series of legislative events and therefore each are actionable under tj 1983 (see,
Harris v County ofRiverside, 904 F2d 497, 501; see also Town of Orangetown v. McGee, 88
N.Y.2d 4 1, 665 N.E.2d 1061 (1996); see also Nasierowski Brothers Investment Cornpany v. Ciw
Of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890,894 (1991); (the act of denying procedural due process is
arbitrary and capricious and a substantive due process violation). Plaintiffs' claim (and thus
have a cause of action under

5

1983) arose every time Defendants denied Plaintiffs due process.

Defendants are "persons" in this matter both in their individual capacities and in their official
capacities and that they acted/failed to act under the color of state law, therefore this requires two
issues to be addressed: whether the Defendants decision, under the color of law: 1) was the type
of governmental actiom'failure to act to which due process applies and 2) deprived Plaintiffs of a
protected property right (see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); see also
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980)). The first issue-the

type of governmental action-was

answered by the recent denial of Plaintiffs' petitions for partial summary judgments on the basis
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that the "width of the easement" needs to be factually determined. An unrecorded prescriptive
right of way is synonymous with there being no substantial evidence in the record of what the
limits (i.e. width, use, location) of an unrecorded right of way are. Hence, in the case of an
unrecorded prescriptive right of way, any and all "not unauthorized" exertions of governmental
power with a necessary authority base of width of the easement are "the type of government
action" to which not only does due process apply but are also without substantial evidence in the
record to support a claim without the due process of an evidentiary hearing. There are no
disputed inaterial facts. Defendants have admitted to altering the road on several occasions (see
Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplenzent, Iten1 No. 1, at 3, Request For Admission No. 3, subpart c.;
see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. 3, at 16-17, Interrogatory Nos. 40 - 44;
(Defendants have altered Camps Canyon Road several times). The 1996 alteration, without
survey and/or accurate description of the lands required for the alteration, left the unrecorded
prescriptive right of way without even the physical evidence on which to base a rational
conclusion of the legal established location, width, or character of the right of way. Defendants
admit to further widening of the road in 2005 and 2006 without notice or hearing in either event,
fixrther they deny they are even required to afford Plaintiffs a hearing andlor an evidentiary
proceeding to establish the width and location of the right of way, while also admitting that they
have no evidence in their agency record on which to base their findings and conclusions that they
are within their 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of way (see PlaintifSs ' Third Record
Supplement, Item No. 2, at 4-5, Interrogatory No. 3). Defendants have based their claim of 50
foot-25

feet from centerline right of way totally on a wrongful reading of I.C. $ 40-23 12,

strictly a matter of law, as Defendants counsel state in his response and at the last hearing (see
Plaintij'j ' Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. 20, at 8-9). Defendants have also admitted to
having issued the first Wagner driveway access permit and failed to revoke the same on the
conclusions and findings of the easement (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 11,
at 7, Interrogatory No. 13; see Plaint@ss' TlzirdRecordSupplement, Item No. 12, at 4-5,
Interrogatory Nos. 6- 10 (Defendants have issued a permit for the first Wagner driveway access
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claiming the access is within their right of way and therefore valid and/or within the 699' of road
frontage noted on the Wagner deed-both

matters have been altered with the 1996 alteration).

Defendants have made other findings and/or conclusions and reiterate the same rebutted claims
for which they have no rational basis of substantial evidence in the agency record (see Plaintiffs

'

Third Record Supplement, Item No. 12, at 13, Interrogatory No. 28; see Plaint@ ' Third Record
Supplement, Item No. 5, at 2-3; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. 6, at 5-8; see
Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 13, at 4-7 and 10 Interrogatory Nos. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
11, 13, and 14; see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 15, at 1). Defendants also
subvert I.C. $ 40-23 12 to imply the legislature has mandated the width of a highway (see
Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 18, at 2-4, Interrogatory Nos. 1-6). Defendants,
through their counsel, state that I.C. 5 40-23 12 and the holdings of Meservey allow Defendants to
mandate a 50 foot width without hearing to the abutting landowner (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record
Supplement, Item No. 20, at 8-9). ( Defendants do not have substantial evidence in the record, or
they have not supplied such evidence at discovery). As such these findings and/or conclusio~ls
(see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplenzent, Iteni No. 20, at 8-9) and Defendants' claims to a 50
foot-25

feet from centerline right of way, which are not supported by substantial evidence on

the record and/or not in accordance with and/or in excess of the statute, I.C.

5 40-23 12 and the

holdings of Meservey and/or not in accordance with and/or in excess of other statutes, 1.C. $4013lO(2) and I.C. 5 40-23 12, and amongst others and to that extent all such "not unauthorized"
exertions of governmental power are and that ha\?e been applied to Plaintiffs are arbitrary and
capricious, and/or an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal at the time of the
Defendants' actiodfailure to act, and this is true whether eventually an evidentiary hearing
shours that a fifty foot right of way exists or not. (Those actions/failures to act xithin the "width
of the road are also in jeopardy as Defendants now claim a continued 25 feet from centerline,
xhich is also not based on substantial evidence in the agency record, nor is the category of a 25
feet from centerline even a rational choice to be considered under either I.C. $ 40-203a or the
holdings of Meservey). The Court in its Opinion (at 9) denying Plaintiffs' petition for a partial
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summary judgment on Defendants' liability under

5 1983 stated, "Before this Court can consider

whether there was a due process violation, questions of material fact must be resolve.
"Specifically, the determination of the width of the right of way of Camps Canyon Road must be
addressed." The Court's conclusion, "Should the facts of the case establish that any alterations
to the road occurred within the right of way, the Highway District was not required by I.C.

5 40-

605 or I.C. 5 40-1310(2) to acquire a survey of the roadway, or contact the adjoining land owners
prior to modifying the road" (see Opinion, at 8) might hold some sway if the highway were
recorded in some manner (see Honzestead, above) and the monuments were well known.
Defendants have claimed Camps Canyon Road is prescriptive and further they acknowledge that
there has not been any recording of it; they also say they don't have to hold any public
evidentiary hearings or provide Plaintiffs with due process. Defendants' decision is obviously
arbitrary and capricious-there

is no evidence in the record to support that a survey was not

needed prior to any and all alterations, as there is no record without a survey, (In the matter of
an unrecorded prescriptive right of way on what would the Defendants base their findings and
conclusions that no private property was taken?) Further, Defendants admit to not providing
Plaintiffs with due process-to

factually determine the width of the right of way. Further, the

Court acknowledges the harm done-"[algain,

this argument centers on the underlying issue in

this case, vvhich is a determination of the width of the right of way of Camps Canyon Road" (see
Opinion, at 7). See H4lliarnson County Regional Planning Cor~m'nv. Hamilton Bank, 473 US
172, 193 (1 985) (The matter of the "issue that inflicts the actual, concrete injury" determines the
necessary proofs). The harm was done when it was feasible to give Plaintiffs a hearing before
any actionlfailure to act took place. Inasmuch as the Court acknowledges that due process was
not afforded to Plaintiffs (the "harnl" was done)-that

the width of the right of way needs to be

factually determined (in this matter that factual determination is Plaintiffs' due process)-and

as

Defendants have admitted that no hearing has been before the Commissioners (no due process
has been given), and that Defendants claim that the Camps Canyon Road right of way is
prescriptive and probably acquired before 1930 and that no recording, survey, laying out, and/or
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evidentiary procedures have been recorded in the agency record (no rational basis for a finding
or conclusion exists); the Court relies on Defendants' affidavits (see Opinion, at 9) ("The
Defendants have submitted affidavits from the commissioners of the Highway District which
have stated that the Commissioners actions regarding Camps Canyon Road have been made
within the lawful authority of the Highway District. The Highway District argues that any
alterations of the road were made well within the right of way.") Defendants affiances are
simply repetitious testimony unsubstantiated by any specific evidence and rebutted by Plaintiffs.
And clearly Plaintiffs have a property interest in Defendants'
-

claims and actionslfailures to act.

The Defendants need to be correct on this issue for it is their authority to operate, that is
Defendants must show by more than a suggestion, a scintilla of evidence, that they have a valid
right of way and also an undisputed right of wav, as the actions/failures to act-the

"not

unauthorized" exertions of governmental power (issuance/revocation of the first Wagner
driveway access permit and/or widening of Caixps Canyon Road) require both. The Court fails
to note that the injuring party in this case is a governmental agency which is required by law to
acknowledge their responsibility of the Plaintiffs' property rights and liberties whether
Defendants want to or not (see Opinion, at 9, "Specifically, the determination of the width of the
right of way of Camps Canyon Road must be addressed"). Defendants' conclusions and findings
are not supported by substantial evidence in the agency record and run contrary to the evidence
in the agency and the present case's record. This is arbitrary and capricious and as such the
"final decision" of "the issue" which caused the Plaintiffs' injury occurred when Defendants
actedfailed to act under these arbitrary conclusions. "This issue "-"[~Jpecifically, the
determination of the width of the right of way of Camps Canyon Road.. ." is the injury. The
extent of the injury in this case--"[s]pecifically, the determination of the width of the right of
way of Camps Canyon Road.. ." is a matter of damages and even here this extent of damages is
not a matter of "just compensation", rather the full extent of common law damages (see Gamble
v. ELIu Claire County, 5 F.3d 285 (7thcircuit 1990)). Even the exposure of the public asset,

Camps Canyon Road, to such heightened risk of common law damages as compared to the
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"cheap" acquisition at the fair market value is arbitrary and capricious. Although Defendants
tried to improperly augment the public record through Affidavits of public officials (none of the
attested to facts in the affidavits are part of the public record, duly recorded at an open public
meeting), Defendants did not bring forth any specific evidence of an undisputed 50 foot right of
way. This Court seems to indicate that the Defendants can with the wave of a hand and/or the
wink of a blind eye set claim to the whole of SENE quarter quarter of Section 15, move Camps
Canyon Road anywhere they want and annihilate anything in their path with impunity. (The
Court confirms this-the

dispute-but

denies Plaintiffs a partial summary judgment on the basis

of the "width of the easement" needs to be factually determined-however

that was what

Plaintiffs based their summary judgment on. Plaintiffs have essentially won the battle, yet were
denied victory of the war-partial

summary judgment.) Defendants' defense to Plaintiffs'

Motions for declaratory judgment as well as the public record (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record
Supplevlzent, Item No. 6, at 6 (Ron Landeck confirms no hearing has been before the
Commissioners); Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 6, at 6, Item Nos. 4, 5, 6, 9, 10
(Plaintiffs have tried to bring matters before a hearing of the Commissioners) Defendants admit
that there have been no hearings before the Commissioilers and that Coinmissioners have made
no attempts at a final decision in almost three years. Plaintiffs have a plausible, probable, if not a
con~pletelyvalid, in the sense of actual damages, claim (in this case allegatioil is all that is
necessary-that

the "width of the easement" equals the "width of the road") as there is no

dispute that the right of way has been moved and kvidened and under such conditions the present
right of way can not occupy the identical strip of land (the recordation of that identical strip is the
legal basis for Defendants claim, whether Defendants subvert the meaning of I.C. 40-23 12 or
not) that it did when the unrecorded prescriptive right of way was acquired. Plaintiffs are at least
deserving of nominal damages (see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d
252 (1978) (". ..right to procedural due process is 'absolute' in the sense it does not depend upon
the merits of a claimants assertion.. .")). Further, the annotation under I.C. 5 40-23 12 indicates
the required due process (see a&feserveyv. Gullford, 14 Idaho 133,93 P. 780 (1908) (width is a
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presumption of 50 feet implying an opportunity for rebuttal is required; further, no presumption
of 50 feet is avaliable if land owner limits width (e.g. with a fence)), as does the 5thAmendment
of the U.S. Constitution (Due Process Clause and/or for public use), and as does the
determination that Defendants sit in a quasi-judicial capacity in the matter (see Cooper v. Board
of County Cornmissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980) (Defendants sit in
a quasi-judicial capacity in such matters which general laws are applied to specific individuals,
situations, or subgroups). Plaintiffs have a due process claim (14'" Amendment) subject to
nominal damages whether there is found to be a taking or not. "No final decision7'is a frivolous
defense as the "issue which causes the harm" is not a legislative, regulatory issue (see
Williamson County Regional Planning Conzm 'iz v. Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172, 193 (1985) (The
matter of the "issue that inflicts the actual, concrete injury" determines the necessary proofs).
The issue is one which requires due process (see Harris v. County of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497
(1990). Defendants are in effect the proximate, direct, legal, and substantial cause and such
alleged injuries Plaintiffs complain of (see Complaint, at 8-25) are within the scope of
responsibility of the wrongful physical invasions of Plaiiltiffs' land, damages to Plaintiffs'
property and other damages Plaintiffs have sustained, economically and non economically.
Without presenting specific evidence that the unrecorded prescriptive right of way is in some
way sufficiently recorded to provide substantial evidence to support Defendants' conclusions and
findings, and as the Court is not so persuaded by the Court's Opinion, Defendants are liable
under Ij 1983. Defendants admit to these actions andor failures to act; to widening the road
without due process, to issuing the first Wagner driveway access permit, to not revoking the first
Wagner driveway access permit when they had no rational reason to maintain its issuance,
without due process, do not deny damaging Plaintiffs' fence, do not deny not having made "no
final decision", do not deny that no hearing has beell given to Plaintiffs, have not shown any
exigent circumstances to justify their actions, have not shown any rational basis for a legitimate
governmental interest to regulate Plaintiffs' land, have not shown Plaintiffs' use of their land is
u~healthful,unsafe, immoral or a diminution to the general welfare of the public or the Wagners,
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nor do they have any agency record of these actions/failures to act or substantial evidence in the
agency record to support their findings or conclusions. Defendants can not even sustain an
argument that they did not know what they were doing as they were given fair warning at the
4/12/06 meeting and were directly connected to the Camps Canyon neighborhood, the Wagners,
and the previous alterations to Camps Canyon Road and deliberately indifferent to the
deprivation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights and property.
4.1.1 Objection to the notion of a regulatory power to regulate Plaintiffs land, as
-

Court implies a "taking" must be shown ("Specifically, the determination of the width of the
right of wav of Camps Canyon Road must be addressed"): Plaintiffs have not applied for land
use permit, a building permit, or any change in "use" of their land; rather, they simply are trying
to continue in the Latah County zoned "use" of agriculture and forestry and objecting to
Defendants improper interference with Plaintiffs' property rights. Defendants have only the
limited jurisdiction over the "width of the easement" and not the unbridled authority to regulate
the use of Plaintiffs' land. What is at stake here is the Defendants' "use" of Plaintiffs' land for
road purposes. Defendants claim that they have the prescriptive right to "use" Plaintiffs' land to
the extent of 25 feet from centerline for any and all road purposes, including but not limited to
issuing of the Wagners a driveway access permit; inferring that the 25 feet from centerline were
used throughout, unchanged during the prescriptive period.
4.1.2 All evidence points against Defendants that they occupy the identical strip

of land that was originally claimed: Defendants acknowledge that they have moved (in 1996)
and widened (in 1996 and in 2005, and 2006) Camps Canyon Road and continue to claim 25 feet
from centerline. This is a physical impossibility. It is an irrational claim and is arbitrary and
capricious, an abuse of Defendats' discretion and/or illegal. Defendants are deliberately
indifferent to the constitutional deprivation and the property lines (see Plaintiffs' Third Record
Supplenzent, Item No. 5, at 3 ('Richard Hansen said the property line issues have nothing to do
with the highway districtm),-in effect they are deliberately indifferent to the alleged deprivation
or they are irrationally saying they have the fee in the land (that the NLCHD owns the entire
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SENE quarter quarter of Section 15 T39N R3 WBM on the ground that it provides supporting
structure for Camps Canyon Road)-and

that they have the right to regulate Plaintiffs entire

property as they can move Camps Canyon Road throughout the whole of Plaintiffs property with
impunity (see Plaintiffs' petition for partial summary judgment on invalid procedure to widen the
road; Defendants do not circumscribe their broad authority to widen with statutory safeguards
and remedies for erroneous deprivations-post

deprivation remedies are inadequate in such

situations ( see Zinermon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124, Zimrnerman v. City of Oakland,
255 F.3d 734, (9thCircuit, 2001), Logan v Zimmerman Brush C o , 455 U.S. 422,435-436 (1982)
(availability of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is foreseeable,
predeprivation process was possible, and official conduct was not "unauthorized"). Whether
Defendants, as final policy makers, are deliberately indifferent to the constitutional deprivation
(see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) or they have concluded they own the SENE
quarter quarter of Section 15 and/or Plaintiffs' land uilderlying Camps Canyon right of way,
which is irrational and therefore arbitrary and capricious (Defendants only claim prescription, an
easement across Plaintiffs' and not the fee in it), an abuse of their discretion and/or illegal; the
outcome is the same. Defendants are liable under

5 1983 (see itifonell v. Dept. of

Soc. Svcs. of the

City of:Y Y., 436 U.S. 658,690-691, (1978) (policy of agency and/or approval of actions by final
policy makers invokes liability of agency and individuals); see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469 (1986); see City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 1 12, 127 (1988).
4.1.3 This matter of the adequacies of the facial validity of Defendants'
customs/policies/standard operating procedures is a matter of law and not a matter of factual

determination; and as such, Plaintiffs made a facial challenge to Defendants standard operating
procedure to widen a prescriptive right of way and not an as applied challenge. The Court
improperly denied Plaintiffs' petition for partial sumillary judgment of a facial challenge on an
"as applied" basis-"The

underlying issue in this case requires a factual determination of the

width of the right of way of Camps Canyon Road. Should it be determined that the highway

.

department's actions fell within the right of way, the Plaintiffs' arguments have no merit.
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Therefore, the motion for partial summary judgment dated October 6,2008 is denied" (see
Opinion, at 8) (see Eide v. Sarasota County 908 F.2d 716 (1 lthCir. 1990) (citing Smoke Rise,

Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm 'n, 400" F.Supp. 1369 (D.Md.1975), ('a claim of
deprivation of property without due process cannot be blended as one and the same with the
claim that property has been taken for public use, without just compensation.'). Such a judgment
is manifestly unjust as (i) Plaintiffs were due a judgment as a matter of law; on the facial validity
of Defendants' standard operating procedure or on I.C. 5 40-23 12 if that is the basis of
Defendants' defense; (ii) for the Court to base its ruling on the agency record (Defendants'
Affidavits) without first obtaining and reviewing the agency record. The Defendants reply in
their responses to Plaintiffs' interrogatories and requests for admissions that there is no
evidentiary record in the agency record to provide substantial evidentiary support for Defendants
conclusions and findings. None of the Defendants affiances are in the agency record, are
material to the issues Plaintiffs petitioned for partial summary judgment on or were specific to
conclude Plaintiffs do not have a valid dispute on the validity of the right of way of Camps
Canyon Road; and as such "Plaintiffs' argument" does have merit as Defendants could not do
what they admit to doing even if their procedures were correct, and Plaintiffs continue that they
u7erenot, for the actions/failures to act are irrational, arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion and/or illegal and this Court so concludes "Should it be determined that
the highway department's actions fell within the right of way, the Plaintiffs' arguments have no
merit", (see Opinion). Camps Canyon Road is an unrecorded prescriptive right of way"Should it be determined that the highway department's actions fell within the right of way.. ."
(i) should have been determined (its arbitrary, an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal
as it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record); or (ii) should have been allowed to
be determined (I.C.

5 40-203a and IRTA Requests for Takings Analysis as well as Plaintiffs'

petitions for declaratory judgments should have been granted and Defendants are deliberately
indifferent in not doing so) ; and (iii) was not Plaintiffs' responsibility to determine (to pay $750
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and petition Commissioners to validate Camps Canyon Road under I.C. $ 40-203a when it is the
duty of the Defendants to do so).

4.1.4 The holdings of Meservey conclude this also; there is no authority in I.C. 5
40-23 12 to widen (infinitive verb form, Meservey and I.C. 5 40-23 12 talk about the width, a
noun) unrecorded prescriptive right of way (for all prescriptive rights of way) or as applied, for
the claimed umecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road, in the vicinity of the
3+/- acre parcel. I.C. $ 40-23 12 allows for Defendants to describe the width to be in the
discretion of the authorities in charge as wide as it needs to be and even though it may be simpler
in a standardized world, the wisdom of the legislature and I.C. $40-23 12 does not mandate the
width of a prescriptive right of way (see Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 53 1, 536 (1988) (no
mandate if choice is given). Defendants abuse their discretion by reading a statute as mandating
when it is discretionary what the width of a road when the width is discretionary (see Roberts v.
Transportation Department, 121 Idaho 727 (199 1) (an agency, under the guise of regulation,
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the legislature's or exercise sublegislative powers to
modify, alter, enlarge or diminish the provisions of the legislative act that is being administered),
Even if viewed as a goal to be achieved, the means for achievement is found under eminent
domain and the manner for accomplishing the legislative under I.C.

5 40-605 (the annotation

here says this; see Gooding) and 1310. Defendants' discretionary function, abused or not, does
not then allow Defendants to break the law under

$5 605 and 1310 (see Czaplicki, above).

As

such, discretion as ascribed to define the width does not then become the authority to 1.videl.l(see
Opinion, at 7). The Court aclmowledges that the authority to widen is found under I. C. $$40605 and 13 10; however, when the Defendants in bringing forth no specific facts to bear that
would conclude Plaintiffs would have no case in disputing the validity of the right of way; that
is, there is no substantial evidence from the agency record to support Defendants' claims and in
light also that all the evidence in the agency record consists of a repetition of rebutted testimony
and therefore not a findin%of fact and that all such evidence in the record of this case runs
counter to the conclusions and findings that the Defendants make, that it is implausible that the
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right of way now claimed is the identical one so claimed at the end of the prescriptive period and
the unrecorded prescriptive right of way that the Defendants claim has been altered numerous
times without any substantial evidence in the agency record to do so; finally the Court skips over
the obvious that the Defendants are totally relying on their invalid policy/custom to find their
authority to widen under I. C. $ 40-23 12, which the Court concludes is not correct. Once again
"arbitrary and capricious, abuse of discretion and/or illegalities" only produces "arbitrary and
capricious, abuse of discretion and/or illegalities". If you use the math that creates the problem
to solve the problem you only compound the problem. Plaintiffs now find themselves in this
court arguing the same unjust result that they did with the Defendants. How to get a just
determination on what is in the record? Plaintiffs should be in Court for a judicial review of the
Defendants' record, such as under I. C. $40-203a and I. C. $ 40-208 and the absence of that
record to review is the affirmation of the lack of the require due process. One can only wonder
what it is that elected officials may have against the act they have taken oath to uphold-the

laws

of the U.S. and the State of Idaho.
4.1.5 Whenever those authorities in charge exercise their discretion is when a

predeprivation (an opportunity to show that the land owner had restricted the width of Camps
Canyon Road with a fence and or to rebut the 50 foot presumption) hearing is predictable,
foreseeable and possible (see Ziinnlerman v. City ofOakIand, 255 F.3d 734, (9thCircuit, 2001) (it
is predictable when the authorities should hold a hearing that is when they exercise their
discretion and it is "not absurd" for Plaintiffs to expect due process before they are deprived of
their property especially when the opportunity is there). All post deprivation remedies (such as
may be present in the quasi-legislative process of "land use" zoning) are inadequate as in this
case whether such remedies apply or not or ~ ~ h e t hsuch
e r regulatory process is a legitimate
governmental interest or not. Defendants' actions/failures to act are arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of the Defendants' discretion and/or illegal as well as procedural violations of Plaintiffs'

9"Amendment rights.
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4.1.6 The case record shows sufficient evidence that Defendants have deprived
Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights-without
confirms this-the

specific evidence to the contrary. The court

"width of the easement" requires factual determination. The fact that the

Defendants required Plaintiffs to pay a substantial, nonrefundable fee ($750 and petition to have
the road declared Public or not in the Public Interest, which is not disputed) to apply to regain the
unrestricted, agriculture and forestry "use" of their land as well as the deprivation of the "use" of
their land by Defendants floating of dirt and gravel into the "buffer" and onto Plaintiffs' fence as
well as the issuance of the first Wagner driveway access permit wholly across Plaintiffs land
amount to "actual, concrete injuries (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 6, at 6
(Halvorsons ask if they will get their money back if they prevail and Landeck responds the
money goes for research and his fees) (see also Harris V. County of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497
(1 990)). Plaintiffs allege concrete injuries as a result of Defendants' irrational, arbitrary and
capricious behavior, an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal acts and failures to act (see
Cornplaint 8-25). The Court proposes an irrational approach to resolution. Plaintiffs have said
that Defendants are in wrongful possession of their land, a result of the irrational arbitrary and
capricious behavior of the Defendants. The Court says Plaintiffs must first show a "takingwthat the Defendants are in rightful possession of Plaintiffs land by stating, "Specifically, the
determination of the width of the right of way of Camps Canyon Road must be addressed" (see
Opinion, at 9) before summary judgment can be granted. That would require Plaintiffs to do the
impossible; to create a public record of relevant evidence that the Defendants have already
altered, i.e. the location and width of Canlps Canyon Road at the end of the prescriptive period,
the location and width of Camps Canyon Road before and after each of the unsurveyed and
unrecorded alterations of the road. In essence the Court requires Plaintiffs to afford Defendants
due process before they are allowed to '-takem Plaintiffs' land. Plaintiffs point out to the Court
that Plaintiffs are not the ones elected by or employed by the public to carry out these duties.
"The Defendants have submitted affidavits from the commissioners of the Highway District
which have stated that the Commissioners actions regarding Camps Canyon Road have been
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made within the lawful authority of the Highway District. The Highway District argues that any
alterations of the road were made well within the right of way" (see Opinion, at 9). See Affidavit
Of Dan Payne In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motions For Partial Summary Judgment Filed
September 19, October 6, And October 2 1,2008 (hereafter Payne AfJidavit) at 11, ("The entire
stretch of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of Plaintiffs' real property used by the District for
public highway purposes as described in paragraph 9 above lies within the District's minimum
fifty (50') wide right of way.") To be "within the lawful authority of the Highway District"
such conclusions and findings that "[tlhe entire stretch of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of
Plaintiffs' real property used by the District for public highway purposes as described in
paragraph 9 above lies within the District's minimum fifty (50') wide right of way" is simply
repetitious testimony and has not been supported by substantial evidence in the agency record,
and runs contrary to the substantial evidence in the agency record and the record of this case, and
Defendants have not relied on factors which the legislature has intended them to consider, and
Defendants have relied on factors which the legislature has not intended them to consider, and
Defendants have entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, and the findings
and conclusions are so implausible that the conclusions and findings could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise; that is, these conclusions and findings are
not done with a rational basis and was done in disregard of the facts and circumstances presented
or without determining principles (see Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City,96 Idaho 734, 536 P.2d
729 (1975). Once again Plaintiffs have requested such information, documents, minutes, logs,
and all such papers which would reveal such evidence on which such conclusions and findings
are rationally based. This is, as Defendants respond it to be, the null set. The Court now deems
this requirement fulfilled on one hand-that

Defendants must have sufficient evidence in their

record to support their findings and concIusions, with specific evidence ( see "Once the movant
has made and appropriately supported its motion, it is the responsibility of the adverse party to
come forward with evidence, id., and to 'set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial' I.R.C.P. 56(e)." Foster v. Traul, 141 Idaho 890, 120 P.3d 278 (2005)) (Emphasis
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added.), although saying at the same time they do not, that the width of the easement needs to be
determined. Therefore either Court sides with the Defense that this case will end with time
running out in a circular argument, or the affidavits have been submitted in bad faith or
Defendants have supplied insufficient answers, evasive answers, or have failed to answer or all
three. For either Plaintiffs petitions for partial summary judgment are denied as the Defendants
have brought forth substantial specific evidence that Camps Canyon Road in the pertinent part is
not an unrecorded prescriptive right of way

that substantial evidence in the agency record

exists to support Defendants conclusions and findings and that Plaintiffs' petitions for partial
summary judgments are denied on other grounds; or, that the width of the easement of the
unrecorded prescriptive right of way has not been determined and Defendants are liable under 42
U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs point out to the Court that Defendants brought forth no evidence to
support their claim-evidentiary hearing concluding that Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of
the 3-4- acre parcel was acquired as 50 feet wide-25

feet from centerline and remains as it was

at the end of the prescriptive period, even though its usage was less than twelve feet, and lined by
old spontaneously growing trees and a fence before the 1996 alterations, and that in moving the
road bed in 1996 Defendants cut down several trees and pushed the road bed to the northeast
altering the intersecting points of the east and west property lines with Camps Canyon Road by
more than fifty feet, straightening the curves to the extent that the road frontage of the 3+/- acre
parcel was reduced by 200 feet, and lowered the road bed by approximately 8 feet as the
northeast movement of the road bed was down hill and widen the road and its supporting
structures to approximately 15 feet and amongst other widening in 2005 and 2006. Mr. Payne's
affiance is repetitious testimony and is not substantiated by substantial evidence in the agency
record and Defendants have disregarded the facts and circumstances presented by Plaintiffs and
have done so without the authority of law or by determining principles. The answer may be all
three but if there was a public evidentiary hearing at which such evidence uJas submitted and
gathered, Plaintiffs would have been or should have been invited and Plaintiffs have received no
invitations.
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4.1.7 The Court creates unconstitutional conditions by suggesting that Plaintiffs
have an opportunity in I.C. fj 40-203a to resolve the "width of the easement dispute". The Court
would have Plaintiffs give up their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection for
the tenuous benefit of a validation proceeding conducted by biased and self serving politicians
(see Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2135, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980)). I.C. $ 40-203a
does not provide a predegrivational remedy as Defendants suggest (see Plaintiffs ' Third Recovd
Supplement, Item No. 20, at 8), as Plaintiffs would need notice of operational activities in order
to apply for validation; (see Zinermon, (a predeprivation hearing is generally required when
feasible). These piecemeal injuries are final as they have occurred (see McCuskey v. Canyon
County Conz 'rs, 128 Idaho 212,912 P.2d 100 (1996) and do not depend on any final decision the
Defendants may make on the eventual "width of the road" as each injury is likened to a
continuous tort. The "width of the road" is not a work in progress within the "width of the
easement". The two are equal (road equals easement) unless otherwise proven and not unequal
until proven otherwise (evidence exists in the agency record to support Defendants' findings and
conclusions. A presumptive width of 50 feet of an ullrecorded prescriptive right of way has less
evidence in the record to support Defendants' conclusions and findings to alter Camps Canyon
Road than does a record which lacks substantial evidence in the record to support adding Camps
Canyon Road, in the pertinent part to the NLCHD's map system (see Homestead Farms v. Board
ofComrn'rs Teton County, state ofldaho, I41 Idaho 855, 119 P 3d 630 (2005) (Justice Eismann

SPECIALLY CONCURRING) (see Carscallen Afidavit). By simply ignoring the implied
evidentiary hearing of hleservey, especially when confronted with obvious rebuttal by land
owner and the obvious self rebuttal that Defendants altered the road-a

"not unauthorized"

activity, does not then relieve Defendants of their constitutional and statutory duties. This is
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal. Neither is the "width
of the easement" a work in progress within the "deeded land of Plaintiffs". The two (Plaintiffs'
land and the easement) are distinct as an unrecorded prescriptive right of way across Plaintiffs
land is a concrete determinable quantity based on its location of its centerline and used width for
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road purposes at the end of the prescriptive period absent any alteration. There is nothing in the
public record which would indicate 25 feet from centerline is either adequate in all situations and
terrains as opposed to being unnecessary in most nor is it even a statutory category. The needs
of a "secondary easement", maintenance does not require additional width as Defendants have an
implied perrnissioil to plow snow within the limits of a reasonable standard of performance.

3.1.8

These claims. under 42 U.S.C. 1983, then ollly depend on whether the

Defendants' decision 1) was the type of government action to which due process applies and 2)
deprived Plaintiffs of a protected property interest

.

4.1.8.1 1) Type of government actions to which due process applies. Due
process is required by. at least, any of the following determinations: (i) the legislative intent of
the statute itself as so interpreted by the Idaho Supreme Court (see Meservey); (ii) Idaho's
Doctrine of Quasi-judicial Capacity (See Idaho Historic Preservatiorz Council, Im. v. Cily
Council of the City of Boise, 134 Idaho 65 1, 8 P. 3d 646 (2000) ("The test for determining
whether a local governing body sits in a quasi-judicial capacity was expressed in Cooper v.
Board of County Conzrnissioners ofAda Counl)), 101 Idaho 407, 6 14 P.2d 937 (1 980). In that
case, this Court stated: Basically, this test involves the determination of whether action produces
a general rule or policy which is applicable to an open class of individuals, interest (sic), or
situations, or whether it entails the application of a general rule or policy to specific individuals,
interests, or situations. If the fornler determination is satisfied, there is legislative action; if the
latter deter~ninationis satisfied, the action is judicial. Id at 410, 614 P.2d at 950 (quoting
Fasuno v. Board of Cozlnty Colnm 'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 27 (Or. 1973))"); (iii) the positive guaranty of
the 5' Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; (iv) the positive guaranty of the 14"' Amendment to
the U S . Constitution; (v) the positive guaranty Article I

$5 13 and 14 of the Idaho State

Constitution; (vi) the intent of Title 40 Chapter 20 of the Idaho Code and/or the Federal
Relocation Assistance Act; and/or (vii) Plaintiffs right to private action (see Dopp v. Idaho
Comnzissiouz of Pardons, In the Court of Appeals for the State of Idallo, Docket No. 32598,2007
Opinion No. 3 1, Filed h4ay 24, 2007 ("When a statute like I.C. 3 20-223 is silent regarding
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private enforcement, courts generally may recognize a private right of action only if it is
necessary to assure effectiveness of the statute. Foster v. Sl~oreClub Lodge, Inc., 127 Idaho 921,
926,908 P.2d 1228, 1233 (1995); White v. Unigardhrlut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014
(1986). In White, the Supreme Court analyzed whether an insured person could sue the insurer
for violations of Idaho's Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act committed in conllection with
the settlement of the insured's claim. The Court ultimately held that a private right of action did
not exist under that particular statute, and in so doing quoted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS

5 874A, which provides: When a legislative provision protects a class ofpersons

by

proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the
court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the
legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured menzber
of the class a right of action . . . . (emphasis added). Tllus, only persons who are among the class
of individuals that a statute is designed to protect may bring an action for a violation of the
statute. This principle was recognized over ninety years ago in State v. American Surety Co. of
New York, 26 Idaho 652, 145 P. 1097 (1914), where the Court said: [A]n individual has no right
of action against a public officer for breach of a [statutory] duty which he owes to the public
only, even though such individual is specifically injured thereby. But it is equally well settled
that if the plaintiff can show that the [statutory] duty was imposed for his benefit, and that the
Legislature had in mind his protection in passing the act in question, and intended to give him a
vested right in the discharge of that duty, then this will give him such an interest as miill support
an action. Id. at 67 1, 145 P. at 1102-03 (citations omitted)"). Such implied right to private
action is also found in I.C.

$5 40-203a, 40-605,40-13 10, and 40- Chapter 20 and is stated under

the IRTA (see Bivens v. Six Unkraotvn Fed. hiarcotics Agents, 403 US 388 (1 971)).

4.1.8.2 2) Type of government action which deprived Plaintiffs of a
protected property interest. Defendants issued and failed to revoke the first Wagner driveway
access for a driveway access wholly on Plaintiffs land (see PlaintiSfs -4f$davit, a1 14) and have
widened Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in 2005 and 2006 (see
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PlaintiffsJ Third Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 16, Interrogatory Nos. 40 and 41; see
Plaintzffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 2, at 4-5, Interrogatory No. 3) and do not deny
injuring Plaintiffs' fence (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 12, at 13-14,
Interrogatory No. 28). See Evers v. Custer County, 745 F.2d 1196 ("The issue here, however, is
not whether section 40-1 03 could extinguish Evers's rights in the road if its requirements were
met. The issue is whether the County may make a determination that those requirements have
been met and enforce its conclusion that the road is public without giving Evers prior notice and
an opportunity to present argument and evidence that the road was her private
property.. .Meservey v. Gullford, 14 Idaho 133, 93 P. 780 (1908) (interpreting predecessor
statute, holding that provisions dealing with encroachments and obstructions to highways 'duly
laid out or erected' does not apply to highways established by prescription or user absent
recordation by the County)". See also Lingle v.Chevron US. '4. Inc., (04- 163) 544 U.S. 528
(2005) 363 F.3d 846, ("Conversely, if a government action is found to be impermissible--for
instance because it fails to meet the 'public use' requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due
process--that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compensation can authorize such action.")
See also Harris v. County ofRiverside, 903 F.2d 497 (9thCir. 1990) (the county has made the
change in zoning specifically to Plaintiffs' property and injury occurs when County demands fee
for plaintiffs to regain what was already taken from him). Undisputed alterations took place in
1996 to Camps Canyon Road-Camps

Canyon Road can not possibly occupy the identical strip

of land it did at the end of the prescriptive period (no reasonable person could come to another
Cil-. 1980) (plaintiff was entitled to
conclusion). See McCulloch v. GZasgow: 620 F. 2d 4 7 (jfh
Due Process before road was built over land of disputed ownership). See also Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67,92S.Ct. 1983,32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), ( 1 4 Amendment
~~
property right even though
dispute exists). See also Carey v. Piphzds, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)
(". ..right to procedural due process is 'absolute' in the sense it does not depend upon the merits

of a claimants' assertion.. ."). See Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City ofsun Vallejt, 506
F.3d 85 1 (9thCir. 2007), (". ..note that Lingle answers the question whether takings
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jurisprudence or due process doctrine governs by stating: '[The Takings Clause] is designed not
to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure
compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference.. ..Due process violation cannot be
remedied under the Takings Clause, because if governmental action is found to be
impermissible-for

instance because it fails to meet the 'public use' requirement or it is so

arbitrary as to violate due process-that

is the end of the inquiry." The valid attempts at Due

Process and/or Equal Treatment Under the Law are the only valid defenses in this matter.
Defendants have not only, not tried; but they have also, outright denied when asked and are
deliberately indifferent to the erroneous deprivations. These actionslfailures to act are arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal.
4.1.9 Defendants meet both requirements for impermissibility of Lingle-(i)
-

not

for public use (the first Wagner driveway access permit) and (ii) so arbitrary as to violate due
process ((a) the first Wagner driveway access permit when all parties were present at the 4/12/06
meeting and time was allotted on the agenda and (b) the widening of Camps Canyon Road after
the 1996 alterations authorized solely on the arbitrary and capricious and irrational grounds that
Camps Canyon Road with its continued 25 feet from centerline claim of presently lies within the
identical strip of land it did at the end of the prescriptive period (a legal determination absent of
any factual determination by Defendants). See also Gross v. i%f~iV~tt,
4 Idaho 286 (1 894)
(changes in the road cannot be made legally by just making the changes, even if the changes are
an improvement). See also Plaintiffs ' Third Record Szipplement, Itein No. 20, at 8, ("The
District's policy for improving public highways under its jurisdiction is based on Idaho Code
$40-2312 and the holdings of Meservey [Meservey v Gullford, 14 Idaho 133, 93 P.780 (1908)l
and its progeny. The District is well within its legal rights to widen a road without holding a
public hearing when that activity occurs within the area of the District's public right-of-way,. ."
i2i2eservey does not say that, if there is a dispute of the 50 foot presuinption or unless the land
ouner limited the width of the road with a fence. These actions/failures to act are arbitrary and
capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal.
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1.1.9.1 Defendants have not shoun this-that

they are within a legally

established riyht of way and admit to alterations and still claim identity-a

25 foot from

centerline right of way. Not only are Defendants claims umsupported by the agency record, their
admitted movement of, straightening of and widening of is a self rebuttal of their presumption
and their conclusion that their present claim of 25 feet from centerline is identical to the one
claimed at the end of the prescriptive period as it is implausible, it can't happen. Defendants
affirm their "final decision" and reapply the law again and again (the effect of a coi~tiiluoustort)
without any factual determinations of the "width of the easement" before or after and with each
subsequent alteration. Defendants continue, Id., above Item No. 20 ". . .Plaintiffs fail to accept or
understand that the District is empowered under law to improve and even widen public highways
so loizg as it does not exceed, under usual circumstances, the lawful 50 foot width of that
highway.. ." Plaintiffs agree that the activity is "not unauthorized"; however, Defendants broad
authority must be circun~scribedby statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous
deprivations, as alterations to Camps Canyon Road must conform to the rules set dowi~by the
Idaho legislature (see Gooding H~ily.Dist. v. Idalzo Irrigation Co. 30 Idaho 232, 165 P 99 (1917)
(see Zirzermon v. Burclz 494 U . S. 113 stai-ting at 124; see Zimrner17zan v. City ofOakZand, 255
F.3d 734, (9thCircuit, 2001); see Logan v. Zintmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-436 (1982)
(availability of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is foreseeable,
predeprivatioil process was possible, and official conduct n7asnot "unauthorized"). The
safeguard is a predeprivation hearing and a post deprivation remedy is not adequate when a
predeprivation hearing is feasible. Defendants have not shown-no
agency record-that

substantial evidence in

they have a "law-ful 50 foot right of way7'-before or after they've

repeatedly altered the unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity
of the 3+/- acre parcel. These actionslfailures to act are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal.
4.1.10.2 Is the "lam-ful 50 foot width" any 50 foot width in SENE Section
15 T39N 3WBM?-it

is certainly not the identical one as originallv claimed. This is a fact-that
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a 50 foot right of way can be legally established, and not disputed-which

it is feasible to

determine before the operational actions/failures to act take place and after the fact
determinations are not adequate. Defendants Brief at the previous summary judgment only said
"a"
- 50 foot right of way, not a scintilla of evidence that a 50 foot right of way is legally
established and that there is no evidence colorable of dispute. Plaintiffs continue to assert that
Defendants have not brought forth any specific evidence to show that, "The District's policy for
improving public highways under its jurisdiction is based on Idaho Code $40-23 12 and the
holdings of Meservey [Meservey v Gulliford, 14 I d d ~ o133,93 P.780 (1908)] and its progeny"

Id., does indeed "[empower the District] under law to improve and even widen public highways
so long as it does not exceed, under usual circumstances, the lawful 50 foot width of that
highway.. .", Id., above Itein No. 20, without due process. Neither does I.C.

3 40-23 12 mandate

a 50 foot width, nor give Defendants authority to widen a claimed unrecorded prescriptive right
of way; nor does Meservey deny the need for due process-A

presuinptive width of 50 feet, if

the landowner did not limit the maximum width of the unrecorded prescriptive right of way by
placing a fence or some other type of nlarker demarcating the "width of the easement", and an
opportunity for rebuttal of the 50 foot width, a "consideration of the circumstances peculiar to
the casey'-or

for public use. "'In the absence of valid statutory authority, an administrative

agency may not, under the guise of a regulation, substitute its judgment for that of the legislature
or exercise its sublegislative powers to modify, alter, enlarge or diminish provisions of a
legislative act that is being administered', Roberts v. Transportation Department, 121 Idaho 727,
827 P.2d 1178 (Ct.App. 1991) aff'd 121 Idaho 723,827 P.2d 1174 (1991)", Roeder Holdi~gsv.

Ada County, 136 Idaho 809'41 P.3d 237 (2001). Defendants have an invalid exercise of their
police powers, and that the actions/failures to act are in and of themselves each actionable based
on the application of the -'final decision" of the "width of the easementm--asa matter of law; and
were made without due process as no factual considerations were made; as there is no record to
substantiate Defendants' conclusion of a fifty foot right of way. In Defendants' exercise of their
police powers, Plaintiffs deserved due process prior to the execution of the "not unauthorized"
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police powers and Defendants have not shown a rational basis to a legitimate governmental
interest nor have they attempted to show a rational relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare and that Defendants actions/failures to act are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse
of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal(see Complaint pages 8-25). These claims are not
subsumed by the 5thAmendment, therefore Plaintiffs have a valid

5 1983 claim.

4.1.10.3 As Mr. Landeck continued, ". . .Plaintiffs' failure to accept or
understand has resulted in a need to grasp at procedural "straws" such as are presented with this
motion. The cases cited by Plaintiffs primarily center on the deprivations of personal rights or
freedoms visited by gover~imenton unsuspecting citizens otherwise powerless to act.. ." Id.,
above Item No. 20. Plaintiffs can neither vote against Defendants who determine these improper
interferences with their land, nor can they vote for or against the judge who now sits in judgment
of the Defendants, as Plaintiffs live south of the line dividing the SLCHD and the NLCHD and
Plaintiffs live in Latah Cou~ltyand not Nez Perce County. Plaintiffs allowed Defendants
deference and comity, believing that they were elected officials and were the most likely to be
knowledgeable of an u~lrecordedprescriptive right of way. Plaintiffs found that the extensions of
Plaintiffs' good faith attempts to resolve the dispute to be futile and their extension of deference
and comity to Defendants to be misplaced and undeserved by the Defendants. Plaintiffs made
the same mistake with Defendants7 counsel and found him in need of reading the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct with particular attention to

5 1.13. Plaintiffs after having determined that

their case amounted to more than a simple boundary dispute and that the problem would not go
away with the establishment of a boundary; as, Defendants were determined not to allow a
boundary to be determined, and would simply never write it down and then simply ignore it a
day later and as such required action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. 42 U.S.C. 1983 is a legitimate
course of action (see U.S. Supreme Court San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S.
621 (1 981) 450 U.S. 621 ("Footnote 23 A different case may arise where a police power
regulation is not enacted in furtherance of the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare so
that there may be no 'public use.' Although the government entity may not be forced to pay just
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compensation under the Fifth Amendment, the landowner may nevertheless have a damages
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation")). 42
U.S.C. 1983 is an appropriate course of action (see Zinermon (actions/failures to act are "not
unauthorized" and foreseeable)). 42 U.S.C. 1983 is the only course of action (see Lingle (if it is
arbitrary and or not "for public use", that is the end of the inquiry). However, the District Court
of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho may not agree. Our case was kicked out of
the county of Latah as soon as it was filed. We contacted the Court assistance clerk of Nez Perce
County upon arrival of our case at Nez Perce County, and in no uncertain terms, he notified us
that he wanted nothing to do with a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim or us. We've presented our case on
four occasions and have been turned down on each by the court confirming that we are
essentially right- Defendants' decision, under the color of law: 1) was the type of goverlmental
actiow'failure to act to which due process applies-a
the easementp-and

an admission of that-"no

factual determination of the "width of

final decisionv-110

due process has been

afforded Plaintiffs, and 2) deprived Plaintiffs of a protected property right-the

"width of the

easement" claimed and taken minus the "width of the road" equals deprivation, as the
Defendants have not in the first instance afforded Plaintiffs' due process. The present claim of
25 feet froni centerline can not plausibl~rbe the identical one so claimed at the end of the
prescriptive period and there is no substantial evidence in the agency record to support
Defendants' findings and conclusions, the evidence in the agency record runs contrary to
Defendants findings and conclusio~isas well as the record of this case and Defendants actions are
not supported by determinative principles laid out by the Idaho Legislature or the Idaho Supreme
Court. In its barest form Plaintiffs have a valid

1983 case, as these actions/failures to act are

arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal, whether Defendants,
Defendants' counsel, the Latah County District Court, Nez Perce County Court, or the Second
Judicial District wants to confront it or not, for at least nominal damages, declaratory and
injunctive relief. Without declaratory or summary judgment, Plaintiffs are powerless to enjoin
Defendants from continuing their abusive assault on our buffer and fence, as any illjunction
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would be based on the identical logic as the summary and/or declaratory judgments.
Governmental accountability depends on two basic factors-elections

of those who govern and

those who are elected to provide due process.
4.1.10.4 As Mr. Landeck continued , ". . .Even under those
circumstances, the courts have been reticent to apply a broad stroke requiring a hearing before
every deprivation of a person's rights. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 310, 335 (1976); see
also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,268-9 (1 970). The Matthews and Goldberg cases illustrate
that the degree of potential deprivation that may be caused by a particular decision is a factor in
assessing the validity of the process, as is the fairness and reliability of the process and the
probable value, if any, of the additional procedural safeguards.. .". These alleged and undisputed
actions/failures to act are "not unaut11orized"-the

widening the road and/or the issuing/revoking

driveway access permits. The simplest safeguard is a predeprivation hearing or even a town hall
meeting convened to allow affected residents input on the proposed alterations to a road or a
simple meaningful time to get a meaningful response to a meaningful inquiry-validity

of a

driveway access permit issuancelrevocation or the widening of the road and injuries to a fence.
See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comrfzittee v. ,VicGratIz, 341 U.S. 123, 170-72, 71 S.Ct. 624,64749, 95 L.Ed. 8 17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), ("when a person has an opportunity to speak up in
his ofin defense, and when the state must listen to what he has to say, substanti~~ely
unfair and
simply mistaken deprivations of property interests can be prevented. It has long been recognized
that "fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights

.... [And n]o better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in
jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him an opportunity to meet it"). Failure to
follow Meservery's presumption is a failure to provide statutory safeguards and failure to
provide a meaningful hearing, at a meaningful time and provide a meaningful response is a
failure to provide Meservey's remedy for erroneous deprivations, Id. These actions/failures to
act are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal.
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4.1.10.5 As Mr. Landeck continued, ". . .A final factor in striking the
appropriate due process is the 'public interest.' This includes the administrative burden and
other societal costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an
evidentiary hearing upon demand in all cases.. . ' Mutthews, supra at 347.. .", Id., above Item No.
20. The 5th~mendment'slegitimate governmental interest is to spread the burden of the benefit
amongst the public and not require an individual to bear the burden; whether the abutting
landowners may at times choose to gift the necessary land when asked. Gifting a portion of land
for public road benefits does not waive the landowner future constitutional rights, nor does it
relieve the Defendants of their statutory duties-to

survey and record. See Evers v. County of

Custer, 745 F.2d 1196 (1 984), ("The Supreme Court held that the government could not create a
public easement, 'result[ing] in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned [property],'
444 U.S. at 180, I00 S.Ct. at 393, without exercising its power of eminent domain and paying
just compensation. The County's actions in this case resulted in a coinparable interference with
Evers's right to exclude others'). Whatever the societal costs and administrative burdens, the law
needs to be changed if the Defendants do not want to offer a predeprivation hearing in all cases
of alteration of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way. "Where the legislature enacted a statute
requiring that an administrative agency carry out specific functions, that agency cannot validly
subvert the legislation by promulgating contradictory rules." Roeder H o l d i ~ g sciting Roberts
supra, 12 1 Idaho at 732.

4.1.10.6 When as Idaho Code tj 40-23 12 reads in part, "and may be as
wide as required for proper construction and maintenance in tlle discretion of the authority in
charge of the construction and maintenance", it is at that molllent in time that a predeprivation
hearing-Meservej?'~ rebuttable presumption-is

predictable and feasible (see Zinermorz v.

Burch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124, Zimmemail v. C i v ofOaklan8 255 F.3d 734, (gt" Circuit,

2001), Logan v. Zirnn?ermat;?Brusiz Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-436 (1982) (availability of
postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is foreseeable, predeprivation process
was possible, and official conduct was not "unauthorized").
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4.1.10.7 As Mr. Landeck continued, "...The administrative costs to the

District in matters such as the instant case would outweigh any safeguard. Moreover, this case is
unique in the District's history which is evidence that this alleged problem does not need
additional safeguards, See Arneberg Affidavit, par. 10...", Id., above Item No. 20, Defendants
brought forth no evidence of this-no

specific itemized costs. If the NLCHD's complaint box is

empty, it may mean the NLCHD has a facially invalid policy or that economic infeasibility
permits Defendants to do clandestinely what they could not do in the open court room. Exclusion
of the public participation from the public's interest is irrational-public

hearing prior to the

widening of a road is appropriate in today's democracy. Secret, executive sessions are not the
place for NLCHD decisions. The public record is void of substantial evidence to support the
conclusions and findings that the Defendants and Defendants' counsel expound. The assertions
Defendants make and these actions/failures to act are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal.
4.1.10.8 As Mr. Landeck continued, ". . .Therefore, given that Plaintiffs

have not shown a deprivation, have an available predeprivation remedy, and have not shown that
a hearing is warranted under the due process considerations of this case, this Motion must be
denied.. .", (see Plaintiffs ' TThxdRecord Supplement, Item No. 20, at 9). Plaintiffs allege
Defendants have issued the first Wagner Driveway access permit which Mias wl~ollyon
Plaintiffs' land, and failed to revoke the permit on 4/12/06 when a predeprivation hearing was
predictable (Defendants made time on the agenda and all parties w-ere present (see Plaintiffs '
@davit at 13; Plaintiffss'Third Record Supplement, Item No. 10, at I), and feasible. I.C. $ 40203a does not provide a predeprivation remedy and as a post deprivation remedy it is inadequate.
Further, an appropriate predeprivation remedy was denied Plaintiffs by Defendants arbitrary,
capricious, and biased actions/failures to act. Further, Defendants presented no argument that
there was no dispute over the width, location, use, character of the easement, and no showing of
substantial evidence in the agency record nor in the record of this case to confirm a "hearing is
not warranted"; as Meservey says it is. The "width of the easement" as the needing a factual
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determination was a Court derived conclusion based on the evidence in the record of this case;
however, the Court denies Plaintiffs' partial summary judgment by confirming the undisputed
material fact that a dispute exists and without specific evidence to the contrary provided by
Defendants agency record of substantial evidence to support Defendants' findings and
conclusions. These actions/failures to act are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants'
discretion, and/or illegal. Idaho Code $40-23 12 and the holdings of Meservey neither exonerate
Defendants' actions/failures to act nor do they authorize the actions that Defendants' counsel
pui-ports and the Court sidesteps this point.

4.1.10.9 Defendants' only sustainable argument was that it may be too
expensive to offer a hearing before altering a road, yet Defendants brought forth no specific
evidence of this. Plaintiffs' argument was that there was a dispute over the width of the
easement, that the width of the easement equaled the width of the road. Defendants brought
forth no specific evidence that no dispute existed and the C o ~ ~confirmed
rt
that indeed a dispute
existed. However, the Court denied Plaintiffs' petition for partial summary judgment, contrary
to the substantial evidence in the record.

4.1.11 At this point the difference between the "width of the road" and the "width
of the easement" is a matter of damages and not an issue liability-to

the extent that Defendants

l~aveacted outside of their claimed "width of their easement" they are liable for their claim of
not being right-Defendants

are wrongful possession of Plaintiffs land (this is not amendable by

the 5thAmendment Takings Law). This claim of a 50 foot prescriptive right of way is totally
statutorily derived-it

is a matter of law. The factual parts of the equation of the "width of the

easement"-Meservey 's "circumstances peculiar to the case" were disallowed by Defendants

denying the rebuttable presumption (reading of an unintended legislative mandate) and resolving
the difference between the width of the road and the width of the easement and by denying the
fact that the old fence eliminated the maximum of 50 feet and replaced the maxin~umthat could
be presumed was where the fence once stood and this could be further reduced by the actual land
used for road purposes by the user at the end of the prescriptive period. Defendants admit that
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there has been no "final decision" which in the present case, as there is no ongoing legislative
"land use" activity going on, is simply an admission of no due process. In the application of

Mathews, this case has already determined liability if Defendants choose not to present specific
evidence weighing the private vs. the public interest with specific evidence-for

instance

comparing Mr. Landeck's salary to the price of a public hearing to determine what the neighbors
would like to do with the road. These claims rightfully stand on their own and have no basis in
regulatory land use law-the

"width of the easement" needs to be factually determined first,

having been not so performed all actionslfailures to act have deprived and do continue to deprive
Plaintiffs of their constitutional property rights. These actions/failures to act are arbitrary and
capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal. The book was closed on the "final
authoritative decision" at the end of the prescriptive period whether Defendants ever read the
book or not. The 5thAmendment only subsumes the due process if due process and for a public
use are first fulfilled. Neither of these have been accomplished. See First English Evangelical

Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,3 14 (1987) ("[The
Takings Clause] does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition
on the exercise of that power"). '"[ilt is axiomatic that the Fifth Amendment's just compensation
provision is 'designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' First English

Evarzgelicnl Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County ofLos Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 482 U. S.
3 18-3 19 (1 987) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 364 U. S. 49 (1960))"

Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9 (1988). See also Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United
States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)
(stating that the Due Process Clause is intended, in part, to protect the individual against "the
exercise of power without any reasonable justification ill the service of a legitimate government
objective"). Plaintiffs land and/or fence is neither immoral, unsafe, unhealthful, nor do they
cause a diminution in the general welfare of the public or the Wagners; Defendants have no
rational basis for regulating any harmful effects of the land use provided Plaintiffs by the County
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of Latah-agriculture

and forestry. As to the burden of the promotion of safety and/or other

provision for public benefit, the

st'' Amendment provides a legitimate governmental interest.

Without the provisions of the 5'" Amendment, that's the end of the inquiry-Plaintiffs

have a

valid 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim. This even fulfills Williamson County's "issue that inflicts the actual,
concrete injury". See Harris v. County ofRiverside, 904 F.2d 497 (1990); Logan v. Zinzmerman
Brush C o , 455 U.S. 422,435-436 (1982); Zimmerman v. City ofoakland, 255 F.3d 734, (9'"
Circuit, 2001); See Crown Point Developnzent, Inc. v. City ofsun Valley, 506 F.3d 851 (9thCir.
2007); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) ("...right to
procedural due process is 'absolute' in the sense it does not depend upon the merits of a
claimants assertion.. ."); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972),
( l l t hAmendment property right even though dispute exists); McCulloch v. Glasgow, 620 F. 2d
47 (jthCir. 1980); Lingle v. Chevron U S A Inc., (04-1 63) 544 U.S. 528 (2005) 363 F.3d 846;

A4ieservey v. Gulliford, 14 Idaho 133,93 P. 780 (1 908); and see Evel-s v. Custer County, 745 F.2d
1196. Plaintiffs have a valid

5

1983 claim and Defendants are liable for, at a minimum, nominal

damages. The only question is to which forum do Plaintiffs' bring their witnesses to determine
the factual question-this

Court or the NLCHD?

4.2 Defendants Conclusions and Findings Are Arbitrary and Capricious, Defendants
Have Abused Their Discretion, Defendants' Actions/Failures To Act Are Illegal. If the law is
consistent, Plaintiffs should be able to get to the same place-a

valid 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim-

through application of regulatory land use law, as this Court seems to imply-42
claim is denied on factual determination of the "width of the easement"-a

U.S.C 1983

taking must be

shown (see Williamson Coullty Reg'l Planning Comrn'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 190,
105 S.Ct. 3108, 31 18, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985). See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1 98 1); Agins v. Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980): Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2636, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978)). (i) Without waiver of 4,1through
4.1.11 above Plaintiffs and (ii) without waiver of Plaintiffs objections that Defendants defense of
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"no final decision" is frivolous and (iii) with objection that any defense of previous summary
judgments on the basis on a dispute of a material fact that the "width of the easementn/the "width
of the road" is not disputed is an improper augmentation of the public record, not supported by
substantial evidence of the record and/or that the width of the easement equals the width of the
road and at best the "width of the easement" is disputed. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered
the Court's unanin~ousopinion in Lingle v. Chevron USA., Inc. 544 U.S. 528 (2005) that the
Court needed to "correct course'' and make clear that the "substantially advances" formula put
forth in Agins was inappropriate for determining whether a regulation amounted to a Fifth
Amendment taking. Takings clause challenges to regulations had to be based on the severity of
the burden that the regulation imposed upon property rights, not the effectiveness of the
regulation in furthering the governmental interest. "The paradigmatic taking requiring just
compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property. See,
e.g., li'nited States v. Peewee Coal Co., 341 U.S.

114", Lingle.

Justice O'Connor concludes,

"Con\~ersely,if a government action is found to be impermissible--for instance because it fails to
meet the 'public use' requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process--that is the end of
the inquiry. No amount of compensation can authorize such action", see Lingle. Plaintiffs have
alleged that the Defendants have effected "'physical invasion" of Plaintiffs' land permanently and
temporarily (on a to be determined length of time) and that Defendants actions/failures to act
"fail[ed] to meet the 'public use' requirement" for the first Wagner driveway access permit, and
for reasons of Defendants alterations to Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, as well as the
issuance and/or failure to timely revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, that
Defendants' actions/failures to act are "so arbitrary as to violate due process". Camps Canyon
Road is claimed to be a prescriptive right of way and for all intents and purposes remains
unrecorded and Defendants claim a mandated 50 foot right of way under I.C. 5 40-23 12 and have
admittedly refused to give Plaintiffs an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the disputed "width of
the easement". Plaintiffs have alleged (see Cornylaint 8-25) that these actions/failures to act
have effected a deprivation of Plaintiffs' property and that the Defendants are in wrongful
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possession of Plaintiffs' land, and that these acts/failures to act are arbitrary, an abuse of the
Defendants' discretion and/or illegal. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U . S.
104, 124 (1 978), ("A 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property can
be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good" (citation omitted)). "To prove an arbitrary and capricious claim Plaintiffs need only to
prove that the government has acted arbitrarily and capriciously", (see Eide v. Sarasota C o u n ~
908 F.2d 716 (I 1' Cir. 1990). AS Plaintiffs have stated above (4J

above) this Court has already

confirmed this, "Specifically, the determination of the width of the right of way of Camps
Canyon Road must be addressed" (see Opinion, at 9). Defendants' claim that an unrecorded
prescriptive right of way is mandated by Idaho 5 40-23 12 to be 50 feet-25

feet from centerline

and gives Defendants unbridled authority to perform "not unauthorized" actions and/or failures
to act on Plaintiffs' land without evidentiary hearing to support Defendants clainls and/or
affording Plaintiffs due process and/or equal protection of the law violates Plaintiffs 5th
Amendment rights and is actionable under the 14~"Amendment. Plaintiffs incorporate by
reference all proceeding parts of this document and all subparts and continue with ripeness of
due process challenges and ripeness of arbitrary and capricious challenges:

4.2.1 Procedural andlor substantive due process and/or arbitrary and capricious
due process and/or equal protection facial challenges are ripe (i) when the NLCHD adopted the
North Latah County Highway District Application and Permit To Use Public Right-of-wayApproaches (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. 16, at I ); (ii) when the NLCHD
adopted the North Latah County Highway District customipolicylstandard operating
procedurelexertion of goverrunental power under I.C. 5 40-23 12 and/or (iii) under I.C. 5 4023 17'23 19, 605, 1310, 608,2302, and amongst others, as these statutes are arbitrarily carried out
if accurate record keeping, surveying, conveying, recording, evidentiary hearings are avoided by
unlawfd, and arbitrary conclusions and findings are made by Defendants is regards to an
accurate and legal right of way determination (see Hodel v. Virginia Surface M i ~ i n gand
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Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,295-96, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2370,69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). Plaintiffs
do not know when the NLCHD made such adoptions and have become only aware of the
"widespread and persistent" presence and application of such exertion of Defendants'
governmental powers over the time frame of 4/12/06 until present (see Plaintiffs ' AAffidavitat 2
through 13).

4.2.2
-

As applied substantive due process or arbitrary and capricious challenges

are ripe when the North Latah County Highway District Application and Permit To Use Public
Right-Of-Way-Approaches

("first Wagner driveway access permit"), or the North Latali

County Highway District custoin/policy/standard operating procedure/exertion of governmental
power under I.C. $ 40-23 12 ('width of the easement") and/or under I.C. $40-23 17,2319, 605,
1310, 608, 2302, and amongst others, were applied to Plaintiffs (see Hoehne v. County of San
Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 533 (9:" Cir. 1989). These applications to Plaintiffs' land occurred as
follows:

4.2.2.1 North Latah County Highway District Application and Permit To
Use Public Right-Of-Way-Approaches

("First Wagner driveway access permit") was applied

when (see Conzplaint pages 8-25): (i) it was issued sometime before 3/21/06 (although Plaintiffs
could not obtain a copy of said permit and on information and belief, Plaintiffs were told the first
Wagner driveway access permit was destroyed) (see Plaint2ffs ' Third Record Szpplement, Item
No. 12, at 4, 8 Interrogatory Nos. 6, 7, and1 8) (Defendants issue permit knowing a property line
dispute existed, confirming with the Wagners that it was 0.1~.if the access was within the
prescriptive right of way); (ii) Defendant, NLCHD foreman Dan Payne, signed the Wagners'
Building Permit Application, Latah County Department Of Planning & Building Road Access
Approval on 3/21/06 (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Szlpplement, Item No. 15, at 1) (Defendants
confirmed legal authority to the access). (iii) Defendants failed to revoke the first Wagner
driveway access pennit when they were told the access was wholly on Plaintiffs' land (see
Plaintiffs 'Affidavit at 9 through 15; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplernent, Item No. 10, at 1)
(Defendants, final policy makers, failed to take action); (iv) Defendants failed to temporarily
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revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, Defendants refused to call for a survey,
Defendants refused to request Wagners obtain a professional survey, and/or when Plaintiffs told
Defendants they would call for a survey, Defendants still would not temporarily revoke the
permit (see Plaintiffs ' AAfJidavitat 9 through 15; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item
No. 10, at I ; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. I 1, at 7- 10, Interrogatory Nos.
13, 14, 16 and 17) (Payne does not deny he didn't know of the dispute, but implies that that was
the reason for not revoking the permit, prejudicing his own testimony); see Plaintiffs ' Third
Record Supplement, Iteni No. 12, at 4-1 1, Interrogatory Nos. 7 through 21) (issuance of the
permit was based on two factors; (a) a road frontage of 699 feet (not a dependable statistic as the
Defendants are knowledgeable and participatory in the 1996 alterations of Camps Canyon Road
in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, and (b) the access is within the prescriptive right of way,
although Plaintiffs allege the access is wholly on their side of the east property line of the 3+/acre parcel); and (v) Defendant final policy makers approved the issuance and/or failure to
revoke first Wagner driveway access permit on same grounds as Payile and have reasons not to
be impartial (see Plaintiffs ' AAfJidavitat 13; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Iten1 No. 10,
at 1; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 13, at 7-9 and 10-11; Interrogatory Nos.
12 and 16; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. 17, at 6, Interrogatory No . 14; see
Plainti&s ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. I, at 10-12, Requests for Admissions Nos. 23
through 27(Defendants admit their relationship to the Wagners as relatives and business
associates of third parties who were also in attendance of the 4/12/06 meeting).
4.2.2.2 The North Latah County Highway District custom/policy/standard
operating procedure/exertion of governmental power under I.C.

5 40-23 12, as were I.C. $ 40-

23 17,23 19, 605, 13 10, 608,2302, and amongst others, ("width of the easement") was applied
when (see Complaint pages 8-25): (i) the first Wagner driveway access permit was issued (see
Plaintiffs ' Third Record Szlpplenzent: Item No. 12, at 4. Interrogatory No. 7; also inclusion by
reference of all items 4.2.2.1 as the issuance and failure to revoke first Wagner driveway access
permit was application under I.C. 5 40-23 12 (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplen~ent:Item No.
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12, at 8, Interrogatory No. 18) (Payne tells Wagner the driveway access is okay if it is within the
limits of the prescriptive right of way, [the NLCHD does not have the fee in the land]; (ii)
Defendant, NLCHD foreman Dan Payne, signed the Wagners' Building Permit Application,
Latah County Department Of Planning & Building Road Access Approval on 312 1106 (see
Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 15, at 1 (legal application of the permit), (iii)
Defendants failed to hold hearing and give Plaintiffs meaningful response when all parties were
present for a hearing at the 4112/06 NLCDH meeting (see Plaintiffs ' Afldavit at 13; see also
Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 10 (Defendants have made findings and/or
conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence on the record), at 1; see Plaintiffs '
Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. 18, at 13, Requests for Admissions Nos. 27 through 29;
Plaintiffs ' Third Record Sznpplemerzt, Item No. 13, at 7-9, Interrogatory No. 12); (iv) when
Plaintiffs prepared a letter, was given time on the agenda, attended the 3/21/07 NLCHD meeting,
and was given no hearing, and Defendants took no action to initiate validation proceedings under
their own resolution (see Plaintiffs' Affidavit at 17 through 20; see also Plaint$$

' Third Record

Supplemerzt, Iten1 No. 4, at 1 through 9; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 5, at
2-3 (Defendants liave made findings andlor conclusions that are not supported by substantial
evidence on the record, nor did they take into account substantial evidence which ran contrary to
their conclusions); see Plair~tiffs' Third Record Supplen.tent, Iten1 No. 18, at 14, Requests for
Admissions No. 30); (v) Plaintiffs were given time on the agenda to submit their analysis of the
aerial photos submitted by Defendants as being valid evidence of no movement on Camps
Canyon Road and then they were denied opportunity to present their analysis and again
Defendants denied Plaintiffs' request for Defendants/Conlrnissionersto initiate validation
proceedings under their owl1 resolution. (see PlaintifSs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 6, at
4 through 8); (vi) Defendants failed to respond to Plaintiffs' Requests for Regulatory Takings
Analysis (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 18); (vii) Defendants claimed
damages to Plaintiffs3 fence were a result of Plaintiffs' fence being within the limits of
Defendants' right of way and took no action to ascertain their justification and denied Plaintiffs
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resolution with deliberate indifference (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Szipplement, Item No. 10, at
1; see Plaintiffs ' Affidavit at 8 through 22; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 4,
at 3-4; see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 5, at 2-3; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record
Supplement, Item No. 6, at 4-8; see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 8; see
Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. 9, at 20; see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement,
Item No. 18, at 9-1 1, Requests for Admissions Nos. 21 and 22, at 7, Requests for Admissions
No. 15, at 3-4, Requests for Admissions Nos. 4 and 5) (Arneberg denies on basis of a mandated
50 foot right of way); and (viii) Defendants have not ceased their w-idening and maintenance
activities and continue to threaten Plaintiffs fence (see Plaintiffs ' Affidavit at 24 see Plaintiffs '
Third Record Supplement, Item No. 18, at 7-9, Requests for Ad~nissiollsNo. 16-20); (ix) When
Defendants widened Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 31-1- acre parcel without notice
and due process (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 12, at 11 and 13,
Interrogatory Nos. 22,26, and 27; Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 19, at 17-18
(foreman's log indicates NI,CI-ID is pulling banks and widening Camps Canyon Road); (x)
when Plaintiffs requested Defendants initiate validation proceedings under their own resolution
and Defendants failed to act (see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No.4, at 1); (xi)
Idaho's Doctrine of Quasi Estoppel prevents Defendants claiming they have "used" 25 feet from
centerline throughout the prescriptive period and now say they have not yet reached finality on
whether they are going to "use" 25 feet from centerline.
4.2.2.3 The North Latah County Highway District custorn/policy/standard
operating procedure/exertion of governmental power under I.C. $ 40-23 17 ("removal of fences")
and 23 19 (abatement of encroachments) was applied when (see Conzplaint pages 8-25): (i)
Plaintiffs alleged injury to their fence and Defendants took no action (Plaintiffs incorporate by
reference of 4.2.2.1, 4.2.2.2, above); see Plaintiffs' AAfJidavit,2-24; see Plaintiffs' Third Record
Szcpplement, Item Nos. 4, 5, 6, 8,9, 10, 20, at 8-9, and 21 (Defendants have made findings
andlor conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence on the record); (ii) Defendants
acknowledge injuries to fence and continued same policy without giving Plaintiffs notice (see,
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Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplernent, Item No. 17, at 10-11, Interrogatory No. 25; see Plaintiffs '
ThivdRecord Supplement, Item No. 12, at 13-14, Interrogatory No. 28; see Plaintiffs' Third
Record ,Supplement, Item No. 18, at 7- 9, Interrogatory Nos. 16-20, compare to Plaintiffs ' Third
Record Supplenzent, Itein No. 12, at 13, Interrogatory Nos. 26 and 27; (iii) Defendants have not
ceased their widening and maintenance activities and continue to threaten Plaintiffs fence (see
Plaintiffs' AAffidavitat 24; see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 18, at 7-9, Requests
for Admissions No. 16-20).
4.2.3 Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all the preceding sections of this
document L_ through 4.2.2.3 including all subparts. Due Process (procedural), as applied,
challenges are ripe under the same final decision requirements as above (i) when the NLCHD
adopted and applied the North Latah County Highway District Application and Permit To Use
Public Right-Of-Way-Approaches

(see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 16, at 1);

(ii) when the NLCHD adopted and applied the North Latah County Highway District
custom/policy/standard operating procedure/exertion of governmental power under I.C.

5 40-

23 12 and/or (iii) under I.C. Ij 40-23 17/2319 (see Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclanzation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,295-96, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2370, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). Plaintiffs
do not know when the NLCHD made such adoptions and have become only aware of the
"widespread and persistent" presence and applicatioil of such exertion of Defendants'
governmental powers over the time frame of 4/12/06 until present (see Pluintgfi 'Affidavit at 2
through 13; as well as

tlxough 4.2.2.3 above).

4.2.4 Record of "finalitv"
-

and "authoritative" (Defendants are final policy

makers) determinations and/or approvals:
4.2.4.1 "Richard Hansen explained that technically the fence encroached
on the right of way." (See minutes from 312 1/07 meeting of NLCHD Commissioners, Plaintiffs'
Third Record Supplement, Item 5, pages 2-3 (Defendants have made findings andlor conclusions
that are not supported by substantial evidence on the record);
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4.2.4.2 "Richard Hansen said the property line issues have nothing to do
with the highway district." (See minutes from 3/2 1/07 meeting of NLCHD Commissioners,

Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item 5, page 3) (Defendants have made findings and/or
conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence on the record and with deliberate
indifference to erroneous deprivations);
4.2.4.3 "Ron Landeck quoted Idaho Code 40-109 that says the Highway
District's right-of-way is what they need to maintain a safe roadway." (See minutes from
312 1107 meeting of NLCHD Commissioners, Plaintiffs ' Third Record Szapplement, Item 5 , page
3 (Defendants have made findings and/or conclusions that are not supported by substantial
evidence on the record);
4.2.4.4 "Sherman Clyde said that the fence that the tree fell on was in the
public right of way." (See minutes from 9112/07 meeting of NLCHD Commissioners, Plaintiffs '

Third Record Supplement, Item 6 , at 6(Defendants have made findings and/or conclusions that
are not supported by substantial evidence on the record);
4.2.4.5 "Richard Hansel? showed pictures from 1949 and 1965 that show
the road in the same place it is today. Don Halvorson said the picture nlay not show enough
detail to show a 50 to 80 foot difference in roadway position. Orland Ameberg and Richard
Hansen doubted the road could have moved that far and it would probably show at this scale.". . .
"Ron Landeck said that by looking at the aerial photos one could see there have been no major
changes in the position of the roadway in the last 40 years." (See Plaintiffs 'Affidavit, 18-20; See
minutes from 3/21/07 meeting of NLCHD Commissioners, Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement,
Item 5 , page 2-3; Plaintijfi' TJ2irdRecord Supplement, Item 4; Defendants have made findings
and/or conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence on the record, that there has
been no evidentiary hearing on the question of the original claim of a fifty foot right of way nor
any evidence in the agency record to support of Defendants' implausible claim that Defendants
are within the identical strip of land that the original prescriptive right of u7ajrwas so claimed;
Defendants have failed to take into account important aspects of the problem, that the deed
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showed a discrepancy of greater than 50 feet in that ancient record of the intersection points of
the east and west property lines of the :+/-acre parcel and the recent Rimrock survey, and that
the aerial photos Defendants presented were not verified to be orthogonally rectified and
Defendants gave no rational basis for their conclusion that the aerial photos showed no
movement; that Defendants had issued the first Wagner driveway access for an access which was
wholly on Plaintiffs land based on Defendants' arbitrary conclusions that the first Wagner
driveway access was within the 699 feet described on the Wagner deed, which was not a
dependable statistic, as Defendants Arneberg and Payne knew, as they had straightened the road
in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in 1996, therefore reducing the road frontage of the 3+/acre parcel and the erroneous (the Camps Canyon Road right of way is claimed to be prescriptive
therefore Plaintiffs have the fee in the land and Defendant have no authority convert Plaintiffs
land to Wagners usage) legal conclusion that the width of the prescriptive right of way would
justify the issuance of the permit; Defendants' deliberate indifference to the erroneous
deprivations by not holding a hearing when they knew the Plaintiffs were coming to the meeting
and Plaintiffs had submitted a letter ahead of time and had received time on the agenda and
Defendants blatant reply that they are not concerned with private property lines; and Defendants
submitted evidence without giving Plaintiffs advanced notice of -the aerial photos-so

Plaintiffs

could analyze and examine Defendants stated evidence and the Ex Parte relation of Arneberg and
Bob Wagner as the same photos were shown to Plaintiffs in June of 2006 by Bob Wagner which
on Plaintiffs' information and belief Bob Wagner had said Orland Arneberg had given to hiill to
use, but that he had to return them to Arneberg as they belonged the NLCHD; and the arbitrary
and capricious and completely knowingly inaccurate claim by Defendant Arneberg that Camps
Canyon Road had never moved, amongst other conclusions and findings which were arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal.

4.4.4.6 "Richard Hansen asked Mr. Halvorson if he felt his fence was
more than 25 feet from the center of the road. Don Halvorson said he thought it was. Richard
Hansen said he thought it wasn't." (See minutes fkom 3/21/07 meeting of NLCHD
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Commissioners, Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item 5, page 2-3 (Defendants have made
findings and/or conclusions tliat are not supported by substantial evidence on the record);
4.2.4.7 "Richard Hansen said there is an existing road with a 50 foot

prescriptive right of way.. ." (See minutes from 3/21/07 meeting of NLCHD Commissioners,
Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Itein 5, page 2-3 (Defendants have made findings aiid/or
conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence on the record; Defendants make legal
conclusions based on determinative principles the Idaho Legislature did not intend-

Idaho Code

fj 40-23 12 and the holdings of Meservey);

4.2.4.8 "Don Halvorson asked what he could do to solve his situation.
Ron Landeck said Mr. Halvorson should file a petition for validation of right-of-way. Sherman
Clyde said if Mr. Halvorson would file it the Commissioners would act on it. Mr. Halvorson
said the right-of-way was invalid. Sherman Clyde said Mr. Halvorson had to file for validation
of right-of-way. Mr. Halvorson asked why the highway district would not file for validation.
Both Sherman Clyde and Richard Hansen said they felt the road is where it always has been, so
they were okay with the road's location, therefore there was no reason for them to initiate
validation proceedings" "Landeck said it was not the Highway District's responsibility to
initiate the validation proceeding, but as a landowner Mr. Halvorson can file a petition to initiate
the formal proceedings" (Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. 6, at 8 (Defendants have
made findings and/or conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence on the record;
have deliberately misrepresented the law and had told Plaintiffs in effect they had to financially
provide due process to the Defe~idantsto validate their authority to operate and to take Plaintiffs'
land.);

4.2.4.9 "Mr. Halvorson asked how to get a contested case. Ron Landeck
said to start w-ith a validation petition. Landeck said that if Mr., Halvorson had other issues he
should get an attorney. Mr. Halvorson said that the validation petition would not deal with the
trespass issues. Landeck said that hiring a lawyer urould be Mr. Halvorson's first step. Sherman
Clyde said that bath sides were just going round and round over the same issues and that Mr.
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Halvorson should just hire a lawyer." (See Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 6, at 8
(Defendants have made final decision on the exhaustion off agency remedies);

4.2.4.10 "Mr. Halvorson should just hire a lawyer" is a final decision (see
Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(l); see also Johnson v. Frankel, 520 U.S. 9 11 (1 997) (Defendants
have made final decision on the exhaustion off agency remedies).

4.2.5 Some finality decisions require Plaintiffs to submithesubmit requests for
variances to determine finality. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding parts and
subsection of this document. In light that Plaintiffs are not requesting permission of a change in
the land use of their land, there is no land use variance to be applied for. The request that
Plaintiffs have made of the Defendants are requests for Due Process and Equal Protectionpositive guaranties of the U.S. Constitution. "This Court has held that, in planning and zoning
decisions, due process requires: (a) notice of the proceedings; (b) a transcribable verbatim record
of the proceedings; (c) specific, written findings of fact; and (d) an opportunity to present and
rebut evidence. Cowan, 143 Idaho at 510, 148 P.3d at 1256. In order to meet procedural due
process requirements, an individual must be provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Cowan, 143 Idaho at 512, 148 P.3d at 1258. The opportunity to be heard must occur at a
n~eaniilgfultime and in a meaningful manner. Id. Due process is not a concept to be applied
rigidly, but is a flexible concept calling for such procedural protections as are warranted by the
particular situation. Id.", Spencer v. Kootenai County,

Idaho -(filed March 6, 2008

Docket No.33060). The determination of the 25 foot from centerline is not a series of legislative
decisions that would be synonymous with legislative land use decisions, as Defendants have
misrepresented Idaho Code § 67-8003(3) to read. However it is, that the Defendants portray the
"width of the road" to be a work in progress within the "width of the easement" and/or the
"width of the easement" to be a work in progress within Plaintiffs' property, it is a novel idea for
which there is no legal basis and for which there would be many Constitutional and statutory
prohibitions (Article I $ 13 and 14 of the Idaho State Constitution, the 5'" Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, amongst others). There is no such variance applicatioi~available in present
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case, as it is the Defendants who choose to alter the "use" of Plaintiffs' land, by making a bigger
and bigger road out of it at their discretion. This is in and of itself indicative of the lacking of a
legitimate governmental interest andlor of a rational basis to any imaginable such governmental
interest to regulate the harmful effects of the use of Plaintiffs land and the need of "a final
decision" is frivolous. The nearest thing to requiring a "final decision" in this case would be
under the Wagners' first driveway access permit and as such final decision was given to the
Wagners when Dan Payne signed off on the Wagners' Latah County Building Permit for road
access in March of 2006. Such action was final to the Plaintiffs as well and when Plaintiffs
attended the 4/12/06 meeting to inform Defendants that they had issued the first Wagner
driveway access permit for an access wholly on Plaintiffs' land, the final policy makers of the
NLCHD approved of such issuailce and their failure to revoke the permit was in effect a denial
of a variance as it confirmed Defendants' position, whether arbitrary or not that they were not
going to revoke the permit, even if Plaintiffs were going to call for a survey.

4.2.5.1 However, Plaintiffs will continue with other analogies to a
variance request in this case is (i) Plaintiffs' request that the Conlmissioners initiate validation
proceedings under their omm resolution (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplernerzt, Item No. 4, at
1 (Plaintiffs show the existence of all three permissive criteria for the Commissioners to initiate
validation proceedings on their own and without a meaningful response of the evidence
presented Defendants abuse their discretion and/or arbitrarily (Defendants have made findings
and/or conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence on the record) turn down the
request); see also Plaintiffs ' ;Third Record Supplement, Item No. 6, at 6-8 (Plaintiffs request
again that Defendants initiate validation proceedings under their own resolution, pointing out to
Defendants that all three permissive criteria were shown. Defendants informed Plaintiffs that if
they wanted their case heard Plaintiffs would have to submit a $750 fee and file a petition for
validation. Plaintiffs were told that the fee was nonrefundable even if Plaintiffs prevailed.
Plaintiffs questioned the intent of the fee, if the Defendants could simply initiate the proceedings
on their own.); (ii) Plaintiffs' submittal of Idaho Regulatory Takings Analysis Requests (see
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Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No.8; see also Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement,
Item No. 6, at 6) (Defendants' counsel told Plaintiffs they would not need to respond to these
requests-as

Plaintiffs claiins were too small to warrant his time); (iii) On 4/12/06 Plaintiff, Don

Halvorson attended the regular meeting of the NLCHD Commissioners to inform Defendants
that they had issued the first driveway access permit across Plaintiffs' land, had illjured
Plaintiffs' fence with their grading operations, and had invaded Plaintiffs "buffer" by pushing
dirt and gravel beyond Defendants easement (see Plaintiffs ' Affidavit, at 13). All parties
necessary for a hearing were present at the 4/12/06 (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement,
Item No. 10, at 1, (Defendants have made findings and/or conclusions that are not supported by
substantial evidence on the record) meeting, time was allowed on the agenda for the submittal of
evidence, Chairman Arneberg called first on Plaintiff, Don Halvorson, but no verbatim record
was kept, Defendants were biased, no rational weighing of the evidence was given to Plaintiffs in
any kind of a meaningful response, and Defendants arbitrarily and capriciously andlor abused
their discretion, or illegally failed to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit without a
rational or valid basis (see Plaintiffs 'Affidavit, at 13 submitting letters, requesting records,
analyzing aerial photos, requesting time on the agenda, etc.(see Plaintiffs ' Third Record
Supplemer~t,Item No. 17, at 4-5, Interrogatory No. 9); the final requests for "variance" in
Defendants' decisions were final and confirmed to be that Camps Canyon Road is a prescriptive
right of way therefore the "width of the easement" is 25 feet from centerline, regardless of the
"circumstances peculiar to the case", regardless of the alterations made over time, and regardless
of what I.C. 5 40-23 12 reads in a harmonious way with the statutes and constitutions of the State
of Idaho and the U.S.

4.2.6 Futility: Idaho offers two exceptions to the requirement to exhaust agency
remedies (see Fair-way Development are applicable to their appeal. This Court in Fairway
Development acknowledged that the general rule that administrative remedies must be exhausted
before a district court will acquire subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case, has been deviated
from in certain cases. The Court stated: In relaxing the doctrine of exhaustion, this Court held
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that the rule will be departed from under certain circumstances, first, where the interests of
justice so require and secondly, where the agency acts outside its authority. Fairway Dev., 119
Idaho at 125, 804 P.2d at 298 (citing Grever v. Idaho Tel. Co., 94 Idaho 900, 903,499 P.2d
1256, 1259 (1 972). Plaintiffs are not required to engage in idle and/or futile conduct to resolve
to initiate validation proceedings under
these matters. I.C. 5 40-203a allows Commissio~~ers
their own resolution only if one of three conditions exist. (i) On 4/12/06 Plaintiffs questioned the
legal establishment of the Camps Canyon Road right of way (alterations had been made to the
right of way in 1996 with the permission of the previous owner and the Defendants were now
claiming prescription (see Plaintiffs ' AfJidavit, at 8 and 13) availed Defendants of the facts that
alterations had been made to Camps Canyon Road (see Plaintgs ' AAffidavit,at 8 and 13) and that
Defendants were not knowledgeable of the accurate location of the right of way if they believed
that the first Wagner driveway access permit was not on Plaintiffs land (see Plaintiffs ' Third
Record Supplenwrft, Item No. 12, at 9, (however Dan Payne is also knowledgeable of the 1996
alterations to Camps Canyon Road, as he conducted the alterations (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record
Supplernenf, Item No. 3, at 16-17, Request For Admission Nos. 40-44). Dan Payne altered the
centerline of Camps Canyon Road on several occasions; yet he used the measurement of the
centerline to determine the validity of the first Wagner driveway access permit. (ii) On 3/21/07,
Plaintiffs represented the facts of (i) and supplemented those facts with the results of the
Ri~nrocksurvey which showed movement of the intersection points of the east and west property
lines of the 31-1- acre parcel of greater than 50 feet. The present location of Camps Canyon Road
no longer agreed with the Latah County records (our deed) (see Plaintiffs ' Tljird Record
Supplement, Item No. 4, at 2-3). The Idaho Doctrine of Quasi-Estoppel estops Defendants from
asserting reliability of the deed description for issuance/failure to revoke the first Wagner
driveway access permit and then denying the reliability of the deed in negating the movement of
Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel. All t h e e "permission given" factors
of I.C. (i 40-203a for Commissioners to initiate validation proceedings under their own resolution
had been shown to Commissioners and they refused to respond. It would be futile to believe the
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$750 fee and the same data would result in a meaningful response. Further Defendants demands
of the $750 fee and that Plaintiffs apply for validation proceedings would only result in the
declaration of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel as being "in the public
interest" or not (a fact not in dispute-the

only dispute is with the doubts of location, public

records, numerous alterations, claim of legal establishment as an unrecorded prescriptive right of
way). The questions (as a right to private action) of doubt are better addressed by the
Commissioners initiating validation proceedings under their own resolution. See ??'&rev. Idaho
State Tax Comm 'n, 98 Idaho 477, 567 P.2d 423 (1977). Defendants and Court incorrectly
identifies I.C. 5 40-203a as a predeprivation remedy and as a post deprivation remedy I.C. 5 40203a is inadequate on the grounds: (a) a predeprivation remedy is feasible, predictable, and
practicable; (b) exhaustion of agency remedies is not necessary under 1983; and even if
exhaustion of agency remedies was required, this case meets both exceptions to exhaustion in
Idaho as the Defendants are alleged to be biased both in their culpability to improperly altering
Camps Canyon Road and their ties to the aspirations of the Wagners and it would be unjust to
require Plaintiffs pay a $750 fee to petition Defendants to validate Camps Canyon Road when
Plaintiffs had already shown them the evidence for questioning the validity of Defendants claims
and Defendants stated that they were not interested and the Defendants were acting outside their
authority, to operate without a valid right of way; and (c) Defendants are estopped from claiming
Plaintiffs should file for validation proceedi~lgswhen it is their duty for providing Plaintiffs with
a valid right of way (see Ware v. Idaho State Tux Comm 'n, 98 Idaho 477, at 483 (1 977).

4.2.7 Submittal of a takings claim requirements:
-

(i) Plaintiffs submitted a

reasonable written proposal for settlement at the 8/8/07 NLCHD meeting giving Defendants a
reasonable time for response. The proposal was accepted by the by the Commissioners and the
clerk at the meeting and Plaintiffs were given the tentative response date of 9/12/07 (see
Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 2 1; see also Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement,
Item No. 9, at 20). No response was ever received. (ii) Plaintiffs submitted a Tort Claim Notice
(dated 11/1/07) on 11/6/07 outlining complaints and requests for compensation. (iii) After the
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Rimrock survey was completed and the Wagners realized their access was wholly on Plaintiffs'
land, the Wagners approached Plaintiffs seeking resolution. Plaintiffs said that they would
cooperate with the Wagners and the NLCHD to deed an easement to the NLCHD to resolve the
issue (see Plaintiffs ' Afldavit, at 15). On information and belief, Bob Wagner told Plaintiffs that
the NLCHD had turned down the offer based on the fact that it would create a fifty one foot
easement. Defendants were arbitrary and capricious andlor abused their discretion in ignoring
offers to settle.
5. Arguments In support of Plaintiffs' Motions for partial summary judgments, Plaintiffs make
the following arguments in regards to the unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon
Road, in the vicinity of the 311- acre parcel and Defendants' exertion of power under I.C. fj 4023 12, I.C. fj 40-23 17/2319, and Defendants' authority to issuelrevolie driveway access permits
and Defendants' invalid widening of Camps Canon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel,
Defendants' issuing and failing to revoke the first Wagner driveway access pennit for a driveway
access wholly on Plaintiffs' property and Defendants' damaging of Plaintiffs' fence in the
process of widening of Camps Canyon Road and the validity of Defendants' customs, policies
and exertions of gover~mentalpower based on a fifty foot-25

feet from centerline right of way,

whether determined as an absolute, an unrebuttable presumption and/or as a rebuttable
presumption without provisions for rebuttal and other statutory safeguards and remedies for
erroneous deprivation:
5.1 Undisputed Material Facts:
5.1.1 Camps Canyon Road traversing Section 15 T39N
-

R3 WBM including

SENE quarter quarter of Section 15 was, until 1996, an unrecorded prescriptive right of way
used by public possibly dating back to circa 1870s to 1880s.
5.1.2 No agency records exist as to the laying out, surveying, or recording of
Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, at any time from the end of the prescriptive period
until present.
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5.1.3 No agency records exist as to any public evidentiary hearings performed to
ascertain the use, location, width, or character of Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part.

5.1.4 In the fall of 1996, alterations were made to Camps Canyon Road, in the
pertinent part, including straightening of the curves at the east and west property lines of the 3+/acre parcel, moving of the centerline to the northeast and some widening of the road surface.

5.1.5 Alterations were made to Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, in
1996 and the late fall of 2005 and again in 2006.

5.1.6 No known alterations to Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, have
been noted or recorded before the alterations of 1996.

5.1.7 No public evidentiary hearings have been held in regards to the legal
establishment, location, width, use, character of Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, or in
regards to any of the alterations before or after any of the alterations noted in 5.1.5 .

5.1.8 At no time prior to any of the alterations as noted in 5.1.5 was a survey of
the proposed highway alteration caused to be made, with or without an accurate descriptioli of the Iands
required for the alterations.

5.1.9 At no time prior to any of the alterations as noted in 5.1.5 was recorded in
agency record all proceedings of the commissioners relative to Camps Canyon Road, in the
pertinent part, any orders for laying out, andlor for altering of Camps Canyon Road, in the
pertinent part in 1996,2005 and/or 2006.

5.1.10 No known public evidentiary hearing has been held to determine the width
of Carnps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part at anjJtime prior to the i996 aiteration or after,
and/or prior to 2005 widening or after, andlor prior to the 2006 widening or after.

5.1.11 The "width of the easement" has not been factually determined for Camps
Canyon Road, in the pertinent part at any time.

5.1.12 The location of the original Camps Canyon right of way has never been
surveyed, laid out, or recorded by the NLCHD.
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5.1.13 The location of the Camps Canyon right of way has never been surveyed,
laid out, or recorded by the NLCHD after or before any of the alterations of 1996,2005 and/or
2006.
5.1.14 No hearing has been before the Commissioners on any of the matters
concerning the issuancelrevocation of the first Wagner driveway access permit, Plaintiffs'
alleged Defendants' physical invasion of Plaintiffs' buffer and damage to Plaintiffs' fence, or the
determination of the "width of the easement" for Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part.
5.1.15 Defendants have acted and/or have failed to act on Camps Canyon Road,
in the pertinent part, based on their determination of the width of the easement of an unrecorded
prescriptive right of way to be statutorily mandated at 50 feet-25 feet from centerline, that is
Defendants have issued andlor failed to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, and
Defendants have added width to Camps Canyon Road in the pertinent part.
5.1.16 Defendants have no recorded evidence as to the original width and
location of Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, as no survey was done prior to the 1996
alteration and no accurate description of tlie laids involved in the 1996 alteration was recorded
and the physical attributes of the original right of way, the width and the location, were altered
and no survey and/or accurate description of the lands required was performed prior to the 1996
alterations and as such no records exist, physical and/or documentary, as to the location and
width of Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part in the agency records.
5.1.17 Plaintiffs have since tlie 4/12/06 meeting of the Commissioiiers of the
NLCHD and in effect told the Commissioners and have given Defendants fair warning that the
first Wagner driveway access had violated the east property line of the 3+/- acre parcel and told
the Commissioners they and/or the Wagners needed to call for a professionally done survey.
5.1.18 Plaintiffs have since the 4/12/06 meeting of the Commissioners of the
XLCHD and in effect told the Commissio~lersand have given Defendants fair warning that they
did not have a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of way on Camps Canyon Road in the SENE
Section 15 T3 9N R3 WBM.
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5.1.19 Plaintiffs have since the 4/12/06 meeting of the Commissioners of the
NLCHD and in effect told the Commissioners and have given Defendants fair warning that they
did not have a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline prescriptive right of way on Camps Canyon Road
in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel.
5.1.20 Plaintiffs have a valid deed recorded with the County of Latah of the fee
simple interest of all lands in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM, except for the 311- acre
parcel.
5.1.21 The public has only an easement, whatever form the easement takes, over
Plaintiffs' land, that is the NLCHD does not have the fee in the land which underlies the Camps
Canyon right of way in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3kTBM.
5.1.22 The first Wagner driveway access permit was for an access wholly on
Plaintiffs' property as it required road access east of the east property line of the 3+1- acre parcel.
5.2 Facial invalidity of Defendants exertion of govenme~ltalpowers under I.C. 65 4023 12,2317, 23 19,203a, 605, 1310, 608.2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and
Defendants' authority to issuelrevoke driveway access permits: I .C. $5 40-23 12,23 17, 23 19,
203a, 605, 13 10,608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title '-/-Chapter7 are unambiguously written
and can be harmoniously coilstrued to be in constitutional agreement with the 5thAmendment of
the U.S. Constitution and Article I

5

13 and 14 of the Idaho State Constitutioil which, in effect

state that a goverixnental agency with the authority of eminent domain may oilly properly
interfere with an individual property rights, as in this instance, the fundamental liberty right to be
free of improper interference and the right to own land, through due process and then only for a
public use. Further, it has long been held that the physical invasion of and physical occupation
of, as in this instance land, no matter how small or how temporary is a per se taking; and any
regulation which requires such physical occupation of, as in this instance land, is a taking and
such a taking is particularly egregious if a third party is the allowed invader. See First Et2glish
E~iangelicalLutheran Church of Glendale, "public burdens.. ., in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole"; see Lingle, citing Utzited States v. Peewee Coal Co., 341 U.S.
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I 14, "The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation

or physical invasion of private property"; see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982) (the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that and owner suffers a special ltiild of
injury when a "stranger" invades and occupies the owners' property, and that such an occupatioii
is qualitatively more severe than a regulation on the use of the property). The U.S. Supreme
Court has long held and the Idaho Statutes, I .C. $5 40-2312,2317,2319, 203a, 605, 1310,608,
2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, are unambiguously written and harmoniously
construed to holding that a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a
"taking" without regard to the public interest that it may serve (see Aztec (an increase in the
physical width of a right of way is enveloping of more land)). Any "taking" without Due
Process and/or for a public use is arbitrary and capricious (see Liuzgle; see also Crown Point
Development). Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all previous sections of this document.
Defendants reading of I.C. 5 40-23 12 and tile exertion of power as so read mandates that an
unrecorded prescriptive right of way be 50 feet wide-25 feet from centerline (see Plaintiffs '
Third RecordSupplement, Item No. 13, at 4, Interrogatory No. 4 (Chairman Arneberg states that
a prescriptive right of way is under Idaho law 50 feet wide which means it is 25 feet from center
line; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplernerzt, Item No. 18, at 2-4, Requests for Admissions Nos.
1-6 (Chairman Ameberg states that a fifty foot width is a legal presumption but that all
prescriptive ways must be 50 feet wide); see also Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No.
5, at 3, ("Richard Hansen said there is an existing road with a 50 foot prescriptive right of way");
see also Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplenzeuzt, Item No. 20, at 8, (iCTheDistrict's policy for
improving public highways under its jurisdiction is based on Idaho Code 540-2312 and the
holdings of hfeservey [lbleservey v Gullifurd, 14 Idaho 133,93 P.780 (1 908)] and its progeny.
The District is well within its legal rights to u-idei~a road without holdiilg a public hearing when
that activity occurs within the area of the District's public right-of-way. Plaintiffs fail to accept
or understand that the District is empo~ieredunder law to improve and even widen public
highways so long as it does not exceed, under usual circumstances, the lawful 50 foot width of
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that highway") without more, as in an opportunity for an affected persods to rebut a presumption
of a fifty foot right of way or that the width of the right of way was limited by a fence or some
other manner by the land owner, is facially invalid, unconstitutional, as it is arbitrary and
capricious as it denies the abutting land owier to an unrecorded prescriptive right of way his
right to due process and/or equal protection under the law, and/or is an abuse of Defendants'
discretion, andlor is illegal. Defendants' stated policv, custom based on persistent and
widespread usage is in effect a mandated 50 foot width-25 feet from centerline. allows for
operational duties without holding of public hearing andlor due process (see ilfonell

Department of Social Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (a goverimental agency is liable for civil
rights violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983 if such violations result from the execution of a
governmental policy or custom); see also GilZette v. Delmo~e,979 F.2d 1342, 1346-1347 (9"'
Circuit 1992) (liability if the final policy makers approve of subordinate's unconstitutional
decision or the action and the basis for it)).
5.2.1 A facial challenge to a statute or rule is purely a question of law (see State
v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197 (1998). Generally, a facial challenge is mutually exclusive from an

as applied challenge (see State v. Ko~"ser7,138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003). Defendants' exertion of
power under I.C. 5 40-23 12 is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion andlor
illegal and is facially invalid for the following reasons:

5.2.1.1 I.C. $40-23 12 is not ambiguous and the holdings of Meservey
clearly outline the legislative intents and the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation that the width
of s highway is matter of choice (the width shall be any of three choices, and further the width is
at the discretion of those in charge) is not mandated, and it may be presuilled to be 50 feet if a
land owner had not limited the width and the width was to be a matter of consideration of the
circ~imstancespeculiar to the case ("If the court finds that Congress had a specific intent.. ., the
court stops there and ei~forcesthat intent regardless of the agency's interpretation", Chevrorz

U.S.A. Inc. v. Aktural Resources Defense Council Irzc.: 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984).
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5.2.1.2 1.C. 5 40-23 12 does not (i) mention a specific-mandated-width
for a prescriptive right of way. Choice of three options is given: (i) fifty feet; (ii) lesser than
fifty feet; or (iii) greater than fifty feet. There is no (ii) inention of a category of 25 feet from
centerline (see Roberts v. Trarqsportation Department, 121 Idaho 727 (1991) (an agency, under
the guise of regulation, cannot substitute its judgment for that of the legislature's or exercise
sublegislative powers to modify, alter, enlarge or diminish the provisions of the legislative act
that is being administered); see Berkovitz v. Uftited States, 486 U.S. 53 1, 536 (1988) (no mandate
if choice is given));
5.2.1.3 Meservey holds a prescriptive right of way is presumed to be fifty
feet wide; however an evidentiary presumption only holds as a finding if it is unrebutted;
h4eser-vey implies an abutting land owner is afforded an opportunity for rebuttal. Any
policy/custoin under I.C. § 40-23 12 and the holdings of 2Weserveywithout an opportunity for
rebuttal ~vouldbe arbitrary aiid capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal as it
would ignore an important part of the prescriptive sight of way; public use can not be said to
apply to lands not actually used; there is no reason that an owner should know that he is required
to dispute the rightfulness of a nonexistent user; a property owner thus receives no notice as to a
public claim on any property in excess of that which is actually been used; without an
opportunity to rebut a policy/custonl would violate 5thAmendment rights to due process and
therefore arbitrary; and therefore a violation of the 14t" Amendment. Defendants policy/custorn
is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal (see Enterprise, IEC.
v. :Yampa City, 96 Idabo 734, 536 P.2d 729 (1975) (an action is arbitrary if it was done without a

rational basis; if it was done in disregard of the facts and circunistances presented or without
adequate determining principles);
5.2.1.4 Neither I.C. $ 40-23 12 nor Meservey create a rational basis for a

50 foot right of way. An evidentiary starting point may be created; however, it does not establish
a rational basis that a prescriptive right of way necessitates a 50 foot width. If the presumption is
rebutted, as in the width of the road presently is not fifty feet wide and without more, it must be
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then shorn- that more than the width of the road and its supporting structures is actually used,
Therefore denying an evidentiary hearing when the legal establishment, location, width, use, or
character of the road has been questioned is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants'
discretion, and/or illegal to require a prescriptive right of way to be 50 feet wide (see Idaho Rules
Of Evidence Article 111 5 30 1). Defendants' refbsal to provide Plaintiffs with due process of an
evidentiary hearing when Plaintiffs have rebutted the Defendants claim of a 50 foot-25

feet

from centerline right of way and without any specific evidence leaves Defendants with simply
repetitious testimony;

5.2.1.5 Defendants policy /custom is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal as it is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest; the legitimate governmental interest in enveloping more land for public benefit is to
spread the burden amongst the public. Defendants have not shown a rational relation to public
health, safety, morals or general welfare. The regulation of the ill effects of land use is tlle
prevue of county planning and zoning; I.C. 5 22-4504 prevents the adoption of ordinances or
resolutions declaring as a nuisance any agricultural operations operated in accordance with
generally recognized agricultural practices (-"hehen

a conflict exists between a statute and a

regulation, the regulation must be set aside to the extent of the conflict", see Roeder Holdings
citing Idaho County Nz~rsingNome v. Dep 't of Healtlz, 120 Idaho 933, 93 7, 82 1 P.2d 988, 992
(199 1);

5.2.1.6 Defendants policy /custom is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal as it allows Defendants to destroy the evidence, the
precedent conditions of the prescriptive right of way without creating an agency record of the
basis for their conclusions and findings. I.C.

$5 40-605 and I.C. $5 40-1 3 10 requires Defendants

survey before taking of private land. Altering an unrecorded right of way without a prior survey
and an accurate description of the land to be used for the alteration is arbitrary as there is no
rational basis for Defendants' claim that no private property was taken. I.C. $9 40-608 requires
record keeping of alterations of roads and I.C. $5 40-2302 requires Defendants to record and
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convey all instruments of dedication; Defendants have no discretion to not record alterations. I.C.

5 5 40-203a mandates Defendants validate a right of way about which there is doubt its legal
establishment, such as occurs when Defendants arbitrarily mandate an unrecorded prescriptive
right of way be 50 feet-25 feet froin centerline and Defendants' policy for altering an unrecorded
prescriptive way is that the alterations are within 50 feet of the right of way. All policies,
customs, exertions of governmental power under I.C. $5 2317,2319,203a, 605, 1310,608,2302,
Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, amongst others must fail, are arbitrary, an abuse of
defendants discretion, and/or illegal if they are based on exemption by an arbitrary reading of

I.C.

5s 40-23 12.

("A regulation that is not within the expression of the statute, however, is in

excess of the authority of the agency to promulgate that regulation and must fail", see Roeder
Holdings citing see Levin v. Idaho State Board of Medicine, 133 Idaho 413, 987 P.2d 1028

(1 999).
5.2.1.7 Defendants policy /custom is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of

Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal as it does not allow abutting land owner without a hearing
to establish evidence that the landowners limited the width of the road, such as with a fence
which would rebut or disallow the Meservey presumption and is a violation of the 5*"and 14~''
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution;

5.2.1.8 Defendants policy /custom is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal as neither I.C. S; 40-23 12 nor A4eservey give Defendants
authority to alter a prescriptive right of way; as such authority is found under I.C. 5 40-605
and/or I.C. 5 40-1 3 10 and these statutes would require an evidentiary hearing to provide
substantial evidence in the record on whicli to base a conclusion or finding of the legal limits of
the right of way and evidence in the record that no private property was taken in the alteration.
Without substantial evidence in the record to support the agency's conclusions and findings
would be arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants discretion, ai~d!or illegal (see
Enterprise, above);
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5.2.2 Defendants exertion of governmental powers under I.C. $ S 40-23 12,2317,
23 19,203a, 605, 1310, 608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and Defendants'
authority to issuelrevoke driveway access permits are facially invalid as the width of the
easement is invalidly established under I.C. $ 40-23 12 and it4eservey (see above) aildlor:

5.2.2.1 Both I.C. 5 40-23 17 and I.C. $ 40-23 19 require due process of
notice and hearing and without these Defendants' exertion of governmental power is arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal (see 5thand 14~"
Amendments
to the US Constitution);

5.2.2.2 Without a hearing under I.C. 5 40-23 17 andlor I.C. $ 40-23 19
Defendants findings and conclusions are without support of substantial evidence in the agency
record and therefore arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal
(see Enterprise, above);

5.2.2.3 Without a requirement that a permitee's driveway access is
coilclusively shown to be wholly on land which permitee owns, Defendants' policy for issuing
driveway access permits is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or
illegal (see the

Amendment and the 5'" Arnendnleut to the U.S. Constitution);

5.2.2.3 Without a requirement that a permitee's driveway access is
conclusively shown to be ~vhollyon land which permitee owns, and an opportunity for a bearing
for the adjoining laiid onner, Defendants' policy for issuing driveu;ay access permits is arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal (see Zinermon).
5.2.3 Defendants' exertions of power under I.C. 5 40-23 12, I.C. $40-23 17 and
-

I.C.

5 40-23 19 and Defendants' authority to issuelrevoke driveway access perillits are facially

invalid as they deny an abutting land owner equal protection under the law and are therefore
invalid for the following reasons:

5.2.3.1 Land owners abutting to an unrecorded prescriptive right of way
have similar rights to a stationary, legally established, and adequately documented and locatable
right of way traversing his land as an abutting landowner abutting to a right of way with a deeded
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easement; and that alterations, widening, and/or straightening take place within the
predetermined boundaries of the easement and without the enveloping of more land without
substantial evidence in the record to establish the limits of the right of way before alteration; and
are invalid as these actslfailures to act treat abutting landowners to unrecorded prescriptive rights
of way differently than abutting land owners to deeded rights of way without a rational basis for
a legitimate governnlental interest to do so (see the 14"' Anlendrnent and the

jthAmendment

to

the U.S. Constitution);
5.2.3.2 Defendants policy /custom is not rationally related to a legitimate

governmental interest; the interest the Defendants have in occupying an abutting landowners'
land is for the benefit of road purposes and hence to spread the burden amongst the public and
Defendants' policylcustom bears no relation to the public health, safety, welfare, morals, or
general welfare; the regulation of the ill effects of the use of an abutting land owner's land is not
the prevue of the NLCHD. Defendants have not shown any rational basis to regulate an abutting
landowners' land related to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare (see Rocder

Holdings);
5.2.4 Defendants exertions of goverilmental powers under I.C. tj ij 40-23 12, and
-

all stat~~tes
subject to a legally established right of way, such as I.C. $5 40-23 17,23 19, 203a,
605, 1310, 608, 2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and Defendants' authority to
issuelrevoke driveway access perinits are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants'
discretion, and/or illegal and therefore f~ciallyinvalid as such policies/customs have failed to
adhere to the legislature's unambiguous intent of the statute to a discretionary width of a
highway and the holdings of ~Weser.ve.yimplied right of the land owner to rebut the 50 foot width,
would allow Defendants to make findings and/or conclusions that are not supported by
substantial ex-idence on the record andlor make implausible assumptions uhich run counter to
any theory of prescription andlor the harmonious construction of Idaho statutes (see Eulterprise,
luzc. v. itTa~npa
Cip, 96 Idaho 733,536 P.2d 729 (1975) (ail action is arbitrary if it was done
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without a rational basis; if it was done in disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or
without adequate deterinining principles).
5.2.5 Defendants exertions of governmental powers under I. .C. §fj40-23 12,
-

23 17,2319, 203a, 605, 1310,608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and Defendants'
authority to issue/revoke driveway access permits are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal and tlzerefore facially invalid as such policies/custoins have
no rational basis to a legitimate goverm~lentalinterest as Defendants have no authority to
regulate the use of an abutting land owner's to an unrecorded prescriptive right of way land as
such regulation is unrelated to the public health, safety, n~orals,or general welfare. If the public
road is unsafe the abutting landowners land use is not the cause even if a landowmer has a fence
at the side of the road. Defendants have statutory ways of dealing with encroachme~ltson
unrecorded prescriptive rights of way (see ri4eservey) (see Roeder I7Toldings).

5.2.6 Defendants exertions of govel~lmentalpowers under I.C. $5 40-23 12'23 17,
2319,203a7 605, 1310, 608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and Defendants'
authority to issue/revoke driveway access permits are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal and tlierefore facially invalid as ~vithoutan opportunity to
rebut such customs, policies or exertions of goverilmeiltal pou7erviolates the due process of the

sthand 14" Amelldn~entsof the U.S. Constitution and therefore are invalid exercises of
Defendants' police power. Defendants conclusion that the lawful width of ail unrecorded
prescriptive right of way is 50 feet is arbitrary and capricious and/or an abuse of Defendants
discretion andlor illegal on the grou~ldsthat Defendants have entirely failed to consider
impoilant aspects; such as, circumstances pertainiilg to the case, and/or limitations of tlze nidth
set by tlie owner of the fee in the land, and the due process afforded a land owner by the
presun~ptivenature of 50 foot width, of the deter~ninationof the width of an unrecorded
prescriptive right of way (see Chevron US.A. IHC.v. nhtuval Resources Defense Council Ilzc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984) (the court held that an agency "cannot validly subvert the
legislation by promulgating contrary rules");
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5.2.7 Constitutionality:
-

As unambiguously read I.C. $$ 40-23 12,2317, 23 19,

203a, 605, 1310, 608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, are not unconstitutional.
Defendants create ambiguity and therefore an unconstitutional reading of these statutes by
denying an evidentiary hearing on which to base their conclusions and findings by denying a
hearing to rebut the 50 foot width presumption, by in effect saying the legislature has mandated a
fifty foot width. Defendants exertions of governmental powers under 1.C. $5 40-23 12,2317,

23 19, 203a, 605, 1310, 608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, are therefore arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal and therefore facially invalid.
"The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of establishing that
the statute is unconstitutional and must overcome a strong presumption of validity.' Olsen v.

J A . Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706,709, 791 P.2d 1285, 1288 (1990). An appellate court is
obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that will uphold its constitutionality. Cobb, 132
Idaho at 197, 969 P.2d at 236. In addition, 'a statute should not be held void for uncertainty if
any practical interpretation can be given it.' Id. at 197, 969 P.2d at 246", State of Iduho v. John
Doe, -Idaho-,

(2004) (Opinion No. 69). Without a presumptive width of fifty feet, and only

a presumptive width of 50 feet, if it was determined that landowner had not limited the width of
the easement, such as with a fence, and an opportunity to rebut any claimed width on the basis of
the circumstances peculiar to the case, the interpretation of the statute, Idaho Code 540-23 12,
would be invalid, in all cases of determination of the width of an unrecorded prescriptive right of
way. Defendants claim to regulate a fifty foot easement-25

feet from centerline-solely

on the

grounds that said right of way is prescriptive is an invalid police po~%~er.
The exertion of a

L,

governmental power over land the NLCHD has no authority to regulate is invalid-including

all

such operational activities (see Roberts, see Roeder, and see Levin). Defendants' counsel
reading of Meseniey is misplaced as Adeservey implies the necessary notice and predeprivation
hearings and does not infer that notice and hearings may be excluded at Defendants' discretion in
regards to an unrecorded prescriptive right of way. Indeed the statute regulating -'pLCHD's]
legal rights to widen a road" is 1.C. 5 40-605 (same verbiage in I.C, 5 40-1 3 10). The annotation
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under 605 admonishes Defendants' counsel for doing just what he says Defendants may do (see

Gooding Hwy. Dist. v. Idaho Irrigation Co. 30 Idaho 232, 165 P 99 (1917) ("In order that act of
county commissioners in laying out highway be valid, whether upon public domain or private
property, board must conform to law giving such authority, as power to establish highways rests
in legislature and right may be exercised only in such xnanner as legislature provides"). I.C. 5
40-23 12 provides only for the discretionary determination of the width of a highway and I.C.

5

40-23 12 is not the "law giving such authority, as power to establish highways rests in legislature
and right may be exercised only in such manner as legislature provides", Gooding. Such
misplaced authority claimed by Defendants' counsel is also exemplified by his confabulation of
Meservey. Defendants' counsel denies Meservey's determining facts of "user" and limitations of
landowner and then seeks to regulate the "use" of Defendants' claimed 50 foot right of way.
This allows Defendants to make findings and/or conclusions that are not supported by substailtial
evidence on the record, as there is no record made. According to Defendants' regulatory theory,
the Defendants can regulate the "use", as in "no final decision" has been given as to the limits of;
yet the limits of this "use" was necessary to establish the "width of the easement" of an
unrecorded prescriptive right of way. This activity goes so far that it allows the undocumented,
and the unsubstantiated by any evidence in the agency record, invasion of the land owner's
property and is an invalid exercise of Defendants' police power. This is irrational as it in effect
says that that which has not been established can be reestablished, arbitrary and capricious and
does not bear a relation to the public safety, health, morals or general welfare and is therefore an
invalid exercise of Defendailts' police powers. Any extension of or alteration in an unrecorded
prescriptive right of way or the application of any other statutes, policies, customs, standard
operating procedures, issuance of or revocation of, or failure to revoke drive way access permits
are, without notice and opportunity for a hearing at a meaningful time to an abutting or adjoining
landowner are also invalid as they are not rationally based, as the "width of the easement"
determines the validity of the operational activity. Defendants interpret an unconstitutional
reading of I.C. $ 40-23 12, by ignoring the implied presumption, the express land ou7ner
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limitation, and an opportunity for the abutting landowner to rebut prior to actions. Further,
Defendants' policies and customs do not take into account the harmonious construction of the
Idaho Statutes and the Idaho State Constitution and the U.S. Constitution by allowing
Defendants distinctly prohibited activity such a trespass, malicious trespass, malicious damage to
abutting landowners' property, damage to abutting landowners' fence, destruction of survey
landmarks and/or monuments, as in the destruction of a centerline of a road which lies as a
property line, amongst others wherever the authority to operate is based within the limits of an
easement and proliibitions are not justified by the presence of an easement. Standards of review
of Defendants' interpretation, abuse of discretion, arbitrary and capricious, de novo (Defendants
have made findings andlor conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence on the
record, they have not conducted an adequate thoughtful development of a policy through a
rational approach to policy formulation; although there may be a place for informal policy,
custom, such informality is not meant to justify an intentional or unintentional abdication of
Defendants' duties to create a basis for their coilclusions and a record of their facts and findings
or to come to thoughtful rational conclusions), or other are at the Court's discretion.
5.2.8 I.C. 5 40-23 12 makes no mention of unrecorded prescriptive rights of way.
I.C. 9 40-2312, reads, "WIDTH OF HIGHWAYS. All highways, except bridges and those
located within cities, shall be not less than fifty (50) feet wide, except those of a lesser width
presently existing, and may be as wide as required for proper coiistruction and maintenance in
the discretion of the authority in charge of the construction and maintenance. Bridges located
outside incorporated cities shall be the same width to and across the river, creek or stream as the
highway leading to it." As I.C. 5 40-23 12 unambiguously reads a 50 foot width is not mandated
by the Idaho State Legislature-the
and it can be more-"may

"width of the easement" can be less-"presently

existingn-

be as wide as required for proper construction and maintenance in the

discretion of the authority in charge of the construction and maintenance." I.C. $ 40-23 12 makes
no mention of the width of an unrecorded prescriptive rights of way and any such mandate as to
a 50 foot width and further, there is no reference at all to a 25 feet from centerline category.
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There are three choices-50

feet or less or more as the u~idthof highway may be as wide as it

needs to be, Ambiguity: "The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this
Court exercises free review. State v. Maidwell, 137 Idaho 424,426,50 P.3d 439,441 (2002).
Where the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must
be given effect and there is no occasion for this Court to consider the rules of statutory
construction. Payette River Property Owners Ass 'n v. Bd. of County Comm Ps, 132 Idaho 55 1,
557, 976 P.2d 477,383 (1 999). An ordinance is anlbiguous where reasonable minds might differ
or be uncertain as to its meaning. Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 856, 893 P.2d 801, 803
(Ct. App. 1995). However, ambiguity is not established merely because the parties present
differing interpretations to the court. Matter ofpermit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 823, 828
P.2d 848, 852 (1992). Where the language of an ordinance is ambiguous, courts look to the rules
of construction for guidance and may consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations.
Ada County, 126 Ida110 at 856, 893 P.2d at 803", State ofIdaho v. John Doe, Idaho (2004).
There is no ambiguity in I.C. 5 40-23 12. Defendants' interpretation creates the ambiguity by
confusing their discretion of the determination of the width and any necessary extension or
alteration in the acquired unrecorded right of way with their operational duties to accomplish the
changes they have determined need to be done and that all prescriptive rights of way are 50 feet
wide (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item 18, at 3-4, Request For Admission Nos. 4,
5, and 6). Determination that a right of way needs to be altered does not allow for the discretion
to break the law (see Gooding). I.C. Ij 40-23 12 does not give operational authority to alter the
road nor the manner in which private property may be obtained to alter a road. I.C. 5 40-23 12
and the holdings of iweservey only give Defendants the autl~orityto determine the width and such
determination does not then decree that the width is now legally established. Without the
establishment of an evidentiary record of what was acquired by user, as in a prior survey and
accurate record keeping, there is no basis of substantial evidence to base a claim or begin to
reestablish the alterations Defendants have chosen to make and without a survey increases the
risk of erroneous deprivations (see Zinermon). Harmonious construal with Idaho statutes
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indicates the acquisition of land for road purposes requires the civil procedures of eminent
domain. These actions/failures to act are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants'
discretion, and/or illegal.
5.2.9 At best, a 50 foot width is a presumption. "Width of highways established

by prescription or public use had to be determined from a consideration of circumstances
peculiar to each case, and was presumed to be 50 feet, unless facts clearly indicated that owner
limited width of said road prior to time it became a highway by user'', Meservey v Gullford, 14
Idaho 133,93 P.780 (1908). I.C.

5 40-202(3) sets forth three types of highways, two recorded

and one unrecorded. The unrecorded one is described as highways that were 'used for a period
of five (5) years, provided they shall have worked and kept up at the expense of the public'.
Highways in this uilrecorded category require evidence showing that the road was used for a
period of five years and worked and kept up at the expense of the public, with the exception of
those unrecorded ways which nlay have been established before 1893 when no public upkeep
was required (see I-lornestead Farms v. Board of Comm 'rs Teton County, state of Idaho, 141
Idaho 855, 119 P 3d 630 (2005) (Justice Eismann SPECIALLY CONCURRING). Uiu-ecorded
prescriptive ways have no evidence in the public record for \vhichJindings and/or conclusions
that a7.e supported by substantial evidence on the record can be made. It is irrational to base
something on something that is not there. Without an evidentiary hearing before alterations in an
unrecorded prescriptive right of way, there is no substantial evidence in the record to base
conclusions and/or findings. Further, the determination that an unrecorded prescriptive right of
way needs extension in width as to accomn~odateincreased use does not preclude that the
extension in width has not been accomplished at the expense of private property and a survey is
required in all cases as is a predetermination of the actual use for at least five years prior and the
intended extent of the intended alteration as in the pernutation of the two acting forces of
surveying and altering the act of survey must precede the act of altering, as to survey after
alteration provides no record on which to base conclusions and provides no vital information;
further the permutation of no survey and altering makes an arbitrary and capricious error as there
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is no record for the alteration whether the alteration proves to be correct or not and it is irrational
to try to reestablish that which has not bee established. These actions/failures to act are arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal (see Chevron US.A. Inc. v.

Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1 984) (an agency cannot
subvert the legislature' intent). Any policy Defendants bring forth whether based on I.C.

6 40-

23 12 or other statute must in the first instance in order to alter an unrecorded prescriptive right
of way must require a prior survey and accurate record keeping and notice and hearing to the
abutting landowners as the Idaho Legislature mandates this under Idaho Code Title 40 Chapter
20, I.C.

66 40-605, 13 10, 2302,608, amongst others as an unrecorded prescriptive right of way is

UNRECORDED. Without the data provided by the hearing, survey, and the accurate record
keeping all conclusioils are iirherently arbitrary and capricious and invalid. Not only does the
failure to survey increase the risk of erroneous deprivations and constitutional violations as
Defendants are operating UNDER THE COLOR OF STATE LAW, it also increases the risk of
greater expenditures as the agency is subiect to paying common law damages as opposed to the
paying of fair market value. To try to escape the fair market value, which history shows has
often been gifted by the abutting land owner, the Defendants invalid policies, without a
predeprivation notice and hearing, a prior survey and accurate description of the intended taking
of p r i ~ a t eland, whether private land is taken or not, and an opportunity to rebut any claim of
right of way by the abutting land owner only increases the expense of the Defendants' actions.
not only monetarily, but also at the expense of the public's belief in the system to which our
society seems to believe holds us together (see Zinermon, (a policy/custom is invalid if it does
not circumscribe its broad a~~thority
with statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous
deprivations).
5.2.10 Exclusion of the presumption excludes both "a consideration of the
circumstances peculiar to each case" as well as the opportunity to exclude the presumption
itself-"unless

facts clearly indicated that owner limited width of said road prior to the time it

became a highway by user". Both facts are elementary to an unrecorded prescriptive right of
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way and without the presumption and the inclusion of the Meservey holdings in any exertion of
governmental power under I.C. $ 40-23 12 any such exertions would be facially invalid,
unconstitutional, and an implausible view; as it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of Defendants'
discretion and/or would go to far and allows the physical invasion of the landowners property to
go on unchecked. Without the opportunity for rebuttal, the required procedural due process, the
taking would be arbitrary and capricious and/or an abuse of discretion and/or illegal as it is not
based on substantial evidence in the record, nor is it based on the determinative principles
intended by the legislat~u-eand concluded by the Idaho Supreme Court and prohibited by the
guaranties of U.S. Constitution. Such an exercise of governmental power would disallow
landowner to restrict others from his property, void the landowners clear marketable title,
disallow landowner all economic returns from his land, result in the physical evasion and
occupation of the landowners property by Defendants and third parties, not so invited or
licensed, and would deprive the land owner of his right to peacefully enjoy his property. These
piecemeal invasions of abutting landowner's property are each actionable and as such requires
abutting landowner to submit multiple causes for action and therefore makes justice inadequate
(see U S, v. Dickinson, 331 U S . 745 (1947) ('.When dealing with a problem which arises under
such diverse circunlstances procedural rigidities should be avoided. All that we are here holding
is that when the Government chooses not to condemn land but to bring about a taking by a
continuing process of physical events, the owner is not required to resort either to piecemeal or
to premature litigation to ascertain the just compensation for what is really 'taken'.") Such
exclusions are arbitrary and capricious and do not bear a rational relation to a legitimate
govenmental interest (see Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S . 255, 260 (1 980), ("The determination that
governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at large,
rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public
interest") and are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal as
such exclusions are without substantial evidence in agency record..

PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009, AND BRIEF
116

5.2.11 Further, the clause, "unless facts clearly indicated that owner limited
width of said road prior to time it became a highway by user", renders the 50 foot presumption
moot. If an owner limited the width of a road prior to the time it became a highway by user, the
width of the road was equal to the constraints of the owner at a maximum and the actual width
may be restricted even further by what the actual use for road purposes was. The position of a
fence is just such a limitation of width. "For nearly a century it has been the law of this state that
evidence of a long established fence creates two presumptions. First, when a fence line has been
erected, and then coterminous landowners have treated that fence line as fixing the boundary
between their propel-ties "for such a length of time that neither ought to be allowed to deny the
correctness of its location" the law presumes an agreement fixing that fence line as the boundary.
Johnson, 131 Idaho at 523, 960 P.2d at 744 (citing Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359, 365, 262
P.2d 1006, 1010 (1953)); see also Cox, 137 Idaho at 494-95, 50 P.3d at 989-90; Cavzerouz, 130
Idaho at 901,950 P.2d at 1240; Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37,41, 794 P.2d 626, 630
(1990); Berzeficial Life Ins. Co. v. Wakamatsu, 75 Idaho 232,241, 270 P.2d 830, 835 (1954);
Woll v. Costella, 59 Idaho 569,577, 85 P.2d 679,682 (1938); O'Malley v. Jones, 46 Idaho 137,
141,266 P. 797, 798 (1 928); Bayhouse v. Urquides, 17 Idaho 286,298-98 105 P. 1066, 1068-70
(1909). Second, coupled with the long existence and recognition of a fence as a boundary, 'the
want of any evidence as to the manner or circumstances of its original location, the law presumes
that it was origiilally located as a boundary by agreement because of uncertainty or dispute as to
the true line.' Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 75 Idaho at 241, 270 P.2d at 835." Luce v. Marble 142
Idaho 264, 127 P.3d 167 (2005). Any other reading would deem the first clause, con side ratio^^
of the circumstances peculiar to each case-the

Court's opinion meaningless. The presence of

an ancient fence or other appropriate land mark is sufficient rebuttal to a 50 foot presumed width;
reducing the maximum width to that level of the fence, which in turn may be reduced more by
the circumstances of the case. Refusal of Defendants to take note of this is an obvious denial of
due process and is arbitrary and capricious, and a failure to consider an important aspect of the
issue at hand, an unrecorded prescriptive right of way.
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5.2.12 An unrecorded prescriptive right of way is lined by private property. If
the NLCHD has jurisdiction over 600 miles of road, it has interface with 1200 miles of private
property. Many of the 600 miles are unrecorded prescriptive rights of way. By its defined
nature, unrecorded and prescriptive, it has values which require rational conclusions and
findings, determinations which require evidentiary hearings. Without such there is no substantial
evidence in the agency record to base a reasoned conclusion. By this very nature of the beast, an
unrecorded prescriptive right of way, all alterations in the road must first establish that base
whether or not it turns out that the right of way happens to be fifty feet or not. Without such
hearing all such alterations, conclusions and or findings are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal.
5.2.12.1 "The criteria to determine a public road has been stated as
follows: 'When a right-of-way has been used by the general public for a period of five years and
has been maintained at public expense, the right-of-way becomes a public highway.' State ex rel.
Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 146, 594 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1979). See also Meservy v. Gulliford,
14 Idaho 1331, 93 P. 780 (1908) (public use of a highway for the statutory period and keeping it
in repair at public expense is all that is necessary to establish a highway by prescription)", Floyd
v. Board ofComnzissioners of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 71 8, 52 P.3d 863 (2002).
5.2.12.2 Justice Trout expresses the difficulty the Court has in deciding
matters not based

011

a public record, "Once again, the main problem which led to this dispute

was the Commissiollers decision to include the subject roads on the official map apparently
without initially making findings or providing evidence that the roads were public in the first
place (although since there is no record, we don't know whether this was ever done)",
Homestead Farms v. Board ofComm 'rs Teton County, state of Idaho, 141 Idaho 855, 119 P 3d
630 (2005). It's not a great leap of faith to see that if the Court has difficulty in placing a road on
a highway map without some evidence in the record, it would not be difficult to see the difficulty
the Court would have in accepting a 50 foot width of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way
simply because the Defendants have informally and inadequately made policy or custom,
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without any record or adequate policy making procedures decided it was so. In the present case
there is not only not substantial evidence in the record to back Defendants' conclusions, there is
also insufficient evidence in the record to substantiate a thoughtful, rational approach to
development of a valid policy/custom. Evidence in the record is required to conclude the
publicness of a road. This evidence in the record if it is so legally accomplished in an open
public meeting is still insufficient to conclude that that the width is then fifty feet wide without
even more evidence in the record. The predilection Defendants have for avoiding the public at
any and all stages of the game determines their policy making and their policy making activities
are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal.

5.2.12.3 "A party seeking to establisfi the existence of an easement by
prescription "must prove by clear and convincing evidence use of the subject property, which is
characterized as: (1) open and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a
claim of right; (4) with the actual or imputed kilowledge of the owner of the sewient tenement (5) for
the statutory period." Nodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229,76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). The statutory
period in question is five years. I.C. 3 5-203; Weaver v, Stafford, 134 Idaho 691,698, 8 P.3d 1234.
Any determination of the width of the unrecorded prescriptive right of way would then necessarily
consider the same five standards are required for the public to establish prescription with the
exception that the evidentiary standard may only be a preponderance of the evidence. (See the
discussion of The United States District Court For The District Of Idaho in Hash v. United
States,(what the U.S. District Court feels Idaho has concluded). To the extent that any of these fi\,e
characteristics !nust he considered in the detemi~naticnsf width of an unrecorded prescriptive right
of way in Idaho may not have yet beell detennined. Meservey S "consideration of the circumstances
peculiar to the case", implies there are circumstances to consider; Idaho Code

6 40-23 12 gives an

unlimited option to the size of a highway leaning toward a goal of 50 feet; hfeservey says Idaho
Code 8 40-23 12 gives a presumptive width of 50 feet unless the land owner limited the width
and implies creation of a an evidentiary public record; the Idaho Supreme Court says rational
decisions can not be made without substantial evidence in the public record. Defendants'
informal policy is inadequate and invalid as it accomplishes none of these and further Defendants
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say none are necessary. Therefore Defendants' custom, policy under Idaho Code 8 40-23 12 is
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal.
5.2.12.4 Further, Defendants exertions of governmental powers under

I.C.9

5 40-23 12'23 17, and 23 19 and Defendants' authority to issue/revoke driveway access

permits are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal and
therefore facially invalid as so stated allow Defendants such unbridled destruction of and
invasion of abutting landowners' property to the extent that they become liable under prohibitive
statutes and put the agency at increased and unnecessary risk of liability and increased cost.
Defendants have entirely failed to consider the important aspect of the concomitant responsibility
Defendants have for their exertions of their governmental powers and such failures are arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion andlor illegal. I.C.

$5 18-7001, 7008, 70 12,

amongst others generally prevent the damage, destruction, or misuse of abutting land owner's
fence and property and provide for criminal prosecution for such actslfailures to act. I.C. 9 Title
35 generally provides for the legal establishment and rights and legal relationships to a rightfully
built fence. I.C. 6 6-904B 3. provides for Defendants' liability for while acting within the course
and scope of their employment and with malice or criminal intent and with gross negligence or
reckless, willful and wanton conduct as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code for
issuance/revocation of a permit. I.C. 5 6-904 provides for Defendants' liability for operations
activities not performed under a reasonable standard. The harmful effects of Defendants'
misplaced, destructive, and inappropriate "use" of abutting land owner's property is regulated by
the intent of other legislative actions and justification of Defendants' harmful actions as being
within Defendants authority under I.C. 5 40-23 12 is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion and/or illegal.
5.2.12.5 Without the "presumption" and hence an opportunity for "a

consideration of circumstances peculiar to each case" and to rebut the presumption, a prior
survey and accurate record keeping, any reading of I.C. 5 40-23 12 demanding a 50 foot width
goes too far and allows Defendants to regulate the "use" of land which Defendants do not have
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the authority to regulate. It allows Defendants to make alterations, straighten and widen an
unrecorded prescriptive right of way and denies abutting landowners an opportunity for rebuttal.
Privately owned land becomes public road beyond the portion so originally used merely by a
statutory pronouncement to that effect. It allows Defendants to "take"-to

envelope more land

(see Aztec Ltd., Inc. v. Creekside Investment Co., 100 Idaho 566, 569,602 P.2d 64, 67 (1979),
"An increase in width does more than merely increase the burden upon the servient estate; it has
the effect of enveloping additional land7')-without a provision for rebuttal it denies the effected
landowner due process. It allows Defendants to regulate lands not actually used by user during
the prescriptive period and deprive abutting landowner of all economic use of his land by
piecemeal enveloping more land by a physical invasion of abutting land owners land with
extensions of the road surface and its supporting structures. In the enveloping of the land outside
of the land used for road purposes at the end of the prescriptive period, it denies abutting land
owner notice of Defendants' adverse intentions and actions. There is no reason an owner should
know that he is required to dispute the rightfulness of a non existent user, therefore Defendants
make implausible assumptions at the jeopardy of the land owner without an opportunity for the
unsuspecting land owner to rebut. A property owner thus receives no notice as to a public claim
on any property in excess of that which has actually been used. The right of way claimed of a
highway by acquired by public use exceeds the amount that was actually used at the end of the
prescriptive period. Without the presumption and an opportunity for the landowner to rebut, the
Defendants' exertion of governrneiltal power over an unrecorded prescriptive right of way under
I.C. 5 40-23 12 for any width than is actually used for road purposes and all width which is used
for road purposes such as supporting structures is arbitrary and capricious as it has 110 rational
basis of a legitimate government interest (see the 5'" Amendment of the U.S. Constitution) and
without anv such findings or conclusions of width to be necessitate to be based on substantial
evidence in the agency record. However it is then that the Defendants are able to establish
custom/policy which invariably effects the riglts and relations which an abutting landowner has
in the law and to do so irrationally, without establishing adequate agency record; it then becomes
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the height of injustice to require the abutting landowner to prove first what the "'width of the
easement" is (factually determined) before the full effect of the law comes down upon
Defendants' invalid and inadequately derived and therefore doubly invalid customslpolicies and
the Defendants themselves, when it was, in the first instance, the duty of the Defendants to create
such adequate and substantial record. A stricter scrutiny is then required by the Court in such
agency/defendant cases, which become agency/defendant "friendly" cases, as Defendants are
estopped from requiring the abutting land owner from having to do what the Defendants are
legally required to do-to

establish a substantial agency record of evidentiary supported

conclusions and findings-and

what the Defendants are prohibited from doing-making

arbitrary a are arbitrary and capricious conclusions, abusing of Defendants' discretion, and/or
illegal acts/failures to act. "The issue" then is not that factual determinations do indeed need to
be made; "the issue" is that they haven't been made and therefore all exertions of governlnental
power under I.C.5 5 40-2312,23 17,23 19 and Defendants authority to issue and revoke driveway
access permits are inherently invalid and are so for every such case of any and all unrecorded
prescriptive rights of way in any and all operational activities beyond the actual width of the road
actually used and unaltered and maintained by the public for at least a period of five years for
road purposes and even this would suggest this is at risk if a highway district changed in any way
the configuration of the so origillally established right of way, as it is irrational to try to
reestablish that which has not in the first instance been established, therefore any admission that
a unrecorded prescriptive right of way has been altered without survey, accurate record keeping,
or a notice and predeprivational hearing to the abutting land owner is invalid as it is irrational,
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal.

5.2.12.6 The question then arises at what critical time does such
substantial record need to be in place. I.C. § 40-202 (3) and Justice Eismann says it is a
minimum of five years (such time period can be ongoing and preexist) before the activity
happens and that would include substantial evidence of what the width and location was
throughout that five year period. Any and all prior alterations would necessarily need to be
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documented as well as evidence of the original claim (any notion of a prescriptive claim would
require stability of "user" over the five year period

a lack of permission from abutting land

owner, and adequate notice to the owner that the public (the "public" is not synonymous with the
"public agency") intends to use the abutting landowners' land. The Defendants have no power to
create (only to acquire) additional width, relocate a highway or alter a highway under the guise
of prescription and or maintenance; they may only do so under the powers of eminent domain.).
Such a matter as the determination of the claim of the "width of the easement" is a matter of a
fact finder, however as such, that statement does not address u7ho is the proper fact finder. If the
present claim runs contrary to the evidence of the original claim, as in the road has undergone
alterations, then that negates the present claim is identical to the original; therefore the present
claim would rely on what the use was five years before the questioned activity. Therefore any
and all claims must be shown to be stable and unchanged for a period of five years and that
substantial evidence in the record exists to substantiate this and substantial evidence in the record
exists to substantiate that the claim at the end of that five year period is identical to the claim at
the end of the five year period and that any such claims are a legitimate reestablishment of the
original claim as the NLCHD has no power to create a prescriptive right of way whether it was
mistakenly done or not. Indirect, circumstantial evidence, can be used to support the original
clairn or the time running claim at what ever time such original claim can be made, such as
ancient records; so as to show that the ruiming of the period of time that a highway has been
"used by the public and maintained by the public (and would so continue in the absence of the
rebuttal that the road had been altered), unless such period of time was beginning before 1893,
then only use by the public needs to be shown (see Homestead, above).

5.2.12.7 Even as such claims of "use" are made, such as they are made to
be necessitated for maintenance and or the convenience of the user, such claims are subject to
due process, at each and every step of the way. Defendants have no authority to create a
prescriptive right of way, only the authority to maintain a prescriptive right of way. Thus any
alterations in an unrecorded prescriptive right of way are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
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Defendants discretion andlor illegal without in the first instance to record and lay out the
highway. See I.C.5 5 40-605 and 1310 and ask when do the Defendants need to survey an
unrecorded prescriptive right of way when the election has been made to alter an unrecorded
prescriptive right of way (private property lies at the edge of all unrecorded prescriptive right of
ways and as they are unrecorded no information is in the agency record to substantiate the
determination of the line demarcating public easement across private land; 600miles of county
road equals 1200miles of private property lines; therefore the risk is high). The answer can not
be arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal. The "not
arbitrary" restriction indicates the answer to be a t all times; to increase the risk for erroneous
deprivations is arbitrary and capricious, irrational especially when it is cheap and predictable to
hold a public meeting when an unrecorded prescriptive right of way is to be altered (see (See
Zinerrnon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124, Zimnzerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734,
(9thCircuit, 2001), Logan v. Zimmernzan Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-436 (1 982)(availability
of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is foreseeable, predeprivation process
was possible, and official conduct was not "unauthorized") and also see Mathews v. Eldrige, 423
U.S. 319,355 (1976) and Goldberg v. k'ellj, 397U.S. 254,268-9 (1970) (both sides of the issue
of the deprivation must be considered in determining the reliability of the process and if any
additional safeguards need to be added). There are no new options necessary if the inadequately
determined policies and customs have not yet emploj~edthe statutory safeguards and remedies
for erroneous deprivations. There are two separate actions taking place (the same argument
holds for to survey and to determine an encroachment and to survey and to issue a driveway
access permit or to revoke a driveway access permit)--to survey and to alter. The sequence of
events are ordered, first survey and then alter, as to survey after the fact of altering provides no
salient information. Thus there are four possible permutatiol~s:(i) to survey and to alter
(adequate record to support any conclusions to alter); (ii) to survey and no to alter (record is
complete, for what ever reason alteration was not done is irrelevant here); (iii) not to survey and
to alter (legality depends on being right; however not being arbitrary depends on being able to
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show substantial evidence in support of being right as well as not being wrong, which doesn't
work if the evidence is the null set, as in an unrecorded prescriptive right of way; this is true even
if someone is right and there is a dispute, it is arbitrary); (iv) don't survey and don't alter (life
goes on and an unrecorded prescriptive right of way continues as is where is; maintenance by
definition is a notion of stability-preserving

what is there, not improving or allowing to decay.

Reasons to alter for reasons of prevention of decay do not preclude the necessity for substantial
evidence in the agency record to substantiate findings or conclusions to alter or improvemaintenance, or some other reason for altering, does not change the sequence of events or
outcomes; not increasing the risk of erroneous deprivation requires survey, & accurate record
keeping g
i
c
J public evidentiary hearing for completion of record). Increased risk may be
justified under exigent or unpredictable circumstances. Altering a road is a discretionary activity
which implies one has a choice-there

are no exigent circumstances; therefore safety of the road

lies with the problems in the road and that is not a reason to regulate abutting land owner's land.
At that very point in time of choice is when the hearing is predictable, feasible, and practicable.
What is the cost of a hearing? What is the cost of increased risk? The risk is high in an
unrecorded prescriptive right of way as there are many of them. No survey (this same argument
works for predeprivational hearings, accurate record keeping, such as recording of agreements,
conveying and recording with the county) increases risk of erroneous deprivation and no survey
means the decision is arbitrary even if it is later proven right as there is no evidence in the record
if there is a dispute. What does it cost to survey and keep accurate records and to hold public
hearings and to acquire abutting landowners' land "on the cheapm-at fair market value. Doing a
reasonable job at this is why the public has hired and elected Defendants in this case to
adequately establish valid policy and to validly carry it out. On the other hand what are the costs
of the increased risk and the final outcome of the arbitrary and capricious conclusions and
findings, abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal actsifailures to act? The outcome is a 42

U.S.C.

5 1983 lawsuit for full common law damages economic and non economic, injunctive and

declaratory relief. This is not only expensive; it puts public assets at unnecessary risk as does the
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deliberate indifference to deny exhaustion of agency remedies andlor safeguards for erroneous
deprivation on the invalid policylcustom of an arbitrarily and capriciously determined 50 foot-25
feet from centerline right of way, compounded with the invalid policy/custom that Defendants do
not have to have substantial evidence in their record to make rational decisions and compounded
by the invalid policy/custom that it is the abutting landowners' responsibility to pay to have the
agency record to be completed. Plaintiffs petition Court to grant order that Defendants'
policies/customs, exertions of governmental power under I.C.5 tj 40-23 12, 23 17, and 23 19 and
Defendants' authority to issuelrevoke driveway access permits are arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal and are therefore facially invalid and to enjoin
Defendants fi-om enforcing such.

5.3 Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding sections of this docunlent and continue:
-

Any and

all customs, policies, standard operating procedures, andlor exertions of governmental powers of
any such "not unauthorized" exertion of governmental powers, such as altering, straightening, or
widening an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, issuing and or revoking driveway access
permits on an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, and/or determining an encroachment of an
abutting landowner's fence, andor any and all other operational activities dependent of the
correct knowledge of the width of the easement of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, are
invalid without the circunlscription of the statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous
deprivations as implied by I.C. 5 5 40-23 12,2317, and/or 23 19 andlor the holdings of Meservery,
and the harmonious construal of the Idaho Statutes, the U.S. and the Idaho State Constitutions
(most notably 1. C. Title 40 Chapter 20, Title 7 Chapter 7, I.C. §§ 40-203a, 604,605, 608 13 10,
2302, the 5thand 1 4 Amendments
~
to the U.S. Constitution, Article I tjtj 13 and 14 of the Idaho
State Constitution, amongst others) rebuttable presunlption, the consideration of the
circumstances pertaining to the case, and the owner's clear limitation to width allowed to the
"user", and/or the U.S. Constitution, are invalid as any such available postdeprivation remedy is
inadequate when as it is in this instance the deprivation is foreseeable and the predeprivation
process, i.e., the "determination of the circwnstances peculiar to the case", and the liinitations of
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the width of the "user" set by the owner, and the opportunity to rebut the presunlption of the 50
foot width are predictable and possible and the deprivation is foreseeeable (See Zinevmon v.
Burch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124, Zimmerrnan v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, (9th Circuit,
200 I), Logan v. Zimmevman Brush C'o., 455 U.S. 422,435-436 (1982)(availability of
postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is foreseeable, predeprivation process
was possible, and official conduct was not "unauthorized"). Plaintiffs petition Court to grant
order that Defendants7policies/customs, exertions of governmental power under I.C.5 5 4023 12,23 17, and 23 19 and Defendants' authority to issuelrevoke driveway access permits are
uncircumscribed with statutory safeguards predeprivational hearings, agency records of
substantial evidence to support Defendants7 conclusions and findings andlor of adequate policies,
surveys, record keeping, recordation, conveyance, records of agreements with abutting
landowners and remedies for erroneous deprivations and are therefore invalid and invalid as
applied to Plaintiffs as Defendants have not provided Plaintiffs with evidentiary hearing and any
safeguards sucli as accurate record and substantial evidence in the record and surveys and
agreements with previous owners and their heirs in succession, the Plaintiffs, and remedies for
erroneous deprivations and have denied Plaintiffs' attempts at such remedies and as such
Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs seek relief in the form elljoining
Defendants from enforcing such policies, custom, standard operating procedures and of the
return. of Plaintiffs' wrongfully taken property and any and all economic and non economic
damages incurred by Plaintiffs in such wrongful taking as to be determined by trial, temporary
and permanent injunction preventing any further improper interference with Plaintiffs' 5"'

Amendment rights by any further extensions of the "width of the road" without due process and
equal treatment under the law and support by substantial evidence in the agency record and
illegal damage to Plaintiffs' fence, by unfounded and unsubstantiated claims to "width of the
easement" greater than the "width of the road" as authority to actifail to act for the unrecorded
prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, without
substantial evidence in the agency record to support such claims, declaratory relief as to the
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accurate determination of the width of the road and Plaintiffs rights to due process and equal
protection in any and all exertions of governmental power effecting Plaintiffs' property abutting
to, underlying and adjoining to Camps Canyon Road, and for full common law damages to be
proved at trial.

5.4 Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding sections of this document and continue:
-

Any and

all customs, policies, standard operating procedures, and/or exertions of governmental powers of
any such "not unauthorized" exertion of governmental powers such as policies, customs andlor
standard operating procedures which determine the reasonable amount of record keeping in all
such manners of minutes, agency record, logs, or the like are invalid without the circumscription
of the statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous deprivations as implied by 1.C.g 8 4023 12,23 17, and/or 23 19 and/or the holdings of Meservery, the rebuttable presumption, the
consideration of the circumstances pertaining to the case, and the owner's clear limitation to
width allowed to the "user" and are invalid as any such available postdeprivation remedy is
inadequate and the harmonious construction of the Idaho State statutes, an the U.S. and Idaho
State Constitutions, when as it is in this instance the deprivation is foreseeable and the
predeprivation process, i.e., the "determination of the circumstances peculiar to the case3', and
the limitations of the width of the "user" set by the owner, and the opportunity to rebut the
presumption of the 50 foot width are predictable and possible and the deprivation is foreseeeable
(See Zinerinon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 134, Zirnmernzan v. City ofOakZand, 255 F.3d
734, (9Ih Circuit, 2001), Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-436
(1982)(availability of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is foreseeable,
predeprivation process was possible, and official conduct was not "unauthorized"). Plaintiffs
petition Court to grant order that Defendants' policies/customs, exertions of govenlnlental power
under any such nlanner of agency record keeping are invalid and are arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal and are therefore facially invalid and invalid as
applied to Plaintiffs as Defendants have not provided Plaintiffs with evidentiary hearing and any
safeguards such as accurate record and substantial evidence in the record and surveys and
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agreements with previous owners and their heirs in succession, the Plaintiffs, and remedies for
erroneous deprivations and have denied Plaintiffs' attempts at such remedies and as such
Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs seek relief in the form of the return of
Plaintiffs' wrongfully taken property and any and all economic and non economic damages
incurred by Plaintiffs in such wrongful taking as to be determined by trial, temporary and
permanent injunction preventing any further improper interference with Plaintiffs' 5th
Amendment rights by any further extensions of the "width of the road" without due process and
equal treatment under the law and support by substantial evidence in the agency record and
illegal damage to Plaintiffs' fence, by unfounded and unsubstantiated claims to "width of the
easement3' greater than the "width of the road" as authority to act/fail to act for the unrecorded
prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, without
substantial evidence in the agency record to support such claims, declaratory relief as to the
accurate determination of the width of the road and Plaintiffs rights to due process and equal
protection in any and all exertions of governmental power effecting Plaintiffs' property abutting
to, underlying and adjoining to Camps Canyon Road, and for full common law dainages to be
proved at trial.

5.5 As applied invalidity of Defendants exertion of governmental powers under I.C. @
40-2312,23 17,2319, 203a, 605, 1310, 608.2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and
Defendants authority to issue/revoke driveway access permits and amongst other exertionzf
governmental power dependant on a legally established right of way: Plaintiffs incorporate by
reference ail previous sections of this document. Defendants interpretation of I.C. 4 40-23 12
and the exertion of Defendants' governmental pourer, as so interpreted and as so applied to
Plaintiffs from the late fall of 2005 until present; in regards to Plaintiffs' land in the SENE
Section 15 T39N R3 WBM and the traversing of their land by the claimed unrecorded
prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road and in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, which
in effect says that the District is well writl~inits legal rights to w-iden a road without holding a
public hearing and/or w-hich in effect indicates that the legislature has mandated that an
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unrecorded prescriptive right of way be 50 feet wide and/or without a provision for Plaintiffs to
rebut is invalid, and/or that Camps Canyon Road and in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel can be
altered or that Plaintiffs' buffer and/or Plaintiffs' fence can be encroached upon, physically
invaded and/or destroyed or injured in any way and/or without a prior survey and/or accurate
record keeping and/or an evidentiary hearing to determine the legal width, use, location and/or
character of the right of way of Camps Canyon Road and in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel is
invlaid, unconstitutional (see above; the ripeness of such policy application to Plaintiffs; and any
such remedies and/or exhaustion of NLCHD remedies, whether such remedies require
exhaustion or exist or not; and any futility of any such attempts or implied further attempts of
such remedies) and amongst other exertions of their governmental power has resulted in
Defendants taking wrongful possession of Plaintiffs land and improper interference with
Plaintiffs property rights. Such wrongful possession has taken place on both sides of Camps
Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 31-1- acre parcel. To the northeast Defendants have invaded
Plaintiffs' buffer, the area between Plaintiffs' fence and the northeast edge of the supporting
structures of Camps Canyon Road and have damaged Plaintiffs' fence in doing so. On the
southwest side of the road, Defendants issued and did not revoke the first Wagner driveway
access permit taking wrongful possession of Plaintiffs land for an indefinite period of time and
converting the possession and use of the land to the Wagners. (See Plair~tiffs' Affidavit; see also

Complaint at 8-25.) Defendants have not denied their authority to issuelor failure to revoke a
driveway access permit crossing a private property line underlying an unrecorded prescriptive
period, nor

they shown by any substantiai evidence that they even have a 25 foot from

centerline right of way on either side of the road. Further, Defendants have justified their
damage to Plaintiffs' fence on the grounds that Plaintiffs' fence is within the bounds of the
public right of way, as claimed by Defendants to be 50 feet-25 feet from centerline wide and an
u~lrecordedprescriptive right of 1%-ay,and as such, such conclusions, which have neither been
factually determined (width of the easement) and which are not supported by substa~itial
evidence in the agency record and which run counter to the agency record and the record of this
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case (see Opinion). Such actions/failures to act, conclusions, findings, and exertions of
Defendants' governmental power are improper interference with Plaintiffs' property rights and
are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal (incorporated by
reference all previous section to this document). Such actionslfailures to act, conclusions,
findings, and exertions of Defendants' governmental power are improper interference with
Plaintiffs' property rights and invalid exertions of Defendants' governmental power, as such
exertions of Defendants' governmental power are not related to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare, andlor are not rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest to the
5Ih Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and have in effect resulted in Defendants taking

wrongful possession of Plaintiffs7 land (the first Wagner driveway access permit was for an
access wholly on Plaintiffs' land and invasion of Plaintiffs' buffer has not been shown to be
within Defendants' right of way by substantial evidence in the agency record) without strict
scrutiny, in the alternative without a rational basis, to a legitimate governmental interest, and
have violated Plaintiffs' 5thAmendment rights as Defendants have arbitrarily, capriciously, or
have abuse their discretion by not, or have illegally denied Plaintiffs due process both
predeprivatiol~allyand postdeprivationally and equal treatment under the law without strict
scrutiny, or in the alternative without a rational basis, of a legitimate governmental interest and
have done so for not "a public use". All such actioas/failures to act, conclusions, findings, and
exertions of Defendants' governmental power are improper interference with Plaintiffs' property
rights and are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal. ( See

Lingle and also Crown Point Development.)

5.5.1 Defendants lack substantial evidence in the agency record to support their
claim that they have the authority to either issuelfail to revoke the first drive way access permit
or extend the width of Camps Canyon Road and as such their exertions of goverlmental power
are an improper interference with Plaintiffs' property rights and are arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of Defenda~its'discretion, and/or illegal as Defendants have performed no prior surveys ,
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have not kept accurate records and/or have not conveyed and/or recorded easements and/or
agreements with the previous landowners or the Plaintiffs.
5.5.1.1 As claimed by Defendants, Camps Canyon Road, in the vicinity

of the 31-1- acre parcel, is an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, and placement on Defendants
map of roads under Defendants' jurisdiction is insufficient evidence to establish the width of the
road. Further, the Defendants have not produced sufficient evidence in the agency record to
even provide support for their placing such segment of Canips Canyon Road on their map (see
Homestead, above (an unrecorded prescriptive right of way requires evidence to place it on the
county's road map). Without more Defendants' exertions of governmental power are an
improper interference with Plaintiffs' property and are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal (see Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa Cify, 96 Idaho 734, 536
P.2d 729 (1975) (an action is arbitrary if it was done without a rational basis; if it was done in
disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles).
Plaintiffs have requested such information of Defendants' records and Defendants have brought
forth no record evidence to substantiate their claims. Further Plaintiffs have asked Defendants to
validate or in some other way perform such evidentiary hearing as needed and Defendants have
with deliberate indifference not responded. This court has said that Plaintiffs have the ability to
petition Defendants for such validation and Plaintiffs assert that they have not disputed that the
segment of Camps Canyon road is an unrecorded prescriptive right of way and they have no
reason to question their right to travel on Camps Canyon Road nor do they need to travel on it.
Further, Piaintiffs need not pay a $750 fee to have the road validated at the expense of giving up
their 5'' and 14"' Amendment rights to due process and equal treatment under the law to have the
road validated (see Lingle, above citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255,26 1 (1980)
(unconstitutional conditions)) (see Castrigno citing Ware, above at 25 (Plaintiffs need not do
Defendants job for them, especially when Defendants are misrepresenting the law)).
5.5.1.2 If Defendants have records of evidentiary proceedings which

contain substantial evidence to support their claims of a 50 foot-25

foot from centerline right of
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way which would allow Defendants to do as they claim they have a right to do without providing
an evidentiary hearing (see (Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 20; at 8-9), prior to
their actions/failures to act in widening Camps Canyon Road to the northeast and to issuelfail to
revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, then they have not supplied such to Plaintiffs as
Plaintiffs have sought in their discovery (Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 2, at 4,
Interrogatory No. 3). Neither does the agency record provide substantial evidence to suppost
Defendant Dan Payne's affiance (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 22, at 1I)
that the "entire stretch of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of Plaintiffs' real property used by
the District for public highway purposes as described in paragraph 9 above lies within the
District's minimum fifty (50') wide right of way". There have been no evidentiary hearings
produced by Defendants to substantiate the District has a minimum 50 foot right of way or that
the present usage locatioil or width lies within it (see Plaintiffs ' Thir-d Record Supplement, Item
No. 2, at 4, Interrogatory No. 3). However, the agency record shows the District has altered the
road in 1396,2005 (see Plaintiffs ' T1zir.d Record Supplement, Item No. 19, at 13, and 17-19); and
Defendants' discovery responses acknowledge this and that they have made additional
alterations in 2006 and that these alterations have altered the centcrline and the width of the road
in the vicinity of Plaintiffs' property (see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 2, at 45, Interrogatory No. 3; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Itein No. 3, at 16-17,
Interrogatory Nos. 40-44). Further Defendants have acknowledged through discovery that they
issued the Wagners two driveway access permits (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item
No. 5 , at 5, Interrogatory No. 10). The secoild perixit after the Rimrock surlreyhad shown the
first Wagner driveway access permit to be wholly on Plaintiffs' land (see Plaintiffs' Affidavit, at
14 and 15; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Sz~yylement,Item No. 12, at 5, Interrogatory No. 11).
Defendant Payne issued the first permit even though he knew there was a dispute (see Plaintiffs'
Third Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 10-11, Request For Admissioil Nos. 25 and 26).
Defendant Payne has defended his action to issue and not revoke the first Wagner driveway
access permit at the 4/12/06 meeting of the NLCKD and the final policy makers approved this
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action (see Plaintiffs' AAfJidavit,at 13) on the basis of it was within the 699 feet of road frontage
on the Wagner deed and that the drive way access was within Defendants right of way (see
Pluint$j~' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 12, at 6-8, Interrogatory Nos. 12, 14, 15, 17 and
18). All these claims and such actions/failures to act, conclusions, findings, and exertions of
Defendants' governmental power are improper interference with Plaintiffs' property rights as
they are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal. Defendants
Payi~eand Arneberg were in charge of the 1996 alteration in which curves were straightened and
the centerline of Camps Canyon Road was altered, therefore the road frontage distance was
known by both Arneberg (see Plaint$@' Third Record Supplement, Itein No. 24, at 2 and 5 ) and
Payne to be wTong. Further, Defendants claim an unrecorded prescriptive right of way. This is
an easement across Plaintiffs' land; Defendants do not have the fee in the land, at least there is
insufficient evidence in the record to support ownership of the land. Defendants, including the
final policy makers (see see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 16-17,
Interrogatory Nos. 40-44) knew Bob Wagner had conducted his own survey (see Plaintffs' Third
Record Supplement, Item No. 1, at 11-12, Request For Admission No. 27 subpart b.). If not
before the 4/12/06 Defendants, as final policy makers knew that there was a dispute about the
drive way access; Plaintiffs at the 4/12/06 meeting requested that Defendants and the IVagners
get a professional survey (see Plaintfls ' Third Record Suppl'enzent, Item No. 10, at 1); when the
Wagners and the Defendants refused to get a survey, the Plaintiffs said they would call for one
(see Plairztgs ' Afidavit, at 13). All these claims and such actions/failures to act, conclusions,
findings, and exertions of Defendants' governmental poLver are improper interference with
Plaintiffs' property rights as they are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants'
discretion, and/or illegal. Defendants have no evidence in their agency record to substantiate
they have an easement which would allow the Wagner to cross a property line to reach a
driveway access wholly on Plaintiffs property. This is not oilly arbitrary, it is illegal as it
converted possession of plaintiffs land, took plaintiffs land for not a "public use", was the direct,
proximate, legal, and substantial cause of the Wagners trespass on Plaintiffs land and the
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resultant damages and the access was issued for an illegal act-trespass.

Defendants knew the

road frontage on the Wagner no longer could be accurate. Refusing to call for a survey or
requiring Wagners to call for a survey and not revoking the permit when the Plaintiffs said they
would call for a survey, Defendants, as final policy makers, in complete and deliberate
indifference to the deprivation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights, as well as not substantiating any
evidence in the agency record for substantial evidence to support their conclusion and findings
on the continuation of the first Wagner permit by not conducting a hearing when all parties were
present (see Plaintffs ' AfJidavit, at 13) and time was allotted on the agenda (see Plaintiffs ' Third
Record Supplement, Item No. 18, at 13, Request For Admission Nos. 27,28,29). Defendants
also increased their risk of erroneous deprivation by not only not calling for a survey but also by
no holding a hearing to provide substantial evidence in the record for their actionslfailures to act,
conclusions and findings. The only reasonable choice Defendants had was in the first instance
was to call for a professional survey, secondly they could have required the Wagners to get a
professionally done survey and thirdly and in both previous instances to temporarily revoke the
permit especially when the Plaintiffs called for the survey. It was also unreasonable not to
require the Wagilers to call for a survey and it was unreasonable for the Defendants themselves
not to call for a survey as they had no evidence in the record to substantiate their findings and
conclusions and they knew they had altered the road. It would be difficult to find anything
defendants did that was not arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andior
illegal (see Natural Resour-ces Defense Council v. US. E.P.A.,966 F.2d 1292, citing Vehicle
h.ilJils.Ass'n v. State Farm A4ut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983) ("[Aln agency rule would be
arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.") .
5.5.2 Under Defendants' policy under I.C. 5 40-23 12 and as applied to Plaintiffs,
-

Defendants have denied Plaintiffs due process without affording Plaintiffs the "presunlption" and
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the opportunity to rebut a 50 foot width of the claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way,
Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, and as such the denial allows for the
physical invasion and occupation of Plaintiffs' land; that it destroys the value of Plaintiffs' land
by allowing Plaintiffs' land to be covered with dirt and gravel, by denying Plaintiffs the right to
restrict others from their land, by allowing Defendants to destroy Plaintiffs' fence, by allowing
Plaintiffs' property to be physically invaded and occupied by Defendants and/or third parties;
and by not allowing Plaintiffs the right to peacefully enjoy their land. I.C. $40-23 19 and I.C. $
40-23 17 both require Defendants give Plaintiffs notice if Defendants have a problem with
Plaintiffs' fence. Such exertions of governmental power as widening the unrecorded prescriptive
right of way, Camps Canyon Road is invalid as Defendants have ignored the legislative intent
and the holdings of iCileservey of a presumptive width with an opportunity for rebuttal by
Plaintiffs and a determination of the limitations of width set by previous owners fence and a
consideration of the circumstances peculiar to Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 31-1acre parcel and the right of the Plaintiffs to rebut ildeservey 's presumption as well as a notice to
Plaintiffs, if the Defendants have a problem with Plaintiffs' fence, whether the right of way is as
Defendants claim it to be or not. Such improper interference with Plaintiffs' property is arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal as it violates Plaintiffs' 5thand

idth Amendment rights, as well as does the issuance of the first Wagner drive access permit
whether it be on the grounds of not for "public use", a bold face denial of due process, or so
arbitrarily done it violates due process as when all parties were present and time was allotted on
the agenda and therefore a hearing was feasible and Defendants did not call for a survey to
clarify the matter and were deliberately indifferent to the erroneous deprivation by not
temporarily revoking the first Wagner driveway access permit. Defendants policies as applied to
Plaintiffs under I.C. 5 40-2312, I.C. 5 40-23 17, and I.C. $ 40-2319, and under Defendants'
authority to issuejrevoke driveway access permits has denied Plaintiffs due process and
Defendants have admitted as much (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 6, at 6,
(Ron Landeclc said no hearing has been before the Comniissioners) and (Defendants defense for
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denial of Plaintiffs' IRTA Requests of "no final decision")). Defendants are liable under 42
U.S.C. 1983 in their individual capacities as well as their official capacities.

5.5.2.1 Under Defendants' policy under I.C. Ij 40-23 12, I.C. Ij 40-23 17,
and I.C. Ij 40-23 19 and Defendants' exertion of governmental power under Defendants'
authority to issue/revoke driveway access permits and the exertion of power as so read, and as
applied to Plaintiffs, is without the due process as required by any of the following
determinations: (i) fails and violates the legislative intent of the statute itself as so interpreted by
the Idaho Supreme Court (see Meservey); (ii) fails and violates Idaho's Doctrine of Quasij~rdicialCapacity (see Cooper, above); (iii) fails and violates the positive guaranty of the .'?"
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; (iv) fails and violates the positive guaranty Article I IjIj 13
and 14 of the Idaho State Co~lstitution;(v) fails and violates the intent of Title 40 Chapter 20 of
the Idaho Code and/or the Federal Relocation Assistance Act; andlor (vi) fails and violates
Plaintiffs right to private action (see Dopp supra (right to private action).

5.5.3 Under Defendants'
-

policy under I.C. 5 40-23 12, and the exertion of power

as so read, and as applied to Plaintiffs, of a 50 foot width of tlie claimed unrecorded prescriptive
right of way, Carnps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel and without an
opportunity for Plaintiffs' to rebut, as well as Defendants failure to provide notice if Plaintiffs'
fence was if Defendants believed it to be encroaching on Camps Canyon Road right of way, as
urell as issuing/failing to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit and to do so without
survey, accurate record keeping and/or witlzout the recording andlor conveyance of agreement
with previous owners to the SENE quarter quarter and/or to Plaintiffs to the extent Defendants
claim an authority to regulate the "use" of Plaintiffs' land are invalid police powers as they have
no rational basis to a legitimate governmental interest. Defendants have shown no evidence that
Plaintiffs' use of their land under the Latah County approved zoning category of agriculture and
forestry bears any rational relationship to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare for
nhatever reason Defendants may state as a reason to regulate Plaintiffs' land. Defendants have
not shoun Plaintiffs' land and the Latah County approved use of it to be unhealthful, unsafe,
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immoral, or result in a diminution of the public's, the NLCHD's or the Wagners' general
welfare. Further, Plaintiffs have sought no intensification of the use of their land as in applying
for a land use permit from the Defendants and their entitlement to the land underlying Camps
Canyon Road lies i11 their deed and the use of it is adequately and properly regulated by the
County of Latah planning and zoning as agriculture and forestry and any further regulation is in
contradiction to Idaho Code 5 22-4504 which prevents the adoption of ordinances or resolutions
declaring as a nuisance any agricultural operations operated in accordance with generally
recognized agricultural practices; there is no legislative determinations being considered in this
matter. The nature of Plaintiffs' complaints for the issuance of the first Wagner driveway access
permit and the extensions of the road bed are adjudicative. The legitimate governmental interest
in this case lies with benefit desired by the public for Plaintiffs' land to use for road purposes and
as such the legitimate governmental interest is that the "public burdens.. ., in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole" (see First Englislz Eva~.zgelicalLutheran
Cl~urchof Glendale, above). "The determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is,
in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the
burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest", Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255,261

(1 980). There is significant difference in the degree of deference owed to the Defendants in a
legislative decision as opposed to an administrativeladjudicative decisioil as the
administrativeladjudicatory decision must be supported by substantial evidence on the record
(see Plaintiffs' petitions for declaratory judgments under I.C.

5 40-203a and

I.C.

6 67-8003(3))

Without either the substantial evidence in the public record, that Plaintiffs' use of their land is
harmful to the public health, safety, or welfare, or is immoral, said policylcustorn is arbitrary and
capricious and/or an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal. And in corollary to this, ally
defense by Defendants that no "final decision'' justifies the request for IRTA Requests is
frivolous and is made in bad faith and only intended to harass and delay. All such claims by
Defendants to the authority to regulate the public's health, safety, morals, or general welfare are
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal.
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5.5.4 Defendants have entirely failed to consider the important aspect of the
-

concomitant respoiisibility Defendants have for their exertions of their governmental powers in
their formulation of policy/custom and such failures are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion and/or illegal. I.C. tj S; 18-700 1, 7008, 70 12, amongst others generally
prevent the damage, destruction, or misuse of Plaintiffs' fence and property and provide for
criminal prosecution for such acts/failures to act. I.C. 5 Title 35 generally provides for the legal
establishment and rights and legal relationships to a rightfully built fence. I.C. S; 6-904B 3.
provides for Defendants' liability for while acting within the course and scope of their
employment and with malice or criminal intent and with gross negligence or reckless, willful and
wanton conduct as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code for issuance/revocation of a permit.
I.C. 4 6-904 provides for Defendants' liability for operations activities not performed under a
reasonable standard. The harmful effects of Defendants' misplaced, destructive, and
inappropriate "use" of Plaintiffs' property is regulated by the intent of other legislative actions
and justification of Defendants' harmful actions as being within Defendants authority under I.C.

S; 40-23 12 is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal.
5.5.5 Defendants'
-

application of policy/custom based on I.C. S; 40-23 12 in the

regulation of the "use" of Plaintiffs' property which is not limited to the "width of the road"
equals the "width of the easement" but rather extends a 50 foot "width of tlie easement3-25 feet
from centerline is an invalid exercise of Defendants' police powers. It is implausible for
Defendants to ascribe to a different interpretation of the width of the claimed unrecorded
prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel other than it
was only presumed to be 50 feet in width, unless the width was limited by land owners fence;
other than to ascribe to a policy/custom that the width of the unrecorded right of way falls within
the presumption of "except those of a lesser width presently existing" until proven otherwise
before the 1996 alterations. Even now after numerous widenings Camps Canyon Road including
its supporting structures is less than 21 feet and less than that in most places. After the 1996
alterations, it is implausible for Defendants to claim that Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of
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the 3+/- acre parcel continues to occupy the identical strip of land it did at the end of the
prescriptive period when the "width of the easement" and location was so claimed by user.
Defendants have brought forth no evidence of and there are no findings or conclusions supported
by substantial evidence on the record of any four lane or greater width and/or 50 foot wide
highway ever traversing Plaintiffs' land. Ancient trees, which Defendants admit to cutting down
and excavating the stumps to make way for the 1996 alterations, as well as an old fence occupied
the space at the edge of the old 12 foot (including supporting structures) prescriptive right of way
prior to the 1996 alterations of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel (see
Plaintiffs ' Affidavit, at 8); notwithstanding Defendants' refusal to allow Plaintiffs to bring forth
evidence for the public record (see Conzplaint, at 8-25). Rimrock survey showed the intersection
points of the east and west propesty lines of the 3+/- acre parcel and Camps Canyon Road had
moved greater than 50 feet in comparison with the deed as recorded in 191 1 (Plaint$fss' Third
Record Supplement, Item 4, page 1-9). Further, there is no evidence in the agency record as to
when Camps Canyon Road was first acquired as an unrecorded prescriptive right of way
Altho~~gh
Defendant Arneberg swears oil his O\YSI personal knowledge that Cainps Canyon Road
%-asused by the public prior to 1930 and that the required five years of use necessary for
evidence of acquisitioil predates his birth and no mention of maintenance by the public is made
(see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplemerzt, Item No. 24) (Arneberg ASJidasit)), Camps Canyon
Road may have been acquired very early in recent Idaho history, at least as far back as 191 1 and
maybe as far back as the initial government survey of 1871 or the early homesteading era of the
area of the 1880's. Aerial photos for which Defendants aver accuracy also confirnl the
rnovemeilt of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel to the northeast after the
late 1980s and before 2000 (see Plaint$,%' ASJidavit, at 20). Further, it is equally implausible for
Defendants to claim their present right of way lies in the identical strip of land that the original
unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3i!- acre parcel,
did at the end of the prescriptive period, as Defendants have admitted that the road base was
moved and the "width of the road" was extended in 1996 and with subsequent extensions of
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width in 2005 and 2006 (see above). It is irrational for Defendants to claim the unrecorded
prescriptive right of way they are now claiming is identical to the one claimed at the end of the
prescriptive period, regardless of what the original width was and it is arbitrary and capricious
for them to do so with no evidentiary record of the establishrneilt of Camps Canyon Road in the
pertinent part, as an unrecorded prescriptive right of way is unrecorded. Not only is a 25 foot
from centerline designation not even within the intent of Idaho Code 5 40-23 12 and not referred
to in any way by Meservey; but also, at the part of the road bed which was least repositioned in
distance from its original position, that part of the road laid, afier the alterations of 1996,
northeast of the old trees and fence; so in no way shape or form does the post 1996 road lie
within the old right of way let alone the 25 feet that Defendants now claim without any
substantial evidence in the record and with the entire evidence in the record and this case running
contrary to Defendants' findings and conclusions (see Plaintgs ' Affidavit, at 8). Any and all
such evidence in the record runs couilter (Camps Cailyoii Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre
parcel was a11 unrecorded prescriptive right of way; no records exist; and no process of laying out
the proposed 1996 right of way alteration occurred or was surveyed (see Plaint*

' Tlzird Record

Supplenzent, Item No. 18, at 2-4, Requests for Admissions Nos. 1-6) to a 50 foot width before or
after any alteration legally or illegally accomplished. The evidence needed for the establishment
of the uirecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre
parcel, has been destroyed in the undisputed movement of and extension of the road base and
any direct physical evidence of its previous location and width were destroyed with the
alterations. ,411 recorded data, including Plaintiffs' deed description, the Rimrock survey,
Plaintiffs' and Defendants' aerial photos, and public opinio~i(see YlaiiztifSss'Third Record
Supplement, Item No. 4, at 1-9; Plaintvs ' Third Record Supplenzer~t,Item No. 5 , at 2-3) in the
public record run contrary to Defendants' claim of a fifty foot right of way for Camps Canyon
Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel) and Defendants have denied Plaintiffs any means of
predeprivation hearing and all post deprivation hearings untimely set are inadequate (see
Zir.zer~zon).Defendants have a duty to survey in the taking of private land and keep records of
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alterations of highways. Without surveys and or accurate record keeping and conveyance and
recording of agreements and alterations of the claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way,
Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, prior to the alterations,
reestablishment of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel as a fifiy foot-25
feet &om centerline-prescriptive

right of way, is not supported by substaiztial evidence on the

record. Further ally more recent claims for a 50 foot right of way can not be rationally
reestablished from what was never established. Further, the more recent undisputed widening in
2005 and again in 2006 leave only a record that runs contrary to any establishment at all,
negating even the possibility of a Common law easement after the agreement between the
previous landowner and Plaintiffs and the NLCHD, whether the Defendants deny any agreement
or not as they acknowledge that the improvements the NLCHD intended to do were
accomplished. Any and all Defendants claims of present 50 foot width of Camps Canyon Road
in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, are not supported by substantial evidence on tlie record;
such claims are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and or not legally applied.
Further, the destruction of the evidence of the original location and width of the uilrecorded
prescriptive right of way Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, without
prior survey and/or accurate record keeping and/or conveying and/or recording of agreements,
easements, acquisitions (gifted or purchased) are all capricious, arbitrary, an abuse of Defendants
discretion and/or illegal acts/failures to act.

5.5.6 Defendants'
-

application of policy/custom based on I.C. $ 40-2312 of

Plaintiffss'property greater then that portion of land as is "actually used" for road purposes after
the 1996 alteration, as that was all that was gifted to Defendants by the previous owners and the
Plaintiffs, is invalid and any and all such "not unauthorized" activities permanent and/or
temporary in nature, includiilg but not limited to the wrongful possession of Plaintiffs' property
in the issuance and failure to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, the lvidening of
Camps Canyon Road after the 1996 alterations of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/acre parcel, the wrongful physical invasions of and occupations of tlie "buffer" and damages to
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Plaintiffs' fence up to and including the date of this trial which have improperly interfered with
Plaintiffs' property rights are invalid exercises of Defendants' police powers and are capricious,
arbitrary ,an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal; as these activities are only valid
within the authority of the "width of the road" and such "width of the easement" to be fifty feet
wide is not supported by substantial evidence on the record, as the "width of the easement"
equals the "width of the road".
5.5.7 There is no de minimis applicability in this situation of where such gains
-

from the application of the statute are being weighed against the administrative burdens to the
Plaintiffs, as implied authority to make cost-benefit decisions must be derived from statute and
not from general de minimis doctrine. The amount of cost to Plaintiffs to patrol, record or
document the activities of the Defendants in their general maintenance activities as well as their
alterations to Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel is great without even
considering the time, money and effort required to bring forth a new suit against Defendants
every time they floated more gravel over the edge of the road surface envelopiizg more land of
Plaintiffs' "buffer" and encroachment on and damage to Plaintiffs' fence and the inadequacy of
such remedies.

5.5.8 Plaintiffs have made "good faith" attempts to submit rebuttals and requests
for analysis of and "consideration of circumstances peculiar to each case" of the claimed 25 foot
from centerline prescriptive right of wajr of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3i-I- acre
parcel. Denial of these attempts is arbitrary, capricious. an abuse of Defendants' discretion and
or illegal.

5.5.9 Defendants'
40-2312, I.C. tj 40-23 17, and I.C.

applicatioil of policies/customs to Plaintiffs based on I.C. tj

9 30-2319 and Defendants'

exertions of governmental power

under Defendants' authority to issue/revolte driveway access permits are invalid as they do not
circumscribe Defendants' broad authority to determine the "width of the easement", location,
use, or character of the unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity
of the 3+/- acre parcel with statutory safeguards or remedies for erroneous deprivations.
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Defendants7 policy of "The District is well within its legal rights to widen a road without holding
a public hearing . .." (Plnintijfi ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 20, at 8) and/or Defendants'
policy/custom that all prescriptive rights of way are absolutely 50 feet wide (Plaintij5s' Third
Record Supplement, Item No. 18, at 2-4, Requests for Admissions Nos. 1-6) denies Plaintiffs the
safeguards of the Meservey holdings and Meservey 's remedies of a predeprivation hearing as
does the lack of notice and hearing for determining if Plaintiffs fence and buffer are encroaching
on the Camps Canyon right of way, as does the lack of a hearing when all parties were present
and time was allotted on the agenda on 4/12/06, as does the lack of surveys of private property
when alterations are made to Camps Canyon Road, and as well as accurate record keeping and
recording and conveyances of agreements with previous owners and/or with Plaintiffs when the
"not unauthorized" activity of determining the "width of the easement" was feasible and
predictable as all parties were present and time was allotted on the agenda on 4/12/06 and if not a
hearing could have conveniently and quickly bee11 rescheduled as was a notice if Defendants felt
Plaintiffs' fence was encroaching on the Camps Canyon Right of Way and that. Such
Defendants' failures to act as to provide an adequate hearing and/or notice at a meaningful time
is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion andlor illegal.
5.5.10 Defendants' application of policy/custom based on I.C. § 40-23 12 and as

P

applied to Plaintiffs under any and all customs/policies/standard operating proceduresiexertions
of governnlental powers under the assumption of mandated claim that an unrecorded prescriptive
right of way be 50 feet wide, with or without the "presumption" and a provision for rebuttal, the
exertion of all police powers would be arbitrary and capricious, without a rational basis to a
legitimate governmental interest and/or without support of substantial evidence in the NLCWD
record for such findings or conclusions; having not in the first instance determined the pertinent
aspect of the easement of location and width and provided a predrivational notice and hearing,
the legal establislment, and/or the authority to operate under such right of way-"v,

idth of the

easement"' as under I.C. $5 40-23 17 and 40-23 19 (to determine encroachments), 40-605 (to lay
out and to survey taking of private property), 40-604 (general supervision and acquisition of
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private property), 40-608 (recording alterations), 40- 13 10 (duties, general supervision, surveying
of private property, acquisition of private property), 40-1336 (record books to be kept), 40Chapter 20 (federal requirements for highway relocation assistance), 40-2302 (recording and
conveyance of private property and/or legal agreements with abutting landowners, confirmation
of dedication (1996 and all other alterations)), 40-2307 (wl~osetree is it), 6-202 and others
(trespass and/or nuisance), 7-Chapter 7 (eminent domain), 18-700 1 (malicious injury to
property), 18-7008 (malicious injuries to property and trespass), 18-7012 (destruction of fences),
Title 35 (fences), 18-2602 (preparing false testimony) 18-2603 (destructionlspoliation of
evidence), amongst others. Failure of Defendants to legally reestablish a valid right of way when
findings and/or conclusions that the Defendants have an existing road therefore a fifty foot
prescriptive right of way that is not supported by substantial evidence on the record, and in light
that the claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the

3+/- acre parcel has been moved and widened several times is arbitrary and capricious and/or an
abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal.

5.5.11 If there exists "unused landv-such that the "width of the road" is less
than the "width of the easement", and/or that the "width of the easement" is 50 feet, by
Defendants' application of policy/custom based on LC. 5 40-23 12 to Plaintiffs' situation and the
claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Caiyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/acre parcel, then Plaintiffs have the right to tlze econon~icand physical use of this land: and if the
"width of the road" is equal to the "width of the easemelit", Plaintiffs own this land free of
encumbrance of an easement and/or subject to any regulation by the Defendants. Defendant's
regulation of the use of this "unused" pot-tion for road purposes, if such that the "width of the
easement'' is greater than the "width of the road" requires due process and Defendants denial of
such due process such as in issuance of the first Wagiler driveway access permit, widening of
Camps Canyon Road including and after the late fall of 2005, damage to Plaintiffs' property due
to the exteilsioi~of the road surface and its supporting structures is arbitrary and capricious
and/or all abuse of Defendants discretion and/or illegal.
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5.5.12 Defendants' application of policy/custom based on I.C. 5 40-23 12 to
-

Plaintiffs' situation in the preselvation of a path/road through the woods and Camps Canyon (i.e.
"maintenance7'): (i) does not warrant the invalid regulation of the "use" of Plaintiffs' land and/or
fence (see Cooding, see Roberts) nor (ii) does an increase in use in Camps Canyon Road warrant
the taking of additional land through invalid use of Defendants police powers (see Aztec). If
additional "use" of the public asset increases over time and may create need for (the benefit ofnot the avoidance of harm of) additional "use" of Plaintiffs' land, then Defendants have a
rational basis for performing a legitimate govenmental interest in the civil procedure of eminent
domain.
5.5.13 Defendants' application of policy/custom based on I.C. 5 40-23 12 to
Plaintiffs' situation and in regarding that none of these "not unauthorized" activities, (widening,
straightening, altering a right of way, issuing/revoking the first Wagner driveway access permit
or abating e~~croachments
to Camps Canyon Road) are prohibited by the 5"' Amendment or the
civil procedure of eminent domain, that is all these goals are attainable under the proper
interference with Plaintiffs' property rights. Further the legitimate governmental interest of the
jt" Amendment-to

not overly burden the individual and/or to spread the burden out amongst the

public of the increased "use"' is furthered by the civil procedures of eminent domain. Eminent
domain also allows the public to obtain such private lands as are necessary for the increased
-'use" inexpensively, as opposed to the arbitrary and capricious increased risk of paying financial
damages for tlze invalid exertion of Defendants' police powers. Such actions/failures to act under
invalid exercises of Defendants' police powers in the improper interference with Plaintiffs'
property rights with the addition of the increased risk of erroneous deprivations and the increased
risk of litigation costs and the increased risk of paying out the full extent of common law
damages is arbitrary and capricious andor an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal and
a shock to the conscience of the public taxpayers and an exhibit of deliberate indifference to the
problems it creates and the lack of consideration for the factors that the Idaho legislature liad
intended-eminent

domain.
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Defendants' not originating in the public record andlor order deny in^ Defendants to be
able to augment the public record andlor support for Plaintiffs' motion to compel
discovew: Plaintiffs petition Court, under I.R.C.P. Rules 26, 36 and 37 and under Idaho

Doctrine of Spoliation of evidence for order granting an evidentiary ruling of negative inference
against Defendants for Spoliation of Evidence. Defendants have duty to keep records of
alterations, widening, straightening (see I.C. 5 40-608,40-2302,40-605,40- 1310, amongst
others) of Camps Canyon Road, to survey (Defendants' findings and conclusions that no private
property will be taken in the events as to the change in width, location, use, or character of
cannot be arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal; without a
survey and an accurate description of the lands to be used in the alteration-Defendants'
decisions are without substantial evidence in the record to support their conclusions and
findings) when taking of private property is necessitated for the inlprovemeilt of Camps Canyon
Road (see I.C. §§ 40-605, 1310) to convey and to record agreements (see I.C. Cj 40-2302) of
easements andlor acquisitions of property whether purchased by the NLCHD or gifted to the
public by private land owners. Plaintiffs seek relief from the Defendants trying to augment the
public record with specific measurements, unrecorded claims, and legal conclusions and findings
unaccompanied by facts obtained at public evidentiary hearings, undocunlented or written record
of work on Camps Canyon Road with the inclusion of specific measurements, distances,
volumes, or other relevant material presented as public record and/or opinions of fact 'ivhether
such opinions be from witnesses not represented as experts \vhere such opi~lionsare of no
probative value as they do not related to a documented occurrence event or measurement or
whether the opinion be from an expert source and not documented or not related to the expert's
area of expertise. A validation proceeding cannot be held by affidavit and repetitious testimony
of the NLCHD officials who are suppose to be impartially adjudicating the issue.
5.6.1 Relevant and material evidence has been intentionally
destroyed/concealed/made unavailable to Plaintiffs by Defendants in their standard operating
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procedures for widening, straightening, altering and changing Camps Canyon Road in 1996,

2005, and 2006. Defendants have admitted to the alteration in the physical location and width of
Camps Canyon Road in 1996 and no prior survey andlor description of the land to be affected
were made. No documelltation was produced of agreements with abutting landowners or of the
extent of the alterations; including but not limited to, any and all survey/s (preliminary or
otheiwise) of the proposed alterations, widening and/or straightening that were to be made,
together with any and all accurate descriptioids of the lands required, and any and all agreements
with each owner of property for the purchase of a right-of-way over the lands included within the
description, and any and all determinations of the taking of private property, including consents
a l d orders of the NLCHD Con~missionersand all records of all proceedings of the
commissio~lersrelative to any and all such alterations, widening, and/or straightening including
any and all such orders for the laying out, sun-eying, mapping, and/or any other books,
documents, or other tangible things inemorializing any such events as straightei~i~~g,
widening,
and/or altering Camps Canyon Road in SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM in 1996. There are no
"as is, where is" objective data of the conditions precedent of Canps Canyon Road and no
records reveal extent ofalterations. Defendants have admitted also to expansion of Camps
Canyon Road in 2005 and in 2006, and yet they have perhrmed no sunreys, recorded no
conveyailces of acquired land or easements (properly or improperly acquired), have not made
proper, adequate and/or required record of changes in the location, width, use or character of the
right of wayihighwaylroad, or agreements with abutting landou-ners for these changes in the
public record or their own millutes or records. Defeildants llas~ea duty to perform surveys,
record, convey and record keeping and their findings and conclusions effecting Plaintiffs' land
and Plaintiffs' specific situation are necessarily based on this duty of accurate record keeping to
at least the extent that substantial evidence lies in support and that the record does not run
contrary to their coilclusions and findings. Plaintiffs 11a1.e a right to obtain any and all such
relevant evidence and a right to a conclusive 'and no11 evasive answer as to the absence of any
such relevant evidence.
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5.6.2 Relevant and material evidence has also been destroyed and made
-

u~lavailableto Plaintiffs and this Court by Defendants' destruction of and/or failure to retain the
first Wagner driveway access permit, even though, after the appearance of Plaintiffs at the
4112106 NLCHD meeting and Plaintiffs calling for a survey, and the fact that Defendants knew
they had altered the pertinent part of the road in 1996, and that a dispute was present, that
Defendants knew or should have known it was likely litigation may result and Defendants'
lawyer should have taken steps to insure the first Wagner driveway access permit was retained.
5.6.3 The destruction, spoliation of relevant evidence accompanied by the lack of
-

adequate record keeping prejudices Plaintiffs and puts Plaintiffs in an unfair position to
adequately plead their civil case (Case No. 2008-1 80) as this informatioii is vital to the proof of,
description of, and estimation of the temporary and/or permanent physical damage and the
physical invasion of and physical occupation of Plaintiffs' land and any duration of any
temporary deprivation, trespass, creation of nuisance, inverse condemnation, and/or deprivations
of property rights.

5.6.4 To allow Defendants to obliterate the relevalit evidence of the precedent
conditions and then require Plaintiffs to prove such undiscoverable evidence after it has been
destroyed andlor to necessitate Plaintiffs to constantly remain vigilant to the periodic and
predictable invasions of their property so as to prevent or to be able to provide piecellleal
evidence to prove their case and then allow Defendants to fill any blanlt with tvliatever worlts for
them is patently unfair and unjust. The intent of this litigation is the search for truth for the
purpose of securing justice and fairness for all parties. Such discol~ery,fairness and justice is
better attained, by such sanctions as deemed appropriate by this Court, for Defendants' failures
and/or inadequacies to perform and retain such records and surveys and/or spoliatioddestruction
of the relevant, physical evidence of the exact location of andlor of the exact width of Camps
Canyon Road, both before and after the significant alterations, straightening, and widening of
1996,2005,2006, and after. Defendants' actions/failures to act in the destruction/spoliation of
evidence are implied adn~issionsthat Defendants' case is so weak that Defendants that
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Defendants cannot succeed without eliminating evidence and then to reconstruct any evidence
they may be of the opinion to want to reconstruct. Defendants intended there to be no record of
their actions in the agency record as the Idaho Statutes make mandatory these records and
surveys, therefore Defendants' actions/failures to act is negligence per se and accompanied now
with defendants' attempts to build a record outside of the public meeting is unfair to Plaintiffs
and illegal.
5.6.5 . "In Bronzley v. Carey, 132 Ida110 807, 8 12, 979 P.2d 1 165, 1170 (1 999)
-

(citations
omitted), we stated that the evidentiary doctrine of spoliatioil of evidence was as follows:
The evidentiary doctrine of spoliation recognizes it is unlikely that a party will destroy favorable
evidence. Thus, the doctrine of spoliation provides that when a party with a duty to preserve
evidence intentionally destroys it, an inferetlce arises that the destroyed evidence was
unfavorable to that party. Spoliation is a rule of evidence applicable at the discretion of the trial
court." Courtney v. Big "0" Tires, Inc., 139 Idaho 821, 87 P 3d. 930 (2003).
56.6 There is no question that the acts and/or failures to act of widening,
straightening, altering of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 34-1- acre parcel and/or the
issuing and!or failure to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit and destructioil of said
pernlit were not intentional and may e17enbe discernable as to the 1aio.iuledge of the rainificatioiis
of such actions. Defendants intended to do these alterations and also knew of the repercussions
of their acts as Defendants claim a 25 feet from centerline easement and any change in the
centerline of Canlps Canyon Road would alter the dimensions of the easement.
5.6.7 Under
-

I. R.C.P. Rule 36 and 37 as well as under I.R.C.P. Rule 26 and

under Idaho's Doctrine of Spoliation of Evidence and as a matter of the inherent powers this
Court holds to protect the integrity of the judicial process and to ensure fairness, whether
spoliation occurs prior to court orders or to discovery, and to impose fitting sa~ictiol~s,
Plaintiffs
petition Court to grant and evidentiary ruling requiring a negative inference of Defendants'
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physical descriptions of the alterations of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre
parcel since and including the 1996 alteration.
5.7 In the alternative, Defendants' failure to produce such data, documentation, and/or
-

records is a result of Defendants' invalid/unconstitutional record keeping
policies/customs/staildard operating procedures as such record keeping procedures are not

accurate enough for Defendants to bring fosth substantial evidence for their findings or
conclusions andior such informal policy making procedures are inadequate and are therefore
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal.
5.8 Plaintiffs' arguments in support of Plaintiffs' Motion to conipel discovery and to
consider sufiiciency of answers are brought forth by the following interrogatories and
admissions:
5.8.1 As Plaintiffs brought forth in recent partial sumnlary judgment petitions,
-

Plaintiffs inquired of Defendants of any evidence Defendailts inight have of their claini of a 50
foot easeinelit on Camps Canyon Road. YlaintifJS ' First Interr-ogutories (illmebe~",qi,

INTERROGATORY NO. 3 - "List all available information and documents you know of, the
names. addresses, phone numbers and mihereabouts of anyone, who may have information of or
the possessioi~of documents concerning the acquisition of the prescriptive right of wayihighway,
CCR, the time of the prescriptive period for the prescriptive right-of-wayihighway, CCR, the
establishment of the prescriptive right-of-way/highway. CCR, at the end of the prescriptive
period for the prescriptive right of way/high\vay, CCR. RESPONSE: Object to this
Interrogatory as unduly burdensoine and oppressive in that it covers an unlimited time frame and
seeks inforination and documents not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. Without wail er of objection, Documents regarding CCR in NLCWD's
possession are primarily set forth in District foremail's journals and Comnlissioner ~Uinutes.
Width of CCR was widened on the north side in 1996 to approximately its present width. CCR
M-aswidened on soutl~side in 2005 and 2006 by approximately four feet of road surface ~ n the
d
addition of sloping cut banks. All District Cominissioners and the foreman, including Payne, for
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the CCR where subdistrict is located have knowledge of this information" (see Plaintiffs ' Third

Record Supplement, Item No. 2, at 4-5, Interrogatory No. 3). Plaintiffs asked a specific question
and got a specific answer-the

only record Defendants have is that Camps Canyon Road was

changed in 1996,2005, and 2006.

5.8.2 Plaintiffs have requested all information that the NLCHD has on Camps
Canyon Road and find no evidentiary hearings on the establishment of Camps Canyon Road and
Defendants confirm that Camps Canyon Road exists as a claimed unrecorded prescriptive right
of way. See Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 13, at 4, Interrogatory No. 4:

"PLAINTIFFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES (Arneberg), INTERROGATORY 4.
Please state the present legal established nature (type), width, and location of CCR in the vicinity
of the 3+/- acre parcel. In the application of law to fact, include any and all substantiating data
available and the location of this data for each and every characteristic, attribute and/or limit of
the right of way in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel. If no substantiating objective evidence is
available or known please so state. RESPONSE: To the best of Orland Arneberg's knowledge,
CCR in this vicinity is a public road established by prescription or public use which, at the time
of its establishment, was, under Idaho law, fifiy (50) feet wide and continues to be fiftj7 (50) feet
wide, meaning twenty-five (25) feet on either side of the established centerline thereof."
5.8.3 Plaintiffs ' Third Recor~dSuppler?lent,Item No. 18. at 2-3, Request For
-

Admission No. 2: .'PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS (Arneberg),

REOUEST NO. 2: Referring to the same REPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND
INTERROGATORIES 4, admit that CCR was never surveyed and/or laid out to be 50 feet that is
no records of Camps Canyon Road being laid out to 50 feet wide exist. RESPONSE: Orland
Arneberg does not know whether CCR has ever been "surveyed" or "laid out" or whetl~erany
such records exist."
5.8.3 Plaintiffs conclude from these admissions and interrogatories that Camps
Canyon Road existed before the alterations of 1996 as an unrecorded prescriptive right of way;
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5.8.5 After the alterations of 1996, the character, location and width of Camps
Canyon Road are at question as they are unsupported by substantial evidence in the agency
record as there was no prior survey and/or description of the lands to be involved in the
alteration. Further, Defendants deny changes were accomplished with the permission of the
previous owner and the Plaintiffs. No substantial evidence exists in the record to support this
denial, 110s is there evidence in the record to support Defendants authority to accomplish the
changes admit to malting.

5.8.6 The widening in 2005 and again in 2006 are also without foundation in the
agency record and assuming the permission granted in 1996 created a Commoll law easement,
Defendants are held to the edge of the road and its supporting structures which Plaintiffs allege
to vary from five to ten feet southwest of Plaintiffs' fence in the narrowest part of the buffer near
Plaintiffs' corral and greater from there to the west line of the SENE quarter quarter, there
running 10 to 15 feet, there was no ditch or supporting structure in this area. All extensions of
road and/or road supporting structures northeast of these lines have been ~;t~ongfully
taken. All
Defendants claims to these lands and such actions/failures to act, conclusions, findings, and
exertions of Defendants' goverixnelltal power are improper interference with Plaintiffs' property
rights as they are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal.

5.8.7 Issuance and failure to revoke the first Wagiler driveway access permit
resulted Defendants' wrongful possession Plaintiffs' land for an indefinite period of time.

5.8.8 Plaintiffs seek both relief of the return of Plaintiffs'land \vrongfully
possessed and for damages to Plaintiffs land and fence, as well as for the time Defendants were
in wrongful possessioll after being adequately warned on 4/12/06 of their wrongful possession,
and as well as non economic damages and abatement damages, and court costs.

5.8.9 These claims are as the Defendants and Defendants'
-

counsel so averred to

be a matter of Defendants' iilte~retationof I.C. 5 40-23 12, and amongst others. As the Idaho
Supreme Court states, "There is no room for construction of the statute whose terms, though not
defined, have a plain, obvious, and ratioilal meaning", (see Roeder Nbldings). Here the width of
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the easement may be a factual determination; however, the fact that the determination did not
precede Defendants actions is a matter of law; and, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs petition Court to
grant order that Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for damages to be determined.

-6

Conclusion:

6.1
-

Defendants' custom, policy, and/or exertion of governnlental power under I.C. tj 40-

23 12 mandating that an unrecorded prescriptive right of way be 50 feet-25 feet from centerline is
facially invalid as it fails the legislature's unambiguous intent of giving Defendants a choice in
the determination of the width of a highway and denies the holdings of Meservey of a
presumptive width to be factually determine by a1 implied evidentiary hearing and an
opportunity for the abutting landowner to rebut the presumption, and it assumes an invalid
statutory authority, under a guise to regulate, to improve, i.e. to widen, straighten, alter a
prescriptive right of way; and, as such denies an abutting land owner of due process of a factual
determination of the width of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way and the statutory
safeguards of predeprivational notice and hearing (Me,servey), survey and accurate description of
the lands involved (I.C.

5 5 40-605 and 1310) and the possible remedies (I.C. $5 40-203a and/or

IRTA) and remedies for erroneous deprivations of Defendants before the discretionary "not
unauthorized" actionsifailures to act are effected, as in altering, straightening, widening, ail
unrecorded prescriptive right of way. Any enforcenzent of Defendants custom, policy, and/or
exertion of governnlental power under I.C. $ 40-23 12 and under such statutes wlzich are
therefore ignored (I.C. $5 40-605, 1310, 203a, 2302, IRTA, Title 40 Chapter 20 and/or Title 7
Chapter 7, amongst others) for any unrecorded przscriptive right of way is arbitrary and
capricious, an abuse of Defendants discretion and/or illegal and/or a denial of procedural due
process and therefore invalid. Plaiiltiffs petition Court to grant order to enjoin Defendants from
enforcing their invalid policy, custom to improve highways under I.C.

5 40-23 12 and violating

the authorizing statutes.
6.2 Defendants'
-

custom, policy, and/or exertion of governmental power under I.C. Ij 40-

23 12 is invalid as applied to Plaintiffs, as it has resulted in the physical invasion and occupation
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of Plaintiffs land, it has denied Plaintiffs procedural due process, it is without any rational basis
for doing either and is therefore arbitrary and capricious and/or an abuse of Defendants'
discretion and/or illegal.
6.2.1 Under I.C. $40-23 12, Camps Canyon Road in the pestinent part is, as
Defendants claim, an unrecorded, prescriptive, 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right of way.

Twenty-five feet from centerline is not an authorized category under I.C. Cj 40-23 12 and
Defendants provide no rational connectioil of a 25 feet from centerline right of way to the
authority of I.C. $ 40-23 12; and an unambiguous reading of I.C. 3 40-23 12 offers Defendants
discretion to determine the width of Camps Canyon Road. No mandated 50 foot width has been
intended by the legislatuse. An unrecorded prescriptive right of way shall be 50 feet, unless
preexisting at a lesser width, or as large as necessary, at the discretion of the Defendants.
hfeservefyholds that a prescriptive right of way may be presumed to be 50 feet, however that
requires due process-an

opportunity for the Plaintiffs at a nleaniilgful time to respond in a

meaningful manner.
6.2.2 The holdings of Adesewey not only do not authorize the witldlolding of due
process, they state clearly that each case must be individually factually determined.
6.2.3 I.C. Cj 40-23 12 provides no statutory authority for Defendants to regulate
Plaintiffs' land and Defendants have shown no rational relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare. It has long been held that any envelopment of more land is a burden
the public as a whole must bear and the only legitimate governmental interest here is to spread
the burden anlongst the public. Defendant's under the guise of regulation call not subvert the
intents of the state legislature (see Roberts, above).
6.2.4 As an unrecorded highway Camps Canyon Road has no e~ridencein the
agency records upon which Defendants may base a rational decision, conclusion, or finding.
Therefore Defendants' denial of a predeprivational hearing also denies Defendants of a rational
basis for their claims of the width and location of the easement. Further all evidence in this
record runs contrary to Defendants claims as they admit they have altered the road

011 several
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occasions and have no substantial evidence in the record to support their claims to being within
their easement. Further, all evidence on the ground of the extent of the original easement and
comparison of the alteration is arbitrarily based without a survey and an accurate description of
the lands involved in the alterations, prior to the alterations. Further, without substantial
evidence in the record establishing the location and width of the right of way failure to survey is
arbitrary under I.C.

5s 40-13 10 and 605, as it is arbitrary and capricious not to as there is no

basis for Defendants conclusions and findings that they have not taken private property.
6.2.5 Defendants' custom, policy, andlor exertion of governinental power under
-

I.C. 5 40-2312 is invalid as applied to Plaintiffs as it violates I.C. § 40-203a. Defendants
violated their duty in their decision not to initiate validation proceedings and that decision has no
rational basis &!hen they were sllow~nthe first Wagner driveway access was issued and not
revoked for an access wholly on Plaintiffs' land, that the location of Camps Canyon Road, in the
pertinent part, no longer agreed with the public record as the deed location and the Rimrock
survey showed the intersections of the east and west property lines with Camps Canyon Road
had moved greater than 50 feet and that the agency had no record of the legal established
location of the right of way before there numerous alteratiol~s.
6.3 Defendants have no rational basis for not responding to Plaintiffs' IRTA. This Court
-

acknowledges that the issues which Plaintiffs raise to be examined must be shown to be
examinable in the upconling trial. Plaintiffs see no assurance that this Court Iias jurisdiction to
l-alidate the right of \;ria)-and/or hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the width of the
easement. Eefendanis have no agency record on ~vhicha finder of fact can base findings and
conclusions, save for an admission that the original riglit of way bas been altered and there were
no surveys or accurate descriptions of the lands involved on which to base any co~iclusionsor
findings. Defendants have not shown a rational relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare and therefore a statutory authority to regulate Plaintiffs7 land. Defendants'
defense of no "final decision is therefore frivolous and has no legal merit. There is no judicial
economy in burdening the upconling trial with issues that can't be resolve there or that can be
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resolved now. Defendants actions/failures to act are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal and the Defendants and Defendants' counsel continue with
frivolous and defenses without legal merit and abuse the discovery processes of this case.
6.4 Defendants had no rational basis on which to issue the first Wagner driveway access
-

permit and had no rational basis on which to fail to revoke the first Wagner driveway access
permit and on which not to call for a survey to resolve the matter that the access was not wholly
on Plaintiffs' land and/or not to require the Wagners to call for a survey, and or to fail to
temporarily revoke the permit when Plaintiffs said they would call for a survey. Further the
Defendants were biased and wanted only to give the Wagners, as the relatives of the Defendants'
friends, neighbors, relatives and business associates, a driveway access for the Wagners' new
home as the Defendants had made the historical access unusable in the 1996 alterations to Camps
Canyon Road.

There are no disputed facts in these petitions for partial summary judgments as there are
no evideiitiary records in an unrecorded prescriptive right of way on which the Defendants can
base a rational decision; and, in the as applied case of Plaintiffs' situation not only is there no
dispute that the no evidentiary agency record exists, and/or that the width of the easement has not
been factually determined, for the right of way claimed on Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent
part, the record of this case and the agency record runs contrary to Defendants' claim that they
have a lawful 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right of way as it is undisputed that the

Defendants have altered the location and width of the road and without surveys or accurate
descriptions of the lands involved in any of the numerous alterations Defendants have admitted
to and thus have no record on which to base their claims, and furthermore, Defendants have a
duty to perform such records and not doing so was arbitrary and capricious and/or an abuse of
Defendants' discretion and/or illegal. Defendants do not dispute the decisions not to survey
and/or accurately describe were not intentional nor do they contend the widening of Camps
Canyon Road from the late fall of 2005 until present and/or the alterations of 1996 were
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inadvertent. Defendants intended to make the alterations without record and have destroyed
relevant evidence which is now unavailable to Plaintiffs.
There are no disputed facts as to the Defendants having issued the first Wagner driveway
access permit or that the Defendants did not revoke the permit after the 4/12/06 meeting, or
disputed facts that such findings and conclusions to issue/revoke were not given approval of the
filial policy makers of the agency before or after the 4/12/06 meeting, and/or that such
issuance/revocation findings and conclusions were not based on agency policy or custom.
There are no disputed facts as to the Defendants' policy to improve unrecorded
prescriptive rights of way under I.C. $ 40-23 12 and the holdings of LWe.servey,including but not
limited to Plaintiffs' specific situation, denies the positive constitutional guaranty of due process.
Therefore, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs petition this Court for partial sumniary judgments
on the issues of:
(1) The facial invalidity of Defendants' policy, custom, and/or exertion of governmental
power under I.C. 5 40-23 12 and its inherent violatioiis of I.C. $5 40-23 17,2319,203a7605,
1310,608,2302, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and/or under Defendants' authority to
issueirevoke driveway access permits; that this policy, custom, andlor exertion of governmental
power is arbitrary and capricious and/or an abuse of Defendants' discretion andlor illegal;
(2) The Defendants' policy, custom, and/or exertion of goverrimental power under I.C. tj
40-23 12 and its inlierent violations of I.C.

$5 40-2317,2319,203a7605, 1310, 608,2302. Title

40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and/or under Defendants3 authority to issue/revol<edriveway
access permits is invalid as applied to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs situation, in regards to the claimed
unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part; that this policy,
custom, and/or exertion of governmental power is arbitrary and capricious and/or an abuse of
Defendants' discretion and/or illegal;
(3) Defendants' policies, customs, and/or exertions of governmental power under I.C. $
40-23 12, and its inherent violations of I.C.

$5 40-23 17,23 19, 203a, 605, 1310, 608,2302, Title

40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and/or under Defendants' authority to issue/revoke drive
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access permits in regards to the claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon
Road, in the pertinent part, are a violation of Plaintiffs' equal protection rights, as they are
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal;
(4) Defendants' policies, customs, and/or exertions of governmental power under I.C. S;
40-23 12, and its inherent violations of 1.C. $5 40-23 17, 23 19, 203a, 605, 1310,608,2302, Title
40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and/or under Defendants' authority to issue/revoke drive
access permits in regards to a claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way are facially invalid
and violate an abutting landowners' 5ihAmendment rights to procedural due process;
(5) Defendants' policies, customs, and/or exertions of governmental power under I.C. 5
40-23 12, and its inherent violations of I.C. tj 5 40-23 17,23 19,203a, 605, 1310, 608,2302, Title
40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and/or under Defendants' authority to issuelrevoke drive
access permits in regards to the claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon
Road, in the pertinent part, are invalid and violate Plaintiffs' 5"' Amendment rights to procedural
due proccss;

(6) Plaintiffs have a valid cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as Defendants have
taken wrongful possession of Plaintiffs' land without due process; Defendants do not dispute the
"not unauthorized" actions/failures to act ujhich resulted in the wrongful invasions of Plaintiffs'
land they simply say, as a matter of law, (under Defendants' policy based on I.C. S; 40-23 12)
they don't have to afford Plaintiffs due process. The nearest rational claim that Defendants bring
forth to provide a rational basis for not providing Plaintiffs due process is an irrational and
unautliorized and unintended by the Idaho State Legislature and therefore subverted guise to
regulate Plaintiffs' land under a mandated 50 foot width which is not statutorily valid. As a
matter of law, Plaintiffs petition this Court to declare Plaintiffs right and legal relations under 42
U.S.C. 1983 and to grant order to request Defendants to show cause why Defendants hake taken
wrongful possession of Plaiiitiffs land and why further action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 should not
be granted;
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(7) Defendants' policies, customs, andlor exertions of governmental power under I.C. S;
40-2312, and its inherent violations of I.C.

$5 40-2317,2319,203a, 605, 1310, 608, 2302, Title

40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and/or under Defendants' authority to issuelrevoke drive
access permits in regards to a claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way are facially invalid as
Defendants do not circumscribe their broad authority to determine the width of an unrecorded
prescriptive right of way, and/or to improve, such as to widen, straighten, and/or to alter, and/or
to determine encroachments to an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, and/or to issuelrevoke
driveway access permits on an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, with statutory safeguards,
such as survey and accurate description of the lands involved prior to alteration and/or
iinprovement (I.C. S; 40- 1310 and I.C. S; 40-605), accurate record keeping (LC. S; 40-608),
conveying and recording of easements and/or acquisitions (I.C. 5 40-2302), evidentiary and
predeprivational notice and hearing (5thAmendment, I.C. S; 40-23 12 and the holdings of
Meservey, I.C. S; 40-23 17, and I.C. S; 40-23 19, I.C. Title 40-Chapter20 and I.C. Title 7Chapter7), and remedies for erroneous deprivations, IRTA, I.C. 5 40-203a, and or timely post
deprivational hearing or an adequate policy of exhaustion of agency remedies;
(8) Defendants' policies, custorns, and/or exertions of governmental pourer under I.C. S;

40-23 12, and its iidierent violations of I.C. $5 40-23 17,2319, 203a, 605, 1310, 608,2302, Title
40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7, and/or under Defendants' authority to issuelrevoke drive
access permits in regards to the claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon
Road, in the pertinent part, are invalid as applied to Plaintiffs and to Plaintiffs' situation, as
Defendants did not circumscribe their broad authority to determine the width of the claimed
unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Cainps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, and/or to
improve, such as to widen, straighten, and/or to alter the claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of
way, Canlps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, and/or to determine encroachments to the
claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, and/or
to issuelrevoke driveway access permits on the claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way,
Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, with statutory safeguards, such as survey and
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accurate description of the lands involved prior to alteration of 1996,2005 and/or 2006, and/or
to endeavor to make agreements with Plaintiffs (I.C. S; 40-13 10 and I.C. tj 40-605), accurate
record keeping (I.C. tj 40-608), conveying and recording of easements and/or acquisitions (I.C. tj
40-2302), evidentiary and predeprivational notice and hearing (5'" Amendment, I.C. S; 40-2312
and the holdings of Meservey, I.C. S; 40-2317, and I.C. S; 40-23 19, I.C. Title 40-Chapter20 and
I.C. Title 7- Chapter7), and remedies for erroneous deprivations, IRTA, I.C. 5 40-203a, and or
timely post deprivational hearing or an adequate policy of exhaustion of agency remedies, a
predeprivational hearing was required as these were "not unauthorized" actioils and the
deprivation was foreseeable as all actions and/or failures to act were discretionary;

(9) Defendants have violated the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies Act and/or Title 40 Chapter 20 of the Idaho Code and have violated
Plaintiffs' 5'" and 14' Amendment of the U.S. Constitution rights of due process (procedural and
substantive) and equal protection and as such Plaintiffs petition Court to grant order that
Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
(10) Defendants' policies, customs, and/or exei-tions of govermnental power for
surveying and/or accurate record keeping are invalid as applied to Plaintiffs, for failure to
circuniscribe broad authority with statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous deprivations
as defendants' record keeping and discretions to survey do not provide Defendants with a
rational basis for their findings and conclusions and are therefore are arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal;
(1 I) Defendants failure to reply to Plaintiffs Requests for Takings Analysis, under the
IRTA was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of the Commissioners discretion, and/or illegal , and
tliat Con~missionerswere, as final policy makers deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs claims of
constitutional deprivations;
(12) Defendants failure to initiate s alidation proceedings, under I.C. S; 40-203a and under
the resolution of the Commissioners uras arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of the Commissioners
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discretion, and/or illegal ,and that Commissioners were, as final policy makers deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiffs claims of constitutional deprivations;
(13) Defendants', under the color of state law, in their official capacities and in their
individual capacities, have arbitrarily and capriciously deprived Plaintiffs of their land by
wrongfully invading and occupying and denying Plaintiff the right to restrict others from their
land and the right to peacefully enjoy their land and to grant order of Defendants' liability under
42 U.S.C. 1983.
the extent endants' altered and widened the road, from the late fall of 2005 and 2006, and
issued and failed to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit on the road in 2006,
Plaintiffs were in effect denied notice or an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time in a
meaningful manner and Defendants findings and conclusions on the width and location of the
right of way were then not supported, nor were these findings and conclusions previously
supported by substantial evidence in the agency record, and as the right of uJay was left
unsurveyed and without agency record or evidentiary hearing; and the agency record was
insufficiently recorded in regards to the extent of the 1996 alterations and thus tlie evidence in
the record rail contrary to Defendants' findings and conclusions that the right of way was 50 feet
wide -25 feet fiom centerline and/or that the Defendants remained within the original right of
way; and that Defendants authority to improve Canlps Canyon Road does not arise fi-on1I.C. $
40-23 12 and under the guise of regulation under Defendants were arbitrary and capricious,
abused their discretion.
Further Plaintiffs petition Court by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted; and
also thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy,
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing such fmher proceedings in tlie action as are just: such that upon the trial of the action
the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
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And in also the manner of justice and fairness, Plaintiffs petition Court to enter
evidentiary ruling adverse to the Defendants, and/or in the alternative to deny Defendants from
improperly augmenting the public record, with such opinions of fact that have not been duly
recorded in a public meeting and/or to compel discovery and/or consider the sufficiency of
Defendants' answers in such matters as brought forth under Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement,
as Defendants have in effect denied the existence of any evidentiary hearings on the
circumstances pertaining to the Camps Canyon Road right of way, and/or any records of the
surveying, laying out of or recording of the Camps Canyon Road right of way, and/or accurate
descriptions of the lands involved in any alterations of or surveys of Camps Canyon Road right
of way prior to the alterations of 1996, 2005 and/or 2006, and that they have unreasonably
destroyed all such evidence without accurate record keeping in their intentional alterations to the
Camps Canyon Road right of way, and that Plaintiffs have right to discover such relevant
evidence if such evidence does exist as to be able to factually determine the width of the
easement of the Camps Canyon Road right of way. Plaintiffs petition this Court also to
reconsider Court's denial of summary judgments of September 19, October 6, and October 21, in
the light that the factual determination of the width of the Camps Canyon Road right of way
needs to be addressed is not disputed, that denial of due process is the issue of injury for which
Plaintiffs seek cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and that the wrongful invasions of
Plaintiffs' lands cannot be logically arrived at by this court's requirement that Plaintiffs must
first show that a "taking" took place when fact no such occurrence happened or is claimed to
have happened by Plaintiffs that in any way shape or form did the Defendants properly interfere
with Plaintiffs property rights. Plaintiffs further petition Court for judicial review of Defendants
agency record for completion of such factual and/or evidentiary detzrininations of the Camps
Canyon Road right of way and such substantial evidence in the agency record for Defendants
conclusions and findings to alter the Camps Canyon Road right of way andlor to issue/revoke the
first Wagner driveway access permit.
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6.2.3 Defendants' custom, policy, and/or exertion of govem~lentalpower under
I.C.

5 40-23 12 and the holdiilgs of Meservey has denied Plaintiffs a factual determination of the

width Camps Canyon Road traversing Plaintiffs land in the SENE Section 15 T39N 3WBM and
as such Defendants' actions/failures to act in such actions for which the width of the Camps
Canyon Road right of way needs to be in the first instance factually addressed has ill effect
denied Plaintiffs due process for those actions/failures to act, as in the wrongful invasion of
Plaintiffs buffer, alteration in the runoff drainage and the damages to Plaintiffs fence and the
issuance and failure to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit. The denial of a factual
determination of the width of the right of way and/or Defendants' invalid custom, policy, and/or
exertion of governmental power under I.C. 5 40-23 12 and the holdings of hheservey has left the
Defendants without substantial evidence in their record to support their conclusions and filldings
that Plaintiffs buffer and fence and the altered runoff drainage and the first Wagner driveway
access permit are within the limits of Defendants right of way and therefore there is no rational
basis for Defendants claim to regulate Plaintiffs property. All such actions and failures to act, as
the denial of the due process, the invasion of Plaintiffs' buffer, the damage to Plaintiffs' fence,
the issuance of the first Wagner driveway access permit, as well as, the failure to revoke the first
Wagner driveway access permit, and the alteration of the r ~ ~ n odrainage
ff
are therefore arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of Defendai~ts'discretion, and/or illegal. Plaintiffs petition coui-t to

grant order that Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C.1983 for the wrongful talting of Plaintiffs'
land and/or the deprivation of Plaintiffs' property without due process and for damages for sucli
application as to be determined.
any of the actionslfailures to act for which Plaintiffs allege injury and seek declaratory and
injunctive relief and for which Plaintiffs seek the return of their wx-ongfully taken land and
common law economic and non economic damages. Defendants assert that they have acted,
under the color of state law, and are authorized and Plaintiffs do not dispute that Defendants are
"not unauthorized" to do such actslfailures to act which adversely effect and improperly interfere
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with Plaintiffs' property. However Defendants illegally assert that they may do so and admit to
doing so without any positive constitutional guaranty to Plaintiffs such as due process
(procedural or substantive); and/or equal protection under the law. Plaintiffs discovery record
shows no recordation of Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, and Defendants admit that
no evidentiary hearing has ever been held on Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part; and that
in the laying out of the highway to be improved in 1996,2005 and/or in 2006, there was no
accurate description of the land to be involved made and/or recorded; as well as there was no
survey was done prior to the alterations; and as such all conclusions and findings are arbitrary
and capricious as there is no substantial evidence in the agency record to support a claim that the
right of way that was once used, (and the evidence as to the right of way precedent conditions
was destroyed in the subsequent intentional alteration) was used to the extent of 50 feet or that
the present right of way lies within the 50 foot right of way that was claimed and never recorded.
Once again Defendants assert that they have acted, under the color of state law, and have the
authority to move, extend and alter a ~nandated50 foot -25 feet froin centerline right of way and
then to continue to claim a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of way without any rational basis
for the original claim or a rational connection between the original and the altered claim. The
Idaho Court of Appeals, in the case of Roberts v. Transportation Department, 121 Idaho 727,
827 P.2d 1178 (1991), affirmed 121 Idaho 723,827 P.2d 1174 (1991), surnined up the Idaho law
generally applicable to the extent of and limits on the Board's or other administrative agencies'
authority in carrying out statutory functions. The Court held that an agency "canllot validly
subvert the legislation by promulgating contrary rules. (See also Chevron US.A., Inc. v. AJatural
resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). (See also Roeder Holdings ("In the
absence of valid statutory authority, ail administrative agency may not, under the guise of
regulation, substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or exercise its sublegislative powers
to modify, alter, enlarge, or diminish provisions of a legislative act that is being administered.")
In a chain of confabulated interpretations of unan~biguousIdaho Statutes, Defendants
have concocted a whole series of invalid policies, customs, and exertions of governmental power
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that no reasonable person would arrive at as being permissible exertions of governmental
powers. I.C. 5 40-23 12 does not mandate a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline width; however, in
light of the holdings of Meservey it allows for a presumptive width if the land owner had not
limited the width in some manner as with a fence to be 50 feet, based on a consideration of the
circumstances peculiar to the case, implying abutting landowners, and as applied to Plaintiffs
clearly a right to rebut the presumption. (i) Defendants' conclusion of a I.C. 5 40-23 12
mandated 50 foot-25 feet from centerline width is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal and denies abutting landowners and Plaintiffs alike to tlie
right of due process to rebut a presumption or claim of a 50 f. (ii) Defendants' conclusion that
I.C. 5 40-23 12 gives Defendants the authority to improve highways is arbitrary and capricious,
an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal, as I.C. 5 40-23 12 only gives Defendants the
discretion to determine the width of a highway; and (iii) denies that I.C. 5 40-605 and I.C. 5 401310 gives the Defendants the authority to improve highways by altering, widening and/or
straightening with the concomitant duties to survey and to accurately describe the lands to be
involved in the alterations intended and (iv) then the concomitant duties, under I.C. 5 40-2302 to
in all cases where consent to use the right-of-way for a highway is voluntarily given, purchased,
or condemned and paid for, either an instrument in writing conveying the right-of-way and
incidents to it, signed and acknowledged by the party making it, or a certified copy of the decree
of the court coildeinning it, must be made, filed and recorded in the office of the recorder of the
county it1 which the land conrreyed or condemned shall be particularly described; and (v)
Defendants' failure to hold an evidentiary hearing, survey and/or describe an unrecorded
prescriptive right of way before alteration and which in effect allows Defendants to intentionally
destroy the evidence of the original establishment by user is not authorized under I.C.

5 40-23 12

and is a failure of duty under I.C. fj 540-1 3 10 and 605 and then therefore under I.C. 5 40-2302
and is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal; as well as (vi)
Defendants failure to first provide an evidentiary procedure to relieve the inherent "doubt" of the
legal establishment of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way is arbitrary and capricious, an
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abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal and/or is in violation of I.C. 5 40-203a; as well as
(vii) Defendants failure to provide a prsdeprivation hearing to abutting land owners and/or as
applied to Plaintiffs is in violation of the 5thAmendments' positive guaranties of due process, for
public use and just compensation and therefore is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal; and (viii) further, even if all such policies, customs of
Defendants to improve highways were to be found permissible, (a) Defendants failure to give
Plaintiffs notice and hearing before Defendants intruded into Plaintiffs' buffer and/or daniaged
Plaintiffs fence and/or (b)to issue the first Wagner driveway access permit when Defendants
knew there was a dispute over the Wagners' planned access to Camps Canyon Road, and/or
Defendants knew they had altered the road and that the road frontage on the Wagner deed was
not accurate and the defendants knew they had not surveyed the original unrecorded prescriptive
right of way nor made an accurate description of the lands involved in the alteration and/or that
the Defendants knew they were claiming a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline width right of way on
Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part and therefore only had an easement across Plaintiffs
land and not the fee in the land; andlor (c) that when Plaintiffs gave Defendants fair warning at
the 4/12/06 meeting that their claim to a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline width, a prescriptive
right of way and/or (d)a legal right to issue the first Wagner driveway access permit and/or (e) a
failure to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, until (f) the Defendants conducted a
survey, and/or until (g) the Defendants required the Wagners to conduct a survey and/or (h)
failed to temporarily revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit when Plaintiffs said that
they would call for a survey as the Defendants and Wagners were in error in not so doing, that all
these conclusions, findings, actions and/or failures to act are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal, and (ix)that when time was allotted on the agenda and all
parties were present at the 4/12/06 meeting Defendants denied Plaintiffs a predeprivation hearing
and ally post deprivational hearing is inadequate \%hena predepri.~ational hearing is feasible and
predictable and (x) that all further Plaintiffs attempts to exhaust agency remedies and/or to settle
erroneous deprivations by the Defendants were denied by Defendants with deliberate
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indifference to the constitutional deprivations andlor (xi) all actions andlor failures to act were
given approval by the final policy malters and that all actions andfailures to act were not
"unauthorized" that Defendants' exertions of governmental powers has wrongfully taken
Plaintiffs' land and these actions and/or failures to act are not supported by substantial evidence
in the agency record and are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor
illegal
Camps Canyon Road, in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, was an unrecorded
prescriptive right of way, at least until 1996 when it was moved and widened. As an unrecorded
prescriptive right of way, an evidentiary hearing is required to even list the highway on the
NLCHD' highway map let alone alter it (see Hoi?zestead). The 1996 movement and widening
without prior survey and accurate description of the lands intended to be used and record keeping
destroys the evidence of the unrecorded highway-its

use. Reestablishing what has not already

been established is irrational. Claiming a 50 foot prescriptive right of way prior to 1996 u7asnot
based on substantial evidence in the record and claiming the identical 50 foot right of way after
the 1996 alterations is even more irrational as the evidence of the record is in contradiction to
this. Plaintiffs dispute Defendants' conclusions and findings as there is no rational basis andlor
substantial evidence in the agency record for the defendants' conclusio~lsand findings (see
Plaintiffs motion for partial su~nmaryjudgnent on the nullification (the Court doesn't like our
word "nullification" of the original right of way -but
without a positive response either-see

we have tried other words as "validation"

inotion for declaratory judgment on 1.C.s 40-203a).

Without substantial evidence in the record that a fifty foot right of way exists and is undisputed.
Defendants are confined to the '-width of the road", and in light that even the " ~ i d t hof the road"
may be needed to be determined in terms of supporting structures and encroachments, such as
fences, there may not be evidence in the record for even the conclusions necessary in this regard.
It is glaringly obvious that Defendants' policies, customs, standard operating procedures. andlor
exertions of governmental power under I.C.§$40-2312,23 17, and 23 19 and under Defendants'
authority to issue and/or revoke drive way access permits as well as numerous other customs and
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policies are not within the expression of these statutes, are in conflict with other statutes, and are
in excess of or outside the outer bounds of the authority of the Defendants to promulgate the use
and regulation of Plaintiffs' land in the manner they do not deny doing (see Levin, supra).
Defendants' policies/customs are in~plausible,beyond even being debatable, and can not even be
ascribed to a difference in view or in the product of agency expertise (a secondary easement
requiring an agency to maintain, which a dominant estate may so do and with the necessary
permission does not then establish a legitimate government interest for nor a rational basis to
unnecessarily burden the servient estate with the envelopment of more lad (see Aztec)., as I.C.$§
40-23 12,2317, and 23 19 and the holdings of Meservey all unainbiguously state the adherence to
positive constitutional guaranties which Defeildants say are unnecessary (facial invalidity) and
have readily acknowledged denying Plaintiffs (invalid as applied) (see Motor Vehicle MJ^rs.
Ass 'M V. State Furvlz f i t . Auto Ins., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983)). See also Chevron U SW A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense C o u ~ c iInc.,
l
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (if the law is unambiguous that is
the end of the inquiry regardless of the agency's interpretation). These Procedural Due Process
violations not only find origin in the statutes themselves but they are easily derivable from a
multitude of sources, including the jthAmendment of the U.S. Constitution, Idaho's Doctrine of
Quasi-Judicial Capacity, Idaho's Doctrine of Right to Private Action, Idaho State Constitution
Article I

5

13 and 14, amongst others. Without even exteildiilg the discussion to matters of

statutory construction, the grammatical coiistruction of the statutes illustrates Defendants'
obfuscation of the statutes. Width is a noun, a description of a thing, and is found under I.C.

5

40-23 12. To widen is an injunction, widen is a verb form, and widening is a gerund; all imply a
state of action. Therefore if Defendants are looking for authority to describe they may look at
I.C. $ 40-23 12. If on the other hand Defendants are looking for authority to act, as in to \viden,
they must look in I.C. 5 40-605 or I.C. 5 40-13 10, where such state of action and sucli verbiage is
found and thus follow the rules the legislature has set in place ('-[A]n agency rule would be
arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors Co~igresshas not intended it to
consider.. .", see Motor Velzicle _Mfrs. Ass 'n, supra). Defendants' discretion in I.C. $ 40-2312 is
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lirnited to their discretion to describe the width and even in their description the holdings of
Meservey indicate their description is a presumption subject to rebuttal and due process.
Yet Defendants are not only in procedural due process violation, they are in substantive
due process violation too. Substantive violations are not just limited to the obvious 5th
Amendment violations of failure to even try to provide due process and not "for public use" and
the multitude of other sources of due process, but also for their distinct lack of substantial
evidence in the record and lacking a legitimate governmental interest to regulate Plaintiffs'
property. Defendants' regulation and/or exertion of their governmental power is an invalid
exercise of their police powers as these actions are not rationally based to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare. The fact that these violations are violations of the positive
constitutional guaranties of the 5'" Amendment requires an even greater scrutiny than a rational
basis, as the violation of the 5thAmendment Due Process is substantive in nature (see Lingle and
see also Cr"otun Point Development, hzc, supra). Defendants are compelled to bring forth an
"endd"which would justify Defendants' means in this case (see Plaintijfs ' Third Record
Supplement, Item No. 20, at 8, ("The District's policy for improving public highways under its
jurisdiction is based on Idaho Code $40-2312 and the holdi~igsof ,Uesert.ey [&!eservey

v

Gulliford, 14 Idaho 133, 93 P.780 (1 908)] and its progeny. The District is well within its legal
rights to widen a road without holding a public hearing when that activitt. occurs within

the area of the District's public ri~ht-of-wav...") lWeservey does not say that, if there is a
dispute of the 50 foot presunlption or unless the land ouner limited the widtli of the road with a
fence. What ends do Defendants suggest uhich would justify the denial of a simple public
hearing when Defendants exercise their discretion to choose an alternative width to Camps
Canyon Road and the legitimate gover~mentalinterest in Plaintiffs' land (see Agins v. Tiburon,
447 U. S. 255,261 (1980) ("The deterniination that governmental action constitutes a taking is,
in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a single owner, inust bear the
burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest") or to hold a hearing when all parties
were present and time was allotted on the agenda on 4/12/06 and Plaintiffs complained that
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Defendants had issued the first Wagner driveway access permit for an access wholly on
Plaintiffs' land and Defendants failed to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit when
Plaintiffs said they would call for a survey. All these actions/failures to act are arbitrary and
capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal, as there is no substantial evidence
in the record to support and all evidence in t record runs contrary to any and all Defendants'
findings and conclusions.
Plaintiffs have a legitimate, and an appropriate 42 U.S.C 1983 claim, regardless if it is
finally determined Defendants have a fifty foot-25 feet from centerline right of way or not and
Plaintiffs petition Court to grant order, as a matter of law, that Defendants are liable for common
law damages ecollomic and no economic to be determined and that Plaintiffs should be granted
temporary and permanent injunctive relief and declaratory relief.
Not only is Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C 1983 claim legitimate and appropriate, it is the only
manner in which justice may be served in this matter. This action is not solely for the damages
incurred by Plaintiffs in the time, money, and effort and the disruption of Plaintiffs' lives and the
restitution for the Defendants' inappropriate and public claims that the Plaintiffs are the cause of
the problems on Canlps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel. Defendants'
deliberate indifference in their actions and failures to act are an abhorrence of and a shock to the
conscience of any sense of American Democracy and an insult to those wlio serve to protect such
democratic ideals and to those who seek to educate others in such democratic ideals and to those
who actually serve in critical government areas in which there is truly a need to balance the
rights and freedoms of individuals and sub groups of public with the public safety, health, morals
and general welfare. Defendants (as well as those who would improperly defend such action
(see I.R.P.C.

5 1.13) as well as those would search for justification

of Defendants'

actionsifailures to act, out of their own political or einploy~nentaspirations and/or personal
beliefs) neither come close to qualifying nor do they receive any credit for even trying. Granting
of the facial invalidity is as important if not more important here than the granting of the as
applied invalidity.
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The presumption implied in I.C. 5 40-23 12 and stated in the holdings of Meservey is often
referred to in legal encyclopedias as a "rebuttable presumption". This is, in any way, shape, or
form, redundant; presumption carries with it the connotation of rebuttal. However that Inay be,
the redundancy is apparently appropriate when although those who are educated in the law and
those who may choose to seek employment in the law and/or choose election to such positions in
the law seem recalcitrant to view a presuinption as an opportunity to rebut and may, for whatever
political or private reason, choose to avoid the rebuttal at any cost (see Monroe v. Pupe, 365 U S .
167 (1961) ("It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a

federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or
otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights,
privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the
state agencies") and may so blindly and childisl~lychoose to see a presumption as a mandate to
abuse those who they serve, a conclusion, or a factual finding, ignoring the obvious that such an
opinion is oxymoronic, irrational, arbitrary and capricious; it becomes abundantly clear that
those not so educated in the law or amongst the general public must resort to redundancy to get
the point across. Nothing is more bizarre than to have those who seek public office to be found
to be the ones who apparently want nothing inore than to prove the system can't work-if

due

process and rational and reasonable behavior is expected the system will fail. It becomes a
matter of malicious compliance. Defendants' defenses are fri\,olous and without merit in the law.

Respectfully submitted, on this date

2b

January, 2009,

Don Halvorson, for Plaintiffs pro se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
of this document to be served on
PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009, AND BRIEF
172

RONALD J. LANDECK
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE &
GRAHAM, P.A.
4 14 S. Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
CARL B. KERRICK
DISTRICT JUDGE
P.O. Box 896
Lewiston, ID 83501-0896

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ 1 FAX (208) 883-4593
[x] Hand Delivery

1

[x] U.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ 1 FAX
[ ] Qapd Qeli~ery
U
,
q

&kf&j,

&

Don Halvorsoii

PLATNTIFFS'MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMEXTS ilND OTHER
MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009, AND BRIEF
173

1

Don Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537
(208) 289-5602
Plaintiff, Pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife)) Case No. CV 2008-180
Plaintiffs
VS.

)

PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT IN

)

SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'

North Latah County Highway District; Board of )

MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL

Commissioners for the North Latah County

)

SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard

)

AND OTHER MOTIONS

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official

)

SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;

)

2009

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

)

Individual Capacity

)

Defendants

)

STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
County of Latah

)

Don and Charlotte Halvorson depose and say:
1. We are the plaintiffs named in the above case.

2. On information and belief and Plaintiffs observations, the maintenance of Camps
Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 341- acre parcel from 1996 until 2005 amounted to
PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009

an annual, sometimes biannual grading of the road. Plaintiffs and neighbors plowed
the snow for most of these years. In the late fall grading of 2005, the NLCHD floated
a small amount of gravel towards Plaintiffs' fence. This practice has persisted
through the present.

3. We first became aware of Defendants claim of prescription and/or to a claim of 50
foot-25

feet from centerline right of way to the lands abutting to and underlying

Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in our fee simple title on
4/12/06 at the regular meeting of the Commissioners of the NLCHD.
4. We first became aware of Defendants claim of prescriptive right to damage our fence,
issue and not revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, and to widen Camps
Canyon Road in the late fall of 2005 on 4/12/06.
5. We gave Defendants fair warning of our disagreement with their claims of
prescription to our land and their claims of prescriptive right to damage our fence, to
issue and not to revoke the first driveway access permit, and to widen Camps Canyon
Road in the late fall of 2005 on 4/12/06.
6. We continued from 4/12/06 to give Defendants fair warning of our factls opiniods of
factls and interpretation of the application of law to our facts and opiniods of facts
and sought remedy and settlement with Defendants until they gave us the ultimatum
of either paying $750 and file for petition to validate Camps Canyon Road or getting
a l a ~ y ein
r September of 2007.
7. Plaintiffs identify their recorded deed as a warranty deed recorded in Latah County as
instrument #424411 dated 12/9/1996 as a fee simple and merchantable title for the
real property, situated in the State of Idaho, County of Latah as described in said
instrument, including that land which underlies Camps Canyon Road as described in
said deed.
8. In the fall of 1996, we were in the process of buying the farm which includes the

SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM from Ed and Gladys Swanson. During that time
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the NLCHD, on information and belief through foreman, Dan Payne, approached Ed
Swanson about alterations they wanted to make to Camps Canyon Road in the
vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel to improve the road for new houses built in the
canyon. On information and belief the NLCHD wanted to cut down some old trees,
straighten curves at the east and west ends of the 31-1- acre parcel, move the road bed
to the northeast, and to skirt the rock outcropping. On information and belief, Ed
Swanson gave Dan Payne/the NLCHD permission to make the changes. Ed Swanson
told us about his dealings with Payne and we accepted the change in the road and
confirmed Ed Swanson's permission. Prior to these alterations Camps Canyon Road,
in the vicinity of the 31.1- acre parcel, was approximately 12 feet wide, including
ditches and supporting structures; there were two curves in the road at the east end of
the 3+/- acre parcel. Traveling from southeast to northwest the HarrisiHuff historic
driveway left the road at the peak of the second curve creating a switchback (after the
first curve the road was traveling almost due north-leaving

the road the driveway

was headed almost due south) and thereby skirting the east property line of the 311acre parcel. Northwest of the old driveway access the road passed over a rock
outcropping, then headed slightly to the southwest, into the woods where a logging
road left the road at the peak of the curve and then the road switched back to the north
and then again back to the south descending a steep decline in the road and crossing
the west property line of the 3+/-acre parcel at the peak of the second curve. The
alteratioils of 1996 straightened the curves at both the east end and the west end of the
31.1- acre parcel. On information and belief in the straightening of the curves at the
east and at the west ends of the 3+/- acre parcel altered the geographical intersections
of the east and west property lines with Camps Canyon Road to the north as the
straightening moved the road bed to the northeast. The movement of the road bed to
the northeast also resulted in the dropping of the road bed as the terrain slopes to the
northeast and thus the northeast movement was downhill. The movement of the road
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varied from just a few feet to more than 50 feet depending on where it is measured
and how it is measured. In its narrowest point of movement, the new road bed laid
northeast of the old trees, which were cut down and their stumps were excavated out,
and the old fence line. After the 1996 alterations, there was an 8 foot embankment
left where the historic driveway entered the road and since that time no one exited the
Harris place from the old driveway from that point on (the Harris place was owned by
absentee owners-Martin

Huff, et. al). On his last year of farming the Huff place, the

renter, Larry Hansen, asked Plaintiffs if they could exit the Huff Place through
Plaintiffs' land to carry on their farming operations and finally remove their
machinery as there was no driveway access left. Farming access from then on was
gained from the south out of the old Doug and Edna Kelly place as the new renters,
Ridgeview Farms took over the farming at about the same time as the alterations took
place. In the spring of 1997, we rebuilt the fence leaving a buffer between the fence
and the northeast of the road bed and supporting structures of 5 to 10 feet in the east
end and the narrowest part of the buffer (a narrow strip of the road frontage about 20
feet long at the peak in the curve of the new road). The buffer was left to prevent
damage to the fence from snow removal (ratio of space at edge of road to road
surface: 24 foot road surface in a 50 foot right of way=24/50=.48; .48X15 foot road
surface=7.2 feet: there may have been a small area undersized (less than 5 feet),
however this formula includes a variable of supporting structures which also store
snow; in most of the length of the road the buffer exceeded 10 feet.) from the road
and no gift was intended of the buffer for future widening of the road. For several
years after the 1996 alterations, up until we moved the cows to a different wintering
ground in the early 2000's we shared snow plowing of the road with the neighbors
and had no problems with the storage of snow.
9. The first time I, Don Halvorson, talked with Bob Wagner about his proposed plans

for a driveway access to Camps Canyon Road was in the fall of 2005. Bob Wagner
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had done his own survey of the 311- acre parcel and he wanted to confirm his findings
with me. I told him his survey was wrong as the east property line of the 3+/- acre
parcel was 40+ feet to the west of where Mr. Wagner had staked it out, that the old
historic driveway did not cross the grassy draw and did not approach Camps Canyon
Road in a easterly direction, but rather the old driveway ran along the east property
line and entered Camps Canyon Road in a northerly direction, directly across from
Plaintiffs' corrals. Because of the two sharp curves east of the 3+1- acre parcel a
switchback was created by entering the driveway from the east off of Camps Canyon
Road. I also told Mr. Wagner that the NLCHD had altered Camps Canyon Road in
1996 and where the old historic driveway approached Camps Canyon Road now
stood an eight foot embankment as the NLCHD had straightened the two sharp curves
and moved the road bed to the northeast. The terrain slopes to the north-northeast
along the 3+/- acre parcel and movement of the road bed to the northeast necessitated
the lowering of the road bed and left the abrupt embankment. I told Mr. Wagner he
needed to get a professionally done survey and talk with the NLCHD about the
changes they had made in 1996. Subsequent to the initial call Bob Wagner called
several times in regards to his driveway and construction plans. I told Bob Wagner
that the NLCHD had created the problem and that I would stand with him on the issue
but that his proposed plans were trespassing, and one way or another he needed to
correct the problem.
10. We first became aware of the construction of the Wagners first driveway access to
Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre Parcel on or about 4/8/06. The
access to and into Camps Canyon Road crossed the east property line of the 3+/- acre
parcel in its entirety, the west edge of the driveway being 20 feet east of the east
property line.
11. On 4110106, I, Don Halvorson, called NLCI-ID foreman, Dan Payne, and Clearwater
Power new construction foreman, known only to me as Clint, to inform them that the
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Wagners driveway access was on our property crossing the east property line of the

3+/- acre parcel. On information and belief, Clearwater power did not attempt to
install the underground electric line as planned without confirmation by the Wagners
that the installation would be on the Wagners land andlor within the legal limits of the
highway right of way.
12. On the morning of 4/12/06, I, Don Halvorson, met with the Latah County Surveyor,
Ron Munson, in regards to the first Wagner driveway access permit and the position
of the property lines of the 3+1- acre parcel and Camps Canyon Road. Ron Munson
told me that the best first step was to get a survey; Mr. Munson also said he had
talked with Bob Wagner about the problem and had suggested to Bob Wagner that
Bob Wagner's proposed survey plan may not be accurate. That same morning, I
contacted Rimrock Consultants and talked with John Dunne. Mr. Dunne said he
would begin the paper work and I would get back with him. After the NLCHD
meeting I told Mr. D u n e to go aliead with the survey.
13. On 4/12/06,1, Don Halvorson, attended the regular meeting of the NLCHD
Commissioners at 1132 White Ave Moscow Idaho. The only person I had talked to
in any regards of any NLCHD meeting, other than my wife, was Dan Payne. On
411 0106 1 had asked Dan Payne when and where the Commissioners had their
meetings. I made no requests of Payne or any other member of the NLCHD to be put
on the agenda. My intention was, time permitting on 4/12/06, I would attend the
NLCHD meeting in order to see how tlie meetings were nm and to ascertain the
procedure to speak with the Commissioners about the improper interference with our
property rights. To the best of my recollection, those in attendance were Orland
Arneberg, Richard Hansen, Ron Landeck, Dan Payne, Dan Carscallen, Paul Stubbs,
Don Brown, Gary Osborn, John Bohman, Bob and Kate Wagner, Francis and Patsy
Wagner, and a woman unknown to me. Orland Arneberg called first on me to speak
although I was not on the agenda. I brought the fact, that I was not on the agenda, to
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Orland Arneberg's attention. Mr. Arneberg did not respond but Dan Payne
volunteered that he had not notified anyone of the meeting and that Bob Wagner had
been in his office every day in regards to his driveway access. I then proceeded to
speak and complained to Commissioners that the permit for the Wagner driveway
access was issued for access wholly across our property and I showed them how the
driveway crossed the east property line by showing them aerial photos and where the
east property line was and where the old driveway was. I also complained about the
dirt and gravel being pushed into the buffer between our fence and the road bed since
late fall 2005 extension of width to Camps Canyon Road and continuing with the
maintenance of the road. I told them we had not given them permission to do so and
that the NLCHD did not have the authority to do so. I also complained of the injury
to our fence, on our information and belief, due to the pushing of a wind fallen tree
through the fence by the grader operator in the fall of 2004. Defendants stated all
matters were within their 50 foot125 feet from centerline prescriptive right of way
(Defendants called it their "prescriptive right"). I reminded Commissioners that the
NLCHD had altered Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in
1996 and tliat, there no longer existed a prescriptive right of way in the vicinity of the
341- acre parcel and even if such prescriptive right of way did exist, there was no
extension of the right of u7ay(prescriptive or otherwise) to 25 feet from centerline
encumbering our property greater than the width of Camps Canyon Road and its
supporting structures. Mr. Landeck quoted from the Idaho Code reading I.C. tj 4023 17 (an implied threat that a fine of $150/day could be enforced, however no notice
was given to us to remove our fence). I told the Defendants that they had no right to
destroy our fence regardless of the type or width of the right of way they may have. I
asked the NLCHD to conduct a survey to substantiate their claims that the driveway
access was within their right of way, if such right of way existed. I told
Commissioners that the driveway access crossed the east property line of the 3+/-acre
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parcel. Mr. Payne and Mr. Arneberg stated that the driveway access permit was still
valid as it was within the prescriptive right of way. I told them that there was no
prescriptive right of way and even if there was, the NLCHD only had an easement.
Mr. Payne said the driveway access was within the 699 feet road frontage on the
Wagner deed. I pointed out to Dan Payne that in 1996 he had altered (straightened)
the road. Mr. Arneberg responded that the road had not been moved in his tenure or
under his watch. I suggested that the Wagners and the NLCHD share the expense of
the survey as the NLCHD was largely responsible for the driveway problem. The
meeting was totally without order, Defendants being biased, argumentative and
confrontational. It ended abruptly when the Commissioners refused to call for a
survey, I stated that the County surveyor stated that a survey was the correct place to
start, and then I stated that I would call for a survey. After the meeting, Patsy Wagner
started yelling that we were ruining her children's lives and Gary Osborn came up to
me and said that 1 was probably right. Gary Osborn stated that they [implying those
in attendance of the meeting, including Orland Arneberg, and Dan Payne]. should not
have done this [tried to ram the driveway through some sort of legal process], but that
he was interested in resolving the matter. I told him the place to start was a survey
and that the Wagners and the NLCHD needed to do so and cooperate. The Wagners
and their friends and contractors continued to use the driveway access, and on
Plaintiffs' information and belief were not restricted from any and all use at any time
by Defendants and that the first permit was not ever revoked and that the Defendants
still claim "a prescriptive right'' to issue a driveway access permit in the same area to
resident of the now Wagner place. Defendants have never said otherwise than the
First Wagner Permit was within their policy and valid.
14. In early June of 2006, Rirnrock Consultants set out the stakes for the 3+/- acre parcel
property lines revealing the trespass of the first Wagner driveway access across the
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east property line of the 3+1-acre parcel. The Wagner driveway access was wholly on
Plaintiffs' land.
15. We tried to work out an agreement with the Wagners by offering our cooperation in
bringing a deeded easement to the NLCHD. On our information and belief, Bob
Wagner told us that the NLCHD turned down the idea of a deeded easement and the
Wagners obtained a second permit and built a new driveway access on or about
6110106. On information and belief, Bob Wagner stated the NLCHD turned down the
deeded easement on the grounds that the width of the easement would need to be 5 1
feet as measured from the northeast side of the road to wholly include the first
Wagner driveway access.
16. In the fall of 2006 the NLCHD blasted out some of the old rock outcropping, placed a
culvert for the second Wagner Driveway opposite the culvert for our, Halvorsons',
access to our corral and thus limiting the road surface to about 19 feet between the
two driveway accesses and extended the road surface to the northeast, immediately to
the west of the culvert installation by pushing an old compaction roller and gravel and
dirt into our fence and realigning the drainage ditch. Prior to this the width of the
road in this area was about 15 feet including ditches and supporting structures. This
alteration added 4 to 5 feet of width, including ditches and supporting structures to
the road on the northeast side of the road from the west end of Plaintiffs' corral.
17. In the winter of 2006-2007 we, the Plaintiffs, contacted Mr. Landeck about the
problems we were having with the NLCHD activities-the

improper interference

with our property rights. He said he was not authorized to talk with us although he
did not say he was not the NLCHD attorney. He only said we had to talk with the
NLCHD clerk if we had a problem.
18. In the winter of 2006-2007 we, the Plaintiffs, contacted the NLCHD clerk about the
problems we were h a ~ ~ i nwith
g the activities of the NLCHD. He said he was not able
to answer legal questions and was unable to give us advice on how to proceed. ?Ve
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proposed writing a letter containing our complaints and outlining our requests and
meeting with the Commissioi~ers.It took several months to get what we expected to
be a hearing on the matter on 3/21/07.
19. On 312 1/07, Plaintiffs, Don Halvorson and Charlotte Halvorson, attended the regular
meeting of the NLCHD Commissioners at 1132 White Ave Moscow Idaho. Plaintiffs
had asked for a meeting with Commissioners and had received time on the agenda for
3/21/07. Plaintiffs supplied Defendants with letter (dated 3/8/07) in advance of the
3/21/07 meeting indicating Plaintiffs' concerns and seeking resolution to the right of
way issues with Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel by means
of a validation procedure initiated on Commissioners own resolution and/or some
other means expecting a formal type of hearing. At this meeting Plaintiffs showed
Defendants/Commissioners that after the 1996 alteration Camps Canyon Road no

longer agreed with the public record, and asked DefendantslCommissioners to
validate Camps Canyon Road under their own resolution. Plaintiffs had supplied
Defendants with a copy of the Rimrock survey. Defendants brought forth aerial
photos from 1965 and 1949 without prior notice to Plaintiffs. We received no hearing
or meaningful response to our complaints. The Commissioners were biased and bent
only on finding reason not to have to listen to us.
20. Plaintiffs were not given any advance notice of the presentation of the aerial photos at
the 3/21/07 meeting-without

the ability to make any advance analysis of the aerial

photos. Plaintiffs requested copies of the photos and it took about 6 weeks for
Plaintiffs to receive copies of the photos. These copies were of such poor quality that
they were useless for any analysis. Plaintiffs requested better quality copies after
about three weeks Plaintiffs received somewhat better quality photos, assumed
Defendants'/Commissioners' averred authenticity and accuracy, and found these

aerial photos to show the movement of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the
3+/- acre parcel as Plaintiffs had alleged. Plaintiffs showed Defendants counsel the
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results of Plaintiffs analysis at the 7/07 informal meeting on site at Camps Canyon
Road.
2 1. 011 8/8/07 Plaintiffs attended the regular meeting of the Commissioners and ask that
they could talk directly to the NLCHD attorney to try to work out a resolution to the
problems. The Commissioners felt that our representing ourselves was inappropriate
as without having an attorney to pay, we weren't having to spend enough money and
therefore the commissioners denied our requests.
22. On 8/28/07 (letter dated 8/23/07) we requested the NLCHD to declare the
applicability of I.C. 5 40-203a to the situation and the issues that were involved in the
probleins we were having with the activities of the NLCHD. We received no
response.
23. We asked for and received time on the agenda to show Commissioners the results of
our analysis of the aerial photos for 9115/07. On 9115/07 Defendants' counsel denied
us the opportunity to show our analysis and he told us to get a lawyer.
24. On information and belief, Plaintiffs believe Defendants to be final policy makers of
the NLCHD.
25. Plaintiffs sought and obtained 2"d Wagner driveway access permit, as public
information from the NLCHD clerk, however were unable to obtain the first U'agner
driveway access permit as on Plaintiffs' information and belief, the NLCHD clerk
said the first Wagner driveway access permit had been destroyed.
26. On information and belief, Plaintiffs aver that Defendants continue their widening
and maintenance activities in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, covering Plaintiffs
land with rock, dirt, gravel and debris, and encroaching on and damaging Plaintiffs'
fence.
The above statements are true to the best of our knowledge.
Dated thid@Yhday

2009.
Don Halvorson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
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, 2009, I caused a true and cowect copy

day ofJ

u

of this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:
.-

RONALD
LANDECK

I

/

LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE &
GRAHAM, P.A.
414 S. Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
CARL B. KERRrcK
DISTRICT JUDGE
P.O. Box 896
Lewiston, ID 83501-0896

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[x]
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Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
FAX (208) 883-4593
I-land Delivery
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[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
I 1 FAX
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, I
D 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

IN TWE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAEIO, IN AND FOR THE!,COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),

)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
NORTH LATPLH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMESSIONERS FOR )

Case No. CV 2008-180
DEFENDANTS' SECOND RECORD
SUPPLEMENT lN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
1
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
)
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual )
capacities; DAN P A m , in his oEcial capacity and )
in his individual capacity,
1
)

Defmdants.

1

STATE OF IDAHO )
County of Latah

) ss.
)

Ronald J. Landeck, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1. I asn counsel for all Defendants ("Defendants") and hereby submit Defendants' Second
Record Supplement in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendants' Second Record Supplement in Supyort of Defendants' Motion for Sununary
Judgment -- 1

lid;

2. Attached hereto are true and correct copies of documents fkom Latah County, Idaho
records, as follows:
a. Instrument No. 501677, records of Latah County, Idaho ("Wagners' Deed" to
"Wagners' real property" as defined below).
b. Instrument No. 42441 1, records of Latah County, Idaho ("Plaintiffs' Deed" to
"Plaintiffs' real property").
c. Instrument No. 5742 1, records of Latah County, Idaho (i'19 1 1 Deed").
d. 1940 aerial photo, with mapping annotations, records of Latah County, Idaho
("1940 aerial").

e. 2004 aerial photo, records of Latah County, Idaho ("2004 aerial").
f. Instrument No. 506484, records of Latah County, Idaho ("July, 2006 Survey").
g. Amended Record of Survey, Instrument No. 5 138 19, records of Latah County,

Idaho ("'May, 2007 Survey"), which describes the boundaries of the Wagners' real
property, being, for purposes of this Affidavit, the "2.78 ACF" parcel noted on the
May, 2007 survey contiguous to Camps Canyon Road.
The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated this 2nd day of February, 2009.

-

B

Ron Id J. Landeck
Subscribed and

to before me this 2nd day of February 2009.

---7

A

C

~ 0 t Public
h for Idaho
MYcommission expires
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:

DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ ] FAX (208) 322-4486
[ XI Hand Delivery

Defendants' Second Record Supplement in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment -- 3
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WARRANTY DEED
FOR V A L E RECEIVED, JAMES E. HUFF & PATRICIA A. KUFF TRtlST, dated July
4, 1999, the grantor?, do hereby grant, barqain, eel1 and convey unto:

ROBERT P. N A W R AND KATE A. WAGNER

hueband and wife
P.O. Box 712
Troy, Idaho 83871

the grantees, t h e following described premises situated in Latah County,
State of Idaho, to-wit:

SEE ATTACHED C0NTINUE;D SCHEDULE A
TOGETHER WITH all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and
appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, including all
water and water rights, ditch and ditch rights.
SUBJECT to reservations i n Uniced States Patent, reatrictive covenants,
existing and recorded rights-of-wayand easements, zoning and building
ordinances, and taxes and assessments as prorated between the parties
hereto.

TO HAVE AMD TO HOLD the said premises, with cheir appurtanances unto
the eaid Grantees, their successors, heirs and assigns forever. Said
Grantors do hereby covenant to and with said Granrees, that they are the
owners in fee simple of said precises; that saia premises are free from
all encumbrances except as herernabove set forth and that they will
warrant and defend tha same from all lawful claime whatsoever.

DATED this &&&day

of December, 2005

JAMES E . HUFF & PATRICIA A . HUFF TRUST

&

.
f

On this
day of December. l o a s , before me, che
undersigned, a Notary Public in ard for said state, personally appeared
JAMES 6 . HUFF AND PATRICIA A. tiOFF, Trustees of the JAMES E. & PATRICIA A.
HUFF TRUST, known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the
above and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that they executed
the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, L have hereunto set my hand and affixed my nocarial

~Wiry
bFSAcrRf?m&dTb
C P . 99-63 %

--

P. 09

FAX NO. 2088824255
Pore, Ua.1056-4
a11

mliw F o n d

The land referred t o i n t h i e policy is situated i n che state of
Idaho, County of U t a h and is described a s follows:
The N61/4SW1/4, SW1/4NE1/4, NW1/4SE1/4 and the ~1/2SE1/4NH1/4of
Section 15, Tounehip 39 North, Range 3 Veat, B.M.

a parcel of land located in the SE1/4NE1/4 of s a i d Section 1 5 ,
being more p a r t i c u l a r l y described a s follows:

AND

BEGINNING at a point where t h e public road passes through the West
line of said SE1/4NE1/4, the same being South 201 f e e t , more or less,
of the Northwest corner of said SE1/4NEl/4; thence due South 418
feet$ thence due East 379.50 f e e t ; thence due North 104 feet, more or
less, t o the County Road; thence i n s Northwesterly direction 694
f e e t , more o r less, along the Caucty Road to the POlNT OP BEGINNING.
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MOY ALL WEL~PY ~
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rssm~s:
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That A. ~ d v r r ds w m # m a d ~ l l d y s wans son. husband and wife of
1021 G s d w Road. zroy, 1-0
83871, Grantorla) for and a n
m i d e r a t i o n of the arm of Ten Dollars ($10.00). and other good
in
hand
paid, the receipt of wfiich Is
Uui valuable cwrlslderation,
hereby acknowledged, b &as presents grant, bargain, sell, convey
rod warrant unto Donard I. hlvorson and Charlotte R. Ralvorson.
husband and wife of 15% ~ittle car Road, ~ r o y , ~ d a h o 83871.
Grantees, the follwlng described real property situated in tbe
State of Idaho, County o f Latah to wit:

See schedule .cg attached hereto a d incorporated hereln by
reference.
h e r e d i t a n t s and appurtenances
together with a11 te-ts,
thereunto belonging, or in anywise qqertalniog. and Grantor(s1
that tbe above-described premises are free and
a n e m m t arsd -rant
d e a r frcn a11 liens and tna8brances.utcepting those of record,
and that they u i l l and their beirs, executors, adainistrators and
.aslpns shall forevtr warrant and defend a fee simple and
ranbantable title therein, against all lauful daunds, except
encuabrancea of record.
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